Tag: UAE
No real deal
President Trump’s much-vaunted “deal of the century” landed with a thud today. Conceived and developed without input from the Palestinians, it gives Israel the territory it has sought in Golan, the West Bank, and Jerusalem in exchange for a $50 billion aid package and a supposedly contiguous Palestinian state.
There are lots of ambiguities, which I suppose will be resolved only once we study the 80-page text (not yet on the White House website):
- The President claimed in his announcement that Jerusalem will be undivided but also said there would be a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. That doesn’t make sense.
- He also said Palestinian territory would be “doubled,” which by my calculation suggests that at least 10% of the West Bank (and possibly much more) would be taken by Israel without land swaps.
- There would be a four-year period during which Israel would not encroach further on the West Bank, but it is not clear whether this would require prior Palestinian acceptance of the plan, which is not forthcoming.
- The President did not mention the Jordan River valley, but given his claim that Israel’s security would not be even marginally compromised it is likely the idea is for Israel to hold on to it.
- The plan is said to be “conceptual” and will now be elaborated further in a joint committee, which isn’t going to happen as the Palestinians won’t go along.
What happens now? Nothing much. Most of the Arab world seems to have shunned the announcement–the President mentioned only that the Omani, Bahraini, and Emirati (he said Emiratris) were present. That would mean most of the political heavy hitters, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, stayed away.
The main destinations for this peace plan are the political campaigns of President Trump–whose impeachment trial was ongoing while he made the announcement–and Prime Minister Netanyahu, who today was indicted on corruption charges (specifically fraud, breach of trust, and bribery). They are both hoping to get a bit of political boost out of the White House peace plan, which will likely be forgotten within days.
There is however a broader significance: the playing field has tilted against the West Bank Palestinians in recent years, in part because they have mostly abandoned violence against Israelis and internationals. It would be surprising if no one noticed how their cause has suffered from resorting to nonviolence.
Trump and Netanyahu are trying to supplant the “land for peace” formula that has prevailed in negotiations since 1967. They want “money for peace” instead. It should be no surprise that Trump views the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as requiring a real estate deal for its resolution. But then remember: Trump was no good at real estate and made most of his money franchising his name. Like so many of his deals, this one is a sales gimmick. There is no real deal.
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Imbalanced Region
On September 20 the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted a panel discussion entitled “Red Sea Rivalries: Middle East Competition in the Horn of Africa” to introduce and discuss a new report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) on the influence of Gulf Countries on the Horn of Africa. Opening remarks were delivered by Ambassador Johnnie Carson and Robert Malley, President of ICG. Elizabeth Dickinson, ICG’s Arabian peninsula analyst and Dino Mahtani, ICG’s Africa program deputy director outlined the report’s findings. UN advisor Nicholas Haysom, African Union Chief of Staff to the High-Level Implementation Panel Abdul Mohammad, and former Egyptian Ambassador Hesham Youssef provided commentary.
Malley described three key findings: first, the Gulf must stop exporting its conflicts to the Red Sea region; second, the Red Sea countries should negotiate collectively with the Gulf; and third, Western countries have a role to play in these conflicts but have only recently begun to do so.
Dickinson argued that Gulf competition in the Red Sea region is part of wider strategy throughout North Africa and the Sahel. Qatar and the UAE-Saudi alliance’s interventions in Sudan are related to its actions in Chad and Niger, the three countries bordering the stronghold of the UAE’s Libya proxy General Haftar. She also argued that the Gulf countries do not consider the Horn of Africa part of a different continent in which they are foreign meddlers. Rather, they think of the Red Sea as part of their region and their role in it as a natural extension of longstanding historical ties.
Mahtani emphasized that he is cautiously optimistic about the prospect of a stable dynamic between Gulf countries and domestic actors in Sudan. The killing of 120 people in Khartoum in June by General Hemeti’s forces pushed his Emirati and Saudi backers to show contrition. In July, an attempted coup by Qatar-backed members of Sudan’s military showed that Hemeti faced strong enough opposition to prevent him from ruling through coercion alone. Mahtani argued that this reality may push the UAE to compromise with Qatar on Sudan. This could lay the groundwork for future cooperation between the two countries on their overall plans for Sudan’s post-Bashir development.
