Tag: Turkey

Middle East: less grand, more strategy

Middle East Institute intern Aya Fasih, recently arrived from Cairo, writes in her debut on peacefare:

With the re-election of President Obama and massive transformations ongoing in the region, the Middle East Policy Council’s 71st Capitol Hill Conference focused Wednesday on “U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East: Is There One?” Related questions included:

  • Is it even possible to formulate a grand strategy for the region amidst all the turbulence it is witnessing?
  • Were past U.S. grand strategies for the region successful in achieving their objectives?

The prestigious panel, comprised of Chas Freeman Jr., William Quandt, Marwan Muasher and John Duke Anthony (moderated by Thomas Mattair), identified five main points of discussion: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, the Arab uprisings, the Syrian crisis, and the political-economic security of the Gulf Cooperation Council states.

Chas Freeman Jr., Chairman of Projects International, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and President of the Middle East Policy Council, said the two main U.S. policies in the Middle East, unconditional support to Israel and strategic partnership with pre-revolutionary Egypt and the rentier Gulf states, were contradictory and therefore precluded any grand strategy.  Freeman underscored the costs associated with U.S. support and protection of Israel; he said that U.S. support for irresponsible and immoral policies of Israel has undermined U.S. strategic interests in the region and potential cooperation with the region’s other powers:

America may have Israel’s back, but no one has America’s back.

Continuation post-revolution of an American-Egyptian partnership is in doubt. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, Afghanistan, and “abandonment” of the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has weakened and become more “transactional.”  It should no longer be taken for granted.   In Freeman’s view, U.S. policies preclude formulation of grand strategies and leave room for only limited cooperation.

William Quandt, Professor at the University of Virginia and former staff member of the National Security Council, started by expressing suspicion of grand strategies.  The Bush 41/Clinton dual containment of Iraq and Iran failed, as did the Bush 43 strategy of replacing certain Arab regimes, starting with Iraq, with pro-Western ones. Quandt, like the other three fellow panelists, thought the U.S. needs to revise its policies, starting with the realization that “we are not all-powerful.”   A revised strategy should include:

  1. an end to U.S.-Iran animosity, which would avoid a dangerous war and benefit Iraq, Syria and Lebanon;
  2. maintenance of positive relations with NATO ally Turkey, which will also benefit Iraq and Syria;
  3. friendly relations with Egypt because of its geo-strategic importance and influence over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
  4. greater attention to Saudi Arabia, which faces a difficult generational transition;
  5. a negotiated end to the Syrian conflict;
  6. a renewed effort to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

John Duke Anthony, Founding President of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, discussed mainly the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, highlighting the vital strategic importance of the GCC for the region’s security and U.S. energy supplies.

Marwan Muasher, Vice President for Studies at Carnegie Endowment and former Jordanian Foreign Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ambassador to the United States, highlighted how the U.S. must change its approach by assessing the new governments and players in the region not based on their ideology but rather on their performance. U.S. influence will not be decisive in the process of transition.  Events on the ground and competition for power among local actors will determine the outcomes.  It is crucial that the US start differentiating between different Islamist actors and parties and realize that serious differences exist among them. The clock is ticking on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Unless the U.S. chooses to sponsor it now, peace may never be an option again.

All four panelists agreed that U.S. policies toward the vital region must undergo serious reassessment if the U.S. wants to secure its strategic interests.  The U.S. should exert extraordinary effort to solve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, re-engage with Iran and work quickly to ensure a negotiated settlement in Syria.

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This week’s peace picks

The holiday season has ended.  Monday is particularly busy:

 

1. A Bleak Winter:  Providing Needed Aid to Those Fleeing Conflict in Syria, Monday January 14, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, Migration Policy Institute

Venue:  Migration Policy Institute, 1400 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 300 (third floor), MPI Conference Room

Speakers:   Mort Abramowitz, George Rupp, Fadi al Khankan, Kathleen Newland

The humanitarian crisis in and around Syria is intensifying as more people are forced to flee their homes in the face of continuing violence. More than half a million Syrians have left the country, at least two million are internally displaced, and many more have seen their normal lives and livelihoods destroyed. As winter sets in, stocks of food and fuel are dwindling. The strain on neighboring countries is testing their ability to keep borders open to Syrian refugees and international assistance is not keeping up with the growing needs. No one seems to expect an early end to the displacement, even if the Assad regime falls in the near future.

