Tag: Turkey
Peace picks, December 5-9
- The Arab Woman: Enhancing Leadership and Resilience | Monday, December 5 | 10:00am – 3:30pm | United States Institute of Peace | Click HERE to Register
Social and economic empowerment of women has been shown to strengthen stability and resilience. From the national level to the grassroots, Arab women continue to face and overcome challenges to lead their countries and communities, while empowering one another.
Panelists, including leaders of government and civil society, will explore opportunities for the League of Arab States to invest in supporting women’s empowerment for the region’s peace and prosperity. The discussion will feature success stories of Arab women leaders breaking barriers, assess Arab and global initiatives focusing on women, and make recommendations for greater inclusivity.
Featuring Ambassador Inas Mekkawy,Head of Women, Family and Childhood Development, League of Arab States, Randa Hudome, Founder, Fahmy Hudome International, Manal Omar, Associate Vice President, Center for Middle East and Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace, Hibaaq Osman, Founder & CEO, El Karama, Donald Steinberg, CEO, World Learning, Representative Ilhan Omar, Minnesota House Representative for District 60B, Linda Bishai, Director of North Africa Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace, Kathleen Kuehnast, Senior Gender Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace, Marwa AlKhairo, Manager of Partnership Development, International Youth Foundation, Hajar Sharief, Co-Founder, Libya Ma’an Nabneeha, Sali Osman, Cybersecurity Risk Advisory, Ernest and Young, “One to Watch” Award from Executive Women’s Forum - The Future of US-Turkish Relations: Cooperation or Frustration | Monday, December 5 | 10:00am – 11:15am | Bipartisan Policy Center | Click HERE to Register
Change may be in the future for U.S.-Turkey relations. Members of the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump have expressed both admiration for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and deep suspicion toward his brand of Islamist politics. Whether the new administration goes all in on Turkey or abandons it, this decision will have profound implications for the fight against ISIS, the outcome of the Syrian civil war, and Turkey’s domestic stability.
At this crucial juncture, join the Bipartisan Policy Center for the release of a new report detailing recommendations for the next administration and a discussion of the future of U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Featuring Charles Wald (Ret.), Former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command, Co-Chair, BPC’s National Security Program, Eric Edelman, Former U.S. Ambassador to Finland and Turkey, Co-Chair, BPC’s Turkey Initiative, Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International, Center for Scholars, Columnist, Al-Monitor - Global Economic Challenges for Donald Trump | Monday, December 5 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | American Enterprise Institute | Click HERE to Register
On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump will assume office at a time of considerable strain in the global economy and after an election campaign that has raised serious questions about the relative benefits of globalization.
This seminar will take stock of how the US economy might be affected by the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis, the transformation of China’s economic growth model, and Japan’s renewed efforts to stave off deflation. It will also consider what international economic policies the Trump administration should pursue and the risks that unorthodox monetary policies by the world’s major central banks might pose for the global currency market.
Featuring Alex J. Pollock, R Street Institute, Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Jeffrey Frankel, Harvard University, Greg Ip, The Wall Street Journal, Anne Krueger, SAIS, Desmond Lachman, AEI - Strengthening US-Arab Cyber Security Policy Cooperation | Monday, December 5 | 1:30pm – 4:30pm | Middle East Institute | Click HERE to Register
Cyber threats are on the rise in the Middle East, ranging from electronic vandalism or financial crimes to sabotage and virtual acts of war. Governments and businesses in the Middle East have suffered damaging attacks. State actors and hacker collectives in the region are also believed to be targeting the U.S. military, civilian government agencies, and private sector systems.
What systemic problems will the United States and Arab states confront in the next few years? Are there gaps in national policy or in the collaboration between governments and the private sector that render the United States vulnerable? What is the state of the U.S.-Arab dialogue within these global issues, and how can Washington and its Arab partners coordinate better?