Mahtani contrasted this to the situation in Somalia, where the federal government in Mogadishu is aligned with Qatar while regional political leaders receive support from the UAE and Saudi Arabia. He also described the UAE’s indirect support of al-Shabab through purchases of Somali charcoal, a significant source of funding for the militant group. In exchange, al-Shabab has increased the number of their attacks this summer and targeted a delegation of Qataris and Somali federal government employees, acting as “subcontractors for political violence.” Several panelists agreed that the Gulf rivalries have contributed to political fragmentation and violence in Somalia and will likely continue to do so indefinitely.
Both Dickinson and Mahtani emphasized the role that multilateralism can play in addressing the power asymmetry between the Gulf countries and those in the Horn of Africa. They argued that Horn of Africa countries can increase their bargaining power by negotiating jointly with the Gulf through regional multilateral organizations like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or the African Union. The United States rarely involves itself but when it does it can make a big difference to the effectiveness of these multilateral discussions. In Sudan, the Quad talks among the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE facilitated the power sharing compromise.
Mohammad agreed that Africa’s strong tradition of multilateralism could benefit the countries of the Horn of Africa and added that it could provide an example of positive multilateral relations to the Gulf countries. He argued that while Gulf countries have weaponized the GCC against each other in recent years, adopting an African-inspired culture of multilateralism could provide a means to transcend conflict in the Middle East. Hesham agreed that multilateralism in this part of the world is important but argued that it will not solve the problem of asymmetry in the bilateral relationships between Gulf states and Horn of Africa countries.
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Bluff to talk
Claiming that it is responding to Iranian attack planning, the Trump Administration has added military threat to its “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran. The President has denied what I take to be intentional leaks of a plan to deploy more than 100,000 troops, saying that he would deploy many more if it comes to that. Another American official suggested that Trump might rain 500 cruise missile per day on Iran for an extended period. Non-essential US government personnel have been ordered out of Embassy Baghdad. A carrier battle group and B52s have been deployed to the Gulf.
So far, this is escalatory bluff. The B52s flew from Al Udeid airfield in Qatar, which is too close to Iran to serve as a wartime facility. The war craft are serving statecraft: sending a signal. The Iranians, if they are planning attacks, won’t limit their targets to Iraq. Al Udeid would get its share of incoming. Real war preparations would require removal of aircraft from Al Udeid as well as withdrawal of at least families and other non-essential embassy personnel from throughout the Gulf. Deployment of 100,000 troops is far too many if the plan is for cruise missile strikes and far too few to mount an invasion of even part of Iran, a country of more than 80 million people. It would require months of visible and extensive logistical preparation.
Nor is there any sign at home that Trump is preparing for war. He might try to ignore the requirement for Congressional approval, but you can be sure the Democrats would be making much more noise if they thought he would attempt that. The stock market would also be signaling concern. American public opinion will not favor war with Iran, which would be a much bigger enterprise than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The President was elected because he pledged to end US over-commitment in the Middle East, not expand it.
So what is all this about? Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo have made themselves clear for months: they want Tehran back at the negotiating table. The President has even offered to send his telephone number through the Swiss, who represent US interests in Tehran. National Security Adviser Bolton prefers war, but he has lost that debate on North Korea and Venezuela. He is likely to lose again.
The Iranians are reluctant to talk with the Americans, as they want the US back in the nuclear deal before agreeing to talk with the Americans again. Their internal politics require it. I spent a couple of hours yesterday on news outlets discussing the situation with Iranian thinktankers. They are unconcerned with the American military threat an recognize it as bluff.
So what will happen?
War could happen, more by accident rather than intention of the President or the Supreme Leader. Both the Iranians and the Americans have friends who might create an incident. The Iranian-backed Houthis have allegedly launched a drone attack on a Saudi pipeline. The Saudis have responded with belligerence. The attack on four oil tankers off the coast of the UAE’s Fujairah coast elicited a softer response. The Emirates have extensive trade and financial exchanges with Iran and have not identified the perpetrators. Israel could escalate its attacks on Iranian assets in Syria or elsewhere in ways that Iran might think require a response.
It is also possible the Americans and Iranians will do what they have done in the past: talk in secret. That is how the Obama Administration began its push for the nuclear deal. Tehran might prefer it that way, since otherwise it will be seen as abandoning “resistance” and giving in to the Great Satan. Such secret talks might leak, so anyone in Tehran who conducts them should anticipate being fired if they do. But if they lead to some relief from sanctions, the Supreme Leader might be prepared to run the risk.
