Tag: Turkey
Peace picks, October 17-21
- Elusive Peace in Colombia: A Conversation with Ambassador Juan Carlos Pinzon | Monday, October 17 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | American Enterprise Institute | Click HERE to Register |
On October 2, Colombians rejected in a referendum a peace accord between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) through a national plebiscite. Proponents of the agreement said it was the only way to end the 50-year terror campaign plaguing Colombia and usher in a new era of peace and prosperity. Critics argued that it provided amnesty to human rights violators and that facilitating FARC’s political participation will invite narco influence and corruption into Colombia’s government and society.
Join AEI for a conversation with Colombian Ambassador Juan Carlos Pinzón about what the rejection of the peace agreement means for Colombia and the US, the hopes and concerns of the Colombian people, and the post-accord challenges the country will face. - National Security Law and the Legal Challenges of Terrorism | Monday, October 17 | 3:00pm – 4:00pm | Institute of World Politics | Click HERE to Register |
Andrew McCarthy will give an overview of terrorism law and an explanation for why neither the criminal justice system nor the military system is a good fit against international terrorism. Andrew C. McCarthy III is a former assistant US Attorney for the Southern District of New York. He led the 1995 terrorism prosecution against Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others. The defendants were convicted of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and of planning a series of attacks against New York City landmarks. He also contributed to the prosecutions of terrorists who bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He resigned from the Justice Department in 2003. He is a contributing editor of National Review and a senior fellow at the National Review Institute.
- Saudi Vision 2030: Opportunities and Challenges | Tuesday, October 18 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Middle East Institute | Click HERE to Register |
Saudi Arabia’s ‘Vision 2030’ is the Kingdom’s most comprehensive economic reform package in its history. Put forward by Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, Vision 2030 aims to privatize entire sectors, raise non-oil revenues, cut subsidies, and streamline government services, among other reforms.
But the challenges are significant, including moving Saudi nationals out of the government sector and into private employment, employing higher numbers of women, and raising taxes. In the process, the plan upends the Kingdom’s long-held social contract, which guaranteed its citizens most of their needs in return for their support.
The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program at the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to host a discussion examining the economic and political implications of Vision 2030 with Hala Aldosari (Arab Gulf States Institute, ASGIW), Anthony Cordesman (CSIS), Fahad Nazer (AGSIW), and Jean-Francois Seznec(MEI and SAIS). Paul Salem(MEI) will moderate the discussion. - Turkey and the Syrian War, an EES Distinguished Lecture with Dr. Sonar Cagaptay | Tuesday, October 18 | 6:00pm – 7:30pm | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | Click HERE to Register |
The European and Eurasian Studies (EES) Program cordially invites you to join a presentation and discussion with Soner Cagaptay of The Washington Institute for Near East Studies on “Turkey and the Syrian War” on Tuesday, October 18, 2016, 6:00-7:30pm. The session will be moderated by European and Eurasian Studies Program Director and Professor Erik Jones.
- A New Strategy for Iran-US Relations | Wednesday, October 19 | 9:00am | The Atlantic Council | Click HERE to Register| Nearly four decades since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the United States has found itself at cross-purposes with Iran throughout the Middle East. Though the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to limit Iran’s nuclear program has reopened channels of communication between the United States and Iran, new opportunities for engagement must be measured against the ongoing threat Iran poses to US partners and allies in the region. Ellen Laipson, Atlantic Council distinguished fellow and president emeritus of the Stimson Center, presents her ten-year vision for tackling these complex challenges in A New Strategy for US-Iran Relations. On October 19, Michael Connell, director of the Iranian Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses, Atlantic Council board director Amir Handjani, and national security correspondent for the New York Times David Sanger will join Laipson for a discussion of this first regionally focused installment in the Atlantic Council Strategy Papers.
- Islamophobia: Overcoming Myths and Engaging in Better Conversation | Thursday, October 20 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | The Atlantic Council | Click HERE to Register |
Islamophobia is on the rise in non-Muslim-majority countries. It is worse today than it was in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, with no signs of improvement. Following the recent spate of global terrorist attacks, Muslims are increasingly portrayed negatively by the media. Furthermore, some US politicians and their European counterparts have proposed an array of policies – from policing Muslim communities to controlling the flow of refugees and migrants from the Middle East.