The Middle East Institute is pleased to host industry and policy experts for a program examining Middle Eastern cyber threat trends and developments affecting national security, essential services, and the economy. Register now to hear the analysis and recommendations of these leaders in the field.
Featuring Wendy Chamberlin, President, Middle East Institute, Sean Kanuck
Attorney and Strategic Consultant; former National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues, Omar al-Ibrahim, Security Researcher and Consultant, Omprotect LLC; Assistant Professor, Kuwait University, Robert Knake, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Paul Kurtz, Founder and CEO, TruSTAR Technology, Patrick Tucker, (Moderator), Technology Editor, DefenseOne, James A. Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies - Kurds—A Beacon of Hope or a Harbinger of More Chaos | Monday, December 5 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | Brookings Institution | Click HERE to Register
For the United States, Syrian Kurds are reliable boots on the ground in the fight against the Islamic State. Their agenda for autonomy and self-rule in northern Syria, however, is a source of vexation for Turkey. Ankara is worried about the emergence of a Kurdish state along its borders, which could bolster the demands of Kurds within Turkey for greater political recognition. Limitations on Kurds’ right to social and cultural self-expression is now viewed as a major flaw in Turkey’s democratic edifice. Its actions in Syria against the Kurdish forces also undermine the international coalition against ISIS. In return, these factors hamper Turkey’s relations with the U.S.
How can the actors in this regional theater break through the deadlock? In the latest Turkey Project Policy Paper, “Two routes to an impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish policy,” Ayşegül Aydın of University of Colorado and historical sociologist Cem Emrence of Leiden University explore how “politics of moderation” could offer the most effective solution to the crisis in the region, and discuss how the different actors involved—Turkey, the Kurds, and the United States—should take a more proactive approach, including a willingness to make compromises, in the interest of forging a lasting peace.
On December 5, 2016, the Turkey Project at Brookings will host a panel discussion on new approaches to the “Kurdish issue” in Turkey and its neighborhood. At the event, Ayşegül Aydın will present conclusions from her co-authored paper. Following her remarks, Nicholas Danforth of the Bipartisan Policy Center and Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy will offer their perspectives. The discussion will be moderated by the Brookings TÜSİAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci. - Inside the Islamist Terrorist’s Mind: A Conversation with Former CIA Interrogator James Mitchell | Tuesday, December 6 | American Enterprise Institute | Click HERE to Register
As a key architect of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program, James Mitchell spent thousands of hours questioning terrorists, including 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). He came to understand the terrorist mind better than anyone in America.
Now, for the first time, Dr. Mitchell will share what KSM told him — including his opinions of US counterterrorism policy, the Bush administration’s response to 9/11, his plans for future attacks, and why he is certain they will ultimately prevail in their war against America.
Join Dr. Mitchell and AEI’s Marc Thiessen for a discussion of Dr. Mitchell’s new book, “Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds of the Islamic Terrorists Trying to Destroy America” (Crown Forum, 2016), as he offers a first-person account of the enhanced interrogation program and his personal interactions with the men behind the deadliest terrorist attack in history. - Afghanistan in 2016: A Survey of the Afghan People | Wednesday, December 7 | 9:30am – 11:30am | United States Institute of Peace | Click HERE to Register
The Asia Foundation, in partnership with the U.S. Institute of Peace, will present the findings of the 2016 Survey of the Afghan People at USIP on December 7. Crucial questions of security, economic stability, and reconciliation face the administration of President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah. As they begin their third year in office, an atmosphere of increasing civilian casualties and unrest in the provincial capitals threatens the fragile but significant progress the country has made toward peace and prosperity over the past decade.
The findings of The Asia Foundation’s 12th annual Survey of the Afghan People are being released at an important moment for Afghanistan. The 2016 survey, based on face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of more than 12,600 Afghan citizens, reveals their views on a range of issues including security, the economy, essential services, governance and political participation, corruption, justice, and gender equality. This year’s survey extends to new areas, including youth issues, migration, citizens’ awareness of legal resources, reconciliation with the Taliban, the Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS), landmines, and access to social media on mobile phones.
