Tag: Turkey
Stevenson’s army, May 14
– Erdogan signals opposition to NATO membership for FInland and Sweden, which requires unanimity.
– CNN says IC is reviewing failure — except by State’s INR — to foresee strength of Ukrainian resistance.
– WaPo says US may have violated promise against 3d country transfer of Russian aircraft.
– WSJ says US has cut some Syria sanctions.
– Macron wants Zelensky to make concessions.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to âStevensonâs armyâ via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevensonâs army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. Youâll get an email confirming your join request. Click âJoin This Groupâ and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, May 5
Court decisions on campaign laws opened a big loophole that led to an amazing development in the Ohio Republican Senate primary. As CRS noted,
Unlimited Contributions to Independent-Expenditure-Only Political Action
Committees (Super PACs)
On March 26, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in
SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission24 that contributions to PACs that make only independent expendituresâbut not contributionsâcould not be constitutionally limited. As a result, these entities, commonly called super PACs, may accept previously prohibited amounts and sources of funds, including large corporate, union, or individual contributions used to advocate for election or defeat of federal candidates. Existing reporting requirements for PACs apply to super PACs, meaning that contributions and expenditures must be disclosed to the FEC.
Peter Thiel formed such a super PAC, gave it $15 million, which went for campaign activities for J.D. Vance, who had few ads or activities funded by his own campaign. Since the law forbids “coordination,” the super PAC puts its key information including polls and suggested messages in an obscure place online. It even posted its oppo research findings on Vance, so he could know what attacks might be made.
In other news: NYT says US shared intelligence with Ukraine that helped them target Russian generals.
Reuters says US has offered security assurances to Sweden if it seeks to enter NATO.
Defense News says some key congressional figures are now open to F16 sales to Turkey.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to âStevensonâs armyâ via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevensonâs army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. Youâll get an email confirming your join request. Click âJoin This Groupâ and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 2
Just in time for our week 6 discussion of foreign economic policy, USTR released her first annual report and future year plans. WSJ analyzes. China impact.
Politico reports USTR fights with other US officials.
China offers to mediate Ukraine fighting.
Turkey blocks Russian navy entering Black Sea.
Western arms to Ukraine hindered by need for Russian models.
NYT notes Russian casualties undermine Putin narrative.
WOTR has 2 great reports — on Russian logistics and on recent Marine Corps University war game.
Opinions — from Eliot Cohen and from our brownbag guest next week, AEI’s Kori Schake.
RollCall reports on party unity in Congress last year.
Politico says SecState Blinken is Biden favorite:
Biden begins each day with the presidential daily briefing. On most days in recent weeks, the intelligence briefer has been joined by some of Bidenâs top national security advisers: Secretary of State Antony Blinken, national security adviser Jake Sullivan, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley and more. Carrying over reading habits from his three-plus decades in the Senate, Biden dives into the briefing books and peppers his aides with questions, according to two senior White House aides. But the routine has gotten more time-consuming and frantic in recent weeks as the threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine turned into a reality. Unlike his last foreign policy crisis â the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan â Biden has been forced to spend his time responding to the actions of a foreign nation rather than shaping U.S. policy there. In recent days, Biden has attended morning meetings in the Situation Room as well as evening sessions in the Oval Office; he worked in the Treaty Room last Wednesday when aides believed a Russian invasion was imminent. Blinken, above all others, has emerged as the presidentâs top confidant, used as a sounding board and consigliare on how to shape U.S. policy and rally global pressure against Russia in light of its invasion. Biden has also leaned on those with vast Russian experience, including Bill Burns, the CIA director who once served as the nationâs ambassador to Moscow, and Victoria Nuland, the under secretary of State who was a top liaison to Ukraine under President Barack Obama.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to âStevensonâs armyâ via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevensonâs army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. Youâll get an email confirming your join request. Click âJoin This Groupâ and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Ukraine and Iran will make Syria harder
Ukraine may seem far from Syria. But it is not. Nor is Iran. What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine. What happens in Iran as well as Ukraine will affect the now more than decade-old war in Syria, through geography, markets, diplomacy, and politics.