Trump speaks loudly and carries a little stick. He is bluffing. He wants to talk.
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Confusion and distrust
The Trump Administration is in a remarkable period of serial failures. Denuclearization of North Korea is going nowhere. Displacement of Venezuelan President Maduro has stalled. The tariff contest with China is escalating. Even the President’s sudden shift to backing Libyan strongman Haftar’s assault on Tripoli seems to have fizzled.
The domestic front is no better: Trump is stonewalling the House of Representatives but must know that eventually the courts will order most of what the Democratic majority is requesting be done. Special Counsel Mueller himself will eventually testify and be asked whether his documentation of obstruction of justice by the President would have led to indictment for any other perpetrator. A dozen or so other investigations continue, both by prosecutors and the House. These will include counter-intelligence investigations, which Mueller did not pursue, with enormous potential to embarrass the President and his close advisers.
The result is utter confusion in US foreign policy. Secretary of State Pompeo today postponed a meeting with President Putin and is stopping instead in Brussels to crash a meeting the UK, Germany, and France had convened to talk about how to preserve the Iran nuclear deal. This is happening on the same day that President Trump is meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán, whose anti-democratic maneuvers have made him unwelcome in London, Berlin, and Paris.
Pompeo will be pitching hostility to Iran, based on the presumption that it is responsible for attacks on tankers over the weekend off the coast of Fujairah, one of the (United Arab) Emirates located outside the Gulf of Hormuz. Tehran has denounced the attacks, which may or may not indicate something. The perpetrators are unknown. While concerned about the attacks, the Europeans will want the US to tone down the hostility towards Iran, with which they want to maintain the nuclear deal from which the US has withdrawn.
Germany is likely to be particularly annoyed with the Americans, not least because Pompeo last week canceled at the last minute a scheduled meeting with Chancellor Merkel in order to go to Iraq, where he failed to convince Baghdad to join the sanctions against Iran. She has become the strongest defender of liberal democracy and the rules-based international order that President Trump has so noisily and carelessly abandoned, while at the same time displeasing the US Administration by continuing the Nord Stream 2 natural gas deal with Russia.
In diplomacy, holding on to your friends is important. Washington under Trump has elected not to accommodate the more powerful Europeans and Iraq but rather to support the would-be autocrats in Hungary and Poland, as well as the Brexiteers in the UK and the Greater Israel campaigners who also advocate war with Iran. All of this was completely unnecessary, since it would have been possible to pursue additional agreements with Iran on regional and other issues without exiting the nuclear deal.
The Administration has thrown away the friends it needs and acquired a few it does not. It has lost the key Europeans and has nothing whatsoever to show for it. It has gotten nowhere with Putin, despite the President’s obsequious fawning. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are both crying foul about the tanker attacks, are unreliable. They have been known to purvey fake news in the past (especially in initiating their conflict with Qatar), so might they be doing so again?
The result is monumental confusion and distrust. America’s friends are offended. Her enemies are encouraged. Elections have consequences.
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Empowered decentralization
The Brookings Institution held a panel discussion March 12 about a city-based strategy for rebuilding Libya, with Jeffrey Feltman, Fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, Alice Hunt Friend, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Frederic Wehrey, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Karim Mezran, Senior Fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Federica Saini Fasanotti, Senior Fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence. The report outlining the city-based strategy is “Empowered decentralization: A city-based strategy for rebuilding Libya.”
The report recommends focusing the country’s economic, political and security activity on its major cities, with the return of US permanent presence in Libya.
Wehrey asserted that General Khalifa Haftar has gained ground in Libya, extending his control over oil and water sources. In addition, on territory and population still out of his control some armed groups and political actors have declared themselves with him, while other militias are still negotiating. Haftar also provides cash and protection for some towns and municipalities in the south, but clashes among different armed groups still flare up and militias still hold sway in some places. Haftar’s meeting at the end of February in Abu Dhabi with Fayez Al Sarraj (chair of the officially recognized Presidential Council) was an important step forward, but ordinary Libyans are upset with the UAE’s role in deciding their country’s future. Reconciliation among elites is important, but so too is grassroots involvement in the political process.