Conducted across the country’s 34 provinces, The Asia Foundation’s series of annual surveys since 2004 in Afghanistan provides an unmatched barometer of Afghan public opinion over time. Taken together, the surveys are a resource for policymakers in government, the international community and the broader Afghan public as they seek to navigate a difficult landscape toward a more peaceful and prosperous future for Afghanistan and the region.
Featuring Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace, David D. Arnold, President, The Asia Foundation, Zach Warren, Survey and Research Director in Afghanistan, The Asia Foundation, Idrees Ilham, Director of Governance Programs in Afghanistan, The Asia Foundation, Jena Karim, Former Deputy Country Representative for Programs in Afghanistan, The Asia Foundation, Scott Worden, Director, Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace - Potential for Middle East Cooperation in Various Fields | Wednesday, December 7 | 11:30am – 2:30pm | Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies | Click HERE to Register The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to host five of the contributing authors, Anthony Cordesman (CSIS), Shahrokh Fardoust (College of William and Mary), Querine Hanlon (Strategic Capacity Group), Ross Harrison (MEI), and Jean-Francois Seznec (MEI & SAIS), for a discussion of opportunities in regional cooperation and the costs of the prevailing competition and rivalries between states. Paul Salem (MEI) will moderate the discussion.
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My Goldilocks solution for the Middle East
In the final report of their Middle East Strategy Task Force issued yesterday, Steve Hadley and Madeleine Albright say
…the days of external powers trying to orchestrate and even dictate political reality in the region are finished. So is a regional political order of governments demanding obedience in return for public sector employment and related state subsidies.
They paint instead a future of external powers collaborating to help end civil wars, listening to local voices, and interacting with more responsive and inclusive governments. Their sovereignty restored, if need be by military action, these governments would join in partnerships with each other and compacts with external powers to encourage local initiatives, harness human resources, and incentivize regional cooperation. What’s not to like?
It’s that premise, which looks to me wrong. The US decisions not to or orchestrate or dictate a political outcome in Syria and Libya do not mean that the days of international intervention are over. Russia and Iran are for now doing quite well at it, even if in the end I think they will regret it. Egypt has in fact restored its autocracy and Bashar al Assad clearly intends to do so in Syria. Does anyone imagine that the post-war regime in Yemen will be a more inclusive and responsive one? It isn’t likely in Libya either.
I agree with Madeleine and Steve that failing to implement something like the reforms they point to will likely mean continuation of instability, incubation of extremists, and jihadist resurgence, even if the war against Islamic State is successful in removing it from its control of territory in Iraq and Syria. The instability in the Middle East is clearly the result of governance failures associated with the Arab republics, which had neither the direct control over oil resources required to buy off their citizens nor the wisdom to empower them and enable more decentralized and effective governance.
The question, which Ken Pollack rightly asks, is whether the US has the will and the resources required even to begin to end the civil wars and encourage the required reforms. I think the answer is all too obviously “no.” Ken suggests this means the US would be wiser to flee than to fight with inadequate means.
But the way in which we flee matters. It is the US military presence in the Middle East, which represents upwards of 90% of the costs, that needs to draw down, if only because it is a terrorist target and helps them to recruit. It totals on the order of $80 billion per year, a truly astronomical sum. While I haven’t done a detailed analysis, it is hard to imagine that we couldn’t draw down half the US military in the Middle East once the Islamic State has been chased from the territory it controls without much affecting the things Ken thinks we should still care about: Israel, terrorism, and oil.
