Tag: Turkey
Peace Picks, June 10-14
1. Drones and the Future of Counterterrorism in Pakistan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Monday, June 10 / 5:00pm – 6:30pm
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Frederic Grare, Samina Ahmed
The future use of drones in Pakistan is uncertain after President Obama’s recent speech on national security. Washington has now satisfied some of the demands of Pakistan’s incoming prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. But while drone strikes were seen in Islamabad as a violation of the country’s sovereignty, they were also arguably an effective counterterrorism mechanism. Samina Ahmed will discuss the future use of drones in Pakistan. Frederic Grare will moderate.
Register for the event here:
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/06/10/drones-and-future-of-counterterrorism-in-pakistan/g7f0
2. Tyranny of Consensus: A Reception with Author Janne E. Nolan, Century Foundation, Monday, June 10 / 5:00pm – 6:30pm
Venue: Stimson Center, 1111 19th Street Northwest, 12th Floor, Washington D.C., DC 20036
Speakers: Janne E. Nolan
In “Tyranny of Consensus,” Nolan examines three cases-the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the proxy war with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa-to find the limitations of American policy-makers in understanding some of the important developments around the world. Assisted by a working group of senior practitioners and policy experts, Nolan finds that it is often the impulse to protect the already arrived at policy consensus that is to blame for failure. Without access to informed discourse or a functioning “marketplace of ideas,” policy-makers can find themselves unable or unwilling to seriously consider possible correctives even to obviously flawed strategies.
Register for the event here:
http://tcf.org/news_events/detail/tyranny-of-consensus-a-reception-with-author-janne-e.-nolan
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Power, Power and Rice
While some are predicting (or hoping for) big changes in American foreign policy in the liberal interventionist/human rights first direction with the appointments of Susan Rice as national security adviser and Samantha Power as UN ambassador, I doubt it.
Both have already left marks on US foreign policy, Samantha through the Atrocities Prevention Board and Susan in the Libya intervention and many other efforts at the UN, including the successful use of its Human Rights Commission to report on atrocities in Syria. I wouldn’t suggest these are enormous departures from the past, but they certainly reflect the view that saving foreigners from mass atrocity has its place in US p0licy and needs to be given due consideration along with more traditional national interests of the military, political and economic varieties.
The main “to intervene or not” issue today is Syria. Susan and Samantha have both already been involved in internal debates on Syria, where President Obama ignored the advice of Hillary Clinton, David Petraeus and Leon Panetta. They all advised a more interventionist stance. It is the president, not the advisers, who is choosing not to try to stop the Syrian civil war, largely because of issues unrelated to Syria: Russian support on the withdrawal from Afghanistan and in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, not to mention the American public’s war weariness and the parlous budget situation. No doubt someone at the Pentagon is also telling him that allowing extremist Sunnis and Shia to continue killing each other in Syria is in the US interest. Read more
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“Il potere logora chi non ce l’ha”
As I am about to risk denunciation for drawing unreasonable parallels, let me state up front that Turkey is not Egypt, Egypt is not Libya, Libya is not Tunisia, Tunisia is not Syria, Syria is not Yemen, Yemen is not Morocco or Kuwait. If there is one thing we’ve learned from the Arab awakenings, it is that each finds its own course within a particular historical and cultural tradition. Distinct political, economic, social and religious conditions are like the soil and rocks through which a river finds its way to the sea. It is difficult to predict the water’s course as gravity pulls it in the inevitable direction.
That said, it seems to me we are seeing in the Middle East a common factor, perhaps a bit like the granite that forces water to find another difficult-to-predict direction. That common factor is the difficulty all of the “democratically elected” leaders are having in adjusting to politics with an opposition. Tunisia is struggling with a Salafist opposition that is stronger than many expected. Islamist militias in Libya have forced its parliament into a harder line on purging Qaddafi-era officials than its leadership found comfortable. Egypt is facing a summer of discontent as President Morsi runs into criticism and street demonstrations by his erstwhile non-Islamist allies.
Now it is Turkey’s turn, where protest against destruction of a park in Taksim square has turned into a much broader challenge because of overreaction from the security forces and Prime Minister Erdogan’s arrogant response. Now the theme is “everywhere is Taksim, resistance is everywhere.” I hardly need mention that in Syria Asad and his security forces managed by overreaction to turn a few teenage graffiti artists into a civil war.