A delegation of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) visited Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq in late November to discuss the humanitarian crisis with refugees, officials from host and donor governments, representatives of international humanitarian organizations and local nongovernmental agencies; and to get a firsthand look at the work of IRC partners and staff who are directly involved in providing assistance to the refugees and to Syrians trapped inside the country.

Please join MPI and IRC on January 14 to discuss the delegation’s report, augmented by the perspective of Dr. Al Khankan, representing the Syrian Expatriates Organization, an organization of Syrian professionals who are raising funds, sending critically needed supplies, and providing direct humanitarian assistance within Syria. The discussion will be moderated by MPI’s Kathleen Newland, who is an IRC overseer and was a member of the delegation that produced the report.

Register for this event here.

 

2.  Conference on Israel’s 2013 Election, Monday January 14, 10:00 AM – 3:30 PM, Georgetown University

Venue:  Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets NW, Washington, DC 20057, Copley Hall, Copley Formal Lounge

Speakers: Moran Stern, Natan Sachs, Natasha Mozgovaya, Ghaith Al-Omari, Dennis Ross, Dan Schueftan, Robert Lieber, David Makovsky, Robert Wexler

A conference examining the upcoming general election in Israel, scheduled for January 22, 2013. Experts will discuss the issues that will be factors influencing Israelis as they prepare to go cast their ballots.

This all-day conference in Copley Hall’s Formal Lounge will feature three panels examining domestic politics, regional politics, and Israel-US relations.

Domestic Politics, 10:00 am-11:30 am
Moran Stern (Georgetown, moderator); Natan Sachs (Saban Center at the Brookings Institution); Natasha Mozgovaya (Haaretz Daily Newspaper)

Regional Politics, 11:40 am-1:00 pm
Moran Stern (Georgetown, moderator); Ghaith Al-Omari (American Task Force on Palestine); Amb. Dennis Ross (Georgetown); Dan Schueftan (Georgetown); Gunol Tol (Middle East Institute)

Israel-US relations, 2:00 pm-3:30 pm
Robert Lieber (Georgetown, moderator); David Makovsky (Washington Istitute for Near East Policy); The Honorable Robert Wexler (S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace).

Register for this event here.

 

3. A Kingdom’s Future:  Saudi Arabia Through the Eyes of its Twentysomethings, Monday January 14, 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM, Wilson Center

Venue:  Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, 5th Floor

Speaker:  Caryle Murphy

The “Arab Awakening” has focused the world’s attention on young people in the Arab world, where they have been agitating for political reform. But what about young Saudis, who have not taken to the streets like many of their peers? Have they been affected by the “Arab Awakening?” A Kingdom’s Future: Saudi Arabia Through the Eyes of Its Twentysomethings explores the self-image of young Saudis and what they want when it comes to education, marriage, politics, religion, and personal liberties. It is based on research during Murphy’s three-year reporting tour in the kingdom, as well as scores of interviews while a public policy scholar at the Wilson Center.

Register for this event here.

 

3. Turkey Rising:  Challenges and Prospects for the New Administration, Monday January 14, 12:30 PM, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Venue:  Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 1050, Stern Library and Conference Room

Speakers: Ross Wilson, James F. Jeffrey, Soner Cagaptay

With a booming economy and improving ties with the United States and NATO, Turkey now has a real chance to become a regional power. Yet formidable challenges remain, such as resolving the Kurdish issue, competing with Iran, and easing domestic political friction. To assess these issues and their impact on U.S. policy, The Washington Institute invited Ambassador Ross Wilson, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, and Soner Cagaptay to address a Policy Forum luncheon in Washington, DC, on Monday, January 14, 2013, starting at 12:30 p.m. EST. The speakers will also discuss Dr. Cagaptay’s new report on Turkey.

Register for this event here.