The fighting and sanctions will hamper Russia in Syria
The Russians have been fighting insurgency in Syria since 2015, primarily with air power but also with some troops on the ground. The effort is not large, but Ukraine will take priority. Sanctions will severely limit Russian financial resources. This could affect not only military resources but also willingness to invest in reconstruction. The state-owned companies that might take such a risk are not going to have the cash to do it.
In addition, Russian relations with Turkey, the US, and possibly Israel will be strained. Cooperation with Turkey is important in northwest Syria, where Turkish troops and proxies are in control. Cooperation is important with the US in northeast Syria, where American troops are supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Israel depends on Russian restraint when its aircraft attack Iranian forces and shipments inside Syria.
Moscow will have little reason to segregate the diplomatic and deconfliction issues in Syria from Ukraine. A weakened Russia may well seek pressure points in Syria to respond to international pressure in Ukraine.
Iran will be emboldened
Russia and Iran both support the Assad regime in Syria, but they also compete for influence there. Assuming the Iran nuclear deal revives, Tehran will have a lot more money with oil at around $100/barrel. Some portion of that will find its way to military and financial support for Assad. Even if the JCPOA remains moribund, Iran will find itself strengthened in Syria relative to Russia. It will try to use that strength to embed itself more strongly into the Syrian regime, in particular its security forces (which have grown closer to Russia in recent years).
An emboldened Iran will be less likely to compromise on Syria issues than a weakened Russia, but Moscow has the vital veto in the UN Security Council. Tehran might be even more inclined than Russia to shut off vital cross-border humanitarian assistance to Syrians, but in the end Moscow will decide.
The West’s stake in Syria will increase
The Ukraine war increases the West’s stake in Syria. Abandoning its anti-regime fight there would raise serious doubts about American and European resolve to continue support for Ukraine. Credibility isn’t everything, but it is something. The Biden administration had already tacitly recommitted the US to its continuing presence in northeast Syria supporting the Kurds and allied Arabs, if only to avoid a second Afghanistan debacle and to continue the counter-terrorism fight.
Net net
Syria has not been going anywhere anyway. The UN-sponsored constitutional talks are stalled, humanitarian relief is falling short, terrorism threats are growing, and accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity is limited for now to gathering of documentation and the German courts. Russian weakness, Iranian strength, and Western resolve are going to make things harder, not easier.
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What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine
Here are the speaking notes I prepared on the Balkans and Middle East for this noon’s event on “Whatâs Next for Russia, Ukraine, and the World?” It featured Johns Hopkins/SAIS faculty:
Balkans
- American policy since the end of the Cold War has aimed at âEurope whole and free.â That isnât going to happen so long as Putin or someone of his ilk rules Russia.
- Serbia claims neutrality, but its current leadership advocates a âSerbian worldâ akin to Putinâs âRussian world.â Belgrade also refuses to sanction Moscow. De facto Serbia is siding with Russia.
- That puts Bosnia, Kosovo, and NATO member Montenegro at risk from Serb irredentism.
- The line between democracies and autocracies will therefore also be drawn through the Balkans unless Belgrade changes its inclinations.
Countering Russian ambitions and Moscowâs Serb proxies needs higher priority:
- Deployment of an additional 500 EU troops to Bosnia is a good first step. But more are needed. The UK should augment that deployment. The US should beef up the military presence in Brcko and move some troops to northern Kosovo .
- The EU should tell Serbia that continued adherence to neutrality in Ukraine will result in a halt to the EU accession process.
- The US, UK, and EU should end bilateral and multilateral assistance to Republika Srpska and threaten likewise to Serbia.
Middle East
In the Middle East, the situation is more ambiguous. The interests at stake are less compelling and US policy more accepting of autocracy:
- Syria backs Russia and Iran is attempting the Chinese straddle (for peace but against Ukrainian membership in NATO). Egypt, the UAE, and other small Gulf monarchies are ducking for cover. Saudi Arabia so far has decided to enjoy high oil prices.
- Israel has backed Ukraine, but cautiously to avoid Russian retaliation against its interests in Syria and domestic political complications. Turkey has also backed Ukraine, less cautiously.
- Ultimately, the Middle East will go with the flow. If Russia is successful, no one in the Middle East will refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with a puppet government in Kyiv.
- OPEC+ will gain traction and Russian inroads in the Middle East will expand.
