Tag: Turkey
Peace picks, April 23 – 29
- Washington’s Shifting Syria Policy: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations | Monday, April 23 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Turkish Heritage Foundation | Register here |
As the Syrian civil war enters its eighth year, political dynamics are beginning to shift. On April 4, a tripartite summit to further discussions on the resolution of the conflict was held in Ankara between Turkey, Russia, and Iran – critical countries that once had deeply conflicting priorities in Syria. Notably absent from this high-level diplomacy is the U.S., whose priority in Syria remains fixated on defeating ISIS. On the same day that the presidents of Turkey, Russia, and Iran were meeting in Ankara, President Trump stated his intention to withdraw U.S. troops after the defeat of ISIS, raising questions and concerns about Washington’s long-term role in Syria. The Syrian civil war has heavily strained U.S.-Turkey relations, with Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch in Afrin against the YPG being the most recent example of the troubling rift between the NATO allies. The impact of the shift in Washington’s Syria policy and post-ISIS long-term role will determine the next phase of the relations between the U.S. and Turkey. Featuring Mariam Jalabi (Representative, Syrian National Coalition’s office at the UN), Bradley A. Blakeman (Former White House Senior Staff under President George W. Bush; Commentator, Fox News), Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Peter B. Zwack (Senior Research Fellow, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies), Dr. Mesut Hakki Casin (Academic, Ozyegin University, Air Force and Turkish Military Academies), and Dr. Sahar Khan (Research Fellow, CATO Institute).
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- ISIS in North Africa: Past and Future Trajectories | Monday, April 23 | 12:15pm – 1:45pm | New America | Register here |
From 2013 through 2014 ISIS recruited thousands of fighters from North Africa to fight in Syria and established a fallback position in Libya. Today, ISIS has lost much of its territory both in Syria and in North Africa. How did ISIS emerge in North Africa and what is its future in the region? Featuring Sarah Yerkes (Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Aaron Y. Zelin (Richard Borow Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy), and David Sterman (Senior Policy Analyst, New America; Co-author, All Jihad is Local: ISIS in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula).
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- The Future of Political Islam: Trends and Prospects | Tuesday, April 24 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the progression of events in the Middle East has provoked new questions on the role of political Islam in the region. The Arab Spring offered Islamist parties the opportunity and challenge of governance, and the widely varying results led many observers to reconsider basic assumptions on political Islam. Lines drawn between ideology and politics have become blurred. Common conceptions of Islam and the nation-state as incompatible have come under review. As scholars and Islamists alike imagine the future of political Islam, these considerations and others will play a central role. Featuring Shadi Hamid (Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution), Peter Mandaville (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution), and Jocelyne Cesari (Professor of Religion and Politics, University of Birmingham; Senior Fellow, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, Georgetown University).
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- Public Protests and Prospects for Reform in Iran | Tuesday, April 24 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Over the last few months, Iran has experienced a series of street protests in rural areas and social arenas once seen as the key support base for the Islamic Republic. Politically active youth are voicing their frustrations with the country’s political, social, and economic prospects. Many of these protests as well as online activism have been met with pushback from conservatives and crackdown from the government. What are the prospects for change in Iran’s existing political system? Is there a dynamic that might foster greater openness, pluralism and democratization? Who are the rising political figures who may lead such a change? How can the international community support a political shift in Iran that benefits its own society? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Daniel Brumberg (Co-editor (with Farideh Farhi) of Power and Political Change in Iran), Azadeh Pourzand (Co-founder and executive director, Siamak Pourzand Foundation), and Shadi Mokhtari (Professor, American University) to examine the unfolding political struggles in Iran and their potential implications for the Islamic Republic. Alex Vatanka (Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute) will moderate the discussion. ___________________________________________________________
- The Battle for the New Libya | Tuesday, April 24 | 5:30pm – 7:00pm | Carnegie Endowment | Register here |
The death of Muammar Qadhafi in 2011 freed Libya from forty-two years of despotic rule, raising hopes for a new era. But in the aftermath of the uprising, the country descended into bitter rivalries and civil war, paving the way for the Islamic State and a catastrophic migrant crisis. What went wrong? Based on years of field reporting in Libya, Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey will discuss his new book, The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya, which tells the stories of Libyan lives upended by the turmoil, sheds new light on the country’s afflictions, and provides valuable lessons for the future. Longtime Libyan activist and medical doctor Laila Bugaighis will serve as a discussant and journalist Robert F. Worth will moderate. The discussion will be followed by a short reception, and copies of the book will be available for purchase. Featuring Frederic Wehrey (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Laila Bugaighis (former deputy director general and CEO, Benghazi Medical Center), and Robert F. Worth (contributing writer, New York Times Magazine; author, A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS).