 

4. What’s Next for Syria:  Humanitarian and Political Perspectives, Monday January 14, 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Brookings Institution

Venue:  Brookings Institution, 1774 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium

Speakers: Ross Wilson, James F. Jeffrey, Soner Cagaptay

With a booming economy and improving ties with the United States and NATO, Turkey now has a real chance to become a regional power. Yet formidable challenges remain, such as resolving the Kurdish issue, competing with Iran, and easing domestic political friction. To assess these issues and their impact on U.S. policy, The Washington Institute invited Ambassador Ross Wilson, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, and Soner Cagaptay to address a Policy Forum luncheon in Washington, DC, on Monday, January 14, 2013, starting at 12:30 p.m. EST. The speakers will also discuss Dr. Cagaptay’s new report on Turkey.

Register for this event here.

 

5.  The International Development Assistance Ecosystem of the U.S.:  A Development and Foreign Policy Strategic Asset, Monday January 14, 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM, CSIS

Venue:  CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 Conference Room

Speakers: Carol Lancaster, Paul O’Brien, Tessie San Martin, Susan Reichle, Asif Shaikh, Daniel Runde

Since the end of the Cold War, the method by which the United States delivers foreign aid to the developing world has changed considerably. During this time, as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) saw large-scale staff reductions coupled with an increase in programs, a large base of U.S for-profit and nonprofit organizations grew up to implement projects and programs in the developing world. Although the budgetary situation reversed beginning in 2002, staffing levels at USAID remained low and a need to engage the U.S. implementer community continues. Concurrently, a broader discussion occurred over the effectiveness of development assistance by major donors. This effort, which resulted in the Paris Declaration of 2005 and later agreements at Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011, enshrined the notion of country ownership—that the developing world must drive its priorities to ensure sustainability. The Obama administration launched its USAID Forward agenda to re-establish USAID as the premier development agency in the world. A central aspect of this agenda are reforms designed to reduce the Agency’s dependence on contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with U.S. development implementers and shift to a greater use of government to government support and local organizations.

The report argues that the current U.S. ecosystem of international development assistance should be treated as a strategic asset that plays an important role in meeting U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. As with all systems, it can and should be improved; however, it should be strengthened, not weakened. This system, while imperfect, delivers a level of accountability and transparency for the U.S. government that is vital to continued political support for foreign assistance. The development implementers must do more to evolve to meet the changing nature of how the U.S. government sees development and the broader trends in the field. However, there are significant risks associated with USAID’s proposed reforms, which, if fully implemented, may not achieve the results desired.

Please join us for a panel discussion of this timely report. Copies will be available at the meeting and online the day of the event.

RSVP for this event to ppd@csis.org.

 

6.  Two Years Later:  Assessing Tunisia’s Progress since the Jasmine Revolution, Monday January 14, 5:30 PM – 7:30 PM, Johns Hopkins University

Venue:  Johns Hopkins University, Bernstein Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500

Speakers: Leila Chennoufi, Eamonn Gearon, Stephen McInerny, Samia Msadek, Mohamed Malouche, Daniele Moro

On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali was forced to leave Tunisia by a popular uprising commonly known as the Jasmine Revolution. This historic event triggered mass protests that would sweep the Arab world, forcing other longstanding authoritarian leaders from power and potentially transforming the region. Since that time, Tunisia has witnessed the country’s first free and fair elections, the emergence of new political parties and coalitions, and the many difficulties of maintaining stability amid an uncertain political transition. On the second anniversary  of this historic moment, it is important to assess Tunisia’s progress in its difficult transition to democracy and examine the prospects and challenges that lie ahead.

Register for this event here.

 

7.  U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East:  Is There One?, Wednesday January 16, 9:30 AM – 12:00 PM, Rayburn House Office Building

Venue: Rayburn House Office Buidling, Washington, DC 20515, Gold Room (2168)

Speakers: Chas W. Freeman Jr., William B. Quandt, Marwan Muasher, John Duke Anthony, Thomas R. Mattair

The Middle East Policy Council invites you and your colleagues to our 71st Capitol Hill Conference. Live streaming of this event will begin at approximately 9:30am EST on Wednesday, January 16th and conclude around noon. A questions and answers session will be held at the end of the proceedings. Refreshments will be served.

