Tag: Turkey
More Free Syria
My publication Thursday of a post marginally favoring creation of clearly defined liberated and protected areas inside Syria (“Free Syria”) has elicited, in addition to many laurels I would like to become accustomed to, some critical comments and misunderstandings. I thought I might respond and clarify.
First a clarification: I in no way think the UN is doing anything wrong by pursuing “freezes” in Syria. It is doing what it should be doing, given its institutional role and mission: taking advantage of any opportunity whatsoever to improve the lot of Syrian civilians by embarrassing the warring parties into treating them better. It cannot advocate protected areas that infringe on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a member state. It needs to respect Damascus’ authority, while trying to get it to demonstrate some restraint.
But from an American perspective, the freezes are not promising. Experience in the Balkans and elsewhere suggests security for those willing to cease their fire (or freeze the disposition of their forces) is vital to success. Nor are freezes likely to serve Washington’s first priority: weakening, containing and defeating the Islamic State (ISIS). The US should do nothing to detract from the UN effort, but it should also be thinking about its own options.
One highly experienced and knowledgeable diplomat commented to me that protected areas along the Turkish border would arouse strong opposition from the Gulf, whose monarchies don’t want to see Turkish influence expanded in an important Arab country.
I’m sure he is correct that the Arab Gulf will react that way, but I am not so sure they are right to do so.
What harm to Arab Gulf interests has greatly increased Turkish influence in Iraqi Kurdistan done? If Gulf countries are concerned, they should balance any Turkish inroads by supporting the protected areas themselves, with money, arms and if need be ground troops to back up the Free Syrian Army. The Turks would presumably be providing cover only from the air, along with the Americans. Saudi King Salman is showing, friends tell me, less hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood than his predecessor. A modus vivendi with the Brotherhood-led Turks that helps at least some Syrians may not be beyond reach.
The Turks are irrelevant to a protected area near the Jordanian border, where it would presumably get air cover from the Jordanians and the Americans. That is where the US-trained Free Syrian Army troops are being re-inserted. President Obama would be foolish to risk their rout, which would go down in the annals of American failures with the Bay of Pigs. He will have to provide air cover, or convince the Jordanians to provide it. Israel is already providing humanitarian and likely other assistance across its border with Syria, but expanding that to overt military aid seems to me a bridge too far, at least for now.
Iran will have to have a role in any solution in Syria. How would it react to protected areas? The demands of Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and the nuclear talks have already stretched Tehran’s military, financial and diplomatic capacities. Why wouldn’t the Iranians be relieved to see at least a portion of the Syrian opposition walled off in protected areas, which would necessarily be mostly Sunni and Kurdish? That could enable a focus on the fight against ISIS, in parallel with the US-trained Syrian forces, with reduced short-term risks to the Asad regime (though admittedly I wouldn’t have supported the idea if it didn’t increase the longer-term risks to Bashar).
Russia is the big problem. It will see in the proposal for protected areas the kind of slippery slope that allowed a NATO-led military coalition to take down Muammar Qaddafi. But Moscow is tired and broke. It prioritizes Ukraine. Moscow isn’t likely to allow a UN Security Council resolution to create protected areas until it sees a clear US commitment to do it, resolution or not. But it might then figure better to go along, in order to get a resolution that more strictly limits US and allied military action than was the case in Libya.
So yes, there are serious barriers to “Free Syria.” But they are surmountable, with serious US diplomatic and military commitment. That’s what has been lacking.
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Peace picks February 23-27
- Authorizing Military Action Against ISIL: Geography, Strategy and Unanswered Questions | Monday February 23 | 2:00 – 3:00 | POMED / Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | For the first time in his Administration, President Barack Obama has submitted to Congress a formal request for additional authority to use military force. Is his draft Authorization for Use of Military Force against ISIL “alarmingly broad,” as The New York Times worries, or a narrow set of handcuffs? Does it empower the Presidency or create—as Senator John McCain put it—“535 Commanders-in-Chief”? From different angles, many ask: Does the proposed AUMF reflect sound law and sound strategy? Join experts from the worlds of war, law, and Congress to discuss how legislators can shape national security strategy while guarding their constitutional authority to declare war. Speakers include Lt. General David Barno, former First Commander for Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan and currently Senior Fellow, New American Security, Hon. Jane Harman, Director, President and CEO, The Wilson Center and former U.S Representative , and Jeffrey H. Smith, former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency. The event will be moderated by Jim Sciutto, Chief National Security Correspondent, CNN.