Despite the differences in context, there is a common theme here: the inability of rulers, even democratically elected ones, to govern in an inclusive way that provides opposition with a legitimate role. The flip side of the coin is the inability of opposition forces to figure out how to influence those who govern them without resorting to violence, disruption and rebellion. There is an exception to the rule, but a limited one. Yemen, of all places, is proceeding with a national dialogue that appears for the moment serious, though it has failed to include the southern secessionists and may eventually fail on that score.
Widening our aperture a bit, I would submit that we are seeing something similar in Iraq, where Prime Minister Maliki has managed to keep a few Sunni elites in the tent but seems to have driven large numbers in Anbar and Ninewa into an increasingly disruptive opposition that extremists are exploiting to challenge the security forces and may lead to further division of the state. In Bahrain, the monarchy and its opposition have driven each other into mutual polarization. Only in Morocco, where the king has tried to get ahead of the reform curve, and in Kuwait, where parliament plays a modestly more serious role than in most other Arab monarchies, have we seen the opposition developing as a possible alternative governing elite: loyal but with its own program and leadership cadres.
So the common problem I see is the failure to develop in many places an opposition that is serious about presenting a governing alternative. In dictatorships of course the regimes don’t want such a thing to happen and do everything they can to prevent it. But even in newish democracies that instinct remains. And opposition behavior all too often confirms that there is no viable alternative, or that there are many, no one of which has enough political omph to merit gaining power in a relatively free and fair election. Knowing this, fragmented oppositions do little to gain credibility as governing forces but focus instead on gaining adherents and influence through street demonstrations.
It will take time to get past this stage of things. Maybe a decade. It is not easy to turn a street movement, even a successful one, into a political force with real governing potential. In Giulio Andreotti’s immortal words, “il potere logora chi non ce l’ha.” Power wears out those who haven’t got it.
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Opinion matters
Shibley Telhami presented his new book, The World Through Arab Eyes; Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East, at Brookings this week. BBC’s Kim Ghattas was quick to offer an alternative title: “Everything you want to know about the Middle East but aren’t getting from the headlines.”
Telhami explained that Arab public opinion is now the source of real insight into the layers of conflict spread across the Middle East. The Arab uprisings have increased its importance. The essential theme emerging after the first uprisings of 2011 was Arab identity. Understanding identity is central to understanding public opinion.
While domestic issues and authoritarian abuses may have triggered the Arab uprisings, foreign policy was also important. The years leading up to the Arab uprising were not inherently different from decades past in regards to domestic and economic woes. But Arabs are angry about the collapse of Israeli/Palestinian negotiations in 2000, the war in Afghanistan, the Iraq war and the Gaza wars. It was a strikingly violent decade (and more) in international relations.
Arab populations are angry because their leaders and governments were powerless to stand up to foreign invasions and defend the wishes of their citizens. Arab identity and sovereignty were compromised. Arab leaders played no role in stopping it.
Arab public option polls during this period were striking. One question, “who is the leader you admire most in the world?” is a crucial lens for seeing how Arabs judged and chose leaders at that time. Jacques Chirac, Hassan Nasrallah, Hugo Chaves and even Saddam Hussein were the most common answers. Telhami attributes these responses to each leader’s strong and defiant role in foreign affairs. Post Arab spring polls show Turkey’s Prime Minister, Erdogan, as one of the most popular leaders for his assertive stance in foreign policy and his ability to stand up for Turkey’s identity.
Telhami observes that identification with the state has declined while identification with Islam has increased. The adage, “you are what you have to defend” applies here, as Muslims see Islam as under assault. Increased identification as ‘Muslim’ or ‘Arab’ is also correlated with the rise in transnational media in the Middle East. Arabs are associating with others outside their national borders. This has important implications for the relationship between people and their governments, which have to take into account public opinion that extends beyond their borders.
The discussion of transnational Arab identity naturally led to a discussion of Israel and Palestine. For Arabs, the Palestinian issue reflects decades of painful defeats and remains a humiliating reminder of their powerlessness. It as an open wound.
