Tag: Turkey
Talk but little progress
The Middle East Institute published my brief on the G20 summit yesterday:
The weekend’s G20 meeting in peaceful and prosperous Hangzhou, China focused on the world economy, especially trade and finance, as well as climate change. But President Barack Obama met on the sidelines with presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while Secretary of State John Kerry tried and failed for the umpteenth time to hammer out an agreement on Syria with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The war-ravaged Middle East is never far from world leaders’ priorities these days, but progress is proving elusive.
The American proposal for Syria would renew the cessation of hostilities, allow delivery of humanitarian assistance, and enable joint U.S./Russian targeting of extremists while grounding the Syrian air force. The Russians ran out the clock in Hangzhou, enabling the Syrian army with Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah support to cut off access again to Aleppo, where opposition forces had managed to breach the siege of several hundred thousand civilians. The Russians may eventually agree to a cease-fire, while Syrian government forces pursue the “starve and surrender” tactics they have used successfully elsewhere. Without a rebalancing of the military situation in favor of the opposition, President Bashar al-Assad is likely to regain control of Syria’s largest city, by foul means.
Obama’s meeting with Turkey’s president focused on responsibility for July’s coup attempt, which the Turkish government blames on an erstwhile Erdogan ally who lives in Pennsylvania. While Obama lauded the survival of Erdogan and Turkish democracy and also promised cooperation on determining responsibility for the failed coup, he is unwilling to short-circuit the extradition procedures, which can be lengthy and complex. Erdogan was undoubtedly disappointed.
The Turkish and American presidents likely also discussed Syria. The Americans want to target the Islamic State and minimize Turkish and C.I.A.-supported Arab opposition clashes with Pentagon-supported Syrian Kurds—only making the contradictions in U.S. policy all too apparent.
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Middle East and Europe: impact and prospects
I had the privilege this morning of speaking today by Skype to the Ambassadors’ Council convened at the Macedonian Foreign Ministry in Skopje. These are the notes I used:
- First let me thank the organizers, in particular Ambassador Abdulkadar Memedi and Edvard Mitevski, for this opportunity. It is rare indeed that I get to talk about my two favorite parts of the world: Europe and the Middle East.
- My focus today will be on the latter, as I am confident that Europeans—a category that in my way of thinking includes all the citizens of Macedonia—know more than I do about the impact of the refugee crisis on your part of the world.
- But big as it looms for you, the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants from the Greater Middle East is a fraction of a much larger problem.
- There are 4.8 million refugees from Syria in neighboring countries, the largest number in Turkey but millions also in Lebanon and Jordan. Upwards of 8.7 million will be displaced within Syrian by the end of the year. 13.5 million are said to be in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria.
- The number of refugees leaving Syria has leveled off, but asylum applications in Europe are well above 1 million and still rising, albeit at a declining rate.
- The U.S. is committed to taking only 10,000 Syrians. I don’t anticipate that our politics will allow a lot more anytime soon, though eventually we will have many more arrive through family reunification and other modalities.
- The 1.5 million people you saw flow through Macedonia over the past year or so were the relatively fortunate Syrians, not the most unfortunate. Moreover, most who have arrived in Europe are male. If their asylum applications are successful, that will lead to large numbers of family members eventually joining them.
- The vital question for me is this: what are the prospects for ending the wars that are tearing Syria to shreds? And what are the prospects for other potential sources of migrants and refugees from Iraq, from Afghanistan, Yemen, and Libya?
- More than five years after Bashar al Assad’s attempted violent repression of the nonviolent demonstrations in his country, prospects for peace still look dim.
- The Russians and Iranians, whose support to Assad has been vital to his survival, show no signs of letting up and have in fact doubled down on their bad bet.
- The Iranians have committed Lebanese Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias and their own Revolutionary Guard to the fight, not to mention Afghan and other Shia fighters.
- The Russians have not only redoubled their air attacks but also added flights from Iran, now suspended, as well as cruise missiles fired from the Black Sea. Moscow has now killed more civilians, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, than the Islamic State.