The role of national policy on civil rights protections is vital and now more important than ever before.
Join us on October 20 for a public discussion at the Atlantic Council, convened in anticipation of the Smithsonian’s opening of its international exhibition, ‘The Art of the Quran.’
Our distinguished group of panelists will address issues, including the media’s influence on shaping public perceptions of Islam and Muslims; the role policymakers can and should play in bridging the gap between Muslim and non-Muslim communities; and the role art and cultural institutions can play in shifting the narrative to a more inclusive and productive discussion. This panel will feature Karen Armstrong, author and Commentator on Comparative Religion, Vali Nasr, Dean, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Zainab Salbi, Founder, Women for Women International and Best-Selling Author, and TV Host. Moderated by Frederick Kempe President and CEO of the Atlantic Council.
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Syria’s future
It would be foolish to have much hope well into the sixth year of the Syria’s wars that Saturday’s meeting of the US, Russian, Iranian, Saudi, Turkish and Qatari foreign ministers will lead to a way out of the current impasse. But it is reasonable to ask what would make the meeting more than just one more boon to Lausanne’s luxury hotels.
The current situation is not propitious. Syria’s government is feeling confident as it rides a ferocious wave of mostly Russian and Iranian attacks on the opposition-held neighborhoods of eastern Aleppo, which it is “cleaning.” It figures the fall of Aleppo will be a tipping point leading to government victory in much of more populated Syria. The government has already negotiated an end to sieges of several areas near Damascus, transporting their populations in an effort to adjust their demography. President Assad has no intention of welcoming back the more than 7 million Syrians who have fled the country. He wants, and thinks he can get, a Syria over which he can restore his autocratic rule by violent means.
At this point, the only thing that would increase the likelihood of a negotiated diplomatic solution is a change in the military balance that threatens Assad. There are ways that might be accomplished without directly engaging Russian forces, which the Americans don’t want to do: stand-off attacks on the Syrian air force or on Hizbollah ground forces or giving more and better weapons to non-extremist opposition forces, to cite two examples. The Americans are hesitant to move in that direction for fear of hitting commingled Russians or enabling an extremist takeover. They have spent the last week or two pondering options.
Washington isn’t likely to do anything before Saturday, but if Secretary of State Kerry can go to the Lausanne meeting with an option to re-balance the military equation in his pocket he might be able to make some diplomatic progress. He needs a credible threat, one Moscow and Tehran feel they need to forestall, to get a serious cessation of hostilities. The beginning of serious talks on transition is likely a bridge too far. Iran and Russia have doubled and quadrupled down on their bets favoring Assad. They are unlikely to risk losing him, since any successor regime that is even remotely democratic would throw them out.
What happens if/when Aleppo falls? Assad will force the opposition adherents out, either leaving eastern Aleppo destroyed and deserted or repopulating it with loyalists. Will the government and its allies then turn its attention to Idlib, where there really are extremists (and infighting among them)? Or will they try to drive farther north to the Turkish border, risking clashes with Turkish and Turkish-backed groups advancing there?
Or will they be content to rest on their laurels? That seems unlikely. Many of us, including me, have underestimated Assad’s sticking power and his determination to retake territory. Now that he is on a roll, he won’t want to stop. Nor will the extremist and non-extremist forces leave him alone. I’m afraid more war rather than less is still in Syria’s future.
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Plan B options
The Administration is considering plan B for Syria. In order to be effective, it has to somehow rebalance the military situation to enable the non-extremist Syrian opposition to resist effectively the Russian/Iranian/Syrian government/Shia militia onslaught and to fight the Islamic State.
I take as a given two limits: 1) Washington does not want to directly engage Russian forces and 2) it does not want to put significant numbers of troops on the ground in Syria. Nor do I think it will be possible for the President to gain Congressional approval for an expanded Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF).
Here is a summary of options, all of which I think I have previously discussed on peacefare.net:
1. Encourage Congress to pass and sign the pending sanctions bill. This would have broad political significance, but mainly affect helicopter and airplane parts, if we are prepared to enforce third party prohibitions (i.e. threaten suspension of business with US companies if foreign companies ship parts to Syria).