- Turkey’s Asian Agenda | Tuesday February 24 | 12:00 – 1:30 | German Marshall Fund | Since its inception, the Republic of Turkey has been an Asian country with European aspirations. In the face of global trends that have shifted geopolitics from West to East, Turkey is perfectly positioned to capitalize on its central location as the G-20 chair and host in 2015. In recent years Turkey has transformed itself into a globally ambitious player with relationships with Asian giants such as China, India, and Japan. Balancing these relatively new relationships with its historic allies in the West along with regional rivals such as Iran and Russia has become an area of increasing interest, bringing several questions into focus: Is it possible to talk about a Turkish “pivot” to Asia? To what extent does Turkey have the capabilities to turn ambitions into results? Does this shift necessarily imply or result from Ankara’s distancing itself from the European project? Join the German Marshall Fund for a timely discussion on Turkey’s Asian agenda in 2015 and beyond. The discussion features Altay Atlı, Lecturer, Boğaziçi University and Dr. Joshua Walker, Non-Resident Transatlantic Fellow, Asia Program, German Marshall Fund of the United States. Introductions by Barry Lowenkron, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, German Marshall Fund of the United States.
- What Works? Promoting Gender Equality and the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in Military Operations | Wednesday February 25 | 10:00 – 12:00 | Elliot School, George Washington University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The year 2015, marks the 15th Anniversary of the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 which established the women in peace and security agenda. One of the most challenging areas to advance implementation is where it is most needed – within military institutions. With a view to the 2015 anniversary and planned high-level review of the implementation of Resolution 1325, this event convenes experts who will discuss gaps in implementation, what works, and what should be done going forward. The panel discussion will include Commandant Jayne Lawlor, Gender, Equality and Diversity Officer, Irish Defence Forces, Charlotte Isaksson, Gender Adviser, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, President, Women in International Security, Robert C. Egnell, Visiting Associate Professor and Director of Teaching, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University and Aisling Swaine, Professor of Practice of International Affairs, GW. Continental breakfast will be served at 9:30.
- Unpacking the ISIS War Game: Preparing for Escalation | Thursday February 26 | 12:30 – 2:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The current US strategy to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS has achieved important tactical successes, but Washington is still far from achieving its stated goals. Even more, the strategy has not yet been fully tested by ISIS. However, events on the ground over the past few months suggest that the likelihood of escalation on the part of ISIS is increasing. Conventional as well as terrorist attacks by ISIS in Libya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon suggest that it may be only a matter of time before the movement attacks core US strategic interests in the region. An off-the-record, high-level war game recently conducted at the Brent Scowcroft Center’s Middle East Peace and Security Initiative challenged US strategy by analyzing two hypothetical scenarios in which ISIS resorted to escalation. How can Washington and its allies and partners in the coalition better prepare for these contingencies? The Atlantic Council invites to a discussion with Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Chairman, Atlantic Council, James E. Cartwright, Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bilal Y. Saab, Senior Fellow for Middle East Security, Atlantic Council and Julianne Smith, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for a New American Security. The event will be moderated by Gideon Rose, Editor, Foreign Affairs.
- War in Syria and Iraq: Effect on the Kurdish Issue in Turkey | Thursday February 26 | 2:00 – 4:00 | Emerging Democracies Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Conflict in Syria and Iraq has entered a new phase after the latest escalation of violence by the Assad regime and ISIS. More than 200.000 have been killed in Syria and hundreds die in Iraq every month since the emergence of ISIS last year. Turkey remains a critical actor for the future of the Kurdish political entities in Iraq and Syria as both countries have sizeable Kurdish populations on parts of territory bordering Turkey. The successful defense of the town of Kobane in Northern Syria by joint Kurdish forces against the invading ISIS has once again underlined the importance of Kurds as credible actors in the new Middle East. Turkey on the other hand has acted quiet reluctantly in delivery of military and humanitarian support to the fighting Kurdish forces. Public protests against Ankara’s passivity shook the towns in Eastern Turkey and forced the Davutoglu Government to allow for the Peshmerga to cross over to Kobane. The on-going secret negotiations between the PKK and Ankara are at a critical junction as they are about to go official. Possible peace deal between Ankara and the PKK could be a big step forward in consolidating democracy in Turkey. This panel discussion features Doga Ulas Eralp, Professorial Lecturer, American University, Mehmet Yuksel, Washington D.C. Representative, Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP), Mutlu Civiroglu, Journalist and Kurdish affairs analysts and Nora Fisher Onar, Fellow, Transatlantic Academy of the German Marshall Fund. The panel will be moderated by Reuf Bajrovic, President, Emerging Democracies Institute. The participants will discuss the impact of the wars in Syria and Iraq on the Kurdish peace talks in Turkey along with Turkey’s changing calculations in the Middle East.
