Tag: Turkey
What to do about Syria?
On January 5, CFR hosted a panel discussion entitled “What to do About Syria” which also aired on HBO. The discussion was designed to resemble a National Security Council meeting. Panelists included Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, CFR, Paul Pillar, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University, and Michael Doran, Senior Fellow, the Hudson Institute. Richard Haass, President, CFR, moderated the discussion.
Paul Pillar stated that none of the multiple sides in the Syrian conflict appears poised to win in the near future. The Russian military intervention that began in September has shored up the regime. The regime still controls roughly 1/4 of the country in a North-South strip. There are non-ISIS opposition areas, largely in the northwest but also near the Golan, as well as large areas of ISIS control in the east and Kurdish control in the north. There are hundreds of opposition groups and many coalitions. Over the past year, ISIS has had neither a net loss or a net gain of territory in Syria, but has lost territory on balance when Iraq is included.
Pillar explained that on the diplomatic front, the Vienna process led to the International Syria Support Group, whose members agree on the need for a ceasefire and political settlement. The Saudis held a meeting in Riyadh in December and agreed that Assad did not have to leave until after negotiations are held. The US adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a ceasefire. The recent suspension of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran shouldn’t have a huge impact beyond the enmity we already knew existed.
Philip Gordon described the current situation as a dynamic stalemate. The attrition of regime forces is unlikely to cause the regime’s collapse because of outside support from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The main battle in Syria doesn’t involve ISIS; it’s between the regime and the non-ISIS opposition. The Vienna Process is a positive step. However, the diplomatic gaps between the Saudis and the Iranians remain large.
Michael Doran believes that the US has essentially dropped its demand that Assad leave by pushing his departure so far into the future that it will not happen on Obama’s clock. This frees up the Obama administration to discuss deconfliction with Russia and Iran, a shift the Saudis dislike.
Gordon summarized US policy in Syria as such: since 2011, when Obama declared that Assad must go, US policy has been to strengthen the moderate opposition, in order to pressure the regime to negotiate. So far that hasn’t worked, but it remains US policy. Doran is right that the
definition of what a political transition would look like has evolved. As it became clearer that Russia and Iran would prop up Assad, diplomats examined other types of transitions that might be more feasible. There has been an effort to unify the opposition but it remains fragmented because our partners support different groups. We have tried to build the capacity of the opposition groups, but it has not been enough; they are fighting a professional military backed by Russia and Iran. The president has authorized force against ISIS, using the legal basis that ISIS threatens the Iraqi government; Obama lacks a legal basis to target the regime.
Doran spoke of the limits of our support for the non-ISIS opposition. Iran and Russia have backed the regime and there has not been comparable activity from our side. The train and equip program failed because we found few recruits willing to fight ISIS exclusively. We also work with the Kurds who are aligned with the PKK. We have alienated our Sunni allies. Our position on Assad is critical to mobilizing Sunni support against ISIS. The US would also need ground forces, perhaps in a 1:5 ratio with our allies.
Gordon clarified that the US does support the opposition militarily and politically. We just don’t provide specifics.
Pillar stated that even though the US is a superpower, it may not be able to satisfactorily solve Syria. It’s not in the US’s interest to take sides in the Sunni-Shia conflict. We should place more emphasis on the diplomatic track because tamping down the war is most important.
Gordon outlined two policy options going forward. First, the US could take out Assad militarily, but this could generate more refugees and cause a power vacuum. The better option is to prioritize a ceasefire to stop the war; this is more important than a political transition. Gordon clarified that he is not proposing an alliance with Russia and Iran, but ending the conflict roughly along the lines of the current reality on the ground. Local areas would gain autonomy, but this would stop short of a partition, so as not to set a precedent of carving out new states in the region.
Doran questioned Gordon’s attachment to the integrity of Syria, but largely agreed with his vision for an end state. However, he reiterated that such an arrangement wouldn’t be possible without ground forces. Haass proposed that the US think seriously about supporting an independent Kurdistan as part of a deal, since the Kurds are the most effective fighting force against ISIS.
Pillar highlighted potential positive effects of the Russian military intervention. Russia will draw the ire of radical Sunnis, and Russia will gain more leverage over Assad. Russia also has an interest in tamping down the conflict; it doesn’t want to prop up a beleaguered Assad forever.