RSVP for this event to info@mepc.org.

 

8.  The Iran Nuclear Challenge:  Explore Policy Options, Wednesday January 16, 12:30 PM – 1:30 PM, American Security Project

Venue: American Security Project, 1100 New York Ave, NW Washington DC, Suite 710W, Conference Room E

Speakers: William Fallon, Frank Kearney, Lawrence Wilkerson, Stephen Cheney

Join us for a discussion with retired military leaders on U.S. military options towards Iran. The discussion will begin promptly at 12:30 p.m.  Please arrive by 12:15 p.m. for registration.
We hope you can join us.

RSVP for this event to events@americansecurityproject.org.

 

9.  Freedom in the World 2013 Launch, Wednesday January 16, 1:30 PM – 3:00 PM, Council on Foreign Relations

Venue: Council on Foreign Relations, 1777 F Street NW, Washington DC, 20006

Speakers: David Kramer, Mark Lagon, Arch Puddington, Jill Dougherty, Larry Diamond, Tamara Wittes

Please join us as we release the findings of Freedom in the World 2013, the latest edition of Freedom House’s annual assessment of political and civil rights. This event will feature an in-depth discussion of advances and setbacks in freedom over the past year and the challenges these trends pose for American foreign policy.

Register for this event here.

 

10.  The Way Forward in Afghanistan, Friday January 18, 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM, Heritage Foundation

Venue: Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Avenue NE, Washington, DC 20002, Lehrman Auditorium

Speakers:  Lisa Curtis, Thomas Donnelly, Bill Roggio, Steven Bucci

The United States is moving into a new phase of engagement with Afghanistan as it draws down its combat presence in the country. During last year’s presidential campaign, President Obama declared a goal of bringing American troops home and focusing instead on “nation building” here in the U.S. But a hasty U.S. troop withdrawal and a failure to remain seriously engaged with the Afghans in other ways risks sacrificing everything the U.S. has fought for over the last decade.

What are the best options for the pace and scope of withdrawal over the next two years? What level and type of U.S. troop presence should remain in Afghanistan post-2014 to ensure the country does not revert to its previous status of terrorist safe haven? What are the realistic possibilities for reconciling with the Taliban in a way that preserves democratic and human rights gains?

Join us as a distinguished group of experts addresses these and other questions related to the future of U.S. engagement with Afghanistan.

Register for this event here.

 

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Syria is getting what Assad wants

A Syrian reader, Hashem al Shamy (whom I know only as an occasional commenter on peacefare.net) writes (with some small edits by me):

Dear Mr Serwer,

Thanks a lot for taking the time to respond to my comment, which I hope you did not find aggressive. I only wanted to point out what I think of your blog which brings the experience of a seasoned diplomat to the realm of international relations.

The fact that I am Syrian should not discredit my dispassionate analysis, since covering the political risk and violence in Syria is part of my job. However, my experience as a Syrian is still valuable because I attended Syrian schools, studied its heavily propagandist curriculum, wore the green uniform to school, had to chant for the late President and the Baath Party. I also was a senior member of the Youth Lead Vanguard of Revolt Council in my high school, and a member of the Baath Party, and worked with senior government officials until six months before the start of the unrest.

Unfortunately, I have lost many friends since the start of the unrest in Syria because of their support of the grass roots movement, providing shelter and medicine to fleeing civilians and opposing the regime’s policy publicly. Recently, two of my friends have been referred to the “Terrorism Court” set up by the regime last year after remaining incommunicado for months, which most likely [will] culminate in their execution on charges of undermining the authority of the state and supporting terrorists.

I dont want to summarise the events of the past 22 months, which I am sure you are fairly acquainted with. I just would like to clarify some misconceptions that have been distorting the narrative of the Syrian conflict, including some comments posted by your readers.

The Assad dynasty since it took power in 1970 never had NO interest in negotiating or even recognising any opposition individuals and groups. Most recently, the moderate opposition initiatives such as the Damascus Spring in 2001 and Damascus Declaration 2005 resulted in imprisonment of most of its members. The Syrian regime embodied in the Assad family has been preparing itself for the moment its people decide to revolt.