Oil is the one so many people find inescapable, including Ken. It is traded in a global market, so a disruption anywhere means a price hike everywhere, damaging the global economy. But there are far better ways to avoid an oil price hike than sending a US warship into the strait of Hormuz, which only makes the price hike worse. For example:
- getting India and China to carry 90 days of imports as strategic stocks (as the International Energy Agency members do),
- encouraging them to join in multilateral naval efforts to protect oil trade,
- getting oil producers to build pipelines that circumvent Hormuz (and the Bab al Mandab), and
- encouraging Iran and Saudi Arabia to build a multilateral security system for the Gulf that enables all the riparian states a minimum of protection from their neighbors while encouraging protection as well for their own populations.
I would add that we need to continue to worry about nuclear proliferation, because the Iran deal only provides a 15-year hiatus, and to provide assistance to those in the Middle East who are ready and willing to try to reform their societies in directions that respect human rights.
All of this requires far more diplomatic commitment than we have been prepared to ante up lately, but it is not expensive (for the US) or unimaginable for others. A vigorous diplomatic effort far short of what Madeleine and Steve advocate but far more than Ken’s “flight” is the right formula in my view.
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Russia’s increasing Middle East influence
As Russia becomes increasingly influential in the Middle East, US policymakers question what that might mean for American interests in the region. The Atlantic Council convened a panel Monday to discuss Russian interests in the region, how they might shift in a Trump presidency, and where the Russian relationships with Turkey, Iran, and Syria are heading. The panel featured Anna Borshchevskaya, Ira Weiner Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Thomas Cunningham, the Deputy Director for the Global Energy Center at the Atlantic Council, Alireza Nader, a Senior International Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation and Aaron Stein, a Senior Fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council.
Borshchevskaya said Putin has had his eye on the Middle East since he first took power in 2000. However, it wasn’t until recently that he has made his interventions more obvious. The most obvious move was Russia’s increasingly friendly relationship with Iran, even though the two countries have been historic rivals. Russia’s and Iran’s mutual resentment towards the US has led them to cooperate in the region. Their cooperation is most obvious in the Syrian crisis, where both are working to legitimize Assad’s rule over Syria. Trump has said he will cooperate with Russia in Syria, but it is still uncertain as to whether he will actually do so.
Stein said that Turkish-Russian cooperation is also a very new phenomenon. There was a sense that the two might have become enemies once Turkey shot down a Russian plane in 2015 when Russians pilots tested the Turkish safe zone on the Syrian-Turkish border. However, at the same time, Turkey had begun to distance itself from the US, partly because the US wasn’t doing enough to combat Kurdish forces in both Turkey and Syria. Thus, Turkey was pushed into Russia’s arms. Since the July coup, Turkey has reoriented itself as a hyper-nationalist, isolationist and anti-Western state that is looking to Russia as a “replacement ally” (for the US).
Cunningham said that since both Russia and some Middle Eastern countries are the world’s major oil producers, they are natural competitors and not cooperators. This is the major reason why Russia wants to maintain influence in the Middle East. Russia is producing tons of oil in response to the depreciation of the ruble and trying aggressively to sell this oil to Turkey. Russia is pushing for the creation of a Russia-Turkey oil pipeline, which many European countries oppose. It would be bad from a European diversification standpoint, since at least some of this oil would be directed west. Additionally, Russia is operating oil refineries in Syria, which will give them a leg up with the Assad regime once the civil war in Syria ends.
Nader echoed what Borshchevskaya said about the Russian-Iranian relationship being one that is mutually beneficial to both parties. However, he said, if Putin and Russia begin to cooperate in the region, it is possible that Russia might abandon Iran, since Iran is a weaker ally for them. If they do that, then Iran would have no powerful allies, which would be a major blow. However, Nader does not expect any US-Russian cooperation to be long term. Their goals in the region are much too different. An Iranian-Russian friendship is much more sustainable, since Iranian and Russian hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East can coexist.
I asked whether Russia’s aggressive support for Shiite groups in the Middle East would have repercussions for Sunni groups. Bolshchevskaya responded that Putin maintains that he is friends with everyone and is not favoring Shiite groups over Sunni groups. Instead, he claims, his ultimate goal in the Middle East is to combat terrorist groups and alliances with Shiite entities like Iran and the Assad regime are the best way to go about doing this. Thus far, Sunnis in the region and even Sunni Russians have accepted this explanation.