Kim Ghattas disagreed that the Palestinian issue was central to Arab identity. She thought the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has taken a back seat now that people finally have a chance to change their domestic situation. In the past, Palestinian issues were used as a rallying cry for Arab autocrats trying to suppress and distract their own people. Finally, Arabs have a say within their own country, and they are going to speak.
There is no going back. Public opinion has been empowered.
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Odd duck
I livetweeted Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s appearance in Washington at SETA (a Turkish thinktank for political, economic social research) yesterday, but the performance merited more. Maybe my numerous Turkish readers will find it interesting, even if the Americans don’t. I rarely attend such high-level public events, as little new gets said.
But Erdogan did not disappoint. Speaking in Turkish (I was listening to the simultaneous translation), his main theme was this:
no justice means no humanity, no dignity, and no peace.
He went on to talk about the “bottom billion” living on less than $1 per day, most of whom are innocent children, as well as the suffering in Somalia and Darfur. Personally moved by starvation and circumcision done with a simple knife on several children, he underlined the injustice of racism and discrimination, referring in particular to violence against Muslims in Myanmar.
Lack of justice in one place is a threat to justice elsewhere. Palestine is not a territorial issue but a justice issue. Israeli settlements are making a two-state solution impossible. Israel should release Palestinian prisoners and end the blockade. Hamas will have to be at the negotiating table. It was elected and then denied the right to govern. Israel has apologized for its raid on the Turkish aid flotilla. Compensation is under discussion. Then Turkey will press for an end to the occupation.
The twentieth century was one of war and injustice. The twenty-first century should be one of peace and justice. Turkish policy is based on justice and humanity. This is why Turkey supported the people in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria. But the UN Security Council is doing nothing. The system is blocked, and wrong. Humanity cannot be in the hands of one or two countries; the system has to be changed. Events like those of the 1990s in Bosnia and Rwanda are happening again, but the Security Council is doing nothing.
A world in which babies are slaughtered is not a religious world. This is not honorable and it makes me mad. When you witness things of this sort, you have a responsibility. Why is the media not covering the slaughter in Banias (Syria)? The babies dying are not only their parents, but also ours. You have to act. You have to stop these things. Society shares responsibility for this evil. There is a need for global conscience and justice. We have to see that the elements bringing us together are stronger than those that drive us apart. We have to help the poor and the weak. We cannot step on each other and remain connected to our ideals and faith.
Somewhere around this point, Erdogan took a diversion that I wasn’t able to capture tweeting but I’ll try to reproduce here. God’s justice, he said, is ever present but manifests itself at different times and places. He reminded the audience of the Koranic phrase
Bismillah al rahman al rahim
This is generally translated
In the name of God, most Gracious, most Compassionate
But, Erdogan said, its real meaning is that God has two aspects. The first he shows to everyone on earth during their lifetimes. This is the same for everyone (most Gracious). The second is reserved for the faithful in the afterlife (most Compassionate). I’m no theologian, but this struck me as a millenarian concept rather similar to that of the raptured Christians or the Puritans’ “elect.” No ecumenism in this second aspect. Only true believers enter heaven.
I imagine some aide in the front row was figuratively urging him to move on at this point, which is what he did. Turkey will fulfill its obligations, Erdogan said. We want to see more countries concerned about Syria, where the regime does not control much of the territory but uses its weapons to fire on the population. Asad has fired hundreds of missiles and used sarin gas.
President Obama is trying to do the right thing, but what is needed is UN Security Council action, which would accelerate the process. Russia needs to step forward. Turkey will continue to cooperate with Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
In the Q and A, Erdogan said he would go soon to Gaza and the West Bank (he did not mention Israel). He is against war, but sometimes justice requires it. The clergy should help us avoid getting to that point by reaching across borders. An EU/US trade agreement is a fine idea, but it will need to take into account Turkey’s interests, as Turkey has a customs union with the EU. Turkey will continue to press China on respecting the rights of the Uighurs.
The session ended without questions about Kurds inside Turkey, imprisonment of journalists or other human rights violations. As questions were submitted in writing, the moderator presumably tossed those.
