Tag: Turkey
Limits of US-Turkey cooperation in Syria
On Thursday, the SETA Foundation hosted a talk entitled The U.S.-Turkey “Safe Zone” Agreement: What does it mean?. Panelists included: Sabiha Senyucel, research director of the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), Mark Perry, independent author, Melissa Dalton, fellow and chief of staff at the CSIS International Security Program, and Kadir Ustun, Executive Director of the SETA Foundation. Kilic B. Kanat, research director of the SETA Foundation, moderated. The panelists believe that the recent US-Turkey cooperation in Syria will remain limited because Turkey and the US continue to have divergent interests.
Senyucel said that the recent bombing in Southeast Turkey pushed Turkey to take a more active role in the anti-ISIS coalition. Now the coalition can use İncirlik for bombings. The Kurdish issue is no longer just a domestic Turkish issue. The Turkey-PKK peace process is finished for now, but Senyucel hopes it can restart soon. The roles of the PKK, the PYD and the Syrian Kurdish entity are all linked. YPG fighters fought ISIS in Kobane, giving the Kurds international legitimacy. This changed the Kurds’ thinking about what they could achieve regionally.
After Kobane, the YPG and PKK demonstrated that they could fight ISIS on the ground and US airstrikes helped them take Tel Abyad. This concerned Turkey, which has good reason to distrust the PYD because of its links to the PKK. After the Gezi Park protests, the PKK stopped honoring its commitments and asserted de facto control over some parts of Eastern Turkey. There may have been mistakes from the Turkish side, but the Turkish government also displayed restraint. The PKK’s mid-July announcement that they were returning to arms was unjustified. Turkey is now reminding the PKK that they won’t achieve their ambitions. The US has agreed to support Turkey in this, but Senyucel isn’t sure how long this will last.
Kadir asserted that the US and Turkey can’t agree on the big picture in Syria. Obama believes the US only has limited interests; he isn’t trying to fix Syria. The PYD is a local actor that can contribute to the US’s non-strategy strategy. Turkey has tried to protect its border, host refugees, prevent the spillover of the conflict and resolve the Kurdish question. Necessity has limited Turkish actions. Turkey can’t ally with the PKK-linked PYD; the PKK has asserted de facto control over some towns in eastern Turkey and hasn’t fully committed to withdrawing guerrillas.
Turkey will allow the US to use İncirlik and will work to create a safe zone in Syria for the moderate opposition. Ankara wants a broader strategy from the US, but the US is uninterested. Will planes taking off from İncirlik help the PYD? The PYD has been reluctant to distance itself from the PKK and stop expelling Arabs from its territory. The PYD also allows Assad’s air force to overfly the territories it controls. If these things continue, the US and Turkey won’t come to a real agreement, but both sides need a broader strategy to make lasting progress.
Dalton agreed that the US and Turkey have divergent objectives. The Turks have called the recent agreement a safe zone, but the US has avoided this term. The agreement will involve enhanced border cooperation. The length of this cooperation area will be ~65 miles, but other elements are unknown:
- How deep into Syria will it go?
- Will Assad’s air force be excluded?
- Will there be cover for civilians in nearby cities outside the zone?
Broader US-Turkey cooperation will be needed for a long-term solution, but the anti-ISIS fight and border cooperation are likely to be the focus for now.
Perry highlighted the fact that there is unlikely to be any well-articulated US strategy from this administration, but there are three observable US policy principles:
- We maintain relations with allied regional states despite difficulties.
- Our enemy is Islamic extremism.
- There is no appetite for strong anti-Assad action.
We want Assad to lose, but don’t want his opponents to win. This is a tough line to walk with Turkey. The use of İncirlik will allow the US to gather better drone intelligence. Assad is unlikely to launch air operations in the area of the proposed safe zone because Assad doesn’t want to tangle with the US Air Force. The Obama administration’s vagueness may not be bad. The US has made many foreign policy mistakes; doing nothing is a viable option since Syria is so complex. We can protect our friends, maintain our strength, assist the victims, and remain friendly with Erdogan, without further intervention.