- But if Russia fails, the Middle East countries, democracies and autocracies alike, will claim they supported Ukraine, even if OPEC+ suffers irreparable damage.
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What terrorism tells us about northeast Syria
Former Syrian diplomat Bassam Barabandi sounds the alarm about support for Kurdish governance in northeast Syria:
In Syria, people differ dramatically on the attack the Islamic State carried out in Hasakah last week. Those affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) believe that Turkey was behind it. Pro-Turkey Syrians believe that the battle was a ploy serving SDF. Opposition not affiliated with SDF or Turkey believes the regime is behind the attack. Anti-imperialists think the US remote-controls ISIS. Regime supporters blame Turkey, the SDF, the US, the Gulf States and NATO.
What is clear
Some things are clear. US and British commandos managed the anti-ISIS operations and partook in them, exposing SDF weakness and the likelihood it is infiltrated. ISIS has the ability to surprise. That raises many questions about how the terrorists got past checkpoints in large numbers, with their weapons. Northeast Syria is just not a priority for the Arab opposition. It is keen on nothing but continuing to receive funds from donors; it did not even issue a statement condemning ISIS or calling for civilian protection.
No Arab voice in the northest has publicly condemned the terrorist attack. There are several reasons:
- SDF has failed to build trust with the Arab majority.
- Failure of the SDF to eliminate, or provide protection from, terrorist sleeper cells.
- Lack of leadership by elders, groups of elders, leaders of local councils.
All are fearful of their interests at home or in the countries where they live. Their real influence doesnât go beyond the boundaries of their homes.
The missing ingredient
None of the international actors in the northeast have an interest in dealing with heavyweight Arab leaders. Those who claim to be representing Arabs and other local populations know that they are in their positions only so long as they have no real weight or influence. Â This has led to the Arab majority feeling marginalized.
Marginalization promotes instability. All powers – the Assad regime, Russia, Iran, terrorists – are working to fill the void. They make promises of a better future if the Arabs cooperate against the Kurds and the Americans. Fortunately, the population does not trust these countries or the terrorists. The local Arabs for years have raised their complaints with Amerrican and Western officials at every meeting. They still hope that the international coalition will be more positive in dealing with them, despite the SDF’s behavior.
Nearly a year ago, the SDF announced it had released the âless dangerous terroristsâ upon a request from local leaders, elders and others. Now we need to know who those elders were. Who came forward with those demands? Who submitted lists of names? Who claimed to represent the people of Deir Ezzor, Raqqa and Al-Hasakah? Their identities should be published.
Arab leadership is needed
All the projects of restoring stability, governance, building social peace, and the international initiatives aimed at enhancing Arab-Kurdish communication are useless in achieving real, longterm stability if it does not address the local political questions. They may be good for building the regionâs economy, creating jobs and establishing infrastructure, but the principal problems are politicalânot the lack of services. None of the projects will achieve the essential goal of restoring stability to the region and fighting terrorism.
A new social contract between Kurds and Arabs is needed, one that achieves political, economic and social balance. This will require genuine elections, at least among Arabs, to produce real political leaders who can run their communities and bear responsibility. Otherwise, the northeast will remain unstable. The regime, Russia, and Iran will take advantage of the situation. The Arabs and Kurds of the northeast will miss the opportunity created by the presence of the international coalition forces.
Everyone would benefit
The Americans – including politicians, lawmakers, and think tanks, even those run by Arabs – want to establish a Kurdish entity with special status (an independent region or a federalist unit). They exaggerate the strength of SDF in all fields (military strength, protecting minorities, economy, social service, promoting democracy, and equal representation). The reality is different. More than 60% of the SDF are Arabs. They represent the largest number of dead and wounded during the battles to liberate the region from ISIS. Continuing with the illusion that the Kurds are responsible for the defeat of ISIS is unrealistic.
The Assad regime, not the Syrian people, persecuted the Syrian Kurds for the last 60 years. No one should believe that Assad will give the Kurds their political rights. Neither political pressure nor oil will be persuasive. It would be a dangerous misadventure for which Arabs and Kurds will pay its price. Real decisions should be taken to enhance stability by empowering serious Arab leadersâfor the sake of all parties.
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