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- Iraq’s Upcoming Elections: Likely Outcomes and Impact on US-Iraqi Relations | Wednesday, April 25 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Please join the Atlantic Council for a conversation with a panel of experts to discuss Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary election, post-election dynamics, alliances to form a new government we may see emerge, what political and constitutional reforms the next government needs to adopt, and how the election may impact US-Iraq relations. Featuring Ambassador Feisal al-Istrabadi (Founding Director, Center for the Study of the Middle East, Indiana University, Bloomington), Ambassador Rend al-Rahim (Co-Founder and President, Iraq Foundation), Dr. Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council), Ambassador Ryan Crocker (Visiting Lecturer and Diplomat-in-Residence, Princeton University), and Ms. Vivian Salama (Political Reporter, NBC News) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Frederick Kempe (President and CEO, Atlantic Council).
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- New Year, New Strategy: Shifting Policies on North Korea in 2018 | Wednesday, April 25 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
After more than a year of escalating tensions over North Korea’s nuclear provocations and a war of words between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump, we have seen an abrupt shift in strategy on the Korean Peninsula. Declaring himself content with North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal in late 2017, Kim Jong Un began 2018 with a new approach: diplomatic outreach. A summit between Kim and ROK President Moon Jae-in inside the Demilitarized Zone will be held later this month, the first inter-Korean summit in more than a decade. On the eve of the summit between the leaders of the Koreas, several leading scholars will discuss this shift in strategy, including lessons from history, prospects for peace and reconciliation, and implications for the United States as President Trump prepares for his summit with Kim. Join the Wilson Center for a discussion that will provide background and context as a season of summits between the North Koreans and its Korean War foes unfolds. Featuring Abraham Denmark (Director, Asia Program, Wilson Center), Jean H. Lee (Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy), Jung H. Pak (Senior Fellow, SK-Korean Foundation Chair in Korea Studies, Brookings Institution), and Jake Sullivan (Martin R. Flug Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School). With introductory remarks by Joonho Cheon (Minister, Embassy of the Republic of Korea).
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- Afghanistan in 2020: Is Peace Possible? | Wednesday, April 25 | 2:30pm – 4:30pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
The search for peace has become a central focus of Afghanistan policy in Washington and for Kabul. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani offered the Taliban constitutional reform and status as a legitimate political party in late February on the condition that the group makes peace. In recent months, the Taliban have also publicly offered talks with the United States and prominent Afghan powerbrokers, and high-profile peace demonstrations in conflict-torn Helmand province have spread across much of the country. Featuring Ambassador Timothy Carney (Former U.S. Ambassador to Sudan and Haiti), John Wood (Associate Professor, National Defense University; former U.S. National Security Council Senior Director for Afghanistan), Johnny Walsh (Senior Expert, Afghanistan, USIP; former DOS lead for Afghan reconciliation), Courtney Cooper (International Affairs Fellow, CFR; former U.S. National Security Council Director for Afghanistan), Ahmad Mohibi (Founder and President, Rise to Peace), and Michael Sherwin (Assistant United States Attorney, DOS; former U.S. Navy Intelligence Officer) as moderator.
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- Iran: As Anti-Government Protests Continue, Can the U.S. Help Maintain Momentum? | Thursday, April 26 | 3:30pm – 4:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
In January, the Iranian regime announced that the anti-government protests that unexpectedly swept through the country had successfully been suppressed. In truth, this struggle continues–if not in the streets, then on social media, on city walls, and in the private lives of citizens. In the eyes of the younger generation of the Shiite majority, who are the backbone of the protests, the mullahs are losing legitimacy. This discontent is not limited to economic grievances and has taken aim at the political and social leadership as a whole. Many of these protests have begun to target laws like mandatory headscarves. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, the mandatory headscarf for women has been the enduring symbol of the mullahs’ political control and of women’s restricted status. Foregoing the hijab in public is to risk arrest, job loss, lashing, reeducation classes or other punishments, so these protesters have resorted to posting photos and videos of themselves on social media. Featuring Masih Alinejad (Founder, My Stealthy Freedom), Mehrangiz Kar (Iranian feminist scholar), Mariam Memarsadeghi (Co-founder and Co-director, Tavaana), Nina Shea (Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Religious Freedom, Hudson Institute).
