Tag: Turkiye
Winners and losers from Assad’s fall
The success of Syrians in deposing Bashar al Assad poses the question of who wins and who loses. Inside Syria, Hayat Tahrir al Sham is the big winner for now. It led the breakout from Idlib and inspired the many risings elsewhere in Syria.
There are lots of other countries that stand to win or lose something in the transition. Let’s assume Syria remains reasonably stable and its government basically inclusive and not vindictive, which appears to be HTS’ intention. We can try to guess the pluses and minuses for the rest of the world.
Turkiye is the big winner
In the region, Turkiye is the big winner. President Erdogan had been ready to negotiate with Assad, who refused to engage. Erdogan lost patience and backed a military outcome. He unleashed both Turkish proxies and HTS, which could not have armed and equipped itself adequately without Ankara’s cooperation. He does not control HTS 100%, especially now that it is in Damascus. But he will have a good deal of influence over its behavior. Let’s hope he uses it in the democratic and less religious direction. That however is the opposite of what he has been doing at home.
Erdogan has two primary goals in Syria. First is achieving enough stability there to allow many of the three million Syrian refugees in Turkiye to return. Returns will take time, but there is already a spontaneous flow back into Syria. The second is keeping the Syrian Kurds associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) away from Turkiye’s border with Syria. Erdogan would also like its Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) dissolved. Or at least as far from power as possible.
Refugee returns look like a good bet. Disempowering the Kurds in eastern and northern Syria does not. They are well-established and cooperate closely with US forces in that area. Future President Trump will want to withdraw the Americans. But the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces will remain essential to fighting the Islamic State (IS). HTS, IS, and the PKK all carry the “terrorist” label in the US and Europe. But HTS and IS are rivals. HTS will want the Kurds to continue to fight IS. They will also be vital, at least temporarily, to preventing Iran from re-establishing a land route through Syria to Lebanon.
Israel wins and loses
The Israeli government would have preferred to see the Assad devil it knew stay in power. But his fall means the Iranians and their proxies will no longer be stationed along the northeastern border of Israel. The Israelis have already moved their troops into a UN-patrolled buffer zone inside Syria. They didn’t want some known or unknown force filling that vacuum. That advance might give them a stronger position in future negotiations with Damascus, whenever those occur.
But Israelis have to be worried that a jihadist group led the overthrow of Assad. Ahmed al Sharaa, the birth name of HTS’s Abu Mohammed al Jolani, was born in Riyadh to Syrian parents. They were displaced from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The second Palestinian intifada motivated his conversion to jihad. It is hard to picture someone with that background more pliable than the impacable Assad on border and Palestinian issues. Jolani himself appears to have said little about Gaza or the Lebanon war. But some of his followers are clear about where they want to go next:
Lebanon and Jordan
Lebanon and Jordan, two key neighbors of Syria, can hope to be winners from the change of regime . Both will want to see Syrian refugees return home, as they were a strain on their economies. They will also stand to gain from reconstruction and eventually a more prosperous Syria.
Assad had been financing his government and his cronies with proceeds from the export of the stimulant Captagon. Decent people in both Beirut and Amman will welcome relief from that flood of poison into and through their societies. Some of their corrupted politicians may regret it.
Lebanon will have to reabsorb Hezbollah fighters who supported Assad. They will be a defeated and unhappy lot. But the Lebanese Army and state stand to gain from any weakening and demoralization of Hezbollah. Anyone serious in Beirut should see the current situation as an opportunity to strengthen both.
Iran and Russia are the biggest losers
Apart from Assad, Tehran and Moscow are the biggest losers. They backed Assad with people, force, money, and diplomacy. They are now thoroughly discredited.
Iran has already evacuated its personnel from Syria. Tehran has lost not only its best ally but also its land route to Lebanon.
Russia still has its bases. Almost any future Syrian government will have a hard time seeing what it gains from the Russian air force presence. Moscow’s air force brutalized Syrian civilians for almost 10 years. The air bases will no longer have utility even to Moscow. Moscow will prioritize keeping the naval base at Tartus, which is important for its Mediterranean operations.
