Tag: Turkey
ISIS recruitment
On Thursday, the Middle East Institute and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies hosted ‘Recruiting for Jihad: The Allure of ISIS.’ Charles Lister, Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute, Ahmet Sait Yayla, Terrorism and Radicalization Specialist and Chair of the Sociology Department at Harran University, Turkey, and Anne Speckhard, Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Georgetown University and Director of the International Canter for the Study of Violent Extremism, all presented their thoughts on who ISIS attracts. Daniel Serwer, Professor of Conflict Management at Johns Hopkins SAIS and Scholar at the Middle East Institute, moderated.
Lister believes that every case is unique when it comes to who is recruited into ISIS. It recruits from all over. There is no single profile of a person most likely to join.Its strategies have been effective to the point where it is no longer only a regional terrorist organization, but a global one. In the past few years, ISIS has recruited about 50,000 people. The group now has a presence in countries in and around North Africa and the Middle East. ISIS has an unofficial presence in many other countries.
Lister attributes ISIS success in recruitment to five factors:
- Exploitation of chaos in Syria
- Military success
- Undermining of its rivals and adversaries
- Creation of a clear, alternative way of life
- Exploitation of media and social media
Though ISIS uses all these methods for radicalization, recruitment is most successful with personal contact, both over the Internet and in the privacy of homes. This makes forming effective counter-recruitment difficult.
Lister suggested several counters to ISIS recruitment. Fighting ISIS directly on the battlefield, targeting its leadership and finance, working more with rebel groups on the ground, and enhancing border surveillance are all ways to combat ISIS. Lister added that encouraging a safe space for a healthy, dynamic debate on sensitive issues will help in the fight against the Islamic State.
Yayla spoke mainly on the ISIS presence in Turkey and Turkish fighters that joined ISIS. Out of the 5,000 people from Turkey currently fighting with various groups within Syria, around 1,200 to 1,400 are working with ISIS. These people keep passing the Turkish-Syrian border. On the border, villages are close together, and many of the people directly across the border are friends and family. Villagers and the ISIS Turkish fighters know each other well and do what needs to be done for one another. Many of the people passing these borders are smuggling weapons and supplies.
For ISIS recruitment in Turkey, social media has a large impact. Facebook videos of Turkish ISIS and Jahbat al-Nusra fighters convince some to join the groups. They subtitle these videos in Turkish to appeal to the Turkish audience. Many Turkish recruits worked previously with al-Qaeda previously. They reach out to their close circles of friends in order to recruit. Criminals from Istanbul and Ankara are attracted to ISIS as they need money. ISIS provides $200/month stipends. Living on the streets in Turkey is much worse to these people than living a better life with ISIS in Syria.
Speckhard has interviewed terrorists, defectors, and family members of terrorists. She believes ISIS has been successful in recruitment because of four factors:
- Representation of an alternative world order
- Promotion of its ideology
- Some level of social support
- Individual vulnerability
Speckhard focused on the individual vulnerability to recruitment. Desires for revenge and prior trauma make people vulnerable. Those not in conflict zones watch videos of places like Iraq and want to be a part of something. Unemployment is a big factor in recruitment. Sexual rewards, as an ISIS fighter is given a wife, are also a motivation in joining. ISIS provides immediate satisfaction and relief. People are drawn to this.
ISIS provides an alternative to marginalization. Speckhard pressed for a civil rights movement and more effective integration, especially in Europe. The solution to marginalization will have to be legally enforced. She added that it is important to work with Turkey and support Greece going forward, in order to lessen the number of vulnerable people.
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Peace picks February 29-March 4
- Analyzing the Results of the February 26 Iranian Elections | Wednesday, March 2nd | 10:00-11:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The event will analyze the results of the February 26 elections for the Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, focusing on how these elections will influence Iran’s domestic and international policies. Panelists will also discuss recent political and economic developments in light of the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Speakers include Bernard Hourcade, Global Fellow at the Wilson Center and Senior Research Fellow Emeritus at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director of Foreign Policy and Senior Fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative at Brookings Institution, and Mohsen Milani, Executive Director of the USF World Center for Strategic & Diplomatic Studies (CSDS) at the University of South Florida and Professor of the Dep’t of Gov’t & International Affairs. The moderator will be Haleh Esfandiari, Public Policy Fellow and former Director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
- Libya: What’s Next? | Wednesday, March 2nd | 3:30-5:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In recent weeks, policymakers in Western capitals have expressed an increasing willingness to intervene militarily against the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) in its Libyan coastal stronghold of Sirte, driven in part by an uptick in devastating attacks on Libya’s oil ports by ISIS fighters and the group’s expanding influence along Libya’s coast. Please join the Atlantic Council on March 2, 2016 for a discussion on the protracted struggle for political and military control over Libya. Claudia Gazzini will share her expertise and research on Libya’s recent developments, the rise of ISIS, and recommendations for the development of Libya’s institutions based on recent visits to Tripoli. Karim Mezran will moderate the discussion. As Senior Analyst for Libya, Dr. Claudia Gazzini oversees and directs International Crisis Group’s reporting and analysis on Libya. Dr. Karim Mezran is a Senior Fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, where he focuses on the political developments of North Africa.