Barbara Slavin, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center, asked about the US train and equip program. Many of the 54 rebels that we have trained have reportedly been captured by Jabhat Al-Nusra. Slavin asked whether the possible safe zone could be an injection point for these rebels. Dalton stated that it could be used for this purpose, because there is currently no other logical injection point. However, questions about how and at what cost the US and Turkey plan to protect such a zone remain. Kadir took a similar position, noting the slowness of the program. Perry discounted the program entirely, noting that the last successful US train and equip program was in the Philippines in 1899. The US is keeping the fiction of train and equip so that we can keep our hand in the game in Syria.
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A nervous region wary of the nuclear deal
On Wednesday, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and MEI hosted a talk entitled After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran. Speakers included Roy Gutman, McClatchy Middle East bureau chief, and Joyce Karam, Washington bureau chief for Al-Hayat. Daniel Serwer of both SAIS and MEI moderated. Both speakers emphasized the dynamics that caused regional players to be wary of Iran.
Early last Spring, Gutman traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.
In Israel, he observed that the major national security concern wasn’t the Iranian nuclear program, but rather Iran’s conventional threat through the buildup of Hezbollah forces. Israelis were disappointed that the US was leaving a security vacuum in Syria for Iran to fill. The Israeli position on the Iran deal is difficult to understand; Israeli politicians oppose it, but Israel’s foreign policy elite considers Iranian conventional forces a larger threat.
Jordanian officials also worried about regional chaos and Iranian influence. They were baffled by the half-hearted US response to Assad, as well as its airstrike-only response to ISIS.
Egypt is preoccupied by terrorism and the upheaval in Libya, but Egyptian officials are also concerned about Iran’s growing influence and US inaction.
Officials in every government (aside from Turkey’s) spoke of collusion between Turkey and extremists. The Turks think the Iranians know that the US is not a determined counterpart. They believe the US is appeasing Iran.
Gutman then traveled to Tehran to gauge the mood there. Iran has come in from the cold after 36 years, but Tehran resents the last 36 years of US policy. Change in Iran won’t happen fast. Khamenei has said that Iran’s policy towards the “arrogant” US government won’t change and that Iran will keep supporting its regional allies.
Israel views Hezbollah’s buildup as a direct threat, but Iranian officials told Gutman that the Tehran holds the trigger on Hezbollah’s weapons and won’t pull it unless Israel threatens Lebanon or Iran. However, a former Iranian diplomat admitted that Iran has no vital interest in Lebanon or the Palestinians. Iran also appears to have no vital interest in Yemen, but likes seeing Saudi Arabia embroiled in an unwinnable war. Iran is unalterably opposed to the breakup of Iraq into three states.
Iranian officials don’t think the deal is perfect, but still see it as a win-win for both sides. They view themselves as MENA’s most powerful and stable state. They are glad that US has accepted them as a regional player and negotiating partner.
After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum. The Iraqi Army collapsed on Iran’s watch. Iran does not acknowledge its responsibility for this and ascribes the rise of ISIS to others. They also believe that foreign forces fought in Deraa and refused to acknowledge Assad’s role in fomenting terrorism by releasing terrorists from prison. Iranian officials also stated that all sectors of Lebanese society back Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria. Iran needs a reality check.
Iran opposes the creation of a safe zone/no-fly zone in Iraq and has threatened to send basijis into Syria if this happens. Iranians don’t understand the scope of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe or Iran’s role in it. There are too many disagreements between the US and Iran to form a regional security agreement now. The US needs a policy for Syria; if we don’t have a policy, others will fill the vacuum. The US also needs an official version of what happened in Syria to counter the Iranian invented view of history.
