Tag: Turkey
Nowruz/Passover/Easter: better than expected
I did not anticipate how well President Obama’s visit to Israel, Palestine and Jordan would go last week. I was not alone. In Washington, pre-roadtrip skepticism prevailed: differences over Iran and Palestine were anticipated to overshadow any cosmetic improvements in the President’s often tense personal relations with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.
It may still turn out that way in the longer-term. Whatever new castles Obama built in the Mediterranean sand could be quickly swept away. But for those who think the US is decline and can no longer influence events in the Middle East, this trip should sow doubt. And for those who thought Mitt Romney would do better with the Israelis than Obama, this trip suggests the contrary.
The President went out of his way to establish his bona fides with Israelis: praising their democracy, admiring their courage, recalling their idealism, remembering their history, sharing their losses, ensuring their security. But he at the same time spoke bluntly of the need to make peace with the Palestinians, who will have enjoyed his performance less but still got a blunt and unambiguous defense of their right to a state of their own. The well-crafted statement brought the president ample applause also from Israelis. Presumably there were not a lot of West Bank settlers in the audience. It was a virtuouso performance.
So much for the flash. What about the substance? The big issues for the trip to the Middle East were three:
Iran: The President and Netanyahu sounded more united on preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons. In fact, there are differences, with Israel concerned that the Americans will agree to allow Iran to hold on to a substantial quantity of 20% enriched uranium, which could be further enriched quickly with more advanced centrifuges that Iran is now installing. The Iranians are slowing their accumulation of enriched material while increasing their capacity to move quickly if they decide to develop nuclear weapons. Obama made it clear he would not stand in the way of Israel taking military action, but only the US can cause serious damage to the Iranian nuclear program. Netanyahu seems now to accept that the Americans will draw the redline, albeit closely consulting with the Israelis.
Syria: Secretary Kerry has been leaning forward on bringing an end to the civil war in Syria, but President Obama is still wanting it to be done without US military intervention or lethal supplies to the opposition. Israel is increasingly concerned about more advanced arms flowing to Hizbollah and about the buildup of more radical Sunni Islamists on its Golan Heights boundary with Syria. The apparent use during the week of chemical weapons–the regime says by the revolutionaries, the revolutionaries say by the regime–is a big problem for President Obama, who side-stepped the issue during his trip by saying he would await a determination on whether they were really used or not. Still, he said their use would be a game changer, whatever that may mean.
Palestine: The US and Israel need to keep the Palestinian Authority afloat, even as they discourage it from seeking further international recognition, taking Israeli officials to the International Criminal Court and reconciling with Hamas. This is a delicate dance, and Obama was less than clear on next steps. He is downplaying settlements per se and wants direct negotiations on borders, which of course would limit the extent of Israeli settlements.
Obama also has to be concerned about other issues:
Jordan: The big problem is the burgeoning flow of refugees from Syria, who are getting close to half a million. Amman just doesn’t have the capacity to welcome many more and needs help to manage the burden of those who have already arrived. The presidential visit will buck up King Abdullah, but the public relations effect is likely to be short-lived. He needs financial help (Obama pledged $200 million more for Syrian refugees in Jordan) and some good advice on carrying forward political reform. He is getting most of the former from the Saudis, who aren’t likely to give him much of the latter.
Egypt: The Israelis will have expressed concern about instability in Egypt, even though Muslim Brotherhood President Morsi has so far not undermined the peace treaty. The presence of Islamist extremists in Sinai appears still to be growing. The difficulties Egypt is having in establishing its new regime and maintaining legitimate governance throughout the country will be of concern to both Israel and the US.
Turkey: The big surprise of the President’s trip was his successful mediation of a Netanyahu apology for an attack on an aid flotilla to Gaza that killed nine Turks in 2010. This comes along with Turkish success in convincing imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan to agree to a ceasefire in the decades-long rebellion. Both moves will help to shore up Turkey in its continuing confrontation with Bashar al Asad and restore some confidence in an Ankara whose “zero problems with neighbors” policy had been in tatters.
I have my doubts Obama will succeed where other presidents have failed: on Palestine and Iran in particular. But he did well last week, and for that we should all be thankful. The Nowruz/Passover/Easter season is proving better than expected.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Irregular triangle: Turkey-Iran-Russia
Turkey, Russia and Iran are key players in the Middle East. Understanding their relations is important background to the current Middle Eastern turmoil, in particular the war in Syria. Differences over Syria threaten to disrupt Turkey’s relations with both Russia and Iran, while the Iran-Russia relationship is bound to suffer from mutual historical suspicions and conflicting long-term interests.
These were among the conclusions from a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) event this week focused on the “the Turkey-Iran-Russia nexus.” The panel featured CSIS’s:
- Bulent Aliriza, Director of the Turkey Project;
- Stephen Flanagan, Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Diplomacy and National Security;
- Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Project; and
- Jon Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and Director, Middle East Program.
The event drew on an abbreviated version of the panelists’ joint publication The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies. The information in this post draws both from the panelists’ comments, the publication distributed at the event, and Flanagan’s The Turkey-Russia- Iran Nexus: Eurasian Power Dynamics.
Aliriza explained that Turkey’s policy of “zero problems” with its neighbors, and ambitions to become an energy hub between the East and West, shape its relations with the other two countries. Seeking greater regional influence, Turkey wants to expand trade and economic cooperation with both Iran and Russia, taking advantage of its geostrategic location at the heart of Eurasia. The panelists agreed that the Iran-Turkey and Russia-Turkey relations were the most developed. The Russia-Iran relation is largely political and lacks a strong economic and energy dimension. Overall the CSIS discussion concluded that differences over Syria threatened to rupture the Turkey-Iran/Turkey-Russia relationship, while the Iran-Russia relationship was bound to suffer from the historical mutual suspicions and conflicting interests in the long term.