2. End the impunity of the Syrian air force by destroying helicopters that drop barrel bombs on civilian targets. This can be done with stand-off weapons and does not require US aircraft over Syrian territory. It would likely have to be done as covert action in order to get around the AUMF, which covers only Al Qaeda (and via a stretch Al Qaeda-descended organizations like the Islamic State).
3. Tell the Russians and Iranians we are no longer going to turn a blind eye to Hizbollah engagement in Syria. If they don’t leave, we would need to target them (again as covert action with standoff weapons).
4. Create safe areas inside Syria we are prepared to protect from the air. The opposition, or Turkey, would have to provide ground forces in order to govern there without fear of regime and Islamic State violence. This option would also entail financial and technical assistance to the civilian opposition on a scale not yet attempted.
5. Provide (or allow others to provide) anti-aircraft and other more advanced weapons to vetted opposition groups. Possible use of these weapons against civilian aircraft either in Syria or in the region is the obvious downside. Remember Malaysia Air flight 17.
None of these ideas is a slam dunk. All could generate unintended consequences, in particular Russian and Iranian escalation. It is not clear that Washington would be willing to meet and exceed their responses. Nor is it guaranteed that the non-extremist opposition would be able to take advantage of the opportunities Washington generates.
But without something that changes the military equation, Aleppo is lost and the Syrian/Russian/Iranian alliance will continue its depredations against civilians in Idlib and other opposition strongholds. This would strengthen extremist recruitment and postpone the prospect of any political settlement.
I don’t envy this president, or the next one, in facing the choice among these options, or doing nothing.
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The toughest nut in the Middle East
The Middle East Institute held their 7th annual conference on Turkey last week, gathering regional experts to discuss Turkey’s turbulent domestic politics and regional role. This post focuses on the regional issues discussed.
Haim Malka of the Center for Strategic and International Studies focused on Turkey-Israel relations. The reconciliation agreement following Israel’s 2010 raid on a Turkish flotilla headed to Gaza is being implemented. This is a mutually-beneficial, low-cost measure. Strategic cooperation is likely to remain limited.
Syria will test the renewed relationship as it is an arena where both Turkey and Israel’s interests intersect. Israel’s policy on Syria has to date been confused and vague, perhaps intentionally so, but ultimately the Israelis want to see a Syria with minimal Iranian influence. The fall of Iran’s ally Assad may be assumed beneficial to Israel, but the Israelis seem to have followed a ‘better the devil you know’ approach so far and do not appear to be supporting alternative political actors in Syria.
Bill Park of King’s College, London discussed Turkey’s relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, which saw marked improvement in 2009 and 2010 due to trade and energy connections, shared mistrust of Maliki’s Baghdad government, and President Barzani’s role as a potential partner in the peace process with Turkey’s own Kurds (the PKK). While these foundations for positive relations remain, Turkey’s refusal to support Syrian Kurds in the fight against IS, Turkey’s re-establishing a relationship with Baghdad following the replacement of Maliki by Abadi, and a change in perception of Barzani’s leadership record have undermined the rapprochement.
Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Karim Sadjadpour discussed Turkey-Iran relations. There are notable commonalities between the two states as they suffer both a superiority and inferiority complex – both do not see their current status in world affairs as reflecting their histories as great empires. There is also a strong shared cultural history. The Iran-Turkey border has proven stable in an otherwise turbulent region for centuries. Also important is their economic partnership, with shared gas projects and common concern with Kurdish independence.
Having suffered from terrorist attacks, Turkey is disappointed in Iran following Assad’s lead, especially in ignoring the radical Islamist threat in Syria. Upcoming events could exacerbate frictions between Turkey and Iran. These include the upcoming US presidential election, the May 2017 presidential elections in Iran, and whether the nuclear deal lasts ten years.
Presenting the complex relationship of Turkey, the US and Kurds was Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Fellow with the Wilson Center. She believes the US has an opportunity to use its leverage with the Syrian Kurds (the PYD) and Turkey to revive the Turkey-Kurdish peace process. This will require the US to abandon the fiction that the PYD and PKK are separate groups. The PYD is not seeking an independent state but rather a subnational federal unit within Syria, which the Kurds term “Rojava.”