An audience member asked how we might prevent revenge attacks once the conflict ends. Pillar pointed out that under Gordon’s autonomous regions proposal, groups would have a diminished ability on the ground to carry out revenge attacks. Haass contended that, contrary to Western notions of pluralism, a future map of Syria must reflect more homogeneity than heterogeneity.
Gordon addressed an audience question about why the US sees fighting ISIS as in its national interest versus fighting the regime. The US has identified ISIS as a threat because it kidnaps Americans and seeks to destabilize regional partners. We have identified discrete steps we can take to degrade and destroy ISIS. Taking out Assad would require an effort like the invasion of Iraq; we should not minimize the cost and consequences of such an effort. The notion that taking out Assad would yield a positive outcome requires a larger suspension of disbelief than the notion that the Iranians and Russians might agree to a ceasefire if the US drops its demand that they abandon Assad.
Another audience member asked whether we need the Saudis to agree that ISIS is a fundamental threat to their existence. Pillar contended that it would be ideal if the Saudis would follow their own interests more intelligently. In the past, the Saudis have faced the threat posed by Al Qaeda; persistent diplomacy and tough love talks will be required to get them to do the same with ISIS. Gordon noted that it is difficult to explain to countries what we think their interests should be. Saudi Arabia is more concerned about Iran than ISIS and Turkey is more concerned about the Kurds. Doran contended that the Saudis and the Turks have defined their interests correctly; we are wrong about what their interests are.
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Peace picks, January 4-8
- Stability and Human Security in Afghanistan in 2016 | Monday, January 4th | 10:30-12:00 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In 2016, the year of the U.S. presidential election, the international community will mark another milestone in its 15-year engagement in Afghanistan. Despite billions of dollars spent by the international community to stabilize the country, Afghanistan has seen little improvement in terms of overall stability and human security. The situation on the ground for Afghans continues to be grave, and while the international coalition suffered the least number of casualties in 2015, casualty levels have greatly increased for Afghan security forces. Security for the Afghan people has also deteriorated in large swaths of the country, further complicating humanitarian response. Afghan civilians are at greater risk today than at any time since Taliban rule, with a dramatic increase in the numbers of mostly young Afghans fleeing their country. Afghanistan’s economic situation also remains poor, and major political challenges lie ahead in 2016.In response to these troubling trends, President Obama decided to keep more than 5,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan through the end of his presidency. Looking at and beyond the coming year, what are the key security, economic, political, and humanitarian challenges and opportunities that need to be addressed in Afghanistan?On January 4, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings will host an event focused on the current status of the war and stabilization effort in Afghanistan. Panelists include Che Bolden, federal executive fellow at Brookings; Jason Cone, executive director at Doctors Without Borders; Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown; and Ann Vaughan, director of policy and advocacy at Mercy Corps. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon, and author of “The Future of Land Warfare” (Brookings Institution Press, 2015), will moderate the discussion.
- Insight Turkey 5th Annual Conference: Turkish Foreign Policy After Elections | Wednesday, January 6th | 8:30-4:30 | SETA Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA) will hold its annual conference on Turkey on Wednesday. Panel topics include: Neighboring Civil Wars; The Kurdish Question as a Regional Challenge; and the US-Turkey Relationship. The keynote address will be given by Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister, Mehmet Şimşek. Please see here for a full schedule and list of participants.
- Iraq: Can Good Governance Erode Support for Militants? | Wednesday, January 6th | 1:00-2:30 | US Institute for Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Extremist groups like ISIS have seized control in swaths of Iraq and Syria in part because they tout themselves as an alternative to corrupt and inept government at all levels. Join USIP on January 6 to hear about new research by the global humanitarian and development organization Mercy Corps on the connection between citizens’ perceptions of governance and public support for armed opposition. Panelists will explore how good governance may erode the pull of sectarian identity politics, and showcase instances when governance successes have appeared to reduce support for armed opposition and violence. USIP experts will discuss the research results in light of what the Institute’s staff and partners on the ground have learned in the course of their conflict mitigation and peacebuilding work. Panelists include Nancy Lindborg, President at USIP; Dr. Jacob N. Shapiro, Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University; Michael Young, Senior Advisor a Mercy Corps; Dr. Elie Abouaoun, Director of Middle East Programs at USIP; and Sarhang Hamasaeed, Senior Program Officer at USIP.