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- Investing in Iraq: Reconstruction and the Role of the Energy Sector | Thursday, April 26 | 5:00pm – 6:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
On the heels of the Kuwait conference in February, and with an oil and gas bidding round and elections on the horizon, this wide-ranging conversation will focus on the state of investment in Iraq, including the role the energy sector can play in enabling recovery, and the challenges ahead in terms of rebuilding and recovery. Featuring H.E. Dr. Fareed Yasseen (Iraqi Ambassador to the United States), Majid Jafar (CEO, Crescent Petroleum), Ben Van Heuvelen (Editor in Chief, Iraq Oil Report), Ellen Scholl (Deputy Director, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Frederick Kempe (President and CEO, Atlantic Council).
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Syrian chessboard
Entering its eighth year, the civil war in Syria has developed into a serious regional conflict. What started as a popular uprising by the Syrian public against Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime has become a struggle for power between external actors, including both regional heavyweights such as Turkey and major global powers like Russia. Today, the Syrian theater is a battlefield for the mostly opposing interests of these actors. This competition has obstructed any progress towards a peace settlement for Syria. Rather, the conflict of interest is perpetuating the Syrian ‘civil war,’ with dire consequences for the country and its population.
On April 2, the Wilson Center hosted a panel addressing the issue of outside powers and the future of Syria. Moderated by Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director at the Wilson Center, the discussion sought to break down the array of interests present in the Syrian conflict and the different roles that Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Israel have assumed. Paul du Quenoy, Associate Professor of History at American University of Beirut, Amy Austin Holmes, Associate Professor of Sociology at American University in Cairo, David Pollock, Kaufman Fellow at the Washington Institute and Director of Project Fikra, and Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow, offered their perspectives as long-time analysts of Syria and the Middle East.
Paul du Quenoy argues that Russia’s primary interest is to maintain a presence in the Middle East through preserving the Moscow-friendly Assad regime. Following the Arab Spring in 2011, Russia felt marginalized and humiliated. The political changes in countries such as Libya sidelined Moscow in regional affairs and sparked fears that the wave of public protests and regime instability could even reach Russia. To protect its influence in the Middle East, Moscow thus intervened in the civil war in 2015.
Although Russia has achieved its core goal, the overall track record of its intervention has been meager, highlights du Quenoy. Moscow succeeded in stabilizing the Assad regime. However, it is now bogged down in a costly conflict requiring continuous military activities. Russian hopes for becoming the core facilitator of a lasting peace solution for Syria and a central actor in the profitable business of rebuilding the country have not materialized. Instead, Moscow has had to recognize its limited leverage. Since Russia’s strategic interests are tied to the survival the Assad regime, the despot can exert influence on Moscow’s agenda and even obstruct unfavorable Russian policies.
In contrast to Russia, Iran has been more successful at promoting its interests, says Robin Wright. Tehran’s Middle East policy is driven by a feeling of vulnerability. Against the backdrop of its Shia religious orientation, Iran “feels strategically lonely,” that is, it considers itself surrounded by a hostile Sunni camp. To cope with this adverse environment, Tehran seeks to project power beyond its borders. This undertaking of expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East has been mostly implemented through establishing a strategic corridor linking Tehran in the East with Beirut in the West. Syria is an integral part of this land bridge. Although its intervention in the Syrian conflict has been costly, Tehran considers its efforts to sustain the Assad regime a long-term strategic investment essential to Iranian national security.
According to Austin Holmes, Turkey likewise sees its national security at stake in the Syrian conflict. Ankara’s primary interest is to keep the Syrian Kurds—who maintain close relations with their Turkish brethren—at bay. Faced with an ongoing domestic Kurdish insurgency promoted by the PKK, Turkey wants to avoid the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous zone in northern Syria stretching all along the Syrian-Turkish border. In 2016, Ankara launched its first intervention in Syria dubbed ‘Euphrates Shield’ to prevent a connection of the Kurdish cantons of Afrin and Kobane. In January 2018, Turkey stepped up its military activities to further weaken the Kurds, launching operation ‘Olive Branch’ aimed at occupying Afrin. While Ankara succeed at taking over the Kurdish stronghold, the repercussions have been inimical. Holmes stresses that the Turkish attacks on the Syrian Kurds undermine the fight against ISIS and jeopardize the Kurdish governance project of ‘Rojava,’ which she views as seeking to establish democratic principles in northern Syria.