Karam noted that the Arab response to the deal is less monolithic than Israel’s, but the GCC and Israel view Iran’s regional behavior similarly. The UAE, Oman, and Turkey quickly welcomed the deal because they have good trade relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were more cautious. The Saudis don’t view the deal as US abandonment, but they fear increased Iranian regional meddling. Arab public opinion has shifted drastically since 2008, when 80% of Arabs viewed Iran positively. Now only 12% do. The Arab street is suspicious of the deal. The US explained the deal to Arab governments, but not to their people. The Arab street wonders whether the money Iran will gain from sanctions relief will go to funding Iranian students, or to Qassem Suleimani and more chlorine gas, barrel bombs, and Hezbollah fighters for Assad. Assad is a costly budget item for Iran. When will Iran realize that Assad can’t win? Nevertheless, Hezbollah keeps getting more involved in Syria.
Karam stated that the Gulf countries obtain commitments from the US at talks like Camp David, but then nothing gets done. The US is four years behind on Syria and needs an official policy.
Serwer noted in conclusion that the regional issues would be far worse if Iran had, or were about to get, nuclear weapons.
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The Turkey/Syria conundrum
This discussion of Turkey and Syria on CCTV America yesterday went well. Mike Walter moderated with the following guests:
- Cale Salih, from Oxford, is a visiting fellow to the European Council on Foreign Relations focusing on the Kurdish people.
- Daniel Serwer is a professor in conflict management at Johns Hopkins University.
- Tulin Daloglu from Ankara is a Turkish journalist and opinion writer.
- Joshua Walker is a transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, a non-partisan U.S. think tank.
And part 2:
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Trying to stay off the slippery slope
So now US government officials are denying any intention of creating protected areas in northern Syria. They just want to clear the Islamic State from a portion of the Turkish border.
This makes no sense. ISIS governs the territory in question at present. Something will replace it if ISIS is “cleared.” The Turks can be counted on to prevent Syrian Kurds from filling the vacuum. Washington and Ankara should both be worried about what else might.
One possibility is a return to the area of the Syrian government, whether in the guise of the now decimated Syrian Army, Alawite/Shia militias or Hizbollah. From the Turkish point of view, that would be a disaster, as it would significantly strengthen Ankara’s archenemy Bashar al Asad on its southern border and provide him with the ability to allow infiltration of Turkey by both jihadi and Kurdish terrorists.
Or, more likely, ISIS could return as soon as American and Turkish attention focus elsewhere. The notion that ISIS can be cleared permanently without somehow providing minimal state functions in any area is unconvincing. Turkey is talking about Syrian refugees returning to the cleared area. They won’t do that unless there is some semblance of law and order in the area.
The Americans may be leaving the tasks of “holding” and “building” to the Turks. That makes some sense, since Turkish national interests are directly engaged. But a Turkish occupation of any part of Syria would rouse nationalist sentiments to fever pitch and risk unifying Syrians against a Turkish incursion.
The Turks could try to work through the moderate Syrian opposition, which however is not strong in northern Syria. It would need substantial assistance from Turkey to take over security and governance there. It is not clear that Ankara is prepared to take on that role, but it may have to do so if it wants to keep the Kurds, the Syrian government and ISIS out of the area.
Why is the Obama administration leaving this vital issue of who would govern in a liberated area of northern Syria unresolved? It wants to avoid getting involved in another state-building effort in the Middle East, where such efforts have repeatedly failed.
I understand the impulse. But President Obama has already acknowledged that it was a mistake to leave Libya to its own devices after the NATO-led intervention collapsed the regime of Muammar Qaddafi. Libya is today in chaos. Breeding in that chaos are several jihadi groups, including some that identify with ISIS. It would be no less a mistake to clear the Islamic State from a portion of northern Syria and leave who will then govern the liberated territory to chance.
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On to the slippery slope
Washington has reportedly agreed with Ankara to sweep Islamic State fighters from an important portion of Turkey’s border with Syria, de facto creating a “safe” zone something like 40 miles deep into Syria and extending from Aleppo to the Euphrates river. This move comes on the heels of Turkish agreement to allow the US to use planes based at Incirlik to bomb the Islamic State, whose attacks in recent weeks have reached into Turkey.