- Readout on the Paris Climate Agreement: What Was Achieved and What Comes Next? | Thursday, January 7th | 10:30-12:00 | Center for Strategic & International Studies | RSVP to attend | The CSIS Energy and National Security Program is pleased to invite you to a discussion on the Paris Agreement reached at the 21st Conference of Parties meeting under the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (COP21). To help us understand what the new climate agreement means for future U.S. and international efforts to combat climate change, Paul Bodnar, Senior Director for Energy and Climate Change, National Security Council, The White House, will discuss what the agreement entails and what actions the U.S. government and the international community are likely to focus on in the coming years. Sarah Ladislaw, Director and Senior Fellow with the CSIS Energy and National Security Program, will moderate the discussion.
- The Great Tradeoff: Confronting Moral Conflicts in the Era of Globalization | Thursday, January 7th | 12:15-1:30 | Peterson Institute for International Economics | Online Event – Open to Attend | The Peterson Institute will release its latest book, The Great Tradeoff: Confronting Moral Conflicts in the Era of Globalization, by Steven R. Weisman, the Institute’s vice president for publications and communications. The book has an important theme that there is a moral case to be made for globalization, but the case is far from simple. American Enterprise Institute (AEI) President Arthur C. Brooks, president of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI); Steven Rattner, former counselor to the secretary of the Treasury; and Stelios Vasilakis, the Stavros Niarchos Foundation’s Director of Programs and Strategic Initiatives, will be discussants at the book launch on January 7, 2016.The global financial and economic crisis that began in 2008 highlighted the profound moral concerns long surrounding globalization. In his book, Weisman addresses the questions whether materialist excess, doctrinaire embrace of free trade and capital flows, and indifference to economic injustice contributed to the disaster of the last decade, and whether it was ethical to bail out banks and governments. The Great Tradeoff blends economics, moral philosophy, history, and politics, and Weisman argues that the concepts of liberty, justice, virtue, and loyalty help to explain the passionate disagreements spawned by a globally integrated economy. The Institute is grateful to the Stavros Niarchos Foundation for its generous support of this project and of the Institute’s prior research in this interdisciplinary area.
- GULAG: Gone but not Forgotten | Friday, January 8th | 10:00-11:30 | Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | GULAG, a system of Soviet forced labor camps, was officially shut down more than half a century ago, but its memory remains a topic of dispute. Only a few of the camps’ survivors and former employees are still alive and can share their stories and reflections. For her book, 58th Uneliminated, Elena Racheva interviewed those affected by the GULAG and will recount some of their remarkable stories. She will also analyze what role the memory of these camps plays for the newer generations of Russians. Professor Kathleen Smith will discuss commemorative projects in Russia, and how they have changed over the course of Russia’s independence.
- Uncivil Rites: Palestine and the Limits of Academic Freedom | Friday, January 8th | 12:30-2:00 | The Palestine Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the summer of 2014, renowned American Indian Studies professor Steven Salaita had his offer of a tenured professorship revoked by the University of Illinois Board of Trustees. Salaita’s employment was terminated in response to his public tweets criticizing the Israeli government’s summer assault on Gaza. His firing generated a huge public outcry, with thousands petitioning for his reinstatement, and more than five thousand scholars pledging to boycott the University of Illinois. His case raises important questions about academic freedom, free speech on campus, and the movement for justice in Palestine. In this book, Salaita combines personal reflection and political critique to provide a thorough analysis of his controversial termination. He situates his case at the intersection of important issues that affect both higher education and social justice activism. A light lunch will be served at 12:30; the event begins at 1:00.
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The end is nigh, once again
Two years ago I published a post with this title. Remarkably little has changed since then in many conflicts:
- South Sudan is suffering even more bloodletting.
- The Central African Republic is still imploding.
- North Korea is no longer risking internal strife but continues its belligerence on the international stage.
- China is still challenging its neighbors in the East and South China Seas.
- Syria is even more chaotic, with catastrophic consequences for its population and strains for its neighbors.
- Egypt continues its repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and secular human rights advocates.