The panel was also asked to explain Russia’s relationship with Israel. Bolshchevskaya said that Russia is successfully restoring relations with Israel through economic cooperation, tech cooperation and tourism. However, there are limits to this partnership since Israel is still a Western democracy. The partnership between the two states is fundamentally pragmatic rather than idealistic. But given the chill between Obama and Netanyahu, Israel has found Putin to be a welcome new friend.
When asked whether the US is losing out by allowing Russia to exert their influence in the region, Bolshchevskaya said that that we absolutely are. Prior to Russian intervention in Syria, Assad was weak. Once Russia began intervening, the conflict got much, much worse. Additionally, increased Russian influence degrades US credibility in the region. Stein disagreed, saying that there is a lot of hype about the loss of US credibility in the region. ISIS isn’t as big of threat to the US as many politicians make it out to seem and there is no good reason for the US to make any big commitments to eliminating ISIS. Instead, he thought, the US should focus on strengthening relationships with NATO allies and stay away from the Middle East.
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What to expect in the Middle East
What to expect from the Trump administration is the question on everyone’s mind this morning in DC. My students are worried about their career plans, my interviewer from Voice of America is worried about its fate, my Italian solar energy friend is worried about global warming and the fate of the alternative energy industries. Is there anyone who doesn’t think this new administration will make or break their thing?
Meanwhile Trump has appointed both a pragmatist Republican apparatchik to run his day-to-day White House as chief of staff and a white nationalist, anti-Semitic ideologue to be its chief longer-term strategist. He has denied knowing that his supporters have indulged in racial, ethnic and anti-gay slurs but also suggested they stop it. Contradiction knows no limits with this man. See also my short piece on possible appointees, published by the Middle East Institute this morning.
What do I expect on policy issues relevant to the Middle East?
First, a long and steep learning curve. Trump is a radical: he says he wants to change Washington in fundamental ways and was elected to do just that. I expect him to make some dramatic decisions that some will regret: remember Ronald Reagan’s withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty and George W. Bush’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court.
One likely international victim of these initial mistakes is the Paris climate change accord, from which it is easy to withdraw. Trump will not want the controls on coal-burning power plants and on automobile fuel conservation that are vital to fulfilling the American commitment on green house gases. His supporters will enjoy a big dose of defiance to the international community. The longer-term consequences for the Middle East will be dramatic: agricultural land will be surrendered to the desert and more of the region will become uninhabitable over the longer term. Never mind the flooding of Mar a Lago, Trump’s Florida resort.
I do not expect Trump to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, since it is obviously preferable to freeing Iran to pursue nuclear weapons immediately. Instead, he will seek to impose new sanctions on Iran because of its ballistic missile program, with extra-territorial application to non-American companies, making it difficult or impossible for them to do business in the US if they continue to do business with Iran. This could be the source of a major row with Europe, which wants to expand its business dealings with Iran.
We’ll no doubt see a serious effort to convert Trump’s admiration for Russian President Putin into some sort of result, especially in Syria. This could take the form of ending all assistance to the Syrian opposition to Bashar al Assad. This would please Moscow no end and presumably enable Putin to declare a new era of understanding with the US, brought about by his steadfastness.
I expect Trump to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, an explicit promise he made that would enable him to claim to be Israel’s best friend and stem the loss of Jewish support that his anti-Semitic supporters would otherwise generate. He will be unconcerned with Palestinian reaction and only slightly more concerned with more general Arab reaction. To compensate, the Saudis will continue to get a green light for whatever they want to do in Yemen.