- Inside the Iran Nuclear Negotiations | Thursday February 26 | 6:00 – 8:00 | Washington Institute for Near East Policy | RSVP to link@washingtoninstitute.org by February 23 | On September 27, 2013, Iran and the United States engaged in direct conversation for the first time since 1979. President Obama and President Rouhani agreed there was a basis for a nuclear deal. But, nearly a year and a half later, a final agreement still seems elusive. The deadline for talks has already been extended twice, with the new deadline set for March. Each side has something to lose if a deal is not made — Iran faces further crippling sanctions and the United States risks a nuclear Iran. Can Iran and the P5+1 overcome their differences to arrive at an agreement with one month to spare? Join LINK as Congressman Ted Deutch and Lane-Swig Fellow Michael Singh provide their insights into the Iran nuclear negotiations. Congressman Deutch is a member of the Democratic party, while Mr. Singh served in a Republican administration.
- The Arab Spring@4: What Next? | Thursday February 26 | 6:30 – 8:00 | Project for the Study of the 21st Century | REGISTER TO ATTEND | To celebrate the launch of its PS21 MIDEAST blog, the Project for Study of the 21st Century and Young Professionals in Foreign Policy bring you a discussion on a region in flux. Four years after the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, the Middle East appears as stable as at any point in recent history. What went wrong, what might happen next and what, if anything, can the United States do to influence events? The discussion will feature Sidney Olinyk, former chief of staff, Mideast policy, Department of Defence and current member of the PS21 International Advisory Group, Ari Ratner, Senior Fellow at New America Foundation and Nancy Okail, Executive director, The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.
- An Effective P5+1 Nuclear Deal with Iran and the Role of Congress | Friday February 27 | 1:00 – 2:30 | Arms Control Association | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Negotiators from the P5+1 and Iran are racing to try to conclude a political framework agreement for a comprehensive, long-term nuclear deal to block Iran’s potential pathways to nuclear weapons by the end of March, with technical details on a final deal to be ironed out by the end of June. Over the past year, Iran and the P5+1 have made significant progress on long-term solutions on several challenging issues. At the same time, key members of Congress are threatening to advance new Iran sanctions legislation and set unrealistic requirements for a nuclear deal. The Arms Control Association will host a special press briefing featuring a former member of the U.S. negotiating team, a former professional staff member of the House intelligence committee, and Arms Control Association experts on the status of the negotiations, the likely outlines of a comprehensive agreement, and the the appropriate role for Congress. Speakers include Richard Nephew, Program Director, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and former Principal Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the Department of State, Kelsey Davenport, Director of Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association, and Larry Hanauer, Senior International Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. The discussion will be moderated by Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association.
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Free Syria: better than local ceasefires
SAIS hosted at noon a launch event for the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) report on “Examining Syrian Perspectives on Local Ceasefires and Reconciliation.” Ellen Laipson (Stimson) moderated with Mohammed al Abdallah (SJAC), Craig Charney (Charney Research), Joseph Bahout (Carnegie Endowment) and me as panelists. These are my speaking notes for the event:
1. First let me join Ellen in lauding SJAC and Craig for their truly heroic and fascinating report. People in conflict zones have surprising perspectives. It is important they be heard.
2. I am a vigorous supporter of the Syrian opposition, but it should give us pause that regime-controlled areas report relatively good conditions and services while rebel areas are struggling to survive. Bashar al Assad is not entirely wrong when he claims to be providing a measure of security and government services, especially in Damascus and along the Mediterranean coast.