Turkey-Russia: a more tactical than strategic partnership
The current Turkish government has prioritized strengthening ties with the Kremlin. Understandably cool during the cold war, Russo-Turkish relations warmed up in the USSR’s last decade, when economic and energy ties combined with agreements to cease support of their respective separatist movements, leading to greater cooperation between Moscow and Ankara.
In 2010 the two countries launched a “strategic partnership” consisting of a high-level cooperation council, annual summits, and a joint strategic planning group. Trade, investment, and tourism also greatly increased in the past decade. After the EU bloc, Russia ranks as Turkey’s leading trade partner. In 2012 total bilateral trade amounted to $33 billion, with Turkish energy imports accounting for 80% of trade volume.
Bilateral energy trade relations represent both an area of mutual interest and an area of competition. Turkey aspires to balance becoming a vital energy transit point for Eastern oil to the West, with securing energy supplies from Russia. At the same time Turkey is aiming to reduce its heavy dependence on Russian energy through diversification. Russia’s efforts to control the flow of energy from the Black Sea and Caspian conflict with Turkey’s ambition to becoming a key player for the East-West energy corridor. These conflicting interests have stalled plans for projects such the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline.
Despite the increased economic and energy ties, tourism, and high-level political meetings between the two countries, Flanagan argues that insulating the energy and economic relationship between Turkey and Russia from the sharp differences over Bashar al Asad will become increasingly difficult. Unless Moscow decides to cooperate with the international community on Syria, act more constructively in the Eastern Mediterranean, and establish clear rules in the Caucasus, the Russo-Turkish relationship will suffer. Despite the “strategic” veneer of the relationship, the partnership remains largely tactical because the two countries lack a common political agenda and too many conflicting interests.
Iran-Turkey: on the rocks
According to the panelists, historical rivalry, mutual suspicion and sectarian differences limit this relationship, which has experienced ups and downs. The Turks engage in trade (especially energy) and investment with Iran, hoping to keep their competition peaceful. Iran leverages Turkey’s energy needs to prevent further political isolation. But Turkey is disappointed and frustrated, prompting Ankara to seek alternative partners.
Still Iran ranks as Turkey’s fifth-largest trading partner. Total bilateral trade increased from $1.05 billion in 2000 to $16 billion in 2011, with Iranian exports (mainly energy) constituting $12 billion. Travel also represents a significant area of growth in economic relations. Thanks to visa-free travel Iranians constitute the fourth largest group of foreign travelers to Turkey. Investment is also growing. Iranian firms increasingly operate in Turkey to gain access to international markets. In 2010 1,470 Iranian firms operated in Turkey, up from 319 in 2002. Turkish banks also serve as international intermediaries for financial transactions between Iran and states that fear antagonizing the US by engaging directly with Iran.
The Turkish and Iranian governments have attempted to expand energy trade since 1996. Despite failures to meet its commitments, Iran now ranks as Turkey’s second-highest supplier of natural gas. Turkish energy planners, however, increasingly prefer Azeri, Turkmen and Iraqi gas to Iran’s high-priced and unreliable supply. Turkish and Iranian interests contrast in regards to gas transit and the development of the Caspian basin. While Turkey hopes to serve as a transit corridor for Caspian, Central Asian and Iranian gas and oil, Iran opposes building the trans-Caspian pipeline because it favors Middle Eastern routes to Europe.
Iran and Turkey also diverge sharply on issues regarding the Arab Spring and in particular Syria. Iran’s insistence on manipulating Sunni-Shia’ tensions to expand its influence in the Middle East perturbs Turkish officials. Turkey continues to engage Iran diplomatically, hoping to convince Iran to take a more pragmatic stance on both Syria and the nuclear program, but Syria risks rupturing upsetting the pragmatic economic and energy relations put into place in recent year. Tehran hopes Turkey’s need for energy will sustain the relationship. But Aliriza believes Iran needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Iran.
Iran-Russia: a political relationship
The Iran-Russia relationship remains more political than economic. Russia sees in Iran a potential counterweight to US and Turkish influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moscow does not view Tehran as an immediate security threat. Iran has supported Russia in its larger strategic goal of promoting a multi-polar world. Iran and Russia find commonalities in opposing the US. There is not much personal affinity between Putin and Ahmadinejad. But as differences with the US grow over arms control, missile defense, Syria, and the larger Middle East, Iran and Russia have found more reason to cultivate their relations.
Although bilateral trade between the two countries tripled in the past ten years, Kuchins argues the volume remains insignificant. Russia represents 1.8% of Iran’s foreign trade, while Iran only accounts for 0.5% of Russia’s. There is little quantifiable energy trade and no joint commercial production in the Caspian, despite a 2008 treaty on cooperation in development of Iran’s gas and oil. Moscow and Tehran disagree on demarcation of the Caspian, but both oppose the trans-Caspian pipeline. The two view themselves as competitors for the European market in the longer-term. Alterman went so far as to suggest that containment of Iran plays to Moscow’s advantage, as otherwise it would have to compete with Iran for the European market.