This is an odd duck: a religious and social conservative who has instituted vigorous free market economic reforms but also holds liberal internationalist views on the world, while ignoring those views when it comes to internal politics and human rights.
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No narrow way out
This rare interview with Salim Idriss, who (sort of) commands the forces in Syria that call themselves the Free Army, is telling. It demonstrates three things:
- The rebels are still in need of weapons.
- Their fragmented structure makes supplying them a dicey proposition.
- Disunity is a serious impediment to their military progress.
This is not an unfamiliar situation. It is comparable to the Bosnian army during the first year of that country’s miserable war, which started more than twenty years ago and went on for three and a half years before the Federation forces started winning and the Dayton accords ended it.
By then, the Bosnian (ABiH) was unified under General Rasim Delic and fighting in tandem with the Croat Defense Force (HVO) and the Croatian Army (HV) against the Republika Srpska army (VRS). But things hadn’t started that way. The HVO and the ABiH had even fought with each other in 1992 and 1993, just as some rebel forces inside Syria have in recent months.
Likewise in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army was not completely unified at first and fought occasionally with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), a less well-known group that also fought against the Yugoslav security forces.
The Syrian rebel forces will need greater unity if they are to make further progress against the Syrian army, which has been gaining ground in the past few weeks. That is at least in part due to Iranian and Lebanese Hizbollah forces fighting inside Syria. The regime’s objective is to relieve Damascus and secure the route to the Alawite-populated areas of the northeast, where ethnic cleansing of Sunnis has been proceeding apace.
The rebel forces are also going to need more international help, at the very least arms supplies, but some want a much narrower focus. Aram Nerguizian wants American intervention to focus exclusively on chemical weapons and extremists among the rebels:
How U.S. military power could be used is to selectively target risks tied to proliferation of chemical weapons and other strategic capabilities in Syria. It could be used to contain and curtail the expansion of al Qaeda in the Levant and to prevent the preeminence of radical forces in the region.
The chemical weapons seem to me strategically irrelevant. If used, they have killed a tiny fraction of the more than 80,000 dead. It can still be argued that the President’s “red line” has to be enforced, lest failing to do so sends the wrong message to Iran. Certainly a credible threat of military force to block Tehran from getting nuclear weapons is vital to the diplomatic strategy the President is pursuing. But the notion that chemical weapons, like nuclear bombs, are “weapons of mass destruction” is hyperbole. Syria’s use of chemical weapons has nothing like the implications of Iran gaining nuclear ones. Finding and destroying Asad’s stocks of sarin and other poisons would be a major military enterprise, not the limited intervention some may imagine.
Extremists are likewise a difficult target to engage. Muslim extremists also emerged in Bosnia and Kosovo but were quickly undone once the fighting was over. That will be a far more difficult process in Syria, as it will not be getting the tens of thousands of NATO peacekeeping forces that made it happen quickly, and in retrospect easily, in the Balkans. But how, precisely, does one target Jabhat al Nusra in Syria? Do we really want to be hunting them down with drones while they are fighting the Asad regime? Or encouraging the Free Syria Army, which is less than fully effective against the regime forces, to engage against them while the extremists are fighting Asad? We have made it clear that Jabhat al Nusra is not acceptable to the international community, something the UN reinforced last week with financial sanctions. But do we really need to do more than that right now?
The higher priority is to focus on protecting civilians in Syria. The regime is targeting civilians in rebel-held areas daily, trying to make life there unbearable and governance impossible. The purpose is to get the civilians to expel the insurgents, in the hope doing so will provide some measure of relief from artillery and air bombardment. Protecting Syria’s civilian population from these ravages should be our priority concern.
The costs of failing to do so are high. US humanitarian relief in Syria could total $1 billion by the end of this year. Unless we focus on civilian protection we are not likely to recover some measure of confidence in Syria’s Sunni Muslim population and prevent its youth from further radicalization. A post-Asad Syria dominated by extremists will be a problem for the Middle East and the US for decades into the future. We should want a Syria that respects the rights of its citizens (regardless of sect or ethnicity) as well as its borders with Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon. That will take time and effort. There is no shortcut. A narrow focus on chemical weapons and extremists will not serve these broader strategic purposes. There is no narrow way out.
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