3. While conditions vary, there is an area of consensus: Syrians, who (importantly) continue to identify as such, support the idea of local ceasefires. But the reasons differ. Pro-regime people think local ceasefires will strengthen the regime’s grip and expel foreigners. Anti-regime people want relief.
4. Both want freedom of movement and the universal desire of people in conflict: normal lives.
5. The devil is in the details. I know something of local ceasefires, having worked on the Bosnian Federation—where the ceasefire between Croat and Muslim forces largely held—while the Federation was fighting the Bosnian Serb Army in 1994-95.
6. But I also can’t forget Srebrenica, where UN forces stood by while Serbs massacred thousands of Muslim men and boys. Local ceasefires that amount to surrender could look more like Srebrenica than any of us would like.
7. The key to local ceasefires is security for both sides. In the Bosnian Federation, the often criticized UN peacekeepers provided that security by manning checkpoints set up between the Muslim and Croat forces. At Srebrenica, the Dutch UN forces failed to do so.
8. The problem is that there are no peacekeepers, UN or otherwise, in Syria and little prospect for deploying them. I don’t know any serious country that would consider putting its troops into the current fluid and perilous situation, even if a local ceasefire can be negotiated.
9. Nor, judging from the Charney interviews, are Syrians prepared to see coordination between the opposing forces, which of course is vital even if peacekeepers were available. But let’s suppose FSA and regime forces were willing to coordinate. Spoilers from Jabhat al Nusra or the Islamic State would likely intervene in ways that would make it impossible to continue.
10. So the usual techniques for achieving and sustaining local ceasefires are not available in Syria.
What do we do?
11. Faute de mieux, I am thrown back on a Turkish idea: protected areas that opposition Syrian opposition would govern and non-extremist Syrian forces would guard on the ground while the US-led coalition ensures protection from air and artillery bombardment.
12. I hesitate to call these “safe areas,” as they would not be safe. They would be target-rich environments that the regime would attack unless prevented from doing so.
13. Nascent areas of this sort already exist, both along the Turkish border in the north and on the Jordanian border in the south. What needs to be done is to declare them, draw clear lines around them, protect them, and begin to weave them together into a Free Syria.
14. This idea is different from local ceasefires and reconciliation across the divide between opposition and regime. I just don’t think there is much basis, even in this fairly optimistic report, for believing there is sufficient trust to achieve much in that direction, even at the local level.
15. Sulha and musalaha, the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, require—as does reconciliation in the West—acknowledgement of harm and willingness to compensate.
16. Anyone who can see in Assad’s recent interviews willingness to acknowledge and compensate for harm is reading more between the lines than I am able to do. Nor would the Syrian government have anything like the resources required to compensate for the harm it has done.
17. Of course protected areas have their downsides. They could lay the basis for ethnic or sectarian partition. They could lead to abandonment of less protected areas, increasing displacement. They could open the door to pushing refugees back into Syria. They would require serious, coordinated efforts at protection, both on the ground and in the air.
18. But protected areas might also give refuge from violence to hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. If established along borders in the north and south they would enable humanitarian relief to be far more effective and prevent it from being exploited by the regime, as is common today. They would provide opportunities for the relatively moderate opposition to demonstrate that it can govern and counter extremists effectively.
19. Opposition success would also remove an important reservation in the international community, which wants to know “what comes next.” This is important for the US, which has prioritized the fight against the Islamic State. It will only support efforts that have potential to aid that fight.
20. Gradually expanded, Free Syria areas could present Assad with a serious rival, creating the necessary precondition for a national ceasefire, peace settlement and political transition.
21. For me, those advantages outweigh the disadvantages, though I admit it is a close call.
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When displacement isn’t temporary
Kammi Scheeler, a master’s student in my post-war reconstruction and transition course at SAIS, writes:
The World Bank hosted a panel Wednesday on the need for alternatives to refugee camps, as part of its three-day forum on Fragility, Conflict and Violence. Three themes emerged from the speakers’ presentations:
- Displacement should be treated as a development issue, not a humanitarian one. National development planning should take into account all populations in the area, including displaced persons.