The panel argued that in the short term the Middle Eastern turmoil serves both Moscow and Tehran. But continued support of Asad, and late diplomatic engagement with new Arab governments, may put them at a disadvantage later. Although Russia and Iran are bonding over shared energy and political goals, age-old suspicions and competing commercial interests will limit the alignment’s durability.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks March 18-March 22
A very busy spring break week in DC:
1. Overcoming Obstacles to Peace, Monday March 18, 10 AM- 11:30 AM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington DC, B203-204
Speakers: James Dobbins, Laurel Miller, William Durch, Joe Collins
How can societies build enduring peace? This is a simple question that the international community has tried to answer from a variety of different perspectives and efforts. A new book, “Overcoming Obstacles to Peace,” finds evidence that international interventions can in fact build more peaceful nations. Using thorough research supported by metrics, authors James Dobbins and Laurel Miller of the RAND Corporation demonstrate how 16 out of 20 selected conflicts over the past 25 years affirm the international community’s role and effectiveness in building stable nations.
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the RAND Corporation in this important discussion on March 18, 2013 from 10-11:30 AM at the U.S. Institute of Peace Headquarters.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/overcoming…
2. Obama to the Middle East: Expectations and Implications, Monday March 18, 12 PM- 2 PM, Washington Institute of Near East Policy
Venue: Washington Institute of Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, D.C. 20036, Stern Library and Conference Room
Speakers: Dennis Ross, Michael Singh,and David Makovsky
President Obama embarks on the first foreign travel of his second term next week, and despite talk of a tilt toward Asia and disengagement from Middle East wars, he is headed into the heart of the region, visiting Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank. To discuss why he is visiting the Middle East, what his priorities are for the trip, and what implications it may hold for such key policy issues as the Iran nuclear challenge, the worsening Syria crisis, and the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, TWI will host a Policy Forum luncheon with Dennis Ross, Michael Singh, and David Makovsky.
Ambassador Dennis Ross is counselor to The Washington Institute. Previously, he served on the Obama administration’s National Security Council staff as senior director for the Central Region, responsible for U.S. policy toward the Middle East and North Africa.
Michael Singh, the Institute’s managing director, served in the George W. Bush administration as senior director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council.
David Makovsky, the Institute’s Ziegler distinguished fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process, just returned from a trip to Israel and the West Bank.
3. Economic Turmoil in Arab Countries: Can Partners Help?, Monday March 18 12 PM- 1:45 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Marwan Muasher, Uri Dadush, Ibrahim Saif, Jean-Pierre Chauffour, Nemat Shafik
More than two years after the outbreak of democratic revolutions in several Arab countries, the economic situation in the region remains precarious. Progress in restoring confidence as well as sustainable and rapid economic growth will depend overwhelmingly on internal forces and the return of political stability. However, external partners can also play a role in helping normalize and eventually improving the underlying growth fundamentals of these economies. How will the Arab economic outlook evolve? What more can the United States and Europe-the region’s largest trading partners-do to support democratic transition and economic liberalization in the countries affected? What is the respective role of trade and aid?
Website: http://carnegieendowment.org/events/?…
4. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, Monday March 18 12:30 PM
Venue: Cato Institute 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001Hayek Auditorium
Speakers: Fred Kaplan, Spencer Ackerman, Janine Davidson, Christopher Preble
In “The Insurgents”, Fred Kaplan tells the story of how a small group of soldier-scholars revolutionized the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight a new kind of war in the post-Cold War age: small wars in cities and villages, against terrorists and insurgents. These would be wars not only of fighting but of nation building, often not of necessity but of choice.
Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered their ideas about counterinsurgency – or COIN, for short – through the bureaucracy and made it official policy. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists – today’s best and brightest – can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. By adapting the U.S. military to fight the conflicts of the modern era, they also created the tools – and made it more tempting – for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.
If you cant make it to the Cato Institute, watch this event live online at www.cato.org/live and follow @CatoEvents on Twitter to get future event updates, live streams, and videos from the Cato Institute.
Featuring the author Fred Kaplan, War Stories Columnist, Slate, with comments by Spencer Ackerman, National Security Correspondent, WIRED; and Janine Davidson, George Mason University; moderated by Christopher Preble, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
Website: http://www.cato.org/events/insurgents…
5. Ambassador Marc Grossman on the Campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Monday March 18 3 PM-5 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Ambassador Marc Grossman, Jessica Tuchman Mathews
In his first public event since stepping down as special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Marc Grossman will discuss efforts to reach a political settlement and the future of American diplomacy in the region. Carnegie’s Jessica T. Mathews will moderate.
Website: http://carnegieendowment.org/events/?…
6.Afghanistan in Transition: A Trip Report, Tuesday March 19, 9:30 AM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Anthony Cordesman
CSIS Burke Chair Anthony Cordesman will discuss his recent trip to ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan, and the prospects for a U.S. transition. This event will also launch the Burke Chair’s latest report, a complete analysis of the Afghan transition.
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
9:30 am – 10:30 am EST
B1 Conference Center
CSIS 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006
Please click here to RSVP
Follow @CSIS for live updates
Note: You must log on to your CSIS account to register. If you do not have an account with CSIS, you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, or do not receive ‘password reset’ emails, please contact imisadmin@csis.org
Website: http://csis.org/event/afghanistan-tra…
7. A Delegation of Syrian Opposition Leaders, Tuesday March 19 10:00 AM, National Press Club
Venue: National Press Club, 529 14th St. NW, 13th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20045, Zenger Room
Speakers: Haytham Manna, Rim Turkmani, Riad Drar Al-Hamood
A delegation of Syrian opposition leaders critical of President Bashar al-Asad, and which opposes foreign intervention and Saudi Arabian-backed ‘rebels’ in the current situation,
The speakers will discuss creating sufficient political momentum for a negotiated settlement to the present Syrian Crisis, and moving toward a democratic, secular future for the country.