- Israel and Palestine are no closer to agreement on a two-state solution.
- Afghanistan has a new president but the Taliban are stronger in the countryside and the Islamic State is gaining adherents; money and people are still expatriating.
- Al Qaeda is less potent in many places, but that is little comfort since the Islamic State has risen to take the leading role in Salafist jihadism.
- Ukraine has lost control of Crimea, which has been annexed by Russia, and risks losing control of much of the southeastern Donbas region.
The only issue I listed then that is palpably improved is the Iranian nuclear question, which is now the subject of a deal that should postpone Tehran’s access to the nuclear materials required to build a bomb for 10 to 15 years.
Danielle Pletka of AEI topped off the gloom this year with a piece suggesting there are reasons to fear Putin’s recklessness could trigger World War III.
Without going that far, it is easy to add to the doom and gloom list:
- Europe is suffering a bout of right-wing xenophobia (the US has a milder case), triggered by migrants from the Middle East and North Africa.
- Mali and Nigeria are suffering serious extremist challenges.
- The Houthi takeover in Yemen, and intervention there by a Saudi-led coalition, is causing vast suffering in one of the world’s poorest countries and allowing Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to expand its operations.
- Civil war in Libya is far from resolution, despite some signatures on a UN-sponsored agreement to end it.
- Turkey has re-initiated a war against Kurdish forces that had been in abeyance.
- Even Brazil, once a rising power, is suffering scandals that may bring down its president, even as its economy tanks.
I’m still not ready to throw in the towel. Some successes of two years ago continue and others have begun: Colombia‘s civil war is nearing its end, Burma/Myanmar continues its transition in a more open direction (even though it has failed to settle conflicts with several important minorities), Kenya is still improving, ditto Liberia, which along with Sierra Leone and maybe Guinea seems to have beaten the Ebola epidemic, and much of the Balkans, even if Kosovo and Bosnia are going through rough patches.
I still think, as I said two years ago:
If there is a continuous thread running through the challenges we face it is this: getting other people to govern themselves in ways that meet the needs of their own populations (including minorities) and don’t threaten others. That was what we did in Europe with the Marshall Plan. It is also what we contributed to in East Asia, as democracy established itself in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and elsewhere. We have also had considerable success in recent decades in Latin America and Africa, where democracy and economic development have grown roots in Brazil, Argentina, Ghana, South Africa, and other important countries. I may not like the people South Africans have elected, but I find it hard to complain about the way they have organized themselves to do it.
This is what we have failed to do in the Middle East: American military support for autocracies there has stunted democratic evolution, even as our emphasis on economic reform has encouraged crony capitalism that generates resentment and support for Islamist alternatives. Mubarak, Asad, Saleh, Qaddafi, and Ben Ali were not the most oppressive dictators the world has ever known, even though they murdered and imprisoned thousands, then raised those numbers by an order of magnitude as they tried to meet the challenge of revolution with brute force. But their departures have left the countries they led with little means of governing themselves. The states they claim to have built have proven a mirage in the desert.
If there is reason for doom and gloom, it is our failure to meet this governance challenge cleverly and effectively. We continue to favor our military instruments, even though they are inappropriate to dealing with most of the problems we face (the important exceptions being Iran and China). We have allowed our civilian instruments of foreign policy to atrophy, even as we ask them to meet enormous challenges. What I wish for the new year is recognition–in the Congress, in the Administration and in the country–that we need still to help enable others to govern themselves. Investment in the capacity to do it will return dividends for many decades into the future.