Differences in Turkish and American objectives remain. The Turks want the Syrian opposition to Bashar al Asad to control the zone, thus stemming the advances from the east of Kurdish forces that the Turks regard as hostile to Ankara and supportive of Asad. The Americans want to weaken the Islamic State, which has been bringing men and supplies across the Turkish border into Syria. But there may be enough overlap between these somewhat disparate goals for practical purposes.
The zone will not however be safe just because we call it that. The territory in question is strategically important to the Islamic State, the Syrian opposition, the Syrian Kurds and the Turks. It will have to be protected. Lack of a formal no-fly zone is not the problem. Syrian aircraft know to steer clear of zones where the Americans fly. The use of Incirlik will enable a much more visible and constant US presence. The Americans reportedly intend also to train spotters to direct their air attacks. But indirect fire from artillery as well as infiltration of suicide bombers and other individual operatives could still sabotage any effort to establish a “safe” zone. Security is job 1.
The area will also need to be governed. This is where the Islamic State has excelled. Its brutality has reestablished fear in the populations it controls and enabled it to govern with minimal resources. ISIS brooks little dissent. It is unified, purposeful and predictable. Its courts are merciless. Crime in the areas it controls is down. Many Syrians no doubt would prefer to avoid the mistreatment ISIS dishes out, but in a chaotic situation they may prefer to accept the devil they know.
The Syrian opposition, which both the Turks and Americans will want to put in charge of any area they clear, has been anything but unified, purposeful and predictable. It will need to learn, fast. Withdrawal of ISIS has not brought peace and tranquility to Tikrit, Kobane and other recovered areas. Like it or not, ISIS is more like an insurgency than anything else. Dealing with it requires the counter-insurgency not just to clear but also to hold and build. Neither in Iraq nor in Syria has this part of the job been done well.
The situation will be particularly fraught because of Turkish involvement, which is of course necessary. But the Syrian Arab opposition distrusts the Turks and the Syrian Kurdish opposition loathes them. It is difficult to picture those sentiments overcome easily, especially as Turkey will control the border across which all logistical support for a safe zone will need to come. Turkey, the US and the Syrians (Arabs and Kurds) will need to engage with each other much more intensely than in the past if the problems are to be overcome.
Meanwhile, there are also rumors of a “safe” zone in the south, where my former intern Ala’ Alrababa’h says it will imperil Jordan. He is correct: it will. The question is whether the risks are worth running in order to protect the relatively well-organized moderate opposition on the southern front, keep extremists off the Jordanian and Israeli borders, and eventually help the opposition to mount an offensive farther north.
From the American perspective, these “safe” area proposals, which I would prefer to call protected zones, put President Obama where he has consistently tried to avoid going: on the slippery slope toward greater US involvement in Syria. He knows, as I do, that the “safe” areas in Bosnia only worked by failing and bringing on stronger intervention. Odds are any “safe” areas in Syria will also fail, but this president has been very disciplined. It is unclear whether he would then intervene more strongly. The Syrian opposition had better get its act together and begin governing effectively wherever it can.
PS: Bassam Barabandi of People Demand Change sent this nice picture of the potential zone:
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Peace picks July 27-31
1. Chemical Safety and Security: TSCA Legislation and Terrorist Attacks | Monday, July 27th | 2:00 – 5:00 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Chemical safety and security is one of the fundamental pillars of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), but the recent and ongoing use of dual-use chemicals such as chlorine in the Syrian conflict, several recent chemical accidents in the US, and congressional updating of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) have all raised these goals to a much higher level. This seminar will address three related safety and security issues: (1) new TSCA legislation in the House and Senate; (2) the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS); and (3) Global Partnership efforts to improve chemical safety and security of industry and transportation. The Proliferation Prevention Program will co-host this event with Green Cross International and International Center for Chemical Safety and Security (ICCSS). Speakers include: Ambassador Krzysztof Paturej, President of ICCSS Board, Michael P. Walls, Vice President, American Chemistry Council, Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Director of Oversight & Investigations, Office of Senator Edward J. Markey, United States Senate, Todd Klessman, Senior Policy Advisor, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, Department of Homeland Security, Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, US Department of State, Ali Gakweli, Deputy Government Chemist, Government Chemist Division, EU CBRN National Focal Point National Authority (CWC), Nairobi, Kenya. Moderators include: Paul Walker, Director of Environmental Security and Sustainability, Green Cross International and Sharon Squassoni, Director of the Proliferation Prevention Program, CSIS.