Contacts:
National Press Club: PETER HICKMAN
301/367-7711 (c), 301/530-1210 (t), 202/662-7540 (NPC),pjhickman@hotmail.com
Speakers (Global Policy Forum):
DAVID GRANT
david67grant@gmail.com, 202/577-3145
MEL DUNCAN
mduncan@nonviolentpeaceforce.com, 651/245-8706
Website: http://www.press.org/events/delegatio…
8. Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis, Tuesday March 19 10 AM, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Venue: Dirksen Senate Office Building, Constitution Avenue and 1st Street, NE, Washington, DC Room 419
Speakers: The Honorable Anne C. Richard, The Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg, Mr. Tom Malinowski
Website: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearing…
9. US Policy in the Middle East on the Verge of Obama’s Trip, Tuesday March 19 12 PM- 1:30 PM, Center for American Progress
Venue: Center for American Progress, 1333 H Street NW, 10th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
Speakers: Rudy deLeon, Martin Indyk, Bruce Jentleson
On March 20 President Barack Obama will arrive in Israel in the first part of a regional visit that includes the West Bank and Jordan. The President’s trip to the region comes at a time of change in Israel and the region. On his upcoming trip, President Obama will face a full slate of challenges and opportunities, including concerns over Egypt’s continued political transition, Syrias civil war, the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, and the threats posed by Iran.
Please join the Center for American Progress for a keynote speech by Sandy Berger, chair at the Albright Stonebridge Group and former national security advisor to President Bill Clinton, previewing President Obamas trip to Israel and the regional challenges that face him there. Following his keynote speech, Berger will join a panel discussion with Rudy deLeon, Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy at CAP and former deputy secretary of defense, who just returned from a CAP delegation to Israel and the West Bank; Martin Indyk, vice president and director of foreign policy at Brookings and former assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs; and Bruce Jentleson, professor of public policy and political science at Duke University and an expert on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
As part of this event, the Center for American Progress will release findings from a report based on discussions with Israeli and Palestinian officials during a recent visit to the region by members of the National Security and International Policy team.
Website: http://www.americanprogress.org/event…
10. After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part I), Tuesday March 19 1:00 PM, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC 2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Seth G. Jones, Kimberly Kagan, Peter Bergen, Daniel S. Markey
Chairman Chabot on the hearing: “U.S. national security interests in South Asia are both dire and immediate. The 2014 withdrawal plan from Afghanistan is strategically risky and threatens to plunge Afghanistan into a state in which terrorists will once again thrive. At the same time, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan has deteriorated dramatically and falters over Pakistan’s involvement with terrorist organizations and the drone war in the tribal bad lands. While Islamabad claims U.S. and Pakistani interests can be brought into alignment, we must remain skeptical of its internal divergent interests that risk undermining U.S. interests, the relationship with India, and the chance for a stable, peaceful, and independent Afghanistan. This hearing is an important opportunity to examine the President’s hasty withdrawal plan from Afghanistan and evaluate how events in Pakistan over the next year may affect U.S. national security interests throughout the entire region.”
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen on the hearing: With President Obama’s announcement last month that the U.S. will draw down our forces in Afghanistan by the end of this year without a clear withdrawal plan, it is necessary to have a hearing that will examine the security implications of this decision and analyze the capacity of the Afghani and Pakistan government to address crime and corruption while ensuring secured territories in their countries. This is imperative particularly in light of recent inflammatory accusations made by Afghani leader Hamid Karzai which have further strained U.S. – Afghanistan relations and put our troops at greater risk. We must do everything we can to prevent al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist militants from taking over and undoing the efforts and sacrifices made by the U.S. and our allies for over a decade.
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
11. Iraq, 10 years later: A conversation with Senator John McCain, General Jack Keane, and Frederick W. Kagan, Tuesday March 19 3:30 PM- 4:30 PM, American Enterprise Institute
Venue: American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Frederick W. Kagan, General Jack Keane, John Mccain
Ten years ago, the United States entered Iraq and in a few short weeks ended Saddam Hussein’s reign of tyranny. What followed — wild swings between victory and defeat, liberation and occupation — and ended with President Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw all US forces from Iraq in 2011, is likely to be a source of contention for years to come.
As we approach the anniversary of the beginning of the Iraq War, many questions remain: Is Iraq a success? What role will Iran and al Qaeda play in the vacuum left by the withdrawal of American forces? Were the war and the liberation of 25 million Iraqis worth the high price Americans paid in blood and treasure? Please join us as we reflect on a conflict that helped shape the beginning of the 21st century in American foreign policy. Senator John McCain will be joined by a panel featuring General Jack Keane (ret.) and AEI’s Frederick W. Kagan.
If you are unable to attend, we welcome you to watch the event live on this page. Full video will be posted within 24 hours.
Website: http://www.aei.org/events/2013/03/19/…
12. Crisis in Syria: The US Response, Wednesday March 20 9:45 AM, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Robert S. Ford, Anne C. Richard, Nancy E. Lindborg
Chairman Royce on the hearing: “Unfortunately, we are watching conditions in Syria continue to deteriorate precipitously. The Assad regime has killed tens of thousands of Syrians. Millions more have been displaced or have fled to neighboring countries increasingly strained by their influx. This is a regional crisis. It’s time for the Obama Administration, which has struggled on Syria, to present and defend its policy on all fronts, including its humanitarian efforts. The Committee will focus on how the U.S. can best protect its vital national interests and effectively promote a stable and peaceful Syria.”
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
13.Changing Challenges for the Gulf States- A Panel Discussion, Wednesday March 20 12:00 Pm- 2: 00 Pm, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052Lindner Family Commons
Speakers: Christopher Davidson, Kristin Smith Diwan, Gwenn Okruhlik, Marc Lynch
Christopher Davidson, Reader in Middle East Politics, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University
Kristin Smith Diwan, Assistant Professor, Comparative and Regional Studies, School of International Service, American University
Gwenn Okruhlik, President, Association for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies
Moderated by:
Marc Lynch, George Washington University
Three leading political scientists will discuss the current challenges facing the Gulf States.