Trump will announce some major new offensive against the Islamic State that won’t be much different from the air plus special ops war that the Obama administration is already conducting. Libya will be abandoned to its fate. Turkey’s President Erdogan and Egypt’s President Sisi, both aspiring autocrats, will get ample rhetorical as well as military support, though Erdogan’s conflict with the Syrian Kurds will pose a quandary if Raqqa is still under Islamic State control.
I could of course be wrong on any of these points. Trump prides himself on unpredictability and ignores incoherence. He will not yield readily to logic or facts. But he will have to satisfy at least some of his constituents that he will do what he has said he will do. The consequences could be grave.
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Tragedy, farce and uncertainty
The evening wasn’t so enjoyable after all. Hillary Clinton, who is still leading in the popular vote, has lost in the electoral college, with several swing states that had been expected to tilt towards her instead going for President-elect Donald Trump. The electoral college, where each state has two votes, no matter what the population (plus the number of representatives), favors less populous states that lean Republican.
This is a tragedy for me personally. I’m an establishment progressive who thinks America has to play a strong role in the world, free trade and investment are desirable, and equal rights for everyone are the indispensable basis of liberal democracy, a system that has served Americans and non-Americans well.
It is also a tragedy for many of my friends around the world. Clinton would have pursued democratic ideals wherever possible. Trump shows no interest in them, at home or abroad. He admires Russian autocrat President Putin, draws support from anti-liberal Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, cozies up to Egyptian strongman President Sisi, and gets plaudits from Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, who is using last summer’s failed coup as an opportunity to crack down on all those who oppose him. Those who believe in equal rights in those countries should despair: they will get no support from the United States for the next four years.
My guess is that the same will be true for liberal democrats in other countries Trump has never mentioned. The moderate Syrian opposition, Ukraine’s Maidan democrats, Europe’s traditional socialists and conservatives, Iran’s Greens (what is left of them), and many others can expect no real sustenance from Trump’s America. Throughout the Balkans, Trump’s victory will empower ethnic nationalists, who are already sending me their schadenfreude. There is a real risk that his white nationalist predilections will inspire a chain reaction of ethnic and sectarian partitions there and in the Middle East, spreading war and instability far and wide.
The Trump victory is also a farce. This self-declared billionaire so far as we know hasn’t paid taxes for decades or given any significant contributions to charity. He notoriously stiffed contractors and used illegal workers when building his hotels, not to mention that his Slovenian-born wife worked illegally in the US. He put his tacky label on cheap imported products. But he now claims to represent the American working class, in particular in its distaste for immigrants and foreign products. He claimed to want to make America great again, but criticized its generals and its fighting men and especially women. All this is bozotic.
How did he win? Women and Hispanics, whom he insulted with vigor during the campaign, shifted their votes only slightly towards Hillary Clinton. More educated Americans shifted more, but they were not enough to offset the shift of non-college educated whites to Trump. Minorities did not turn out in the numbers that elected President Obama. Efforts to suppress their vote by limiting early voting, cutting back on polling hours and places, and requiring proof of identity (Americans do not have identity cards) were marginally successful in some swing states.
The tragedy and farce will remain forever. Uncertainty is the most important result of the election right now. No one knows what Trump will really do. That’s why stock markets worldwide sold off and have only partly recovered. He prides himself on unpredictability and has a Republican Congress to go along with his whims.
Here are my best guesses. At the very least, he will have to proceed with the promised repeal of Obamacare, which has provided tens of millions of Americans with health insurance. Repeal will throw them back into hospital emergency rooms, which are the most expensive way to cure a cold ever invented. He will propose cutting my taxes sharply, with no guarantee that I will reinvest the bounty productively. He will try to throw a lot of money at rebuilding infrastructure, something the Republicans have blocked President Obama from doing. He will appoint an anti-abortion member of the Supreme Court, to fill the existing vacancy.
But little else is clear, especially on foreign policy. Renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement I suppose, but that won’t be easy. Complete the wall on the border with Mexico, though his proposed method for financing it (by taxing remittances from Mexicans in the US) is unlikely to work. Tear up the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Cut a deal with Putin on Ukraine and Syria, surrendering Donbas to the Russians and as much of Syria as they, the Iranians and Assad can conquer. Continue Obama’s fight against the Islamic State, which has been strikingly successful over the last year.