The people on the other hand knew very well the limitless repression and the heavy price they will pay once they openly declare their opposition to the regime. When I was asked after my return from Syria in February 2011, one month before the start of the uprising, about the prospects of a similar movement to the ones in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, I was dismissive of any potential event. The reasons were the overconfidence of the regime and the firm grip of its security apparatus on the country, the absence of a grass roots effort to mobilise people on the ground, the division of the political opposition, and most importantly the capability of the regime to inflict a very heavy price on civilians and entire cities. Nevertheless, I never imagined that the regime would write off whole cities and region and would be willing to inflict catastrophic damage on the country as a whole to preserve its power.

In your response, you said that focusing on the community level is a crucial factor which is widely overlooked. The regime, from day one, made its policy to target peaceful demonstrators and their leaders. They embarked on a policy of detaining activists calling for non-violent protests, torturing them and returning them dead to their communities to intimidate people, create a vacuum of potential community leaders, and give prominence to extremism on the streets. This is exactly what happened, when the increasing level of bloodshed accompanied by increasingly brutal techniques of the regime generated a reaction of violent response and emphasized demands of revenge and proactive killings in order to save civilians. This dynamic brought the “opposition” to the regime’s turf where it will be able to set the terms of the game and generate a spiral of violence to scare everyone off.

On top of that, the regime has always been good at creating divisions and then exploiting them to create a fertile ambiance of uncertainty to advance its policy. Domestically, it allowed the existence of regime-sanctioned opposition groups who called for regime-led reform.  Their job was to invalidate the external opposition rather than focusing on the regime’s performance and actions. It also labeled the protestors and later the rebels as “Islamists, extremists and terrorists” to present minorities with an existential threat and lock them into “us or Fundamentalists” narrative.

When the regime had failed to quell the protests, turning into an armed insurrection, it sought to involve regional rivals as it usually does to increase the stake for regional countries for its potential demise. Banking on its initial portrayal of protestors as extremist fundamentalists, it exploited the increasing friction between Sunnis and Shiites in the region. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey on the side of “the opposition” and Iran, Iraq and Lebanon on the side of the government. This strategy unleashed the latent forces in the region and managed to blemish the opposition even more as being aided by countries whose sole aim is to destroy “modern and secular” Syria and replace it with stalwarts of the monarchies in the Gulf.

The intense Post-Cold War divisions between the US and Russia have helped the Regime keep the international community paralysed over its response to the Syrian crisis. The US, under the Obama Administration, has sought from the beginning to engage with the “Reformist” Bashar Al-Assad, giving him a maneuvering space when protests broke out. Russia, on the other hand has no interest in dropping a faithful country since the 1960s for the sake of promoting democracy. The triple veto at the UNSC has been a convenient pretext for major countries not to intervene and to blame the international stalemate on the rogue behaviour of Russia and Iran.

These dynamics have given the Syrian regime the sense of impunity and the ability to make rational decisions to intensify its response and destroy entire cities, knowing that no one will limit its free hand. The convenient illusion and wishful thinking that the regime will negotiate its own demise and exit (the ultimate departure of the President is imminent) have produced a negative response to ending the Syrian conflict.

In conclusion, if the regime is not presented with a “credible threat” there will be no change in the regime’s behaviour and more lives and cities will be destroyed, making Syria ungovernable Post-Assad, which is exactly what the regime wants. Any solution that maintains Assad in power will be highly unsuccessful both in the medium and long term.

I have so many much to say, but I just wanted to give a brief overview of how the Regime has properly evaluated its environment and gradually pushed the red lines in the sand to keep itself in power at the expense on Syria as a nation.

Best,

Hashem Alshamy

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It is not too early

UN special envoy for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi said Friday in Moscow of the Russian Foreign Minister:

I think Sergey Lavrov is absolutely right that the conflict is not only more and more militarized, it is more and more sectarian…And if we are not careful and if the Syrians are not careful, it will be a mainly sectarian conflict.

The day was a particularly bloody one:  more than 200 people are said to have been killed in Homs.