- The Americans continue to refuse to fight Assad, Iran, or Russia. President Obama lacks both legal authorization and popular support to attack them. Americans want him to focus exclusively on the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, which is what he is doing, apart from assistance to some Syrian opposition forces willing to join in the fight against extremists.
- Donald Trump would certainly follow the same policy, perhaps redoubling efforts against the Islamic State and looking for opportunities for cooperation with Russia. Hillary Clinton has pledged to look at other options like protected areas or no-fly zones, but it is not clear that she will pursue them.
- The space for moderates in Syria is shrinking. Violence always polarizes, as you know only too well. In addition, the Americans are restraining the forces that they have equipped and trained from attacking the Syrian army. They want moderates focused exclusively on fighting the Islamic State.
- This morning, Turkish forces entered Syria at Jarablus on the Euphrates, in support of Arab and Turkman forces aiming to deprive the Islamic State of its last border point and block the expansion of Kurdish forces from taking the last stretch of the Turkish/Syrian border they don’t control.
- When will it all end? I don’t know, but I think it likely to end at best not in a clear victory of one side or another but rather in a fragmented and semi-stable division of areas of control.
- The Syrian government will control most of what Assad refers to as “useful Syria”: the western coast and the central axis from Damascus through Homs and Hama, with Idlib and Aleppo still in doubt.
- The opposition will likely control part of the south along the Jordanian border as well as a wedge of the north, including a piece of the border with Turkey stretching from Azaz to Jarablus.
- The Kurds will control the rest of the border with Turkey. Raqqa and Deir Azzour are still up for grabs, with the likely outcome opposition in the former and government in the latter.
- That is the likely best. Will that end the refugee problem?
- I think not. Nothing about this fragmented outcome is likely to make it attractive for Syrians to return home. Security will remain a serious problem and little funding will be available for reconstruction. Syria will remain unstable for years to come.
- What about other parts of the Greater Middle East?
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Shifting currents in Syria
As UN envoy Stefano de Mistura tries to reconvene Syria peace talks next week, there are important developments that could impact his prospects.
The Syrian government has continued to block aid to opposition-controlled areas, causing Stefano to abruptly curtail humanitarian task force deliberations last week. Moscow last week flew bombers from Iran, an innovation now reportedly suspended. The Russians also launched cruise missiles allegedly targeted against Jabhat al Nusra (which is generally embedded with more moderate insurgents) from the Black Sea. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Russia has now killed more civilians in Syria than ISIS, though it started years earlier. Moscow has shown no visible inclination to limit Syrian government strikes on civilian areas, which it targets on a daily basis.
At the same time, the situation in northern Syria has evolved in a direction favorable to the US. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who are mostly Kurdish fighters, have retaken Manbij from the Islamic State and are heading for Jarablus on the border where the Euphrates crosses from Turkey into Syria. Arab SDF forces are said to be preparing the assault from inside Turkey, which wants to block the Kurds from taking over the entire northern border of Syria. At the same time, farther east in Hasakeh, US-supported Kurdish forces are fighting with the Syrian army, with which they cooperated in taking the town a year ago and had maintained a truce since. The Syrian air force last week came close to clashing with US aircraft sent to protect the Kurds, who are reportedly trying to oust President Assad’s forces entirely from their northeastern “canton.”
If successful, these operations in northern Syria will cut off the Islamic State from its supply lines in Turkey and possibly end the ambiguous relationship of the Kurdish PYD forces with the Syrian government, though the Syrian opposition is unlikely to accept the PYD into its fold, not least because of Turkey’s opposition. The possibility of an attack on the Islamic State capital at Raqqa is starting to loom on the horizon, perhaps even before an effort to liberate Mosul in Iraq.
Still John Kerry is saddled as the Obama Administration draws to a close with the unenviable task of conducting Middle East diplomacy without any serious threat of coercion. The President, supported by most Americans, simply doesn’t want to use American force against anything but the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. This means not targeting the Syrian government and Hizbollah forces, even when they attack civilians. The Iranians and Russians in Syria are following his lead in a way: they are using force on the issues they care about and ignoring diplomacy. No matter what they say about not being wedded to Assad, the Russians and Iranians are mostly fighting the Syrian opposition in an effort to prevent regime change, with few relatively few attacks on on the Islamic State.
