Tag: Turkey
Too narrow broadens
The Syria war resolution approved in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee goes a long way to correcting the problems in the original draft. The too narrow definition of American goals has been broadened to include changing the momentum on the battlefield. It looks as if the Administration has the votes to get this version approved in the Senate, provided it is not filibustered.
The question will be whether the broader definition of American goals is just too much for the House, where the increasingly isolationist Tea Party is strong among Republicans and more liberal Democrats likewise oppose getting involved abroad. It is one of the ironies of this Administration that it is paying the cost of George W. Bush’s mistake in going to war in Iraq. The House Republican leadership, while supporting the resolution, will not impose party discipline to ensure its passage, leaving voting entirely up to individual members. Minority leader Nancy Pelosi, who has come out swinging for the resolution, faces a tough uphill battle to get an overwhelming majority of Democrats to support the resolution. That won’t be easy.
My guess is that the key to success or failure lies with, whether you like it or not, Israel. Some think the Israelis are ambivalent about removing Bashar al Asad. Their politicians may be. But their intelligence apparatus has concluded that Bashar has to go sooner rather than later, to better the odds of preventing an extremist takeover. The Israelis have been smart to keep their mouths shut in public, but they are no doubt lobbying hard in private for vigorous military action that would reinforce the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons as well as help to end the war. Failure of the US Congress to approve military action, or hesitation by the President to take it, would reduce the credibility of an American military threat against the Iranian nuclear program, as Secretary of State Kerry made eminently clear in his testimony in the Senate.
The President can take military action without Congressional approval, but failure of the Congress to act would make an already messy process incomprehensible to most of the world and further reduce the likelihood of finding support among friends and allies. The Arab League, while denouncing the use of chemical weapons, has so far not called for military action. With the United Kingdom restricted from participation by its parliament and Germany and Italy reluctant as usual about military action, European support essentially comes down to France and maybe a few smaller countries. Plus Turkey, whose interests clearly lie in the earliest possible end to the war in Syria.
Russia remains adamantly opposed to military action, even if President Putin is sounding Moscow’s usual meaningless grace notes about not necessarily standing forever with Bashar al Asad and wanting to discuss the matter with President Obama. Iran is in an tough spot. It is a diehard opponent of chemical weapons use, as Saddam Hussein gassed Iranian forces in the 1980s, during the Iraq/Iran war. But its high officials, echoed by Moscow, are still insisting the August 21 attack came from the Syrian opposition, not the regime. This creates an opening. If the Americans can present Russia and Iran with detailed, incontrovertible evidence that the regime was responsible, logic would dictate that they at least stop their extensive military support to Bashar al Asad and his Hizbollah allies. But of course logic doesn’t necessarily govern situations like this one.
The action this week will be first and foremost in the House and then in Saint Petersburg, where the world’s major economic powers will be meeting at the G20 Summit. If and when a resolution passes in the House, there will be a moment–likely less than a day–for a quick diplomatic maneuver by Russia and Iran to agree to a diplomatic conference that would remove Bashar and save Moscow and Tehran from the embarrassment of an American air attack like the ones in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan that altered the military balance on the ground. If the diplomacy fails at that point, it will have another chance, but only after whatever happens happens. The law of unanticipated consequences will then be in full force.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What Congress should do
I have resisted comparisons between Syria and Bosnia, or Syria and Kosovo, as the global and regional circumstances are different. It does no good to draw conclusions that just don’t apply in a distinct situation. Bashar al Asad is not Slobodan Milosevic, the Middle East is not the Balkans, Yeltsin’s Russia is not Putin’s Russia, Obama’s United States is not Clinton’s. Distinct times and places make for dicey comparisons.
But as the Congress considers what to do about Syria, some of its members will no doubt want to think about the Balkans, where American bombing campaigns twice ended wars that seemed interminable. So better to help them get it right than to suggest they ignore the precedents.
My starting assumption is that Bashar al Asad did in fact use chemical weapons against Syria’s civilian population on August 21 and several other occasions. If like Vladimir Putin, you think this “utter nonsense,” stop reading here.
If Congress decides to authorize military action, it needs to understand what President Obama has known for a long time: we stand on a slippery slope. How Bashar al Asad will react is anyone’s guess, but we know that Milosevic reacted to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia by escalating his effort to ethnically cleanse Albanians from Kosovo. Likewise, the Bosnian Serbs reacted to the red line known as the “Gorazde rules” intended to protect UN designated safe areas by attacking Sarajevo. NATO responded by escalating in turn. If Bashar al Asad repeats chemical attacks, or sponsors terrorist attacks against American assets around the world, Washington needs to be prepared to escalate.