For Israel, the Syrian civil war has become an existence-threatening challenge, says David Pollock. In essence, the Israeli leadership has been preoccupied with its immediate, narrow interest of keeping the border with Syria secure, and has tried to stay out of the broader Syrian conflict. This approach translated into a threefold strategy: (i) securing the Golan Heights as a buffer zone, (ii) reducing the presence of and threats from hostile actors—including Hezbollah, the IRGC, other Iranian militias, and jihadists—near Israeli territory, and (iii) obstructing the transfer of advanced weapons to any of these actors. To achieve these goals, the Israeli air force has in the past conducted targeted air strikes. Israel has also engaged in intensive talks with Russia and has provided humanitarian assistance to populations in southeastern Syria to build strategic goodwill.
However, Pollock points out that Israel’s interests are eroding. Air strikes have merely achieved tactical successes and were unable to prevent Iran and its proxies from expanding their presence in Syria. Perception of a strategic threat is growing. Moreover, the United States remains disinterested in Syria and is unwilling to counteract Iranian encroachment. Israel therefore sees a need to intensify its involvement in the Syrian conflict to protect itself, and will most likely expand its military interventions in the foreseeable future.
Syria’s future looks bleak. The civil war has evolved into an open-ended confrontation among regional and international actors, which will continue to add fuel to the fire. Destruction and killing of innocent civilians will drag on. Unwilling to force an end to the conflict, the West should at least alleviate the human suffering that millions of Syrians both inside and outside the country endure.
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Stay, but not for long
March 29 President Trump declared:
We’re coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now. Very soon—very soon we’re coming out.
He reiterated that sentiment Tuesday. Yesterday the White House confirmed that the troops will stay, at least for now. Apart from the question of who is really commander-in-chief, and whether President Trump has any idea what he is talking about, this ambiguity (or is it vacillation?) leaves us with important questions: should the troops stay or go? What should their goals be?
The only valid purposes for staying should be US national interests, in particular vital ones. Staying only if Saudi Arabia agrees to pay–a proposition the President has floated–violates this first principle. Foreign governments do sometimes pay part of the costs of deployed American forces, but only when the deployment (to Japan, South Korea, Germany, Italy, or Qatar for example) meets the criterion of being in the US national interest. American troops should not be for sale.
What American interests can be served by extending the US presence in Syria, now that the Islamic State has lost almost all of the territory under its control? I think there are three possibilities:
- Prevent resurgence of ISIS, which will continue its insurgency despite its loss of territory.
- Counter Iran’s presence and influence.
- Prevent allied Syrian Kurdish forces from aiding the insurgency inside Turkey.*
A continuing American presence in eastern Syria is not going to bring down President Assad or otherwise hinder his depredation of the Syrian people. It will not expel the Iranians or the Russians. The US hasn’t even been willing to counter Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, never mind the extensive bombing of civilian targets and abuse of those who surrender to “reconciliation” agreements.
Weighing against the continued US presence are many factors: the risks to the small numbers of Americans (2000 or so) spread out over the large territory east of the Euphrates, the dubious legality and legitimacy of the operation (especially once ISIS has been pulverized), the likelihood that our presence will lead to mission creep in either military or civilian directions, and the costs and domestic political sustainability of the operation. The US troops have shown they are capable of defending themselves, having fended off a Russian mercenary attack weeks ago. But sooner or later, dozens or maybe hundreds will be killed or wounded. How long will an impatient president who promised to bring American troops home from the Middle East persist in keeping them there once that happens?
The troops will at some point be withdrawn. The question is what conditions can be created to allow that to happen without imperiling vital US interests.
First and foremost is some minimal stabilization before withdrawal, so that local people will have the means and the will to resist any ISIS resurgence. That is what is going on now. The key is not physical reconstruction, which will take years, but rather clearing mines and rubble as well as establishing a modicum of legitimate governance by and for local people. Here is a lengthy discussion of the issues involved in stabilization of both Iraq and Syria Monday at USIP:
If President Trump, as some have suggested, was talking about Saudi money for the stabilization process, that would make a whole lot more sense than selling our troop presence.
Countering Iran’s presence and influence is not going to be easy. They are on the winning side in this war. They don’t really have to come through the part of Syria US and allied forces control to be present and influential there. It seems to me the best we can do is try to negotiate withdrawal of the Shia militia forces Iran has deployed inside Syria, in exchange for US withdrawal of its ground forces. It might not work of course, especially as the President has already tipped them off as to what he wants. I thought he said he wasn’t going to do stupid things like that. But it might be worth a try.