*A light lunch will be served.*
RSVP: tinyurl.com/a6tvn2m
Sponsored by the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Website: http://www.elliottschool.org/events/c…
14. Hezbollah’s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat, Wednesday March 20 1:30 Pm, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Will Fulton, Matthew Levitt, Roger Noriega
Chairman Poe on the hearing: “Next week, the TNT Subcommittee will bring together experts to discuss the evolution of Hezbollah. Hezbollah has historically been a terrorist organization whose activity has been isolated in the Middle East. Hezbollah is the puppet of Iran worldwide. Under the guidance of the Iranian regime, this jihadist group has expanded its reach and shifted its strategy to operate in virtually every corner of the world including Latin America and Europe. I look forward to hearing testimony about the relationship between Hezbollah and the Iranian regime, how this threat has grown in recent years, and what implications this dangerous alliance has for U.S. national security.”
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
16. The Muslim Brotherhood and the West, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 4:00pm, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Venue: Reserve Officers Association, 1 Constitution Ave NE Washington, DC
Speakers: Lorenzo Vidino, Abdullah Bijad Alotibi, Joseph Braude, Sam Helfont
Few observers foresaw the Arab Spring, but it should not have surprised anyone that the Islamist movements the most organized movements in the Arab world became the main beneficiaries of the turmoil that ensued. Islamism, in its gradualist and pragmatic approach embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots worldwide, seems ready to reap the rewards of its three decades-old decision to abandon violence and focus on grassroots activities. This monumental change has created many concerns among liberals, religious minorities and, more generally, all non-Islamists in the countries where Islamists have won. In addition, Arab states ruled by non-Islamist regimes have expressed concern. The former worry that Islamist ideology even in its more contemporary, pragmatic form remains deeply divisive and anti-democratic, often at odds with their values and interests. The latter believe that on foreign policy issues, most of the positions of various Brotherhood-inspired parties are on a collision course with the policies of established regimes in the region.
In association with Al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre (based in the United Arab Emirates), the Foreign Policy Research Institute has just published as an E-Book The West and the Muslim Brotherhood After the Arab Spring, edited by Lorenzo Vidino. The book provides an overview of each of eight countries’ policies towards Islamism, including the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, and Israel. In this program, Vidino highlights the key lessons of the volume, and comment is offered by Abdullah Bijad Alotibi and Joseph Braude.
Website: http://www.fpri.org/events/2013/03/mu…
16. The Petro-politics of Azerbaijan, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 3:00pm, Institute of World Politics
Venue: Institute of World Politics, 1521 16th Street NW Washington, DC
Speakers: Vilen Khlgatyan
This lecture is part of a series on the Intermarium, organized by the Kosciuszko Chair of Polish Studies at IWP.
Mr. Khlgatyan will discuss the role Azerbaijan’s oil and gas reserves have played in attracting the Oil Majors to the region, and how this in turn has helped and hindered Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign politics. Moreover, with Azerbaijani oil reserves having hit their peak in 2010-2011, what does the future hold?
Vilen Khlgatyan is Vice-Chairman of Political Developments Research Center (PDRC), a virtual think tank based in Yerevan, Armenia.
He attended Webster University, where he double majored in International Relations and International Business, and graduated in Spring 2010. He spent a semester studying in Vienna, Austria, where he also attended OPEC and OSCE workshops.
His studies at IWP have focused on national security and the geopolitics of energy. He is writing his honors thesis on the ‘Geopolitics of Energy in the South Caucasus.’
Mr. Khlgatyan was a campaign staffer for Congressman Russ Carnahan of Missouri’s 3rd District, who sat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Important note: Attendance at all IWP events requires an RSVP in advance. In addition, prospective attendees must receive an e-mail confirmation from IWP indicating that seating will be available for them at the event. A government-issued ID that matches your name on the confirmed attendee list must be presented at the door for admission to any event. The use of photographic and/or recording equipment is prohibited except by advanced permission from IWP, the event organizer, and the speaker(s). IWP is a private organization; as such, all attendees are guests of the Institute.
Website: http://www.iwp.edu/events/detail/the-…
17. The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 3:30pm, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Bulent Aliriza, Jon B. Alterman, Andrew C. Kuchins, Stephen J. Flanagan
CSIS scholars will present the key findings of their 18 month project that has examined the forces and interests driving relations among Turkey, Russia, and Iran and the strategies that these governments are pursuing to manage differences and sustain economic and energy cooperation. They will also discuss how complex and often contradictory interactions among these three countries are shaping regional dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, Caucasus, and Central Asia, as they have for centuries. The nexus of the three pairs of relations are also influencing each country’s dealings with the other two as well as with the United States, and are being whipsawed by recent events. Starkly differing policies toward the Syrian civil war and the Arab Spring have strained Ankara’s relations with Moscow and Tehran. Understanding these dynamics is essential to avoiding a wider war in the Middle East, renewed conflict in the Caucasus, and instability in Central Asia following the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.
Please Click Here to RSVP online or email us at KissingerChair@csis.org.
(Note: You must log on to your CSIS account to register online. If you do not have an account with CSIS, you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, or do not receive ‘password reset’ emails, please contactimisadmin@csis.org).
Website: http://csis.org/event/turkey-russia-i…
18. The Struggle for Democracy in Tunisia, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:30pm – 5:00pm, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: John Hopkins SAIS- Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036Kenney Auditorium
Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 2:30pm ET on March 20, 2013 at www.usip.org/webcast.