- Displaced persons must be recognized as active participants in development with the capacity to contribute to host communities.
- Government capacities to process and support refugees in alternative ways need to be strengthened.
The first presenter on the panel was Steven Corliss, Director of the UNHCR Division of Programme Support and Management. He discussed UNHCR’s policy to seek alternatives to camps in as many circumstances as possible. Where not possible, the UNHCR still works to protect the rights of refugees and create living conditions that foster individual empowerment and dignity.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has said “anyone who thinks refugee camps are a good idea has never lived in one.” Camps will not disappear, as they remain needed to meet immediate needs in emergency situations. The problem, Corliss believes, is when camps are used as an automatic response to displacement, or when host governments do not have the tools to provide alternatives.
One of the primary pitfalls of camps is the loss of human capital. Typical refugee camps operate as temporary, emergency relief, providing little opportunity for inhabitants to utilize or develop skills. In protracted situations, their inhabitants lose the ability to manage their own livelihoods.
There is a persistent concern among hosts that allowing refugees to integrate will deter them from returning home. Camps will remain as host governments insist upon them. But when refugees are better integrated into local communities and labor markets, they are able to contribute economically and maintain independent livelihoods, encouraging earlier repatriation and better reintegration upon return.
The second speaker, David Apollo Kazungu, is the Commissioner of Refugees for the Ugandan Government. Uganda’s shared borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and South Sudan have led to a persistent influx of refugees escaping conflict since the 1950s. Uganda is now host to 415,000 refugees, with more expected from South Sudan in coming months. Refugees in Uganda are predominantly settlement-based, living alongside and sharing resources and services with Ugandan nationals. Although refugee status is meant to be a temporary solution, the persistent conflicts and instability of Uganda’s neighbors has led to more protracted situations.
This has necessitated a shift from humanitarian support to development support. Uganda’s Settlement Transformation Agenda is a uniquely comprehensive and progressive approach to refugee integration. Its key tenets include security enhancement, access to justice, settlement survey and planning, infrastructure development, refugee and host community empowerment, and peace building and conflict resolution initiatives.
Commissioner Kazungu stressed the importance of these last two programs saying, “refugeehood should be a chance to reconcile and learn to live side by side.”Since most of Uganda’s refugees fled their homes due to conflict, the government of Uganda is making a stronger effort to facilitate conflict resolution among diverse refugee populations so that they may create more stable communities upon return to their home countries. Although Uganda has shown a great deal of openness and commitment to receiving and integrating refugees, they face challenges such as encroachment, land inelasticity, and dwindling resources with no signs of decline in refugee inflows.
The remaining panelists included Niels Harild, the lead social development specialist for the World Bank’s Global Program on Forced Displacement, who reiterated the importance of viewing displacement as a development issue rather than merely a humanitarian one. The second half of the event provided examples of alternatives in action, with World Bank project leaders sharing data from programs in Turkey and Azerbaijan. In Turkey, the Bank is assessing the impact of Syrian refugees on host communities and recommending policies for integrating refugees outside camps. Azerbaijan has approximately 600,000 internally displaced persons supported by a Social Fund for the Development of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This project provides settlements and services to raise the standard of living for IDPs and also creates income-generation opportunities. Both cases highlight the range of possible ways to incorporate displaced persons into longer-term national development planning.
PS: In response to a comment on this piece, here is Killian Kleinschmidt at TedX Hamburg:
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Peace picks January 26-30
- Expanding Counterterrorism Partnerships: US Efforts to Tackle the Evolving Terrorist Threat | Monday January 26 | 12:00-14:00 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Washington Institute for Near East Policy | The attacks in Paris were a stark illustration of the serious terrorist threat confronting the United States and its allies, not only in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa, but far closer to home as well. In his May 2014 West Point address, President Obama emphasized that a successful long-term counterterrorism approach will revolve around strong partnerships with key actors overseas. What steps is the United States taking to bolster its counterterrorism partnerships with other governments and with nongovernmental actors? How should the U.S. strategy evolve in light of the Paris attacks and the continuing challenge posed by foreign terrorist fighters and the conflict in Syria and Iraq? What is the role of the State Department in this effort? To address these timely issues, The Washington Institute is pleased to host a Policy Forum with Ambassador Tina Kaidanow. Tina Kaidanow is the ambassador-at-large and coordinator for counterterrorism at the State Department. She has also served in high-ranking positions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Note that this event will be off the record.