It will be difficult, to say the least, to sever the tie between the Syrian Kurdish forces (PYD) with which the US has collaborated to defeat ISIS and the Kurds rebelling inside Turkey (PKK). The two organizations are closely tied ideologically and loyal to the same leader. But if the US wants to restore its relations with NATO ally Turkey, that is what it needs to try to do. The first step should be getting the PYD out of Manbij, a mostly Arab town west of the Euphrates, as Vice President Biden promised in the summer of 2016. The US Central Command is dead set against fulfilling that commitment, as it doesn’t want to abandon its Kurdish allies. But that’s why we have civilian control of the military.
The Turks should be able to live with PYD, or at least Kurdish, dominance of the area east of the Euphrates, but the Kurds as well as their Arab allies south will need at least continuation of US air support to prevent the area east of the Euphrates from falling to a revived extremist group, the Syrian armed forces, or Shia militias. As a former colleague pointed out to me yesterday, that is precisely what the US did in Iraq for more than a decade: it enforced a no-fly zone that effectively protected Iraqi Kurdistan from Saddam Hussein. During that time, Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds found a modus vivendi, at least until the Kurdistan referendum last year. The air support would most effectively be provided from Turkey, as it is today. Turkey would expect to receive from the PYD at the very least a verifiable pledge of non-assistance to the PKK, as well as assurances about allowing pluralism in their part of Syria.
The good options in Syria evaporated long ago. The best the US can do now is use its position there to meet limited but important national interests that will endure past the troops withdrawal. That will mean staying, but not for long.
*For those keeping score, here are Secretary of State Tillerson’s deadletter objectives:
1) ISIS and al-Qaeda must suffer an “enduring defeat” and Syria must never again become a platform for transnational terror organization that targets U.S. citizens;
2) Syria’s seven year-long civil war must draw to a close through a brokered diplomatic settlement;
3) Iran’s influence in Syria must be “diminished” and its “dreams of a northern arch…denied;”
4) The conditions should be created to allow Syrian refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homes;
5) Syria must be “free” of weapons of mass destruction.
I’ve watered down 1), eliminated 2), kept much of 3), eliminated 4) eliminated 5), and added Turkey and the Kurds.
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A more coherent approach
Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union are under strain. In light of continuous US support for the Kurdish YPG, Washington and Ankara are split over the way forward in Syria. Due to President Erdogan’s hostile rhetoric and increasingly authoritarian governing style, policy makers in Europe have advocated a suspension or even end of Turkey’s accession process to the EU.
Still, Ankara and its Western partner need each other. Turkey depends on the EU as a market, and cannot adequately address the Syrian refugee crisis as well as conflict at its southern border without Western support. Washington and European policy makers rely on Turkey as a pivotal member of NATO to provide stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Where is the relationship headed?
On March 26, the Brookings Institutions convened a panel of experts to discuss how the West should handle its important but challenging ally. Eric Edelman, former US ambassador to Turkey and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Kemal Kirişci, director of the Turkey Project at Brookings, Amanda Sloat, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at Brookings, and Stephen F. Szabo, senior fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, offered their perspectives on the future of relations between Turkey and the West. Lisel Hintz, assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University School of International Studies, moderated the discussion. A recording of the event is available online.
Domestic politics in Turkey drive the country’s relations with its Western partners. Eric Edelman highlights that Erdogan’s domestic agenda of establishing a presidential system has determined Ankara’s stance towards Washington and Brussels. The Turkish president utilizes sentiments against the West to rally support for his political project. In particular, Erdogan has stirred up anti-Americanism to mobilize voters and will likely draw again on nationalistic rhetoric ahead of the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 2019.
Edelman proposes that the United States should adopt a more transactional approach towards Ankara. Washington has so far remained silent about Erdogan’s political game and expected that “if Turkey is treated like an ally, it will behave like an ally.” This perception has proven false. Thus, the United States must increase pressure on Ankara. For instance, Washington could close one of Turkey’s consulates. This would both send a clear message to Erdogan and provide the United States with leverage.
Sloat counters that pressure alone cannot work. She stresses that a purely transactional approach has limitations as it could undermine the West’s efforts to promote the rule of law and good governance. Likewise, abandoning Turkey by either forcing it to leave NATO or ending the EU accession process is not a good option, as it would diminish US and EU leverage over Ankara. Rather, they should pursue a policy of constructive engagement. Washington has to address relations with Turkey from a broader perspective, which goes beyond security-related issues. Moreover, policy makers in both the United States and Europe should acknowledge the utility of engaging with a broad section of Turkish society and increase their outreach to civil society.