I doubt however that he will tear up the Iranian nuclear deal, which is clearly better than no deal at this point. He’ll make a lot of noise about enforcing it vigorously and may levy new sanctions on Iran based on other issues. We can expect belligerent talk about China’s trade and currency policies, but I suppose those complaints will be channeled into the existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms that already exist to deal with them.
Worst of all, we are going to have to listen to him and his appointees for the next four years. Chris Christie, the New Jersey governor who closed highway lanes to punish a Democratic mayor for not supporting him, will direct the transition team. Rudy Giuliani, who invented the “stop and frisk” police tactic that has been declared unconstitutional, will likely be the Attorney General. Newt Gingrich, the Speaker of the House cited for ethnics violations, is thought to be a candidate for Secretary of State. This is a rogues’ gallery of male chauvinist has-beens.
It’s had better be a great country. Otherwise how could it survive such a mistake?
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Whose war is going well?
The popular image is that Russia is doing well in Syria, where it has been bombing for a year. Donald Trump says the American-allied forces in Iraq are struggling to retake Mosul. Precisely the opposite is true.
The Islamic State (ISIS) has now lost well over 60% of the territory that it once controlled in Iraq. Mosul is the last main population center it rules. Its diversionary attack on Kirkuk was just that: an effort to make the anti-ISIS coalition slow its advance by diverting forces. But it will have only a temporary impact. The tens of thousands of troops involved in or supporting the Mosul offensive seem remarkably determined and unified in their objective: to chase ISIS out. ISIS likely has no more than a few thousand fighters left inside the city.
If there is a serious problem in the anti-ISIS coalition attacking Mosul, it is more likely to come after success than before. At least some of the various coalition forces–Iraqi Army, Kurdish peshmerga, Shia “popular mobilization forces,” Yezidi, Christians and other militias–will race to the center of Mosul, each hoping that early arrival will help to strengthen its position in the inevitable pushing and shoving once ISIS is gone. That will be the big test: we’ll see whether the Iraqi government can succeed in putting together a coalition to govern the country’s second largest city. It won’t be easy.
The situation in Syria is much less favorable to the Russian/Iranian/Assad coalition. After months of effort, it has still not succeeded in taking eastern Aleppo, even after besieging it, denying it humanitarian assistance, and bombing it to near smithereens, including many civilian targets. In the meanwhile, Kurdish and allied Arab forces have taken Manbij on the Euphrates river from ISIS. Seeking to block further Kurdish expansion west, Turkey has helped Syrian rebels to take Jarablus, and move towards al-Bab, thus carving out what might become a de facto opposition “safe area” under Turkish protection.
The Assad coalition will eventually succeed in dislodging the opposition from Aleppo, but in doing so they are creating Sunni martyrs and radicalizing people who might otherwise have preferred a more moderate course. They are also guaranteeing that the Americans and Europeans will not be available to foot the bill for reconstructing Aleppo as well as other Syrian towns Assad, the Russians and Iranians have attacked. It is entirely possible for Assad’s coalition to win the battle for Aleppo but lose the war and the peace.
President Obama can be pleased with the progress of the war in Iraq, especially as he was instrumental in recruiting Haider al Abadi to replace Nouri al Maliki. It is impossible to see how the latter would have been able to construct the kind of coalition the former has managed to cobble together.
But Syria is likely to besmirch both Obama and Putin. Their failure to reach an accommodation that ends the war between coalitions that both claim to oppose the Islamic State and to begin a political transition is not just a personal tragedy for many Syrians but also a geopolitical disaster for the region.
The American-backed war is going okay. The Russian war is not. Iraq has a chance for a decent outcome. But no one is likely to be happy with the outcome in Syria.
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