- Internet Freedom in the Age of Dictators and Terrorists | Thursday, March 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe | The original promise of the internet as a mechanism for free exchange of information and greater democratization seems a dream from a distant past. Authoritarian leaders in China, Russia and around the world seek to build walls around their country’s internet and censor incoming information and online discourse, while in free societies we are grappling with the right balance between security and privacy of online information in the face of terrorist threats. The briefing will focus on internet freedom broadly, including censorship and surveillance; and trends in how internet companies are evolving to handle increased government requests from law enforcement. In addition, panelists will discuss the role of export controls in ensuring that U.S. and European technologies do not contribute to human rights abuses. The following panelists are scheduled to participate: Lisl Brunner, Director of Policy and Learning, Global Network Initiative, Rebecca MacKinnon, Director, Ranking Digital Rights, and Tim Maurer, Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics | Friday, March 4th | 10:00-11:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Dr. Joseph Sassoon’s book, Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics, investigates the system of authoritarianism in eight Arab republics through the prism of more than 120 memoirs of senior officials and opponents. This book aims to enrich the understanding of authoritarianism that prevailed in these countries and the difficult process of transition from authoritarianism that began after 2011. Joseph Sassoon, Associate Professor at Georgetown University and former Fellow at the Wilson Center will give a talk, while Henri J. Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center will moderate.
- Beyond 2016: Security challenges and opportunities for the next administration | Tuesday, March 1st | 9:00-4:15 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On March 1, the seventh annual military and federal fellow research symposium will feature the independent research produced by members of the military services and federal agencies who are currently serving at think-tanks and universities across the nation. Organized by the fellows themselves, the symposium provides a platform for building greater awareness of the cutting-edge work that America’s military and governmental leaders are producing on key national security policy issues. With presidential primary season well underway, it’s clear that whoever emerges in November 2016 as the next commander-in-chief will have their hands full with a number of foreign policy and national security choices. This year’s panels will explore these developing issues and their prospects for resolution after the final votes have been counted. During their keynote conversation, the Honorable Michèle Flournoy will discuss her assessment of the strategic threat environment with General John Allen, USMC (Ret.), who will also provide opening remarks on strategic leadership and the importance of military and other federal fellowship experiences. After each panel and discussion, participants will take audience questions. Panel information and panelists may be found here.
- Human Rights Abuses in Putin’s Russia | Wednesday, March 2nd | 2:30-4:00 | Atlantic Council | On February 27, one year ago, Boris Nemtsov was gunned down just steps away from the Kremlin. His murder has since become the symbol of the increasing oppression and human rights abuses in Russia under President Putin. To mark the one year anniversary of Boris Nemtsov’s death, the Senate Human Rights Caucus and the Atlantic Council will host a discussion on human rights abuses in Putin’s Russia. This briefing will also seek to examine the current political environment in Russia and address important questions, including: What human rights violations are occurring? How can policymakers support human rights in Russia? This will be a conversation with Senator Mark Kirk, Illinois senator, U.S. Senate, Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy, Rob Berschinski, Deputy Assistant of State for the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor for the U.S. Department of State, and Paula Dobriansky, Senior Fellow for the JFK Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. John Herbst, Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council will introduce and moderate the event.
- Violence and Gender: The Other Side of Pakistan’s Urban Unrest | Wednesday, March 2nd | 3:00-4:40 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Much of the international focus on violence in Pakistan’s cities tends to revolve around terrorism perpetrated by Islamist extremist groups. In reality, a variety of other major factors drive violence in urban Pakistan as well—including issues associated with water access, waste disposal, transport, and drugs and alcohol. In these cases, gender considerations play a key role. Canada’s International Center for Development Research (IDRC) and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) recently funded a two-year research project examining how gender and violence intersect in the megacity of Karachi, Pakistan’s financial capital and largest city, and in the twin cities of Islamabad/Rawalpindi, the federal capital and home to military headquarters, respectively. The research was jointly undertaken by the Institute of Business Administration in Karachi and King’s College in London. This event will highlight some of the project’s major findings and possible implications for international assistance programs in urban Pakistan. Speakers include Amiera Sawas, Researcher at Imperial College, London, and Daanish Mustafa, Reader of the Department of Geography at King’s College, London.