The Gulf gains, Iraq loses
Gulf diplomacy was trying to normalize relations with Assad in the past year or two. But few Gulfies will mourn his regime, provided stability is maintained. Qatar may be more pleased than Saudi Arabia or Abu Dhabi. The Saudis and Emiratis are less tolerant of political Islam. Nor do they like to see regimes fall. Qatar is more comfortable with political change, including of the Islamist variety.
Iraq’s Shia-dominated government loses a companion in Damascus. It won’t welcome a Sunni-dominated government in Damascus. But Baghdad, like the Gulf, is unlikely to mourn the fall of Assad. He did his damnedest to make life difficult for Iraqis after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
The United States and Europe gain but will need to ante up
The US and Europe have long viewed Assad as a regrettable but necessary evil. They hesitated to bring him down for fear of what might come next. Now they need to step up and fund Syria’s recovery, mainly through the IMF and the World Bank. They will want Gulf money invested as well. The best way to get that is for them to ante up matching funds.
That is also the best way for them to gain leverage over the political settlement. If they want an inclusive outcome, they’ll need to be ready to pay for it. Hesitation could open the door to malicious influence.
Let the Syrians decide
That said, the details of the political settlement should be left to the Syrians. They will need to write a new constitution and eventually hold elections. The extensive constitutional discussions the UN has hosted for a decade may offer some enlightenment on what Syrians want. Just as important in my view is how the new powers that be handle property issues. Only if property rights are clearly established and protected can Syria’s economy revive. But who rightfully owns what and what to do about destroyed property are complicated and difficult issues.
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Assad is imploding, but it’s not over yet
With Russia preoccupied in Ukraine and Iran weakened, Syria’s President Bashar al Assad is now under siege. The forces opposing him include both Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish-supported rebel groups. Opposition forces in several Syrian provinces are joining the fray, as are the Syrian Democratic
Forces. HTS and the Turks have been governing in Syria’s northwest Idlib and Afrin provinces. The Syrian Democratic Forces are affiliated with Kurdish institutions that govern in much of the east.
How far, how fast?
The HTS offensive has moved fast and far. It controls most of Aleppo, Syria’s largest or second largest city depending on how you count. HTS has also evacuated Kurdish forces from Aleppo and advanced south to the outskirts of Hama. In the meanwhile, the Turkish-supported groups have chased Kurds from their strongholds in Aleppo province. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Kurdish led but partly Arab manned, have evicted Iranian and Shia militias from the east.
The question is whether rebel forces can sustain their momentum and move further south to Hama and Homs. So far, there has been little fighting. The Syrian Army is evaporating. It is poorly staffed, trained, and equipped after more than 13 years of fighting rebels. After hesitating at first, Russian air attacks are now battering rebel-held territory, including civilian targets. Lebanese Hezbollah, a major Iranian-supported factor in Syria, has let it be known it will not send more forces. Israel has battered Hezbollah badly in both Lebanon and Syria.
The quandaries
For the US and EU, these sudden developments pose a difficult issue. They don’t like Assad and have maintained vigorous sanctions against him. But they also don’t like HTS, which is a spinoff from Al Qaeda. And Washington won’t want the Turkish-supported forces beating up on the SDF. They have been helpful in fighting remnants of the Islamic State in eastern Syria.
Israel has its own issues. It did not mind the Assad devil it knew and won’t want a jihadist state in Syria. But if he falls, the Israelis will be happy to see Iran and its proxies disappear from their border. And they will want some cred with whoever takes over. In the past they have been supportive to at least some of the opposition to Assad.
The endgame
HTS is trying hard to project a more tolerant image than many jihadists. It has reached out to the Kurds:
HTS has sought to justify its more tolerant approach (translation from a Tweet by Aaron Zelin):
The jihad in Syria has the duty to repel the attacks of the Assad regime. It is part of sharia politics that the mujahidin in Syria should only fight those who fight them, and refrain from attacking those who refrain from attacking them, and strive to disperse the enemies and reduce them.
Assad will have well-equipped, loyal forces defending Damascus. But if HTS takes Hama and Homs, he won’t have much country left. Opposition forces are rising in the south even as the SDF clears regime forces and its allies from the east. The western, Mediterranean coast would still be his, but vulnerable.