But bombing and escalation are not a policy. Nor is a well-targeted and time-limited bombing campaign an appropriate response to mass murder of civilians with chemical (or any other) weapons. Bashar al Asad is not a military problem. He is a political one. The military is a blunt instrument that should be wielded within the context of a broader political strategy to end his rule in Syria, block an extreme Islamist takeover, and put Syria on course towards a more open and democratic society.
The bombing in Bosnia was extensive, eventually reaching the communication nodes of the Bosnian Serb army. It was those tertiary targets that changed the course of the war, because the Serbs were unable to protect their long confrontation line with the Federation forces once they lost their classified communications capability. But even this extensive bombing might have been fruitless, or borne bitter fruit, had it not been accompanied by a diplomatic strategy, which today we associate with the Dayton agreements and Richard Holbrooke but at the time was associated with President Clinton and National Security Adviser Tony Lake.
Likewise in Kosovo, the NATO bombing followed on Yugoslav rejection of the Rambouillet agreement. The war ended with UN Security Council resolution 1244, which was the political counterpart of the military-technical agreement providing for withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo. Resolution 1244 imposed UN administration on Kosovo to develop democratic institutions and rule of law, with a view to an eventual political decision on Kosovo’s final status. NATO did not set removal of Milosevic as a war objective. But he was gone within one and a half years as the result of an election he called and a mass nonviolent movement that demanded he accept it.
I am not privy to the Administration’s military planning, but a serious political strategy would continue to aim for a power-sharing arrangement that shoves Bashar al Asad aside. The diplomacy would likely benefit from broader military action (against the Syrian air force, Scuds and artillery) than is currently contemplated, especially if it aimed at tilting the battlefield in the opposition direction. I don’t know if the Congress is willing to point in that direction, as it might require deeper American commitment than we can afford at present. But at the very least Congress should insist on stronger support for the Syrian opposition.
Is there an American interest in getting more deeply involved? Continuation of the war will likely cause state collapse in Syria as well as weaken Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and possibly Turkey. Al Qaeda affiliated extremists in both Iraq and Syria will be the beneficiaries. Kurdish irredentism is a likely consequence. The Syrian war has the potential to reshape the Levant in ways that are inimical to American interests. If Congress is going to worry about military action in response to chemical weapons use by Syria, it should also worry about a political and military strategy to counter longer-term threats to Middle East peace and stability with potentially gigantic costs to the United States.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Lemonade
President Obama has had more than his share of lemons lately:
- the British parliament defeat of participation in military action against Syria,
- Russian President Putin calling the conclusive report of the US intelligence community indicting Bashar al Asad for chemical the August 21 chemical attack “utter nonsense,”
- Congress asking good questions and pestering for more consultations, and
- the UN Secretary General asking that he await the report of the chemical weapons inspection team.
He has now surprised us all with the oldest trick in the book: when you have nothing but lemons, make lemonade.
This makes a lot of sense. Insisting on a Congressional resolution of approval puts the Congress on the hook and meets the letter and spirit of the law, which is what a University of Chicago constitutional law professor should want to do. A successful resolution will quiet his critics and compensate for the loss in London, putting the Brits and opponents in Congress to shame. The UN time line for completing its technical work seems to be less than two weeks, so its conclusions should give the lie to those who claim chemical weapons were not used. An opportunity to upbraid Putin during the G20 Summit in Saint Petersburg September 5/6 should be welcome.
Trouble is, lemonade is not what is needed in Syria. Bashar al Asad may well read delay as lack of resolve and even use chemical weapons again. What does Obama do then? Rush the resolution through Congress, or go ahead without waiting? The part of the Syrian opposition most friendly to US interests may be disquieted, while extreme Islamists profit from the US delay by pointing to American unreliability. While the President said nothing about it in the Rose Garden, he should be accelerating assistance to the Free Syrian Army in ways that give it more confidence of US backing.
Lemonade is also not what US credibility needed. This may be a temporary problem, so long as the Congress approves military action and the Administration delivers a serious blow. But friends and enemies in the region and beyond will be calculating what this means for them: the Israelis first and foremost, but also the Turks, Iranians, Russians and North Koreans. Friends will be discomforted. Enemies may take heart.
The President is also at risk. If the defeat in the British parliament dealt a blow to David Cameron, a defeat in the US Congress would pull the rug out from under Barack Obama. I trust he is confident he can win, but until he does his prestige is on the line. A loss would leave him hurting just as Congress turns to a budget fight that promises to be a real bruiser.