- The Syrian Jihad: A Book Launch with Charles Lister | Friday, March 4th | 12:00-1:15 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to announce the U.S. launch of the latest book by terrorism expert and Middle East Institute Resident Fellow Charles Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Oxford University Press, 2016). In the book, Lister assesses and explains the emergence of Sunni jihadist movements within Syria’s fledgling insurgency, charts their evolution, and situates them within the global jihadist project. Unprecedented numbers of foreign fighters have joined such groups, who will almost certainly continue to host them. The book scrutinizes the strategic and tactical lessons learned from other jihadist conflict zones, as well as the complex interplay between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and how their relationship has influenced the jihadist sphere both inside Syria and worldwide. Copies of the book in limited number will be available for purchase and signing at the event. MEI Vice President for Policy and Research Paul Salem will moderate.
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The cessation of hostilities that won’t
I’m getting press queries about the cessation of hostilities in Syria, which goes into effect a midnight Damascus time tonight. Here are some of them, along with answers:
- What chance does this ceasefire have of working?
Little. Without any neutral monitors or agreement on what cannot be targeted, parties on both sides will accuse the other of violating without any possibility of determining who is right. In any event, the Russians have published a map indicating very small areas covered by the cessation of hostilities:
2. Won’t the excluded groups, Islamic State and al-Nusra, simply keep on fighting?
Yes. ISIS at least is largely separate from the moderate opposition, so it can be targeted in principle without necessarily hitting others. Al Nusra is embedded in opposition controlled territory, so targeting it will hit moderate opposition as well.
3. Do you think the cessation of hostilities will simply allow Syrian regime/Russians to cement their gains?
It will help them consolidate their gains, yes. Cement would be going too far, however. They are gaining territory where housing, infrastructure and commercial property has suffered enormous damage. Moscow is repeating what it did to Grozny in Chechnya. But neither the regime nor the Russians has the resources to followup with reconstruction. Nor do I think they can restore Assad’s authority over much of the population.
4. Has John Kerry really been forced into an impossible position because of the Russian intervention?
Yes, but the impossible position is determined also by President Obama’s unwillingness to intervene on the side of the opposition or provide them with the means they require to defend themselves from the Russians, Syrian government forces, Iranians, and Iraqi militias arrayed against them.
5. There’s talk the US may attempt to partition off part of Syria – is that realistic?
It might one day have been possible to create a safe area/no fly zone controlled by the opposition. But it is much harder today with Russian planes operating over much of Syria. Some opposition-controlled territories are likely to survive, but they will be few and far between.
6. Why not just divide Syria? Isn’t that what is happening anyway?
Formal, juridical partition of Syria is simply a bad idea. It would open the question of other borders in the region and beyond, putting at risk our Turkish ally as well as the unity of Iraq. Washington will not want to create a precedent that would help the Russians justify what they did in Crimea or what they are trying to do in eastern Ukraine, never mind South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria. The Americans have a big stake in maintaining the notion that national borders should not be changed by military action.
That said, Syria is likely to end up a far more decentralized country than once it was. That is not necessarily a bad thing and might allow for different parts of the country to be governed more to the liking of their inhabitants.
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The Russians win this round
John Kerry went to Munich this week looking for a ceasefire and humanitarian access. He got a “cessation of hostilities,” which implies less legal status and less permanence, and a promise of immediate humanitarian access. This was entirely predictable and predicted: the cessation of hostilities freezes the recent Russian/Iranian/Syrian government gains in place on the ground around Aleppo. Humanitarian access will shift the burden of feeding and sheltering hundreds of thousands of besieged Syrians from their own government to the international community.
Just as predictable as this agreement is its breakdown. There is no neutral party to monitor implementation. Even if the moderate forces represented in the High Negotiation Commission, which gave a nod to the deal, restrain their cadres, there are lots of other fighters all over Syria, including extremists associated with the Islamic State and Al Qaeda who are uninterested in stopping the hostilities. The Russian-backed offensive never made any distinction between extremists and relative moderates, whom it slew with abandon. Some of the relative moderates will continue their efforts to flee northwards. Others who remain will swell the ranks of the extremists.