This free for all isn’t likely to work well for John Kerry in his efforts to bring about a ceasefire in Syria. The proposition he has been flogging is this: US cooperation with Russia in targeting the Islamic State and Al Qaeda (presumably including Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, the allegedly unaffiliated successor to Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra) provided Russia ends attacks on the non-extremist Syrian opposition and convinces President Assad to ground his air force. The relative success of US-allied forces in northern Syria may strengthen Kerry’s hand, but there is no sign yet of any willingness on Russia’s part to meet its side of the bargain.
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Fighting to win
No, this won’t be about the American elections. It’s about Syria.
The Russians and the Iranians are doubling down in Aleppo, where the insurgent part of town is virtually surrounded, civilians are under daily bombardment, and too brief humanitarian pauses are routinely flaunted. The breach opposition forces have made in the siege is mostly unusable, as it is constantly under fire. The Russians are now flying their bombers from Iranian territory, in order to shorten the transit time and increase the ops tempo.
Why would they do this?
They have good reasons. If they ever did, Tehran and Moscow no longer have any hope that a successor regime in Syria would treat their interests respectfully. So many Syrians have now suffered from their intervention that they can count only on autocracy, of Assad or someone like him. They may not share Assad’s objective of retaking control of every inch of Syria, but they want him to win in Aleppo because they think that will ensure his survival in power.
Assad understands this and will drag his allies as deep into the hole he has dug for himself as possible. Yesterday and today he attacked Kurdish forces in northern Syria, if not for the first time still for the first time in a long time. There had been a de facto truce between the regime and the Kurds, who have gotten some support from the Russians (as well as the Americans). It looks as if Assad has decided to put the Russians on the spot, knowing that they don’t dare abandon him for the sake of the Kurds.
Assad is even looking strong enough for the Chinese to pitch some military assistance in his direction. They don’t really have a dog in this fight, but they presumably want to come out on the winning side. If that is an autocracy, all the better.
Meanwhile, the Americans are sticking to their game plan, which requires them to focus exclusively on defeating the Islamic State (ISIS): the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have taken the strategically important northern town of Manbij from ISIS and are heading towards Jarablus, on the border where the Euphrates crosses from Turkey into Syria. Washington has supposedly promised that the Kurds will withdraw from the Manbij “pocket” once the fighting is over, leaving Arabs in charge to prevent the Kurds from controlling the entire northern border of Syria and thus to please the Turks. We’ll see if that intention holds.
The big losers in all this are non-extremist Syrians, particularly those who live in opposition-controlled areas. Their cause at this point seems lost, which I suppose is why the White House persists in its indifference. Only resounding defeat of ISIS will play well in the American election campaign. Obama is also fighting to win, but in a different war from the one Putin and Assad are pursuing.
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Stronger Erdogan, weaker Turkey
The July 15 Turkish coup attempt was swiftly quashed. Just as swiftly came President Erdogan’s fulfillment of his promise that those responsible “will pay a heavy price for their treason to Turkey.” Why the coup failed, who was behind it, and what is the future of US-Turkey relations were the main questions explored at the Atlantic Council event last Tuesday “Ten Days after Quelling the Coup: Where is Turkey Headed?” Moderated by Aaron Stein, Senior Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the event featued Elmira Bayrasli, Visiting Fellow at New America, and Steven Cook, ENI Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Cook offered four reasons for the coup failure. The first and most important was the divided Turkish military. The coup was a factious scheme, not a unified undertaking. Second, the plotters underestimated Erdogan’s hold on power, which he has held since 2003. Third, the Turkish military is not as strong as it seemed. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Fethullah Gulen — whom Erdogan regards as the main culprit of the coup attempt — used to be partners and worked in parallel to weaken and subordinate the military. Lastly, Turkish society appears no longer willing to accept military rule.