Kemal Kirişci highlights that the EU already has considerable leverage over Turkey. The EU is by far the biggest market for Turkish goods, absorbing almost 50% of the country’s exports. Likewise, there are significant Turkish communities in the EU that affect politics in Turkey. Erdogan, who relies on a good performance of the Turkish economy to maintain domestic supremacy, recognizes this dependency relationship.
Szabo hence argues that Western states should follow the example of Germany. Berlin has consistently emphasized the importance of the rule of law when dealing with Ankara. At the same time, the economic powerhouse of Europe has pursued a transactional approach, using its role as a major market for Turkish goods to press Erdogan for concessions. Moreover, Berlin has adopted a long-term view towards Turkey. Instead of simply formulating a rather reactive and shortsighted Erdogan strategy, Germany follows a comprehensive Turkey strategy that looks beyond the president’s time in power.
The West’s biggest challenge in handling Turkey is internal division and confusion. Szabo stresses that growing anti-Turkish sentiments among Germany’s population compromise Berlin’s foresighted approach. Kirişci points out that the erosion of the rule of law and liberalism within the EU has helped Erdogan to push his authoritarian agenda. Likewise, discrepancies in US policies have damaged Washington’s credibility among Turkish policy makers. Edelmann adds that any approach towards Turkey will fail as long as the US government does not sing from the same song sheet. Turkish consternation about conflicting statements concerning Washington’s support for the Kurdish YPG in Syria exemplifies this shortcoming, Sloat says.
Turkey under President Erdogan is certainly a difficult partner. Inconsistent policies in the West have aggravated this challenge. The United States and EU are advised to pursue a more coherent approach towards Ankara. This will ameliorate current strains and potentially bring about positive change within Turkey. The West should not waste this opportunity.
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Peace picks, March 26 – April 1
- Will the Russians Meddle in Latin American Elections? | Monday, March 26 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) | Register here |
2018 will see presidential elections in several countries across Latin America, notably in Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela. This event will discuss Russia’s strategic interests in Latin America, including how the region should prepare for potential Russian meddling in upcoming presidential elections. Featuring Javier Lesaca (Visiting Scholar, School of Media and Public Affairs, GWU) and David Salvo (Resident Fellow, Alliance for Securing Democracy, GMF).
This event will be webcast live.
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- The New Geopolitics of Turkey and the West | Monday, March 26 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union are under significant strain, and they are likely to remain difficult ahead of Turkey’s parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled for 2019. Ankara and Washington remain at loggerheads over the way forward in Syria; several EU member states have been calling for an end to the accession process; and Turkey’s domestic politics are raising further questions about Turkey’s place in the trans-Atlantic alliance. Yet, there is much at stake: Turkey is facing threats from terrorism, struggling to manage 3.5 million Syrian refugees, and dealing with the aftermath of a failed coup. Europe and the United States have shared interests in addressing regional challenges with Turkey, especially as Russia seeks to expand its influence in the region. So how should the West handle this important but challenging ally? Featuring Eric Edelman (Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence, SAIS), Kemal Kirişci (Director, The Turkey Project, Brookings), Amanda Sloat (Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe), and Stephen F. Szabo (Senior Fellow, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies). Lisel Hintz (Assistant Professor of International Relations and European Studies, SAIS) will moderate the discussion.
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- US in a Post-ISIS Iraq and Syria: Realigning Allies and Constraining Adversaries | Monday, March 26 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
In the Post-ISIS Middle East, Iran, Bashar al-Assad, and Russia continue to pose challenges for the U.S. as the Trump Administration develops its policy for Iraq and Syria. Turkey’s expansion of its Syria operations has the U.S. and NATO allies concerned that Turkish actions in the region run counter to NATO goals. Additionally, cooperation between Russia and Iran continues to disrupt the balance of power in the region. Hudson Institute will host a panel to explore U.S. options to realign our allies with traditional NATO and U.S. positions, hold adversaries responsible for atrocities, and prevent security backsliding in the region. Featuring Hillel Fradkin (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute), Michael Pregent (Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute), Jennifer Cafarella (Senior Intelligence Planner, Institute for the Study of War), and Dr. Nahro Zagros (Vice President, Soran University).
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- Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria | Monday, March 26 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Widespread violence has plagued Nigeria over the years, with an epicenter of activity in northeast parts of the country. Much of this violence is related to the Boko Haram insurgency, although other battles between ethnic groups have also intensified, largely over land and partly due to a growing drought. Despite some success by Nigerian security forces in tamping down violence, lives continue to be lost and communities displaced. All of this is ongoing as the country prepares to hold elections next year. Featuring Alexandra Lamarche (Advocate, Refugees International), Mark Yarnell (UN Liaison and Senior Advocate, Refugees International), and Vanda Felbab-Brown (Senior Fellow, Brookings). Michael O’Hanlon (Senior Fellow, Brookings) will moderate the conversation, while adding his own perspectives.