The fear of sectarian conflict is well-founded.  No matter how many times Syrians tell me that their revolution is not sectarian and aims at a civil state and open, democratic society in which all citizens are equal, the normal mechanisms of violent conflict lend themselves to increasing polarization along sectarian lines.  I am afraid, so I seek safety where I can find it, which for Alawites and some other minorities is with the government while Sunnis seek protection from the Free Syrian Army.

Of course there are Sunnis who fight for the Syrian government and minorities who fight for the rebels, but there will be fewer and fewer as time passes.  Then when Assad goes, individuals will try to recover property and seek revenge for the harm done to themselves and their families, even if the more organized and disciplined military units on both sides remain disciplined.  Revenge killing spirals quickly, polarizing people further and driving them into the arms of their family, tribe, sect or ethnicity.  Building a state on the ruins of a fragmented society is far more difficult than anyone imagines in advance.

That’s why I also welcome something else Brahimi said:

Perhaps a peacekeeping force may be acceptable. But it must be part of a complete package that begins with peacekeeping and ends with an election.

This is the first I’ve seen the obvious mentioned at his level:  peacekeeping forces are going to be needed in Syria.  They will be needed not only to protect minorities but also to support the post-war state-building effort.  We’ve seen in Libya what happens when the new state does not have a monopoly on the means of violence.  Extremists of all sorts, including Al Qaeda franchisees, set up shop.  State-building without a monopoly on the means of violence becomes a dicey proposition.  There will be more than two armed forces in Syria at the end of the civil war:  Syrian army, local militias, regime Shabiha, Free Syria Army, Jabhat al Nusra and other jihadi extremists.

The issue in Syria is where peacekeeping troops can be found.  Even if they are needed, that does not mean they will be available.  The obvious troop contributors have all been protagonists in the proxy war of the past two years:  Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey.  The Turks and Russians may be willing, but won’t trust each other.  The Americans will not want to put troops into Syria.  Nor will the Europeans.  China now has experience in 20 UN peacekeeping operations and might like to extend its reach into the Middle East, if the Americans and Russians will allow it.  Iran is out of the question, though it will likely stir up trouble using some of the regime militia forces left over.  There are lots of other possibilities, but few I can think of that meet the full panoply of desirable criteria:  impartial, Arabic-speaking, experienced and self-sufficient in peacekeeping operations, available for deployment abroad.  Algeria and Morocco?

A related question is who would authorize and supervise a peacekeeping operation.  The UN is one possibility, but the divisions in the Security Council over the past two years hardly suggest it could act decisively.  The Arab League is another.  Still another is an invitation from a new Syrian government, which would have the advantage of picking which countries to invite and directing where they deploy.  But that could defeat the whole purpose of inviting in a more impartial force.

If–against the odds–an international peacekeeping force is somehow put together and somehow properly authorized for Syria, it is important to remember Brahimi’s caution, written before he took up his present position:

Even if such peacekeepers are well-armed and well-trained, however, they will be no match for much larger and well organized forces intent on destroying the
peace or committing mass atrocities. It has to be said upfront that the military forces, civilian police, human rights experts and international aid workers will not provide security, protection, justice, social services and jobs for all of the millions or tens of millions of inhabitants of the country.

A solid political solution is a prerequisite to a peacekeeping deployment.

Syria is going to be a very difficult post-war operation.  It is not too early to be thinking about who will conduct it and under what mandate.

 

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Fin de regime

My guess is that we are finally in the waning days of the Asad regime in Syria.  UN envoy Brahimi was in Damascus yesterday and will talk with the Russians this weekend.  His is sounding like a last ditch effort.  Moscow has made it clear that it will no longer prop up Asad.  Now they have to be convinced to give him a shove in the right direction.  It shouldn’t be all that hard.  Bashar’s military police chief has famously absconded, joining his foreign ministry spokesperson.  The regime is cracking, though not yet crumbling.

This is a delicate moment in which a great deal is at stake.  The devil is in the details.  Brahimi is still pressing for a solution that jibes with last June’s Geneva agreement, which Moscow and Washington both endorsed, on formation of a fully empowered government with Bashar still in place.  I doubt the revolutionaries will accept it.  They want him out before agreeing to a ceasefire.  Provided that condition is met, a negotiated transition of power to some sort of “unity” government (which means it would include a “remnant” of the Asad regime) with a guarantee of a future transition could be a good thing, provided it genuinely puts Syria on a democratic path and extracts it from the violence now on going.  But it could also sell the Syrian revolution short by putting a new autocrat in place and creating conditions for renewed violence.