It would be surprising if an agreement built on such shifting sands were to last more than a couple of weeks. The Russians, Iranians, Hizbollah and Syrian forces will suffer many potshots and will at some point decide to take to opportunity to go at it again. The opposition will be trying to regain its footing, but that will be difficult as civilians flee and extremists recruit. The Americans have given no indication of any willingness to beef up arms to the opposition or to allow the Saudis and Gulf monarchies to deliver anti-aircraft and other higher quality weapons. The logistical advantage lies with the regime and its allies, who are not besieged and will more easily rearm and resupply.
So the next round, whenever it occurs, is likely to find the opposition at an even greater military disadvantage. Russia may want to help the Syrian Kurds take control of the entire northern border of Syria with Turkey, thereby boxing in the remaining opposition forces in the north. That could trigger a Turkish intervention, widening the war and weakening America’s best allies, the Kurds, in fighting the Islamic State. The Russians will also want to clear out the opposition forces near Damascus and in the south, where Russian air strikes had intensified in recent days. It is hard to say that the regime may “win” this war, because much of the country will be destroyed, but Assad could end up remaining in the presidential palace and presiding but not ruling over a fragmented and desperate country.
Without a political agreement that leads to his certain departure, it is hard for me to picture the Americans, Europeans and Gulf states supporting any significant reconstruction. Washington has already spent upwards of $5 billion on humanitarian aid and will presumably spend billions more. The Russians and Iranians, so far as I know, haven’t spent a dime on humanitarian aid yet. With oil prices around $30/barrel, both Moscow and Tehran will be hard strapped. Even at $80/barrel they wouldn’t have much to spare. They won’t be willing to spend any significant amount on reconstruction in Syria.
So an Assad “win” will make Syria a ward of poor step-parents with their own offspring to nurture. Some days I think the opposition should just stop fighting and allow the regime to confront the challenges of governing post-war Syria, with its ruined infrastructure, its decimated security forces, its limited oil production, its drought-ridden agriculture, and its dwindling water resources. How long would Assad last? Many Syrians have already been governing themselves through local councils for the better part of five years. It is going to be hard to take the legitimacy and authority they have built up back and stockpile it again in Damascus. Assad may win the military fight, but he has lost his country.
The Russians and Iranians are also likely losers in the long term. They have doubled down on supporting Assad. Their efforts will drive more Syrians to support extremists and guarantee that no successor regime will be friendly to their interests.
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The ceasefire/humanitarian trap
Secretary of State Kerry is in Munich at the annual security conference reportedly talking with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov about a ceasefire and humanitarian access in Syria, focused on Aleppo and the north. That’s where Russian air attacks have decimated both the Syrian opposition fighters and their civilian supporters in recent days.
Let’s leave aside the question of whether Kerry should ever speak with Lavrov again after his mendacity of the past several months, when he led the admittedly gullible Secretary of State to believe that Moscow might make common cause with Washington against the Islamic State (ISIL). Instead, Moscow’s main military targets in Syria have been relative moderates. But we all have to talk with people who have treated us shabbily. The question is whether there is any hope of a ceasefire and humanitarian access.
Surprise: the answer is yes.*
At some point the Russians, the Iranians and Bashar al Assad are going to conclude that they have reached their main objectives. Going further will result in diminishing returns. Having displaced well over 100,000 people and besieged several hundred thousand more, the triumvirate will not want to feed and shelter them, much less provide medical care and sanitary facilities.
Particularly if the Kurdish forces in northern Syria, who are friendly with the Russians and the Syrian government, are able to seize the stretch of the border with Turkey that they don’t already control, Moscow will want to halt its offensive and consolidate its gains. In addition to dumping the humanitarian burden on the UN (which gets its resources from the US, the Europeans and the Gulf), from Moscow’s perspective agreeing to a ceasefire would reduce the (already small) risk that Turkey will enter the fray to block Kurdish advances.
Should the Americans, Europeans and Gulf states fall into the ceasefire/humanitarian trap?
They don’t have much choice. There appears to be no real possibility of a military response to the Russian-backed offensive. Syrian suffering is monumental. The Europeans will want to use humanitarian assistance to stem the tide of refugees. The Gulf states will feel obligated, not least because they too don’t want the refugees. The Americans have never stinted on humanitarian relief.