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Peace picks November 30 – December 4
- Renewed Violence in the Central African Republic: The Roots of a Political Crisis | Monday, November 30th | 12:30-2:00 | US Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Leaders and citizens of the Central African Republic, with the support of the international community, are currently focusing resources and energy on laying the groundwork for a peaceful constitutional referendum and elections in the coming months. But sustained peace in in the country will require longer-term efforts as well, because the recent crisis is rooted in decades of poor governance and persistent insecurity. After the elections, Central African Republic policymakers and the international community will be challenged to lay the groundwork for the new government by addressing the longstanding grievances that contribute to the cyclical nature of the violence in CAR. The panel will bring together some of the foremost experts on the Central African Republic’s recent history of rebellion and instability, including the two most recent coups, international intervention efforts, the country’s political economy, and the ongoing series of United Nations and regional peacekeeping efforts. The experts will draw on their contributions to Making Sense of the Central African Republic, published by Zed Books, to make policy recommendations for the crucial remaining steps in CAR’s political transition and beyond. Panelists include: Louisa Lombard, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Yale University; Tatiana Carayannis, Deputy Director Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF), Social Science Research Council (SSRC); Ambassador Laurence Wohlers, Senior Fellow, Meridian International; Ledio Cakaj, Independent Consultant, Expert on the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Séléka; Roland Marchal, Senior Research Fellow, National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), based at the Center for International Studies (CERI), Paris Institute of Political Studies; and Faouzi Kilembe, Independent Researcher, Expert on Central African Civil Society and Local Development. Nancy Lindborg, President of USIP, will moderate the discussion.Pose questions for the panel on Twitter with #CARUSIP.
- 3-D Printing the Bomb? The Challenge for Nuclear Nonproliferation | Tuesday, December 1st | 10:30-12:00 | The Carnegie Endowment | REGISTER TO ATTEND |3-D printing has opened the world to a revolution in manufacturing. But this new technology may enable the most sensitive pieces of a nuclear weapons program to be more easily produced and transferred undetected around the globe. The United States should lead an international effort to prevent a 3-D printing-enabled cascade of nuclear weapons proliferation before it is too late. Tristan Volpe and Matthew Kroenig will launch their new article, “3-D Printing the Bomb? The Nuclear Nonproliferation Challenge,” and explore how the United States can adopt both top-down and bottom-up strategies to combat this threat to international security. Bruce Goodwin will moderate.
- Developmental Approaches to Countering Violent Extremism | Tuesday, December 1st | 11:00-12:30 | Center for Strategic and International Studies | RSVP to PPD@csis.org | Join us for an expert discussion on the role of development actors in addressing the drivers and manifestations of violent extremism. Although the events and aftermath of September 11, 2001 forced governments around the world to develop new counterterrorism tactics, the rise of ISIS and other violent extremist groups has focused international attention on the underlying risk factors and risk processes that make young people, in particular, vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment.
Development actors have invested significant time and resources into understanding the drivers of violent extremism and developing an evidence-based approach to address these factors. Yet, many questions remain about the most salient development-related drivers and the viability of taking a holistic, developmental approach to violent extremism. Panelists will discuss the contributions that development actors can play in preventing violent extremism and uncovering the limitations to these approaches. Daniel F. Runde, director of CSIS’s Project on Prosperity and Development, and William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis, will give opening remarks, followed by a panel discussion featuring: Farooq Kathwari,Chairman, CEO, and President, Ethan Allen Interiors, Inc.; and Susan Reichle, Agency Counselor, U.S. Agency for International Development. The discussion will be moderated by Shannon N. Green, director of CSIS’s Human Rights Initiative. - Berets are OK, Headscarves are not | Wednesday, December 2nd | 12:30-2:00 | Georgetown University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Relations between the French state and public visibility of religion, particularly Islam, became openly confrontational in the late 1980s with the infamous “headscarf affair” in public schools, where Muslim students were expelled from school for wearing a hijab (Islamic headscarf). With respect to public displays of religion, the initial response of public authorities was a lenient application of laïcité towards the general public but a rigid one towards civil servants. In the 2000s, there were escalating public struggles between public manifestations of religious affiliation and politicians increasingly fighting for a restrictive application of laïcité that regards religious displays as a violation of public order. This increasing politicization of laïcité, where religious freedom was seen as an assault on cultural and republican values, has resulted in a toughening of the legislative speech on religious signs, particularly against Muslims who were seen as more openly violating French cultural norms. While restrictions of expression of religious affiliation of students began in public schools, we are now observing an extension of this control to people in public spaces. This expansion of repressive policies will end badly not only for Muslim minorities in Europe, but also the overall legitimacy and integrity of modern European liberal values. Rim-Sarah Alouane, Ph.D. candidate in Public Law at the University Toulouse-Capitol, will give a presentation on the subject, in the Intercultural Center, room 270.