While Turkey is unable to determine a military outcome, Ankara holds considerable soft power, especially in assisting the moderate opposition.
It was agreed among all the panelists that the US must articulate its policy for the region, and Syria in particular, as Turkey and its neighbors are looking for US leadership and unwilling to pursue their own policies without clarification from Washington. That is proving the toughest nut to crack in the Middle East.
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Peace picks September 26-30
- The Role of Law in the Fight Against International Terrorism |Monday, September 26 | 8:30am – 4:30pm | George Washington Law | Click HERE to register
Join GW Law’s International and Comparative Law Program, American Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (AFHU), Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s Faculty of Law (HU Law), and Minerva Center for Human Rights (HU Minerva) as they examine issues arising from the changing nature of terrorist acts. Alberto Mora, former General Counsel of the US Navy and the recipient of the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award, will present the opening address. The luncheon address will be presented by Michael Chertoff, former US Secretary of Homeland Security. - After Mosul: Rethinking Iraq | Monday, September 26 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Woodrow Wilson Center | Click HERE to Register
ISIS has occupied Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, since the early days of June 2014. The victory in Mosul was both symbolically and materially very significant for ISIS. The group not only obtained large caches of military equipment from a defeated Iraqi army, but occupying such a large city made it a visible contender for power in the region. Now the Iraqi army, with the help of the United States and others including the Kurdish peshmerga, is getting ready to recapture the city. This panel will explore the impact of ISIS’s occupation of the city on its inhabitants, what the recapture of the city will mean for Iraq, and the city’s future relations with the rest of Iraq. Featuring Amatzia Baram, Professor emeritus for Middle East history and director of the Center for Iraq Studies, University of Haifa, and former public policy scholar, Wilson Center, Abbas Kadhim, Senior Foreign Policy Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS-Johns Hopkins University, and President, Institute of Shia Studies, and Wladimir van Wilgenburg, Middle East Analyst at the Jamestown Foundation, Judith Yaphe, Adjunct professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University. - When Should the U.S. Use Force Abroad? | Monday, September 26 | 11:45am – 2:00pm | American Foreign Policy Council | Click HERE to Register
Debate Panel I: What lessons should we learn from America’s use of force in Iraq and how should those lessons inform future decisions on future military missions abroad? Speakers: Phil Giraldi, PhD., former CIA Case Officer and Army Intelligence Officer, and current Executive Director of the Council for the National Interest, Michael Doran, PhD. previously senior director in the National Security Council under President George W. Bush, and currently a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. Debate Panel II: This panel will review the major uses of force since Viet Nam. Panelists will discuss a) when military force is justified and the arguments against its use ; b) multilateralism; c) the views of the American public, and d) the War Powers Resolution and the role of Congress in authorizing the use of military force. Speakers: Jeffrey Bergner, PhD. former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs (2005-2008) and former staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Sen. Lugar R-IN), Gerry Warburg, former House and Senate Democratic leadership aide on defense, intelligence and foreign policy, and current professor at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. - A Vision for the Future of Syria | Tuesday, September 27 | 11:15am – 12:30pm | Atlantic Council | Click HERE to Register
Prime Minister Riad al-Hijab and the Syrian High Negotiations Commission (HNC), an umbrella organization for the Syrian opposition, released its vision for the future of Syria in London on September 7, 2016. This framework detailed three phases consistent with the 2012 Geneva Communiqué: negotiations initiated with a nationwide ceasefire and release of prisoners, a transitional period for rebuilding institutions, and a third phase welcomed by free elections for a new president.
Weeks after this announcement, Syria is experiencing an incomplete, fragile, and faltering reduction of violence facilitated by Washington and Moscow. Nonetheless, a path toward negotiations and other key components of the HNC vision remain elusive, and the future of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains in question.