2. Hearing to Examine Iran Nuclear Agreement | Tuesday, July 28th | 10:00 – 2:00 | Rayburn House Office Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Chairman Ed Royce (R-CA) on the hearing: ‘This Iran deal is one of the most important in decades. It reverses decades of bipartisan nonproliferation and regional policy, has several shortcomings, and demands the closest scrutiny. Secretary Kerry and the other Administration officials will face tough questions before the Committee, as we continue our comprehensive review of the Iran deal and the Administration’s overall regional policy.’
Ranking Member Eliot Engel (D-NY) on the hearing: “I look forward to hearing from Secretaries Kerry, Lew, and Moniz to discuss the Iran agreement. I have serious questions and concerns about this deal, and input from the Administration will be critical as Congress reviews the proposal.”
Speakers include: John Kerry, Secretary of State, Department of State, Jacob Lew, Secretary of Treasury, U.S. Department of the Treasury and Ernest Moniz, Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy.
3. Discussing American Diplomacy at Risk and the Second Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review| Tuesday, July 28th | 11:00 – 12:30 | The Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Government reform is an open ended process; large institutions that conduct our national security and foreign policies need to continually evolve, to adapt to changing realities in the international landscape, and to changes in our own society. Two recent reports address the challenge of aligning the internal structures and personnel practices of the Department of State to the 21st century world. The American Academy of Diplomacy has recently released American Diplomacy at Risk, examining how the professional foreign service is weakened by politicization and by failures to sustain relevant training and professional development for the work force. The State Department itself has released its second Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, looks at recent reforms and innovations to make the department more responsive in an age of partnerships and collaboration with diverse state and non-state civil society players. Speakers include: Ambassador Ronald Neumann, President, American Academy of Diplomacy, Caroline Wadhams, Acting Director in the Office of the QDDR, State Department , Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Director, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and Julie Smith, Senior Fellow and Director of the Strategy and Statecraft Program, Center for New American Security . Moderators include: Ellen Laipson, President and Chief Executive Officer, the Stimson Center .
4. Can the P5+1’s Vienna Deal Prevent an Iranian Nuclear Breakout| Tuesday, July 28th | 11:45 – 1:30 | Hudson Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed earlier this month in Vienna is the culmination of a longstanding Obama administration effort to resolve the international community’s nuclear standoff with Iran through diplomatic means. A host of serious questions surround the agreement, including the complexities of international law and politics necessary to enact its provisions, and the strategic calculations that Iran’s regional rivals will make in its aftermath. But the key question remains the most practical one: Will the JCPOA, advanced by its proponents as a far-reaching and robust arms agreement, actually prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon?
Can the JCPOA’s inspection and verification regime, which allows Iran a 24-day window to prepare – or “sanitize”—any suspected site for on-site review, provide an effective guarantee against violations? What will it mean when the JCPOA expires in 15 years under the “sunset clause” and Iran becomes a “normal” nuclear power? And how, in the meantime, will the deal’s removal of existing sanctions against currently designated terrorists and terror-connected entities – like the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Qassem Suleimani, commander of IRGC’s expeditionary unit, the Quds Force – complicate efforts to constrain Sunni Arab states from pursuing nuclear arms programs of their own?
Speakers include: Senator Tom Cotton, U.S. Senator from Arkansas, Michael Doran, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, William Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Hillel Fradkin, Senior Fellow and Director, Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, Hudson Institute. Moderators include: Lee Smith, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute.
5. Hearing: Women Under ISIS Rule: From Brutality to Recruitment| Wednesday, July 29th | 10:00 – 1:00 | Rayburn House Office Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Speakers include: Sasha Havliceck, CEO, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Ariel Ahram, Assistant Professor, Virginia Tech School of Public and International Affairs and Kathleen Kuehnast, Director, Gender and Peacebuilding, Center for Governance, Law and Society, United States Institute of Peace.