Tunisia’s 2010-11 ‘Jasmine Revolution’ ignited a flame of political rebellion that quickly spread to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria. But as the ‘Arab Spring’ enters its third season, Tunisia’s struggle for democracy is beset by escalating ideological and even violent conflicts. What are the key challenges facing Tunisia? How can U.S. officials and nongovernmental organizations help Tunisians address mounting domestic and regional crises?
To discuss these and other questions, the United States Institute of Peace, Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins SAIS, and Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) are pleased to invite you to a public round-table featuring a delegation of prominent Tunisian political scientists on Wednesday, March 20, 2013 from 2:30pm to 5:00pm at SAIS. Members of the delegation will offer their perspectives on the situation and then participate in a frank question-and-answer session. We hope that you will be able to join us for this very special event.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/the-strugg…
19. Turkey’s Kurdish Question: A New Hope?, Wednesday, March 20 / 3:00pm – 4:30pm, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Speakers: Kemal Kirisci, Aliza Marcus, mer Taspinar, Gnl Tol
Turkey’s approach to dealing with its Kurdish minority-the Kurdish question-at home and in the region is once again at a critical juncture. From the prospects for a new constitution to Ankara’s Syria dilemma, virtually all the pressing issues facing Turkey have a Kurdish dimension. After the failure of the ‘Oslo process,’ Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has initiated another round of negotiations, this time called the ‘Imrali process’ and directly involving the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan. The process has been challenging, but extremely cautious expectations and hopes are growing that the rejuvenated process will not succumb to the fate of the previous efforts at solving the Kurdish problem in Turkey.
Given past failures at dialogue and at finding a mutually-acceptable, peaceful, and democratic solution to the problem, how might the ‘Imrali process’ prove different? What do the Kurds of Turkey want? Is the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) ready to meet Kurdish demands? What is Erdogan’s objective? What are the regional implications? At a time when Syria is in turmoil and Iraqi is facing increasing domestic instability, is a major breakthrough possible?
On March 20, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) will host a discussion to explore these and other important questions related to Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Featured speakers include Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Ömer Taspinar, author and journalist Aliza Marcus, and Gönül Tol of the Middle East Institute. Brookings TUSIAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirisci will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. The event is part of the TUSIAD U.S.-Turkey Forum at Brookings. After the program, the panelists will take audience questions.
Participants can join the conversation on Twitter during the event using #FPKurds.
Website: http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/Broo…
20. What Should Obama do on North Korea?, Thursday, March 21 / 9:00am, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Victor D. Cha, Walter L. Sharp
Please join us for a Korea Chair Platform event with Victor Cha, Walter L. Sharp, and Joseph R. DeTrani. In the wake of the December 2012 missile launch and the February 2013 nuclear test, our distinguished panelists will share their views on the road ahead and what President Obama should do on North Korea. We hope you can join us!
To RSVP for this event, please email KoreaChair@csis.org.
The Korea Chair Platform is made possible by the generous support of Samsung Electronics America.
Website: http://csis.org/event/what-should-oba…
21. The Rise and Fall of Democracies and Dictatorships: New Perspectives on Democratic Governance, Friday, March 22 / 9:00am – 11:00am, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speakers: Scott Mainwaring, Frances Hagopian, Steven Levitsky
Website: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the…
22. Mapping Egyptian Politics: Where Is Egypt Heading and What Does That Mean for the United States?, Friday, March 22 / 10:30am – 12:00pm, RAND Corporation
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC 2168 Rayburn House Office Building
Speakers: Jeff Martini, Michele Dunne, Samer Shehata, Anne Gearan
Despite widespread unrest, continued wrangling over the election law, and threats of an opposition boycott, Egypt is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in the coming months. Egypt’s transition has already been punctuated by a series of Islamist victories at the polls. In this session, three Egypt watchers will take a closer look at what past electoral performance and the current political context say about the Islamists’ strength in Egypt and what it means for the United States.
Website: http://www.rand.org/events/2013/03/22..
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Preventing mass atrocity after Assad
Reuters (http://reut.rs/WMw240) published this piece today:
As the second anniversary of the Syrian uprising approaches, close to 80,000 people have been killed, a million are refugees and several million are displaced. The Syrian army and air force are under severe stress and attacking civilian populations, the revolutionaries are increasingly radicalized in a Sunni Islamist direction and Lebanese Hezbollah as well as Iranian Revolutionary Guards are getting deeply engaged in the fight.
It may seem superfluous to worry about what happens to the Alawite community — the mainstay of Bashar Al Assad’s regime – after he falls. But revenge killing is common after an uprising of this sort, and few regimes born in mass atrocity survive as democracies. A massacre of Alawites could be prelude to state collapse, an extremist regime and regional warfare far worse than the spillover we have seen thus far.
How can mass atrocity in the aftermath of the Assad regime be avoided? Above all, it is Syrians who will need to make sure it does not happen. The Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces has already made clear that it intends to construct a multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic and democratic regime post-Assad. What needs to be accomplished to achieve that goal?
A lot. Here are just a few of the options that need to be considered:
- A negotiated end to the regime. Atrocities will be far less likely if there is a clear, well-constructed and well-communicated end to the Assad regime, with a roadmap to a future democratic constitution that will respect minority rights. A chaotic collapse of the regime will make mayhem much more likely, including a possible “stay-behind” insurgency like the one in Iraq after the American invasion.
- International supervision. The roadmap could be implemented with oversight from a “contact group” that includes the main international powers with influence, including neighbors and regional powers. The big issue here is whether Iran is in or out, which depends on Tehran’s attitude toward any negotiated settlement.