- Where is Turkey Headed? Culture Battles in Turkey | Monday January 26 | 12:00-13:30 | Rumi Forum | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Turkey is a pivotal country: It is one of the few countries with a functioning democracy, it links the West with the turbulent Middle East, and it has been a reliable partner in NATO in difficult times. But Turkey is also a pivotal country in crisis: Under President Tayyip Erdogan it is drifting towards authoritarian rule, being neither a good partner for the West nor having leverage in the Middle East. Inside it becomes less democratic, internationally it becomes more isolated. Rainer Hermann, an international expert on the Middle East and long time correspondent for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, will present his analysis of the current affairs in Turkey with prospects for change and the challenges before the West. He has recently published a new book, Where is Turkey Headed, Blue Dome Press: New York, 2014, which is a comprehensive examination of the changes the last decades of Turkish politics have witnessed. He will be available to sign books at the end of the event.
- The Awakening of Muslim Democracy | Tuesday January 27 | 12:00-14:00 | George Washington University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Jocelyne Cesari is a senior fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs and visiting associate professor in the department of government at Georgetown University. She will discuss her recent release, The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State (Cambridge University Press, 2014). The discussion also features Nathan Brown, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University and Marc Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University.
- US Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: Priorities and Problems | Tuesday January 27 | 13:00 | School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) | REGISTER TO ATTEND | SAIS’ Foreign Policy Institute invites to a discussion with Ambassador Anne Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs on the priorities and problems of U.S. Middle East policy. The discussion is moderated by Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute. This event is off the record. No audio, video, transcription or digital recording is allowed.
- Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide | Wednesday January 28 | 12:15-14:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The destruction of the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire in 1915–1916 was the greatest atrocity of World War I. Around one million Armenians were killed and survivors were scattered across the world. Although the issue of what most of the world calls the Armenian Genocide of 1915 is now a century old, it is still a live and divisive issue that mobilizes Armenians across the world, shapes the identity and politics of modern Turkey, and has consumed the attention of U.S. politicians for years. In Great Catastrophe, the eminent scholar and reporter Thomas de Waal, senior associate in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, looks at the aftermath and politics of the Armenian Genocide and tells the story of recent efforts by courageous Armenians, Kurds, and Turks to come to terms with disaster as Turkey enters a new post-Kemalist era. Please join us for a conversation with the book’s author, moderated by Charles King. Great Catastrophe will be available to purchase, and the event will conclude with a book signing. De Waal will be joined by Jessica T. Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Charles King, professor of international affairs and government at Georgetown University. Lunch will be served.
- Ethnic “Homelands”: Imagining a New Middle East, 1919 – 1948 | Wednesday January 28 | 15:30 | George Washington University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After 1919, as much of the Middle East was absorbed into the beleaguered but still powerful European empires, a new ideology took hold in the region: the concept of physical separation as a “solution” to a newly identified “problem” of ethnic and religious pluralism. Across Europe and the United States, Armenian, Assyrian, and Jewish diaspora groups proved anxious to demonstrate their belonging in the ingathering of civilized nation-states by supporting the project of a homogenous national “homeland,” however remote it might be from their actual lived experiences. Diaspora lobbying, fundraising, and vocal support for creating ethnically based political entities through strategies of transfer and partition also found a reflection in some Arab discourse, as Palestinian, Syrian, and Iraqi Arab nationalists sought to make claims to independent statehood within a global framework that demanded national homogeneity as a corollary to sovereignty. This talk will explore how diaspora communities shaped the emerging political landscape of the modern Middle East as they declared that the only path to legitimate, recognized political status in the new global order was through identification, however distant, with an ethnic “homeland.” Laura Robson is a historian of the modern Middle East. Her current research and teaching focus on the history of religious and ethnic minorities in the twentieth century Arab world. She received her PhD from Yale University in 2009 and is now Associate Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History at Portland State University in Portland, Oregon.