Mezran emphasized that the main goal of the Libyan revolution is to ensure dignity, freedom, human rights, and a pluralist political system. In most cities, local authorities have handled the security situation. The UN has to understand local dynamics and help to strengthen their work. This work at the local level needs to be inserted in a national framework to create a decentralized state, not establishing merely a state of cities and villages. Just as Libya was supported by the US and the UN to get independence, international guidance is still very much needed today. The US can play a key role in settling the conflict.
Feltman made clear that any agreement among the Libyan elite needs to have grassroots support. The Abu Dhabi meeting was a promising start for a top-down agreement. Long-standing political proposals such as reform of the presidency council, unification of the institutions, setting up a new government, and holding elections were on the table. Polls show that the Libyan people expect to choose their own leaders through elections, but Feltman cautions that elections alone do not create a democracy.
Fassanotti spoke about the tribal and ethnic differences that are still present in Libya. Most of the people reside in big cities, but people in the desert have not changed and desert culture is still influential and widespread. The idea of federalism can be a solution for a democratic Libya in the future. The type of federalism Fassanotti contemplates for Libya is similar to that of Germany and Switzerland, with a strong center able to govern the state. For the time being, a city-based model might be more viable as the state is still in the process of reconstructing itself.
Friend stated that the primary security institution in Libya is the militias, who are extremely variable in their size, shape, power, and territory, along with ideological commitment and economic leverage. Although there is a government-organized security institution, national security provision is lacking. Control over security provision in Libya is thus a major source of political power. General Haftar and the National Libyan Army have consolidated most of the territory but not all of it. Since security is a major issue, decentralization of politics and power remain a challenge. The presence of ISIS, though a minor issue for Libyans, is a major concern for the US that might incentivize more US involvement in Libya in the future.
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Peace picks December 18 – 22
- The Middle East Through Gulf Eyes: Trip Report from Riyadh, Muscat, and Abu Dhabi | Monday, December 18 | 10:00 – 11:30 am | Washington Institute for Near East Policy (event is available to the public through livestream) | Watch Here | During an eventful week for U.S. Middle East policy—highlighted by President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital—a fifty-person delegation from The Washington Institute traveled to the capitals of Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates to meet with senior leaders, engage with a broad range of local society, and learn about important changes under way in each country. To share their findings and impressions from the trip, the Institute is pleased to host a special midmorning Policy Forum discussion with four of its experts: executive director Robert Satloff, managing director Michael Singh, and fellows Katherine Bauer and Lori Plotkin Boghardt.
- The Jerusalem Decision: The View from Washington, Tel Aviv, and Ankara (THO Teleconference) | Tuesday, December 19 | 10:00 – 11:00 am | Turkish Heritage Organization (event will take place over the phone) | Register Here | Please tune in to THO’s latest teleconference to hear from Prof. Dr. Cagri Erhan (Rector of Altinbas University), Dr. Raphael Danziger (Senior Research Advisor, Policy & Government Affairs and Editor-in-Chief Emeritus, Near East Report American Israel Public Affairs Committee), and Moran Stern of the Center for Jewish Civilization, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, as they discuss the ramifications of this decision. Prof. Dr. Mark Meirowitz (Assistant Professor of Humanities at SUNY Maritime College and Chair of THO’s Advisory Board Chair) will moderate the teleconference.
- Making Peace in Donbas? The Role of a Peacekeeping Mission | Tuesday, December 19 | 9:00 am | Atlantic Council | Register Here | For years, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has proposed a peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine as an important instrument to achieving a peace settlement. This fall, Russian President Vladimir Putin also suggested a limited peacekeeping mission as one element towards a settlement. Are international peacekeepers or peace enforcers instrumental or even necessary for ending the war in Donbas? The Atlantic Council and the Razumkov Centre are assembling a panel of experts to discuss Russia’s war in Donbas and the prospect of a peacekeeping operation. Speakers will include Ambassador Kurt Volker of the US Department of State, Dr. Sarah Mendelson of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Dr. Evelyn Farkas of the Atlantic Council, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow of the Atlantic Council, and Mr. Oleksiy Melnyk of the Razumkov Centre. The Council’s Ambassador John Herbst will moderate the event and deliver welcoming remarks.
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