- An international intervention force. There will be many armed groups in Syria, however the conflict ends. A strong, legitimate international intervention force of both police and military could separate warring parties, establish a safe and secure environment and protect minorities. The big question is: Who would provide these troops and police? Iraq’s neighbors have all been parties to the conflict. The Arab League is inexperienced at stabilization and peacekeeping. The United States and Europe are trying to stay out.
- New security forces. Assad’s army, police, intelligence and other security forces will be thoroughly discredited once the regime is gone. It will be necessary to reconfigure, retrain and reform the security forces so they can reestablish a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence accepted by both former regime elements and rebels. It was the failure to do this effectively that has made a mess of post-Qaddafi Libya. Training of a small Syrian “stabilization” force could begin even now outside Syria, for deployment into liberated areas.
- Accountability and justice. It is never possible to punish all those who have supported a dictatorial regime, but victims will be looking for satisfaction. This can initially be offered in a well-articulated plan of action for holding a clearly defined and limited number of senior regime figures accountable for abuses, as well as a broader reconciliation effort to give victims an opportunity to voice grievances and seek eventual redress.
- Outreach by the new leaders to communities that have not supported the revolution. Few countries are blessed with a Nelson Mandela, but even lesser figures could try to reassure those who have supported the regime and provide credible guarantees of security. They might even invite in foreign forces to establish a “safe and secure environment” for particular communities at risk.
- Basic human needs. Many Syrians are lacking food, water, sanitation and shelter. The country will need a rapid infusion of vital humanitarian assistance that is distributed fairly and transparently by a duly constituted authority.
- Quick stabilization of the economy. The Syrian economy will be in free fall. The country will be unable to pay its debts and will need relief from international obligations. It may also need a new currency and a credible central bank. It will certainly need jobs, especially for the many youth already unemployed before the war. They will otherwise find employment with militias unlikely to be sensitive to human rights.
- Local community development. Major development projects will have to wait. They will require a well-functioning government and a credible sovereign guarantee to reopen lending by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. A well-targeted reconstruction effort that local communities help plan and monitor, like the successful National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan, would be a good start, provide livelihoods and contribute to mitigating the likelihood of violence.
- Dispute settlement. As people return to their homes, disputes will break out over property, much of which will be badly damaged and destroyed. It is important to establish a relatively quick administrative procedure for settlement of disputes and recovery of private property, in particular real estate.
- Funding for civil society. Syria under Assad lacked the vigorous nongovernmental organizations that provide advocacy, serve as watchdogs and help protect human rights and minorities in open societies. Funding and empowerment of grassroots organizations committed to a democratic outcome and organized across sectarian and ethnic lines, including the revolutionary local administrative councils that have spontaneously appeared in liberated areas, can strengthen social cohesion and prevent violence.
- Safe havens for particular minorities. Odious though it may be on other grounds, temporary separation of ethnic and sectarian groups in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict can help to prevent violence and reduce risks to vulnerable minorities. Many Syrian neighborhoods are more or less segregated. It may be best to keep them that way for a time, but to move once trust is re-established in the direction of much more sectarian and ethnic integration.
Syrians will have to decide for themselves what they want to take advantage of, or not, from this laundry list. They may well also discover some new tricks. But the country will be far better off in the long term if Syrians and internationals start thinking now about what to do to prevent the worst from happening after Assad falls.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Syria seen from Venus and Mars
I enjoyed yesterday two events on Syria, back to back and less than a block from each other. An all-women panel at the Stimson Center co-sponsored by the Middle East Institute was upbeat and optimistic. An all-men panel at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) was anything but. Commentators on both panels were keen observers, including several with recent experience in and near Syria.
With Mona Yacoubian moderating, the Stimson/MEI panel focused on “Syria Beyond Assad: Building a New Syria from the Grassroots.” Rafif Jouejati, spokesperson for the Local Coordinating Committees and leader of FREE Syria (a nongovernmental organization) underlined that the mood among Syrians, who are seeking freedom, dignity and democracy, is far more optimistic than the Western press would lead you to believe. The revolution is determined to build civil society and protect minority rights. There are still upwards of 300 peaceful demonstrations every Friday. Fear of an Islamist takeover is exaggerated. A hijab may be necessary to meet some people, but they quickly forget if it slips off your head. Civil society training for Syrians in Turkey is accomplishing a lot, as they go back into Syria and train others.
Honey al Sayed, a former Syrian anchor now associated with ROYA Association for a Better Syria and the internet radio station SouriaLi emphasized the importance of rebuilding from the grassroots, as Syrian society has collapsed. The challenges are enormous, but Syrians believe in “unity in diversity” and will meet them. Elizabeth O’Bagy of the Institute for the Study of War focused on the relationship between the civilian local councils and armed groups, which she said are not anxious to provide basic services or govern because they are still fighting the regime. Warlordism is not the problem portrayed in the Western press–there is lots of room to empower civilians. There has been some abuse of regime prisoners, looting and exploitation of aid shipments, but no major massacres. Islamist fighters have no difficulty dealing with a Western woman asking questions. Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al Nusra keeps its distance, but most other armed groups do cooperate with each other.
Only Leila Hilal of the New America Foundation clouded the Venusian horizon. The situation is complex and fluid. There are a lot of questions about local legitimacy and authority. Who is really in charge? Elders? Religious leaders? Fighters? Technocrats? What will their relationship be to the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC in Washington parlance)? Will the local councils provide aid? Will they also govern? Are they political bodies or technical ones? What will the role of minorities and women be? How will Western preferences for inclusivity be met? Should we even express them?