- Global Security and Gender – A Forum with Sweden’s Foreign Minister Margot Wallström | Wednesday January 28 | 16:00-17:15 | United States Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The new Swedish government has pledged to increase its focus on global women’s issues with what it describes as a feminist foreign policy. The U.S. Institute of Peace, in collaboration with the Embassy of Sweden, will host a forum with new Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström on diplomacy and gender equality in a challenging global security environment. Following her remarks, Minister Wallström will be joined by former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Ambassador Johnnie Carson, a USIP senior advisor, who will moderate a discussion with the Minister, as well as U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues Catherine Russell, and U.S. Ambassador Donald Steinberg (retired), a former deputy administrator at the U.S. Agency for International Development who now serves as President and CEO of World Learning.
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Not in the cards
Yesterday I published a piece by Matthew Parrish suggesting that Iraqi Kurdistan (plus some of Syrian Kurdish territory) is headed towards independence. He imagines the path may be a relatively easy one, compared to the painful history Kurdistan has already endured.
I don’t agree.
My objections have nothing to do with the Kurdish case for independence. That is pretty good: they were promised it at the end of World War I, they have been mistreated both within Iraq and Syria for long periods, they were chased from their homes and out of Iraq, and they were gassed by the Baghdad government. This is a history comparable to Kosovo’s (though the Albanians were never gassed).
Unlike that former Serbian province, the Kurds do not have a UN Security Council resolution that promises them an eventual decision on their political status and the UN did not administer their territory for the better part of a decade. But they were protected by a UN-authorized no-fly zone that allowed them to develop substantial and relatively democratic governance. The distinction amounts to little net difference.
The case against Kurdistan’s independence is not based on Kurdistan’s merits but on geopolitical factors. Turkey, as Matthew suggests, has already accepted Iraqi Kurdistan’s de facto independence and deals with it pretty much as an independent state. It remains unclear what its reaction to de jure independence would be, but let’s assume it would accept (though recognition would only come if independent Kurdistan forswore any pretensions whatsoever to Turkish territory, as Matthew suggests).
That is the only good news. Matthew’s presumption that Iran would somehow come around is dubious. Tehran has made it absolutely clear that it fears the irredentist sentiment Kurdistan’s independence would unleash, endangering the peace and stability that has generally reigned in the Iranian province of eastern Kurdistan and uncorking other ethnic resentments throughout a country whose Persian population is likely no more than 60% of the total. Iran is not going to welcome an independent Kurdistan.
Just as important: Arab Iraqis would not accept an independent Kurdistan either. The presence of large oil reserves in territory that the Kurds now control, which Matthew cites as a plus for independence, is one reason. Another is Sunni fear of what would be a large Shia majority in an Iraq without Kurdistan. The Sunnis would be unlikely to secede from Iraq without Kirkuk and Baghdad, which they would fight for. Peaceful separation, like that of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, requires prior agreement on the lines of separation, which doesn’t exist today in Iraq and isn’t likely to exist in the future.
Nor would the international community welcome an independent Kurdistan. The Americans will oppose it because of the precedent it would set for the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The Russians will oppose it because of the implications for its ethnically non-Russian republics. The Europeans will be worried about Catalonia. The Chinese about Tibet. Kosovo, which still is not a UN member, was an exception that proves the rule, not a new rule.
In any event, the Kurds aren’t likely to go for independence anytime soon. At current oil prices and production levels, Kurdistan is not financially viable. While Matthew may imagine peaceful coexistence with the Islamic State (yes, he does), few in Turkey or Kurdistan can. Ankara and Erbil as well as Baghdad all know that they need American, European and Gulf help to defeat the self-declared caliphate. Complicating matters by declaring independence will not improve the Kurds’ prospects for needed assistance.
Could things change? Of course. Certainly oil prices can go up, though likely not as high as they were, because anything above $80 per barrel will open the “tight” oil and gas spigot. Kurdistan will need something like that price (and 10 years or so of drilling) to be better off with 100% of their own oil revenue than 17% of Iraq’s. Kurdistan could come to terms with Baghdad on where to draw its border, which would remove one important casus belli. Turkey could settle its problems with its own Kurds and Syria could throw out the Islamic State. Iran could turn into a cream puff. But little of that is likely to happen in the foreseeable future.
Bottom line: Kurdistan is not headed towards independence anytime soon, despite the merits of its case.
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