So turning to Congress is smart, even ingenious, but not without serious risks. But proceeding apace without satisfying Congress had serious risks as well. So lemonade is on the menu, whether it is what you wanted or not.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
This is awkward
British parliament disapproval of participation in a military attack on Syria leaves the US with only France and Turkey as seemingly willing allies in punishing Bashar al Asad’s regime for the use of chemical weapons. The rest of the world seems content to sit back and watch, commenting all the while and reserving the option to hiss and boo if things go badly and to applaud if they go well.
At the same time, there is a growing view in the commentariat that military intervention will have little positive impact, and may even cause Asad to escalate his chemical attacks, or lash out in with terrorist attacks. Narrowly targeted military action to deter use of chemical weapons in the absence of a broader political strategy is likely to be ineffective at best, counter-productive at worst. Even if it deters further use of chemical weapons, the regime has ample alternative means with which to kill Syrians, as it has demonstrated for more than two years.
The UN chemical weapons inspection team is returning from Damascus and will need to prepare a report on its findings. These will presumably demonstrate unequivocally that chemical weapons were used but likely not who used them, as that was never part of the inspectors’ mandate. The Administration therefore needs to clarify for the American public, which is thoroughly unconvinced of the need for the US to take military action, and the international community, including the UN Security Council, why it thinks the regime was responsible. I personally don’t have any doubt, but others do and are entitled to answers from a government that has proved unreliable, even untrustworthy, more than once (read “Gulf of Tonkin,” “WMD in Iraq”).
It will be early next week before a case can be made in the serious way the situation requires. At that point it makes more sense to wait until after Presidents Obama and Putin have a chance to discuss the issues on the margins of the G20 Summit (September 5-6) in Saint Petersburg. An American-led attack on Syria will be a serious embarrassment for Moscow, which will squeal loudly about the horrendous consequences for the Middle East and world peace but will mostly be chagrined that it has once again failed to block the Americans. If Moscow will agree to push Bashar al Asad aside, that would be reason enough to hesitate more.
My colleagues Ed Joseph and Elizabeth O’Bagy have tried to sketch what a serious diplomatic initiative might look like, putting the emphasis quite rightly on security. But they wave their magic wand and create UN peacekeepers who are nowhere on the horizon in the truly vast numbers that would be required (100k at a minimum). They also rightly (if regrettably) suggest some degree of sectarian and ethnic separation, which is occurring in any event. The trouble is that the confrontation lines in many parts of Syria are still intertwined and contorted. It will take a lot more violence to straighten them out. Doing it at the negotiating table will be an even lengthier process.
President Obama is an awkward spot. Damned if he does, damned if he doesn’t. It sure would be nice to find a diplomatic way out.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Well managed conflicts are hard to resolve
This makes sense of course. Why bother paying the high price resolution usually entails if the cost of continuing in conflict is relatively low? We see this happening today in many places: Israel/Palestine, Macedonia/Greece, Armenia/Azerbaijan, Cyprus/Turkey. How should the international community behave in such instances?
Generally the approach has been to continue efforts at resolution, almost no matter what. Depending on how you count, the Israel/Palestine conflict is 65 years old, Macedonia’s conflict with Greece over its name has been subject to mediation for more or less 20 years, the Minsk group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been working on Armenia and Azerbaijan’s dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh for as long, and UN peacekeepers have been in Cyprus for almost 40 years. It makes economic sense to continue because the international community efforts are relatively cheap compared to the potential consequences of ending them.
But does it make sense in terms of getting to yes? Is the international community’s willingness to continue mediation or peacekeeping efforts inhibiting a solution rather than encouraging one?
That is a difficult judgment to make, but I have my suspicions, especially in the Macedonia/Greece dispute. On the surface, it is a fairly simple one: Greece refuses to accept what it prefers to call “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (or the FYROM) by its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia). This wouldn’t make much difference except that Greece can (and does) block the FYROM from entering NATO or getting a date to begin negotiations on EU membership, in violation of a 1995 “interim agreement.” The International Court of Justice has found Greece in violation of that agreement but it does not have the ability to enforce its decisions.
For almost 20 years, now UN envoy Matt Nimetz has tried to find a solution. Greece has appeared at times ready to accept a modifier (for example, “North Macedonia”) but wants the agreed name used in all circumstances, including every time it is mentioned in the Macedonian constitution. This isn’t very attractive to Skopje, which already enjoys a world in which everyone but Greece and international organizations call the country Macedonia. Skopje doubts that even if it accepted the Greek parliament would ratify membership in NATO, much less the EU.