There is something wrong with this picture. Moscow and Tehran have created the current humanitarian crisis in northern Syria. They, not the Americans/Europeans/Gulf, should be paying to alleviate the humanitarian consequences of their military advances. So far as I am aware, neither Moscow nor Tehran has anted up a ruble or a rial. All the assistance they provide to the government in Damascus goes to the regime and areas the regime controls.
It is high time for the Americans to tell Lavrov that we expect Russia to do its part. Putin wants Russia to be counted among the great powers. He should start spending like one. I’d start the bidding at $2 billion from the Russians for UN humanitarian relief efforts and settle for $1 billion.
I’d also make it clear that Moscow’s indiscriminate bombing entails responsibility for post-war reconstruction. The Russian approach in Syria resembles what Putin did in Chechnya: level and rule. Post-war Chechnya cost Moscow a bundle. The bill for Syria will be many times that. Assad’s international opponents may feel obligated to provide humanitarian assistance to his Syrian opponents as they are chased from their homes, but they should not provide any assistance to rebuild a Syria still ruled by Assad or his regime. That is a Russian and Iranian responsibility.
Washington has already provided over $5 billion in humanitarian assistance to Syrians inside and outside the country. American aid is distributed inside Syria both in regime and opposition controlled areas. But if Assad wins this war, we’ll have to take a much harder-nosed attitude when it comes to funding reconstruction.
*For the record: I wrote this before the Russians proposed a March 1 date, and well before the proposed cessation of hostilities.
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Syria options
There aren’t many options left, as Syrian security forces advance to besiege Aleppo and Idlib with Russian and Iranian support. But here are the ones that make some sort of sense to me, with a few pros and cons:
- Impose a no-fly zone over a humanitarian corridor from the Turkish border to Aleppo or even Idlib.
Pro: protects hundreds of thousands of civilians currently at risk from Russian bombardment.
Con: would require the Russians to cooperate, which is unlikely, or American willingness to shoot down Russian aircraft, which is even more unlikely.
2. Down Syrian helicopters that use barrel bombs to terrorize civilian populations, either with US or Turkish air assets or by providing opposition fighters on the ground with the needed anti-aircraft weapons.
Pro: protects civilians without challenging Russian fixed-wing aircraft.
Con: brings the US or Turkey into direct conflict with Syria, or risks proliferation to unreliable forces of anti-aircraft weapons that might be misused.
3. Open the arms supply spigot to the opposition, which has seen the flow sharply reduced in recent months.
Pro: enables Syrians to protect themselves and provides leverage over the regime and the Russians.
Con: re-escalates a war Washington had been trying to end, and in any event it is late in the game for this move to have much impact.
4. Support deployment of Arab ground troops, taking up a recent Saudi/Gulf offer.
Pro: could be deployed to protect some civilian areas, though the offer appeared to be premised on US participation, which is unlikely.
Con: Gulf troops would likely end up clashing with Islamic State or Jabhat al Nusra fighters, with uncertain consequences.
5. Expand US air attacks to include Hizbollah.
Pro: Washington says it is fighting terrorists in Syria; Hizbollah has attacked and killed many more American in terrorist acts than the Islamic State.
Con: Hizbollah and Iran can be expected to retaliate against Americans, most likely somewhere in the Middle East but possibly even at home.
6. Do nothing military and stick with the diplomacy.
Pro: the US stays our of a situation that is increasingly messy.
Con: Putin’s Russia gets to dictate terms, Assad stays in place and Syrians suffer.
None of these propositions is a slam dunk. All would entail American willingness to get more deeply involved in Syria. I haven’t heard a great clamor for that, despite some bold op/ed writing.
President Obama, who is often criticized for being irresolute, is demonstrating iron commitment to not getting involved in the Syrian civil war and keeping his focus exclusively on the Islamic State. His predecessors have been far less disciplined, even if most of them also resisted at first. Bush 41 intervened in Panama and Somalia, Clinton in Bosnia and Kosovo, Bush 43 in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even Obama intervened in Libya, but regrets what happened thereafter.
The results of all these interventions were mixed, with the best results in Panama and the Balkans. Afghanistan and Iraq are arguably closer to the situation in Syria than some of the other countries named. That’s not a good omen. Obama has good reason to hesitate, even if I think he made a big mistake (years ago) that will dog his legacy.
I’d certainly like to see the President consider downing the barrel-bombing helicopters and expanding US attacks to Hizbollah, which is becoming a major force multiplier for an Assad regime that is running short on manpower. Those two moves could be justified on humanitarian grounds and would vastly improve the American diplomatic posture, without clashing directly with the Russians or committing ground forces.
Tell me: which option would you choose?
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