6. Panel: Scorecard for the Final Deal with Iran| Wednesday, July 29th | 12:00 – 1:30 | JINSA | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In Vienna on July 14, the P5+1 and Iran agreed on a final deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA). This report will analyze whether the JCPA addresses the Task Force’s questions and concerns about the framework agreement. Overall, the JCPA rolls back Iran’s breakout time and allows for broader verification, but only in exchange for key restrictions being removed in 8-15 years, R&D on advanced centrifuges, front-loaded sanctions relief – including up to $150 billion in unfrozen assets – with no automatic “snapback” mechanism, an end to the U.N. arms embargo against Iran and no anytime, anywhere inspections. Speakers include: John Hannah, Former National Security Advisor to the Vice President Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies Iran Task Force Member, Dr. Michael Makovsky , CEO, JINSA, Dr. Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations .
7. From Ocean of War to Ocean of Prosperity| Wednesday, July 29th | 4:15 – 5:15 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Over the past two hundred years, the Western Pacific has been the stage for war, peace, development, modernization, and prosperity. Its rich resources and vital shipping lanes are essential to the well-being of all countries within its bounds. Admiral Tomohisa Takei, chief of staff for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, will discuss the development of the U.S.-Japan relationship, Japan’s role in the region, and the future of a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific. Carnegie’s vice president for studies, Thomas Carothers, will moderate. Speakers include: Admiral Tomohisa Takei, Chief of Staff, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, Thomas Carothers, Vice President for Studies, Director of Democracy and Rule of Law Program, Carnegie Endowment.
8. Empowering America: How Energy Abundance Can Strengthen US Global Leadership| Thursday, July 30th | 8:30 – 9:45 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join Senator Lisa Murkowski, Chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, and Senator Mark Warner as they launch the task force report: Empowering America: How Energy Abundance Can Strengthen US Global Leadership. Over the past few months, with the Senators as the Co-Chairs, the Atlantic Council convened foreign policy, defense, and energy experts to assess the foreign policy considerations of the US energy boom. The task force details the nature of our energy abundance, the importance of deploying our prowess in energy innovation and technology to others, and the ways in which we can pursue our responsibilities as a global leader on energy and the environment, while leveraging our supply abundance at the same time. It unequivocally determines that America must embrace this new tool to advance our global leadership on trade and security. Speakers include: Richard Morningstar, Director, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council, Lisa Murkowski, Senator of Arkansas and Mark Warner, Senator of Virginia. Moderators include: David Goldwyn, Chairman of the Energy Advisory Group, Atlantic Council.
9. Threat of ISIS in Iraq: Views from the Ground| Thursday, July 30th | 10:30 – 12:00 | Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | From enflaming sectarian tensions to undermining governance and economic development, the expansion of ISIS continues to pose grave risks to Iraq and the broader Middle East. Stimson and the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS) invite you to join us for a discussion featuring views and perspectives from AUIS scholars and students examining the nature of the ISIS threat, and the related territorial, demographic and socio-economic consequences. Students from Kurdistan and other parts of Iraq will join us through video links.
10. Reviving Citizenship in Turkey through Citizen Journalism| Friday, July 31st | 1:30 – 2:30 | Freedom House | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Engin Önder is the co-founder of the Turkish citizen journalism initiative 140journos. Founded in 2012, 140journos is a collaborative information-gathering and dissemination project that has responded to the censorship and self-censorship of the official media in Turkey by taking matters into its own hands. After huge success as a Twitter-based livefeed that helped document the 2013 Gezi Park protests, in 2015 the project has transformed itself with a new approach that embraces interactive mapping, data visualization, and long-form reportage across multiple social media platforms. Önder will describe how the new 140journos is using citizen journalism to change the information ecosystem and restore the meaning of citizenship in Turkey. Speakers include: Engin Önder, Co-Founder, 140journos.
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