- Examining the Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy | Tuesday, December 2nd | 12:15-1:45 | The Carnegie Endowment | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Many people in non-Western countries say that they want a democratic system of governance—but just not Western-style democracy. Yet what is meant by non-Western democracy often remains unclear, and at times is merely a cover for non-democratic practices. A new book by Carnegie senior associate Richard Youngs, The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy, examines the growing search for variation in democratic practice and the implications of this search for Western democracy assistance providers. Youngs argues that it is most useful to focus on the common challenge of democratic renewal in both Western and non-Western countries, and he identifies areas of democratic variation that may help to productively channel efforts for such renewal. Richard Youngs will present the core arguments of his book in a roundtable event. Shadi Hamid, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Sandra Pepera, director for gender, women, and democracy at the National Democratic Institute, will offer comments on the different regional applications of these issues. Thomas Carothers will moderate the discussion.
- 6th Annual Conference on Turkey | Thursday, December 3rd | 9:00-4:15 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Center for Turkish Studies at The Middle East Institute and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation are pleased to present the Sixth Annual Conference on Turkey, held at the National Press Club. The conference will assemble three expert panels to discuss the country’s tumultuous domestic politics following recent elections, the future of democracy in the country, and Turkish foreign policy. The keynote speaker for the conference will be the co-leader for Turkey’s pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş, in discussion with MEI’s Gönül Tol. The full program can be viewed here.
- U.S. and Western Policy Towards Russia: Cooperation, Containment, or Something Else Entirely? | Thursday, December 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Center for Strategic and International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Russian annexation of Crimea has led to over two years of debate regarding Washington’s strategy towards Moscow. Today, with Ukraine somewhat quieter and seeming progress towards cooperation on Syria, are more cooperative approaches possible? What should be Washington’s goals in engaging with Russia, or responding to it on the global stage? Are there tools that have not yet been tried, and what can they attain where other efforts have failed? Vladislav Inozemtsev, prominent Russian economist and visiting fellow at CSIS, will outline his views of what’s possible, what’s likely, and what should be done by the United States as it reevaluates its Russia policies. Olga Oliker, Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program, will provide commentary. The event will be moderated by Jeffrey Mankoff, Deputy Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia.
- The State of Religious Freedom in the US and Europe | Thursday, December 3rd | 2:00-4:00 | KARAMAH | REGISTER TO ATTEND | It has become increasingly clear that even countries that champion international religious freedom still apply laws and regulations that restrict religious minorities’ rights with respect to many issues including their dress, their ability to have places of worship, and even the validity of their religious marriages.During this event, we will discuss how countries around the world, especially those that ostensibly defend religious freedom, can uphold these values and make sure they are fully reflected in their respective societies. Please attend and discuss with global leaders and advisers how violations of international religious freedom are impacting marginalized communities, especially the fundamental rights of Muslim women and girls. Speakers include David N. Saperstein, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom; Aisha Rahman, Esq., KARAMAH executive director; and Engy Abdelkader, Esq., Adviser with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The event will be held at The General Board of Church and Society 100 Maryland Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002.
- Building Regional Stability: Addressing Pakistan’s Conflict – Displaced Persons | Thursday, December 3rd | 3:30-4:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Given the recent international attention on global refugee issues, including the flow of Afghan and Syrian refugees to the European Union, efforts to keep conflict-displaced persons in their home countries and repatriate them quickly and effectively has become more significant. Pakistan has over 1 million people still displaced from the conflict in FATA that could join those refugee outflows if an effective and resourced strategy is not in place. Recognizing this, Secretary Kerry announced a $250 million US commitment to help resettle and sustain civilians displaced by the Pakistani military’s campaign against militant group, and this month a $30 million USAID-supported FATA livelihoods and education recovery program launched as part of that pledge. John Groarke, USAID’s Pakistan Director, will join us to discuss this challenge facing Pakistan and the region. Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director of Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, will moderate the discussion.