There will be precious little real international support for a true transition to democracy.  The Saudis and Qataris, who have provided the bulk of the arms and money to the revolutionaries, are not much interested in anything beyond getting Asad out and installing a Sunni (preferably Islamist) regime, democratic or not.  The Russians, Iranians and Iraqis will fear that outcome and want to preserve a secular regime, whether democratic or not.  The Americans and Turks will want a secular democracy, but they are not in a position to insist on it.   The Americans have been reluctant to get too involved.  Only if Turkey decides to put its boots on the ground inside Syria will it have the kind of clout required.  Even then, it may fail to get what it wants.

The Syrians hold the key to the outcome.  But of course they point in many different directions.  There are lots of Syrians who would prefer a secular democracy, but they are stronger among the nonviolent protesters than among the revolutionary military forces deciding the outcome.  The Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, now recognized internationally as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, is trying to project a unified and moderate image.  But the results so far are rudimentary:  a few press statements, not always on the most pressing issues.  There is still no transition government.

Jabhat al Nusra, a leading Islamist group among the fighters, is producing more substantial results.  Rejecting the Coalition, it is anti-Western, Islamist, socially conservative and hard-fighting.  The United States has designated it a foreign terrorist organization.  Washington’s primary concern is its links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which Jabhat al Nusra denies.  But I’ve also heard that the designation was done in part to please the Russians, who are genuinely (and justifiably) concerned with Syria becoming a source of Islamist extremism that could infect parts of Russia.  Baghdad is also worried about a Sunni extremist regime in Syria that would try to counter Prime Minister Maliki’s increasingly Shia (and autocratic) drift in Iraq.

Few in Syria want the state to collapse or divide territorially.  The revolution has not been fought on ethnic or sectarian grounds, even if it has exposed ethnic and sectarian divisions.  Only Syria’s Kurds lean in the direction of federalism, inspired and supported by their confrères in Iraq.  But I see no real plan on the horizon to prevent revenge killing, despite the very real likelihood it will happen.  If there is extreme violence against the Alawites or other minorities thought to have supported the regime, collapse and division become more likely.

All decisions that depend on the will of a single individual, as Bashar’s to step aside does, are inherently unpredictable.  There is of course the possibility he will refuse and hang on for a while, even defying the Russians to do so.  A Google search for “fin de regime” turns up a lot of hits concerning Syria, in 2011.  The longer this goes on, the worse it will be in the end.

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Prevent what?

Most of us who work on international affairs think it would be much better to use diplomacy to prevent bad things from happening rather than waiting until the aftermath and then cleaning up after the elephants, which all too often involves expensive military action.  But what precisely would that mean?  What do we need to prevent?

The Council on Foreign Relations survey of prevention priorities for 2013 was published last week, just in time to be forgotten in the Christmas rush and New Year’s lull.  It deserves notice, as it is one of the few nonpartisan attempts to define American national security priorities.  This year’s edition was in part crowd-sourced and categorizes contingencies on two dimensions:  impact on U.S. interests (high, medium, low) and likelihood (likely, plausible, unlikely).

Syria comes out on top in both dimensions.  That’s a no-brainer for likelihood, as the civil war has already reached catastrophic dimensions and is affecting the broader region.  Judging from Paul Stares’ video introduction to the survey, U.S. interests are ranked high in part because of the risk of use or loss of chemical weapons stocks.  I’d have ranked them high because of the importance of depriving Iran of its one truly reliable ally and bridge to Hizbollah, but that’s a quibble.

CFR ranks another six contingencies as high impact on U.S. interests and only plausible rather than likely.  This isn’t so useful, but Paul’s video comes to the rescue:  an Israeli military strike on Iran that would “embroil” the U.S. and conflict with China in the East or South China seas are his picks to talk about.  I find it peculiar that CFR does not treat what I would regard as certainly a plausible if not a likely contingency:  a U.S. attack on Iran.  There are few more important decisions President Obama will need to make than whether to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.  Certainly it is a far more challenging decision than whether to go to war against China in the territorial disputes it is generating with U.S. allies in Pacific.  I don’t know any foreign policy experts who would advise him to go in that direction.