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- Russian Influence in Moldova | Monday, March 26 | 3:30pm – 5:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Since emerging from the Soviet Union as an independent country, the Republic of Moldova has faced various challenges. Moldova, together with Ukraine and Georgia, were “captive nations” of the former Soviet Union; today, the three countries are still affected by Russian interference. For Moldova, the autonomous region of Transnistria raises questions regarding the state’s path forward with various international bodies, and the Kremlin still has clear influence in Moldovan politics. With Moldovan parliamentary elections approaching this year, the stakes are high for Moldova’s future as a free, whole, and secure European state. Featuring Ambassador John Herbst (Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council), Dr. William Hill (Global Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Professor, National Defense University), Dumitru Mînzărari (State Secretary for Defense Policy and International Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Republic of Moldova), and Agnieszka Gmys-Wiktor (Program Officer, National Endowment for Democracy). Mark Simakovsky (Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council and Vice President, Beacon Global Strategies) will moderate the discussion.
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- Elections in Tunisia and Hope for Democratic Reform | Thursday, March 29 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Leading up to long-awaited municipal elections, Tunisia is at a crossroads. The beginning of 2018 saw widespread protests and social unrest in both cities and rural areas, as economic stagnation and unemployment continue to worsen. However, the vote currently set for May 6 signals an opportunity for Tunisian youth, women, and minorities to make their voices heard. How might the elections encourage confidence among Tunisians in a transparent democratic process? Could the results promote or undermine Tunisia’s fragile stability? How can the international community better support Tunisia and its government to address the rising social tensions? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Ambassador Fayçal Gouia (Ambassador of Tunisia to the United States) and Elie Abouaoun (Director, Middle East and North Africa Programs, USIP) for a panel discussion to examine Tunisia’s political challenges—both local and national—ahead of the elections. Paul Salem (Senior Vice President for Policy Research and Programs, MEI) will moderate the discussion.
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- Securing Their Roles: Women in Constitution-Making | Thursday, March 29 | 10:00am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Women’s participation in drafting constitutions leads to more equitable legal frameworks and socially inclusive reforms, laying the groundwork for sustainable peace. Yet new research from Inclusive Security reveals that while 75 conflict-affected countries oversaw significant reform processes between 1995-2015, only one in five constitutional drafters in these environments have been women. As actors from Syria, Libya, and other countries marked by violence are taking steps towards building new constitutions, USIP and Inclusive Security are convening a panel to draw out lessons for policymakers by discussing women’s roles in constitution-making, gender equality in constitutional provisions – including in relation to constitutions developed with an Islamic identity—and their implications for long-term, inclusive peace and security. Featuring Palwasha Kakar (Senior Program Officer, Religion and Inclusive Societies, USIP), Marie O’Reilly (Director of Research & Analysis, Inclusive Security), Amira Yahyaoui (Founder, Al Bawsala), and Jason Gluck (Policy Specialist, Political Dialogues and Constitutional Processes, UNDP). Carla Koppell (Vice President, Applied Conflict Transformation, USIP) will moderate the discussion.
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- Ukraine’s Future Leaders on the Front-lines of Change | Thursday, March 29 | 4:00pm – 5:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
In the four years since the end of the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine has not answered its most important question: how will the country ensure democratic values in its future development? Much of Ukraine’s hope lies in its young leaders who will drive the country forward in the coming years. Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) has been fortunate to provide a year-long residency to some of these future leaders as part of the inaugural year of the Center’s Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program. This event will feature this year’s Ukrainian leaders Oleksandra Matviichuk (Chairwoman, Center for Civil Liberties), Dmytro Romanovych (Member, Reform Delivery Office of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine), and Olexandr Starodubtsev (Head, Public Procurement Regulation Department, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine). They will each discuss their own perspectives on opportunities and challenges to democracy and development in their home country, as well as objectives for strengthening public administration, civil society, and economic reforms upon their return to Ukraine With introductory remarks by Ambassador John Herbst (Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council) and a keynote address by Dr. Francis Fukuyama (Mosbacher Director, CDDRL, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University). Melinda Haring (Editor, UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council) will moderate the discussion.