The clouds thickened at WINEP, where staff reported on recent travel in the region. With Patrick Clawson moderating, Andrew Tabler described Syria as melting down and spilling over. Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan are facing serious refugee challenges. Jordan has seen 100,000 enter in the last 60 days, many of them running a regime gauntlet to get out of Syria. Fighting has spilled into Lebanon. Hizbollah and Sunni fighters are spilling back from Lebanon into Syria. In addition to refugees, Turkey is seeing a big buildup of displaced people inside Syria along the border. There is a concentration of Islamist extremists (including Jabhat al Nusra) along the border with Israel, which is concerned about the transfer of “strategic” weapons (chemicals, anti-aircraft and missiles) to Hizbollah and to Sunni extremists.
The food and medical supplies that the US has announced it will provide to the Coalition will not help to bring down Bashar al Asad. Sentiment within the revolution has turned dramatically against the US and the West and towards the Salafists and jihadists. With no political settlement in sight, the US is unable to influence the armed groups who will decide the outcome. It would be far better to provide aid to the armed groups: those taking the shots will soon be calling them. The SOC, and likely the provisional government to be named this weekend, has little traction inside Syria and risks becoming a Potemkin village.
Jeff White continued in this vein. Localized fighting is the basis of political legitimacy and power inside Syria. The revolutionaries are fragmented. Civilians are marginalized. The military councils are really in charge. The Islamists are in the vanguard. They have cohesion, discipline, leadership and morale. Jabhat al Nusra is also particularly good at civic action, including securing and distribution of food as well as street cleaning. Their command and control is tight.
The Free Syria Army has more problems with civilian/military relations, jihadists vs. nationalists and regime penetration. A revolution that began in the name of freedom and democracy has turned definitively in the direction of an Islamic state. Antipathy to the West, in particular the US, and the international community in general is strong. Conspiracy theories are common, most notably the notion that the US, Iran and Israel are collaborating against the revolution.
Though better equipped now with antitank weapons, the revolutionaries still suffer shortages and maldistribution of weapons. Logistics are ad hoc. There is a security vacuum in the south–a kind of no man’s land. No two revolutionary units are alike and numbers are hard to come by. The rebels are nevertheless gaining territory.
Though losing control, the regime remains cohesive, with good supplies from Russia and Iran. Hizbollah’s fighting role is increasing, as is the role of irregular regime forces (Shabiha). The army is being hollowed out, losing 40 or more dead per day and several times that in wounded. The Syrian air force is a wasting asset.
Simon Henderson talked about Gulf attitudes, where there is strong support for the Syrian opposition because of the prospect of a strategic setback for Iran. But competition among the Gulf states is proving stronger than their distaste for Iran. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are both supporting the revolution, but they are also competing for influence. The competition is trumping concern about the outcome, leaving the GCC divided in the absence of strong US leadership. Qatar is far less willing than Saudi Arabia to be seen bucking Iran, as it shares hydrocarbon resources in the Gulf with Tehran.
Are these views from Venus and Mars reconcilable? My heart is on Venus. I hope the women are right. My head is on Mars. What the men are seeing is all too real.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What Obama should do for Syria
President Obama in an interview with The New Republic published yesterday, discussed in more explicit terms than usual how he makes foreign policy decisions. Commentary has focused on what academics are interested in: is he a realist or an idealist? I see no evidence in what he said to suggest that he should be put in exclusively either category. Dan Drezner does (“national interest and security trumps liberal values every day of the week and twice on Sundays”), but then his own editor appends a note that this is a false dichotomy. The editor is correct.
The far more interesting part of the President’s interview includes his comments on Syria:
…I have to ask, can we make a difference in that situation? Would a military intervention have an impact? How would it affect our ability to support troops who are still in Afghanistan? What would be the aftermath of our involvement on the ground? Could it trigger even worse violence or the use of chemical weapons? What offers the best prospect of a stable post-Assad regime? And how do I weigh tens of thousands who’ve been killed in Syria versus the tens of thousands who are currently being killed in the Congo?
I find the reference to Afghanistan particularly telling. What’s that about?
It’s about the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a logistical network that enables a substantial supply of material to U.S. forces in Afghanistan from the north (without going through Pakistan). It is also important to the withdrawal of U.S. forces and their extraordinary volume of stuff. The NDN depends on Russian cooperation, which the President clearly fears will be restricted or even ended should he take a more proactive stance on Syria.
The President’s other concerns are also valid. In particular the aftermath of military intervention is precisely what he should worry about, given the course of post-war events in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.
What he does not mention, but I am certain is on his mind, is Iran. The civil war in Syria is in some ways a proxy war between the West (counting Turkey as in that category) and Iran, which is Bashar al Asad’s most important ally (more important even than Russia). The United States from this persepective is “bleeding” Iran in Syria, where Tehran is compelled to commit men and money to prop up Bashar. For Washington to commit military force in Syria would risk the loss of Russia’s support not only for the NDN but also in the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran and call into question U.S. commitment to military action against Tehran in case those talks fail. The President is keeping his powder dry while watching Iran weaken itself. That’s not a bad course of action both from a realist and an idealist perspective.
What it does not do however is explain the ineffectiveness of American civilian assistance to the Syrian opposition, amply discussed on NPR this morning:
This is absurd. The President needs to refocus his attention on the civilian side of America’s engagement with Syria. He may well be right to hesitate in using military force. But there is no excuse for failing to provide 100% support to the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces that Washington helped to create.
If, like me, you are wondering if the 60 Minutes interview with the President and Secretary of State Clinton provides more enlightenment, you’ll be disappointed. It’s just a hug fest.
RSS - Posts