This is one spat the world could do without, but nothing the committed and inventive Nimetz has done in 20 years has gotten rid of it. So the question is, should we get rid of the UN envoy, hoping that will give Athens and Skopje ample incentive to cut a deal directly with each other?
I don’t know. There is little likelihood of a solution unless they do, but that is no guarantee they would.
Macedonia’s prime minister has enjoyed a great deal of popularity as a result of his nationalist rhetoric and building program. The only people in Macedonia really unhappy with the current situation are ethnic Albanians, who regard NATO membership as the ultimate guarantee of security and would like to end a dispute that has nothing to do with their own ethnic identity. But Albanians represent close to a quarter of the population. Macedonia is a fragile state that cannot afford to alienate its largest minority.
The Greek prime minister, who was one of the originators of the dispute in the 1990s, has likewise little political incentive to settle it. While there are certainly some Greeks who would like to see the issue resolved, if only to stabilize a neighborhood in which the country has significant investments, they are relatively few. Most Greeks regard ancient Macedonia as quintessentially Greek and are unwilling to see the label hijacked by Slavs.
I don’t want to minimize the importance of this dispute to those most directly involved. Macedonians and Greeks alike regard the issue as profoundly important, as it affects their identities. But is this something the rest of the world should be investing to solve? There is not risk of armed confrontation over this issue. After 20 years, it seems to me the UN would be more than justified to pack in the effort and let the parties to the conflict try to resolve it themselves, or not.
More on other well managed conflicts in future posts.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Syria has dropped off the screen
The White House justifications for backing out of a bilateral summit with President Putin lack one important one: Syria. The list is a long, citing (in addition to the asylum for Edward Snowden):
our lack of progress on issues such as missile defense and arms control, trade and commercial relations, global security issues, and human rights and civil society.
Some might hope that this presages progress in convening the proposed Geneva 2 meeting on Syria, but there is no sign of that. The more than 100,000 people killed in Syria in the past 2.5 years, the 1.5-2 million who are refugees, the 4 million who are displaced inside Syria and the 7 million in humanitarian need have dropped off the radar of an administration that promised to anticipate and prevent mass atrocities.
A colleague deeply immersed in Syria asked the other day whether watching the Bosnian implosion was this bad. I answered that it was worse, because the crisis was on the front pages daily. And it went on for 3.5 years before President Clinton carried out the threat he had made during his first campaign for the presidency to bomb Serb forces. That is why it is not on the list of reasons for canceling the Obama/Putin meeting.
Why was it on the front pages every day? The proximate causes were two: the Bosnians had forceful and effective spokespeople, mainly their ambassador to the UN in New York and their wartime prime minister. Ambassador Mo Sacirbey was on CNN daily strumming the heartstrings of ordinary Americans. Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic would whip himself into a lather bemoaning the latest atrocity. Students organized against the war on college campuses, Congress held hearings, Foreign Service officers resigned and newspapers ran daily accounts of a war in which little of strategic significance was happening.
While Senator McCain and a few others have raised their voices about Syria, mobilization today against the atrocities in Syria extends little beyond the Syrian American community, which is doing its best to funnel in humanitarian assistance but has found no resonance in the broader US population. There is no recognizable and consistent Syrian voice speaking out daily on US television.
Part of the reason is political instability in the Syrian opposition, which has gone through three or four “presidents” in a couple of years, none of whom became a welcome figure in the American media. Divided international sponsorship–the Qataris backing the Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudis backing less Islamist forces–underlies this instability.
The Bosnians faced similar divisions among their international sponsors: their money and weapons came from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others. But the government in Sarajevo had from the first a stable leadership: the laconic Alija Izetbegovic was the more or less uncontested first among equals, accepted even by his rivals as the legitimate president of the beleaguered Bosnian state. There was stolid consistency at the top, which helped to paper over the differences among the international donors and reduce the perceived significance in Washington of the jihadi fighters who joined the Bosnian cause.
In Syria, the Saudis, perhaps emboldened by the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, are now trying to play a leadership role by offering to buy off the Russians. They have managed to install one of their favorites as president of the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. What they have not managed to do is counter the growing significance of the extremist fighters, who have frightened Washington away from embracing the revolutionary cause.
The Syrians are not lacking in rhetorical power: sister and brother Rafif and Murhaf Jouejati here in DC do a great job trying to bring the latest atrocity to our attention. But they are doing it essentially as civil society activists rather than as official representatives of the Syrian opposition. And they are heard mostly in a narrow circle of Syria-watchers and expatriate Syrians, none of whom carry much weight in the broader American body politic. Syria really has dropped off Washington’s screen.
RSS - Posts