Bayrasli clarified that Fethullah Gulen is a US-based cleric who founded the Hizmet movement. Rooted in moderate Islam, Hizmet has attracted millions of followers and has funded hundreds of schools, think tanks, and media outlets around the world. Erdogan accuses Gulen of orchestrating the coup and has urged the US to extradite him. It is possible he was behind the coup, but it is also true that Gulen has become Erdogan’s “default scapegoat.” Until Turkey provides solid evidence, the US cannot extradite Gulen, but the claim of his involvement advances Erdogan’s effort to concentrate power.
Bayrasli noted that the AKP came to power with technocrats who delivered. Turkey has seen enormous economic growth since Erdogan came to power. But economic prosperity hasn’t been matched with political and social advancement.
Cook and Bayrasli believe that Washington and the EU are positioned as mere spectators, with little leverage over Turkey’s internal affairs. The implicit Turkish threat to send a large number of refugees in the direction of Europe means that the EU will remain mute over Erdogan’s purge. According to Cook, “Turkey has the EU over a barrel.” Turkey’s paramount importance in the fight against ISIS will silence Washington too.
With its military in chaos, with police and the ministry of interior decimated by purges, Turkey may not remain an effective partner in the fight against ISIS, either in controlling its borders with Syria or working with the US at Incirlik. Who is going to substitute thousands of judges and teachers, and tens of thousands of policemen and army personnel? The purges are weakening Turkey and are undermining its capacity for effective governance. Turkey might have the EU over a barrel, but at least Washington should not be a mere spectator.
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Peace picks August 1-5
- Vitality, diversity, and diplomacy in Chinese contemporary art | Tuesday, August 2nd | 10:00 am -12:00 pm | Brookings | Click HERE to RSVP | China’s “reform and opening up” period has witnessed a booming Chinese contemporary art scene, which has steadily adopted artistic genres and techniques from the West. But heavy foreign influence has not led artists to abandon the distinctive features of Chinese art; rather, it has inspired a revival of its unique characteristics. Xu Bing, Fan Di’an, and other leading Chinese artists of the day have immersed themselves in multicultural environments throughout their careers, infusing their artwork with related themes. Xu Bing has experimented with innovative methods of expression that reflect his personal philosophical journey, his exposure to diverse viewpoints, and his pursuit of common bonds across cultures. Fan Di’an has advanced global recognition of Chinese avant-garde artists in various regions and across different styles. Together, these two artists have greatly enriched international understanding of this rapidly changing country. On August 2, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings will host these two distinguished pioneers of Chinese contemporary art for a discussion on how global and local forces influence artwork in China and how art reflects the views and ideas of Chinese society. Following presentations by Xu and Fan, Jan Stuart, who has worked with both artists at the British Museum and is currently the curator of Asian art at the Freer and Sackler Museums, will provide a commentary on their remarks. Cheng Li, director and senior fellow of the China Center, will then moderate a conversation with the group and take questions from the audience.
- Madaya: Portrait of a Syrian Town Under Siege| Wednesday, August 3rd | 12:00 -1:30 pm | Middle East Institute | Click HERE to RSVP | July marked one year since the beginning of the siege of the town of Madaya in southern Syria. The town’s 40,000 residents have been surrounded by landmines, checkpoints, and snipers, and forced to survive on meager supplies. Halted aid deliveries, denial of humanitarian evacuations, and unmet healthcare needs have already led to dozens of preventable deaths. The Middle East Institute, Syrian American Medical Society, and Physicians for Human Rights are pleased to host Dr. Ammar Ghanem (SAMS) and Elise Baker (PHR) for the release of a new report, Madaya: Portrait of a Syrian Town Under Siege. The report examines the public heath effects of the siege and puts forth recommendations about best practices in humanitarian assistance to besieged areas.
- A Multi-Pronged Analysis of the Causes and Effects of the Coup in Turkey | Thursday, August 4th | 4:00pm | The Institute of World Politics | Click HERE to RSVP | Today’s talk by Mr. Khlgatyan will focus on the recent coup attempt in Turkey: a discursion on its causes, immediate and long term effects, and implications for regional security and geopolitics. Vilen Khlgatyan is the founder and president of Global Research Center (GRC). He specializes in the geopolitics of energy, non-kinetic warfare, and the post-Soviet region with an emphasis on the Caucasus.
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