The greatest threat to the opposition forces will arise if Turkiye unleashes its proxies against the Kurds. That would divide the opposition and provide an opportunity for Assad to complicate the fight. He might try to strike a deal with the Kurds. Assad is imploding, but it isn’t over yet.
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Nukes could make things worse
Today the journal Survival: Global Politics and Strategy published a paper on “Assessing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.” I prepared it with two talented MEI research assistants, Aya Khan and Zuha Noor.
I have been concerned with nuclear issues since even before my professional career. My first participation in public protests was against fallout from nuclear weapons tests in the late 1950s and early 1960s. I wrote my doctoral thesis at Princeton on the history of radiation protection. When I joined the State Department in 1977, it was as a science and technology specialist. I spent seven years abroad as a Science Attache’ and Counselor in the US embassies in Rome and Brasilia. My main concern was Italian and Brazilian transfers to Iraq, as well as the possible military goals of the Brazilian nuclear program. I’ve visited many nuclear labs, reprocessing facilities, and power plants.
Nonproliferation in the Middle East
One of the interesting questions about the Middle East is why there has been little proliferation there in recent decades, despite the presence in the region of Israel’s nuclear weapons. Part of the answer is that Israel destroyed facilities in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) that might have allowed those countries to develop nuclear weapons. Libya, under American pressure, abandoned its nuclear program (2003). But why haven’t the heavier weights in the region, namely Turkey and Saudi Arabia, gone the nuclear route along with Iran?
This is an especially pertinent question right now, as Tehran approaches the nuclear threshold, at which it will have enough highly enriched uranium to build one or more nuclear weapons. The answer is at least in part that until recently Turkiye and Saudi Arabia have been largely content to rely on US security guarantees. Turkiye is a NATO member and has US nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Saudi Arabia has until recently regarded the US as a reliable security partner. Ankara and Riyadh complain loudly about Israeli nuclear weapons, but so far as we know they have not tried to reply with nuclear weapons programs of their own.
Things are changing
But the strategic environment is changing for both of those countries. Turkiye and the US are trapped in frictions over Ankara’s purchase of Russian air defenses, the American reaction to (and alleged role in) the 2016 attempted coup, and Turkiye’s hostility to the Kurds who are allied with the Americans in Syria. Saudi Arabia resents the American failure to react strongly to the 2019 Iranian attack on its oil production facilities. Nor did it like President Biden’s criticism of Saudi human rights abuses and American efforts to lower oil prices. Security guarantees that once seemed ironclad are now doubtful.
At the same time, Russia and China are making inroads in the Middle East. Moscow has collaborated with Saudi Arabia in maintaining oil prices the Americans think too high. China is importing a lot of Saudi oil and offering to build nuclear power reactors in the Kingdom. Beijing has also mediated an agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Rosatom is building nuclear reactors in Turkiye. Russia and China both have good reasons to fear nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. But is not clear that they will be as exigent on that score as the Americans.
Rosatom is also building power reactors in Egypt.
Leadership matters
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Erdogan have both said that if Iran gets nuclear weapons their countries will follow suit. It is not clear whether deeds have followed those words. Saudi Arabia’s technological capabilities in that direction may be limited. It only recently started up its first research reactor and is thought to be seeking US nuclear power reactors, which come with strong nonproliferation constraints. But we really don’t know. The Kingdom is opaque in that direction. The Turks are likely farther advanced, as they have had research reactors for many years. But there is no public evidence of enrichment or reprocessing research in Turkiye.
Egypt’s President Sisi has said his country doesn’t need to have nuclear weapons to achieve great power status. But what will he do if Turkiye or Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons? And what will his successor do in that case?
Prevention is better than cure
My colleagues and I argue in our piece that prevention is better than cure. We need to be monitoring the nuclear capabilities of possible nuclear proliferators assiduously as well as building a regional security architecture that discourages nuclear weapons. We will also need to collaborate with Europe, Russia, and China in ensuring that other Middle Eastern states don’t follow Israel and Iran down the nuclear path. The Middle East is already a mess. Nuclear weapons would make things worse.
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