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- After Syria: The United States, Russia, and the Future of Terrorism | Friday, March 29 | 10:00am -11:30am | Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with EastWest Institute | Register here |
The collapse of Islamic State control in Syria has been hailed in both Russia and the United States as a victory over terrorism. Both credit their country’s military involvement with victory. But the war that continues in Syria also lays bare Moscow and Washington’s conflicting definitions and approaches when it comes to terrorism, insurgency, and combat operations. Moreover, even if a path to stabilization in that country is found, America and Russia will continue to face terrorism and terrorists at home and abroad. The ways in which these two crucial countries respond as the threat evolves will shape both their own polities and the world as a whole. Featuring Dr. Kim Cragin (Senior Research Fellow for Counterterrorism, National Defense University), Dr. Ekaterina Stepanova (Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, Institute of World Economy and International Relations), Dr. Irina Zvyagelskaya (chief research fellow, Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies), and Dr. Seth Jones (Harold Brown Chair; Director, Transnational Threats Project; and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS). Dr. Olga Oliker (Senior Adviser and Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS) will moderate the discussion.
This event will be webcast live.
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Hope is lost
There is no more Hope. Hicks, ultimate loyalist, is the latest announced departure, but dozens have already left, some voluntarily, others under pressure, and still others fired. Most notorious are the wife abusers, but there was also the head of the Centers for Disease Control who traded in cigarette stocks, the National Security Adviser who was in the Russians’ pocket, the head of the FBI fired for refusing to pledge personal loyalty to the Don, the Secretary of Health and Human Services who racked up a million dollar travel bill, and the Communications Director who never actually got a US government paycheck before getting himself cashiered for an interview he gave to The New Yorker. Rachel Maddow offered this version of the story in today:
She updates that from time to time.
Churn is pretty common in US administrations, but this one is setting records. On top of the political appointees, there is a massive exodus of Civil Service and Foreign Service officers, many of whom can’t stomach the President and some of whom figure their prospects will improve if they get out before the wheels come off.
This is happening in a moment where presidential leadership, both domestically on guns and internationally, is wanted and needed. The President is so erratic and nonsensical on guns that no one can follow him–yesterday he suggested just confiscating them from people deemed dangerous and worrying about due process thereafter. How well is that going to work?
The international scene is crying out for America to make itself clear. In Syria the military commander has said we plan to keep the troops on the ground to prevent the return of ISIS but not counter Iran or President Assad, even though that is what the Secretary of State says our objective is. In Israel/Palestine, everyone is expected to believe that son-in-law Jared Kushner has a magic plan he is about to reveal, but he no longer can even read classified material. I’d bet he’ll be going back to New York soon, without revealing his brilliant scheme. The North Koreans are ready to talk, but the President has said that is pointless, even while his Secretary of State signals that is what we want to do.
But the worst is Russia. President Putin spent a good part of his state of the Russian Federation speech today making it clear that Russia sees itself as a rival to the United States, which it is targeting with every weapon in its arsenal. But Russia is no superpower. It is a declining regional petropower suffering a demographic implosion even as its economy fails to keep up with the rest of the world’s growth. That is not to say it isn’t dangerous: it has invaded Ukraine, pulverized the relatively moderate Syrian opposition in order to support a war criminal president, and is trying to expand its footprint in the Middle East wherever would-be autocrats rule (for the moment that’s Egypt, Turkey, Libya, and Syria).
Trump’s people will claim he has done a great deal to counter Russia. What it amounts to is some limited lethal weapons for Ukraine’s army, some expansion of sanctions, and shutting down some “diplomatic” facilities. But President Trump has conspicuously avoided criticizing President Putin and has failed to speak up against, or even acknowledge, Russia’s blatant meddling in the 2016 presidential campaign. While we can suppose that some of the massive increase in America’s military budget is aimed to counter Russia, the President has nowhere said so. Leadership is silent on Putin and Russia, except to occasionally come to their defense.
It is all too clear why: Trump’s personal real estate empire depends on Russian money, much of it likely headed to the laundry. Today’s news that Kushner has been gaining massive financing for his personal real estate ventures from people who meet with him suggests he has jacked up “pay to play” to a whole new level: hundreds of millions of dollars for his personal pockets. Remember when Trump complained loudly that someone might have benefited from contributions to the Clinton Foundation, an allegation never proven? In my mind, there no doubt Trump is benefiting, invisibly but massively, from his reluctance to criticize Russia or to move more aggressively against interference in the US election.
Hope Hicks was wise to announce she is leaving this sinking ship. It may still take a long time, but it is going down.
PS: For a well-done but ultimately flawed argument that Russia is stronger than its statistics suggest and Trump less a patsy than he appears, see Benjamin Haddad’s piece.
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