It is striking that few of the other “plausible” and high-impact contingencies are amenable to purely military responses:

  • a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure
  • a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
  • severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attack

It is not easy to determine the origin of cyberattacks, and not clear that a military response would be appropriate or effective.  The same is also sometimes true of mass casualty attacks; our military response to 9/11 in Afghanistan has enmired the United States in its longest war to date, one where force is proving inadequate as a solution.  It is hard to imagine any military response to internal instability in Pakistan, though CFR offers as an additional low probability contingency a possible U.S. military confrontation with Islamabad “triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations.”

In the “moderate” impact on U.S. interests, CFR ranks as highly likely “a major erosion of security in Afghanistan resulting from coalition drawdown.”  I’d certainly have put that in high impact category, as we’ve still got 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and a significant portion of them will still be there at the end of 2013.  In the “moderate” impact but merely plausible category CFR ranks:

  • a severe Indo-Pakistan crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by a major terror attack
  • a severe North Korean crisis caused by another military provocation, internal political instability, or threatening nuclear weapons/ICBM-related activities
  • a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
  • continuing political instability and emergence of a terrorist safe haven in Libya

Again there are limits to what we can do about most of these contingencies by conventional military means.  Only a North Korea crisis caused by military provocation or threats would rank be susceptible to a primarily military response.  The others call for diplomatic and civilian responses in at least a measure equal to the possible military ones.

CFR lets two “moderate” impact contingencies languish in the low probability category that I don’t think belong there:

  • political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
  • renewed unrest in the Kurdish dominated regions of Turkey and the Middle East

There is a very real possibility in Riyadh of a succession crisis, as the monarchy on the death of the king will likely move to a next generation of contenders.  Kurdish irredentist aspirations are already a big issue in Iraq and Syria.  It is hard to imagine this will not affect Iran and Turkey before the year is out.  Neither is amenable to a purely military response.

Most of the contingencies with “low” impact on U.S. interests are in Africa:

  • a deepening of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that involves military intervention from its neighbors
  • growing popular unrest and political instability in Sudan
  • military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
  • renewed ethnic violence in Kenya surrounding March 2013 presidential election
  • widespread unrest in Zimbabwe surrounding the electoral process and/or the death of Robert Mugabe
  • failure of a multilateral intervention to push out Islamist groups from Mali’s north

This may tell us more about CFR and the United States than about the world.  Africa has little purchase on American sentiments, despite our half-Kenyan president.  All of these contingencies merit diplomatic attention, but none is likely to excite U.S. military responses of more than a purely emergency character, except for Mali.  If you’ve got a few Islamist terrorists, you can get some attention even if you are in Africa.

What’s missing from this list?  CFR mentions

…a third Palestinian intifada, a widespread popular unrest in China, escalation of a U.S.-Iran naval clash in the Persian Gulf, a Sino-Indian border crisis, onset of elections-related instability and violence in Ethiopia, unrest in Cuba following the death of Fidel Castro and/or incapacitation of Raul Castro, and widespread political unrest in Venezuela triggered by the death or incapacitation of Hugo Chavez.

I’d add intensification of the global economic slowdown (high probability, high impact), failure to do more about global warming (also high probability, delayed impact), demographic or financial implosion in Europe or Japan (and possibly even the U.S.), Russian crackdown on dissent, and resurgent Islamist extremism in Somalia.  But the first three of these are not one-year “contingencies,” which shows one limit of the CFR exercise.

I would also note that the world is arguably in better shape at the end of 2012 than ever before in history.  As The Spectator puts it:

Never has there been less hunger, less disease or more prosperity. The West remains in the economic doldrums, but most developing countries are charging ahead, and people are being lifted out of poverty at the fastest rate ever recorded. The death toll inflicted by war and natural disasters is also mercifully low. We are living in a golden age.

May it last.

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