- Yemen between War and Political Solution | Friday, December 4th | 9:30-11:00 | The Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Yemeni conflict is in its 8th month with no end in sight. What are the prospects for a solution, military or political? If the conflict is nothing more than a proxy war for Saudis and Iranians, what are the prospects for third party solutions? Finally, what are the long-term consequences of this conflict down the road for the region and beyond? Speakers include Mohammad Al-Shami, a youth activist and advocacy trainer in Yemen, and former Leaders for Democracy Fellow, Maxwell School of Syracuse University; Amat Alsoswa, founder of the Yemeni National Women’s Committee, first Yemeni female ambassador, former Human Rights minister, and former UN Assistant Secretary General; and Barbara Bodine, Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy and Director, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, The Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and former Ambassador to Yemen. Henri J. Barkey, director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Middle East Program, will moderate the discussion. There will be a live webcast of the event.
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Precious little Thanksgiving
Thanksgiving is when Americans, who constitute only about half peacefare’s readers, join with family and friends to acknowledge their many blessings. This year that means relative prosperity across much of the country, a parade of giant balloons in New York City, and a lot of good food and cheer–plus a bit of intra-family political controversy–at the single serious meal most of us indulge in today.
But the world is not in good shape and we all know it. Civil war rages in Syria, Libya and Yemen, three former dictatorships that failed to make the transition to democracy after political upheavals in 2011. Islamic State and Al Qaeda-linked terrorists have attacked in Beirut, Sinai, Bamako, Paris and elsewhere. Syrians, Afghans and Africans from many sub-Saharan countries are flowing into Europe, driving politics to the nationalist/nativist right and raising difficult security questions, with echoes in the US.
The Turkish downing of a Russian warplane has upped the ante. I don’t doubt that the Russians violated Turkish airspace or that the Turks warned the Russian pilots. It would be impossible to bomb along that portion of the Syrian/Turkish border without crossing into Turkish territory. But those are not the only reasons Turkey acted. The Russians were bombing Turkmen rebels fighting Bashar al Assad’s forces. Erdogan was making Obama’s rhetorical point with bombs: Russia is welcome to fight the Islamic State, but not to fight relatively moderate rebels opposing the dictatorship.
The escalation is nevertheless dangerous. The Syrian civil war is already a proxy war between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab Gulf states plus Turkey. The Turkish move risks engaging NATO and the US, which are understandably loathe to come to blows directly with Russia. I’d anticipate increasing pressure to produce results at peace talks to be convened early in January. But impending peace talks will also provide an incentive for the warring parties inside Syria to grab as much territory as possible, before a ceasefire freezes them in place.
The situation in Libya, Yemen and Iraq is no more promising. The Islamic State is using the impasse in Libya to deepen and expand its footprint, especially in and around Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte. In Yemen the fighting continues, with Houthi rebels only slowly yielding ground to Saudi- and UAE-supported ground forces (reportedly including Colombian mercenaries) while Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula deepens and expands its footprint in more desolate parts of the country. Iraqi forces are making gradual but agonizingly slow progress against the Islamic State in Anbar, but Mosul and much of western Iraq remain out of Baghdad’s control.
Little of these Middle Eastern dramas are reflected directly in the United States. The numbers of refugees President Obama wants to take in are small even compared to what the Europeans are accepting, who in turn are less than 25% of the total who have already left Syria. The West is unwilling to throw its doors open to desperate Syrians, especially the Muslim ones, fearing that there may be terrorists hiding among them and neglecting to notice how refusal to admit refugees will help Islamic State and other extremist recruitment efforts. John Oliver captured the irony well with this:
There was only one time in American history when the fear of refugees wiping everyone out did actually come true, and we’ll all be sitting around a table celebrating it on Thursday.
I hope Americans will remember this bit of irony and try to spare some sympathy not only for the natives we displaced but also for the Middle Easterners who have so little to celebrate this year.
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Kurdistan under pressure
I enjoyed a couple of hours serving on a panel this morning with Kurdistan Regional Government Representative in Washington Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the Atlantic Council’s Nusseibeh Younes, and SAIS second year student Yael Mizrahi. Sasha Toperich of SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations and leader of its Mediterranean Basin Initiative moderated. I won’t even try to reproduce the nuanced and fine-grained presentations by Bayan, Nusseibeh and Yael, but here are the talking points I used:
1. I am, like most Americans, an admirer of Iraqi Kurdistan and what it has achieved, even if I wouldn’t say the democratic transition there is even near complete.
2. That’s not surprising: Kurdish national aspirations were frustrated in the aftermath of World War I. Even in recent decades, Kurdistan has seen oppression, war, expulsion, and chemical attacks.