Please join us on September 27 for a discussion with Prime Minister Riad al-Hijab to discuss these and other issues. Dr. Hijab will detail the HNC framework for transition in Syria, after which Hariri Center Director Ambassador will moderate a discussion on the vision’s receptivity and the challenges to its implementation. - Civil Society in Eastern Europe and Eurasia: Thriving or Just Surviving? | Tuesday, September 27 | 9:30am -11:00am | Woodrow Wilson Center | Click Here to Register
Is the trend to restrict civil society, visible in Russia and neighboring countries, getting worse? In some of the countries of the former communist world, it has become more difficult for civil society to operate freely, while in others, civil society plays a strong role promoting reform and responding to regional challenges. These are just some of the divergent trends identified in USAID’s 2015 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index(CSOSI), which assesses the health of the civil society sector against key indicators in 24 countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
Practitioners and scholars will discuss these trends, what it means for civil society leaders and activists in these countries, and what can be done to put civil society in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia on a more secure and sustainable path. - 7th Annual Turkey Conference | Friday, September 30 | 9:00am – 4:00pm | Middle East Institute | Click HERE to RegisterThe Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute is pleased to present the 7th Annual Conference on Turkey on Friday, September 30, 2016. The conference will assemble three expert panels to discuss the impact of the recent coup attempt on Turkey’s internal political-military dynamics as well as the country’s relations with its Western allies and regional partners. Register now to attend three expert panel discussions on these and other issues facing Ankara. Registration is free and open to the public. Additional panelists and moderators to be announced.
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The epitome of resolve
AP has published the Syria cease-fire deal that the US government refused to make public. It is instructive, even though the cessation of hostilities is in tatters as Russian and Syrian government forces have launched major attacks focused on Aleppo.
The deal was more or less as anticipated and described in the press: it entailed an effort to stabilize at least parts of Syria by ending attacks on non-extremist forces, thus permitting them to receive humanitarian assistance. Had this happened as agreed for a week, the US and Russia would have jointly targeted extremist forces (ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra and others) while the Syrian air force would have stood down from attacks in designated areas.
Special provisions would have allowed relief to arrive from Turkey to Aleppo in sealed trucks. Checkpoints on the Castello Road north of Aleppo were to be monitored initially by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and later by the UN. The area near the road was to be demilitarized, with both government and opposition forces pulling back. Syrians were supposed to be allowed to leave Aleppo, including fighters with weapons. At least one other route was to be opened into Aleppo.
The joint Russian/American military action against extremists depended on the delineation of areas controlled by Nusra and opposition groups, starting right away but more “comprehensively” once the joint implementation center responsible for coordinating attacks on extremists was established. The Russians have been claiming that the Americans failed to fulfill their commitment to delineation, which also requires separation of more moderate forces from the extremists.
Why hasn’t it worked?
Some blame the failure on a lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. To be sure, this is a complicated agreement with many moving parts that might have been marginally more successful had there been some sort of third-party monitoring.
But fundamentally it hasn’t worked because the parties haven’t really wanted it to or don’t have the leverage required. The Syrian government has the military advantage around Aleppo and wants to finish off the opposition that has controlled parts of the city for years. The Russians, having doubled down on their support for Bashar al Assad, are in no position to undermine their surrogate. The Americans have not provided sufficient support to the opposition to wean it from the extremists, who provide a good deal of the tooth in fighting against the regime.
Secretary of State Kerry is still trying to revive the cessation of hostilities. Foreign Policy has classified this as the textbook definition of insanity: doing the same thing over and over expecting a different result. But Kerry isn’t nuts. His problem is President Obama, who thinks there is nothing he can do that will improve the situation.
My Republican colleagues see this as a failure of resolve. I don’t. All American presidents since the fall of the Berlin Wall have resisted interventions. All eventually undertook one or more, against their better judgment at the outset. What distinguishes Obama is that he is more resolved, not less. But he is resolved to avoid the slippery slope to “owning” Syria, whereas his critiques wish he would start down it. This is the epitome of resolve, not its failure. Remember: this is a man with two teenage daughters who has spent almost eight years in the White House without a whiff of scandal.
I believe there are still things the President can consider doing about Syria: expanded sanctions, stand-off attacks on helicopters that drop barrel bombs or Syrian aircraft that violate the cessation of hostilities, an ultimatum to get Hizbollah and other Iranian surrogates out of Syria, non-declared attacks on Syrian government command and control. Without these alternatives, Secretary Kerry will not be able to deliver the negotiated political solution that is his avowed goal.
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