3. It has taken a hundred years for a fraction of the Kurdish population—the part fortunate enough to live in Iraq—to gain some degree of self-governance.
4. Until recently, it looked to some people as if that self-governance might progress towards independence and sovereignty.
5. I had my doubts, not I hasten to add due to weakness in the Kurds case: they were treated at least as badly as Kosovo Albanians and arguably much worse.
6. But geopolitical pressure from Iraqi Kurdistan’s neighbors has made independence a dicey proposition. Ankara, though friendlier than ever with Erbil, does not want independence for Kurdistan. Tehran is dead set against it. Baghdad doesn’t want it either.
7. In the last year, the situation has become even more complicated.
8. Kurdistan is under pressure for three dramatic reasons:
• The fall of oil prices;
• ISIL’s successful takeover of most of Sunni Iraq;
• Its own internal political strife.
9. Let me consider these one by one.
10. Oil prices are now at less than half their level of June 2014. At $100/barrel, Kurdistan needed production of something like 500,000 barrels per day to replace its share of Iraq’s overall oil production.
11. I’m guessing, but it seems to me likely it now needs production of well over 1 million barrels per day to replace the money it expects from Baghdad.
12. Even 500,000 bpd was a stretch. A million is a much bigger stretch, even with Kirkuk production now in Kurdistan’s control.
13. Second, Kurdistan now has to defend about six hundred miles of confrontation line with the Islamic State, as well as something like two million displaced people and refugees it is hosting with international assistance.
14. That is a daunting battle front and a massive humanitarian requirement.
15. Third is the serious political strife within Kurdistan, which pits President Barzani and his PDK against Gorran and other dissenters from his desire to prolong his stay in the presidency. They want a more parliamentary and less presidential system.
16. Soldiers who are expected to fight ISIL will want to know who and what they are fighting for. There is more ambiguity and dissension about that today than there has been for many years.
17. I don’t see any of these pressures letting up soon.
18. Erbil is getting ready to return to Baghdad in an effort to restore the agreement on oil that was supposed to allow exports directly from Kurdistan in exchange for payment of what Baghdad owes Erbil.
19. Let’s hope that issue can be sorted out, but even if it is oil prices remain under $50 per barrel and are unlikely to go above $80, due to unconventional production enabled by US technology that is now spreading to other countries.
20. Oil is priced in a global market. Kurdistan now has little prospect of meeting its budgetary needs as an independent state.
21. ISIL is not going away. Even if it is forced to withdraw from Ramadi, as it has been forced to do from Tikrit and Bayji, it will be some time before Mosul is retaken. The Kurdish confrontation line with ISIL is likely to remain long for some time to come.
22. Even after ISIS is defeated, I would anticipate extremist attacks on the KRG, as have occurred in the past.
23. Nor is Kurdistan’s internal strife likely to go away. Barzani is standing his ground. So is Gorran, which has been suspended from the parliament and the coalition government. Even if things were to get patched up, the differences remain profound and the willingness to resolve them weak.
24. So Kurdistan faces some intractable problems, even without mentioning the complications that come from the war in Syria: Turkish attacks on the PKK inside Iraqi Kurdistan and the help Erbil has given to the Kurdish forces flying PYD/YPG banners, which Ankara resents.
25. So what looked like a natural slide towards independence a year or two ago now looks like a return to the 20th century: a Kurdistan hemmed in on all sides and unable to pursue the self-determination that its people unquestionably want.
26. What should the U.S. do?
27. It should certainly support the Kurds, both Syrian and Iraqi, in the fight against ISIS, so long as they are prepared to treat Arabs and other non-Kurds well.
28. It should also continue to provide generous humanitarian assistance.
29. And Washington should do what it can to help Erbil and Baghdad resolve their dispute over the distribution of oil revenue.
30. On the internal Kurdistan issues, we should want to see them resolved sooner rather than later, since later could mean disrupting the fight against ISIS.
31. But we also need to nudge our Kurdish friends in a direction that respects the rule of law and democracy.
32. No president is forever. No governing party is forever. Adherence to the constitution as well as fair and free competition for votes is what we should expect of our partners, no matter what the outcome for longstanding friends.
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