Tag: Ukraine

The cessation of hostilities that won’t

I’m getting press queries about the cessation of hostilities in Syria, which goes into effect a midnight Damascus time tonight. Here are some of them, along with answers:

  1. What chance does this ceasefire have of working?

Little. Without any neutral monitors or agreement on what cannot be targeted, parties on both sides will accuse the other of violating without any possibility of determining who is right. In any event, the Russians have published a map indicating very small areas covered by the cessation of hostilities:

According to @yurybarmin
According to @yurybarmin

2. Won’t the  excluded groups, Islamic State and al-Nusra, simply keep on fighting?

Yes. ISIS at least is largely separate from the moderate opposition, so it can be targeted in principle without necessarily hitting others. Al Nusra is embedded in opposition controlled territory, so targeting it will hit moderate opposition as well.

3. Do you think the cessation of hostilities will simply allow Syrian regime/Russians to cement their gains?

It will help them consolidate their gains, yes. Cement would be going too far, however. They are gaining territory where housing, infrastructure and commercial property has suffered enormous damage. Moscow is repeating what it did to Grozny in Chechnya. But neither the regime nor the Russians has the resources to followup with reconstruction. Nor do I think they can restore Assad’s authority over much of the population.

4. Has John Kerry really been forced into an impossible position because of the Russian intervention?

Yes, but the impossible position is determined also by President Obama’s unwillingness to intervene on the side of the opposition or provide them with the means they require to defend themselves from the Russians, Syrian government forces, Iranians, and Iraqi militias arrayed against them.

5. There’s talk the US may attempt to partition off part of Syria – is that realistic?

It might one day have been possible to create a safe area/no fly zone controlled by the opposition. But it is much harder today with Russian planes operating over much of Syria. Some opposition-controlled territories are likely to survive, but they will be few and far between.

6. Why not just divide Syria? Isn’t that what is happening anyway?

Formal, juridical partition of Syria is simply a bad idea. It would open the question of other borders in the region and beyond, putting at risk our Turkish ally as well as the unity of Iraq. Washington will not want to create a precedent that would help the Russians justify what they did in Crimea or what they are trying to do in eastern Ukraine, never mind South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria. The Americans have a big stake in maintaining the notion that national borders should not be changed by military action.

That said, Syria is likely to end up a far more decentralized country than once it was. That is not necessarily a bad thing and might allow for different parts of the country to be governed more to the liking of their inhabitants.

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Russia’s new spheres of influence?

For the past 25 years, the main efforts deployed by the US and the West European allies aimed at supporting the democratization process in the fragile post-Soviet space. Adopting a balanced and efficient policy towards Russia was challenging and in many areas problematic. But never before has this ‘constructive engagement’ in the region been so strained, limited and difficult as it is today.

Russia’s ambitions in the ‘near abroad’ space, its recent violations of the international norms with regard to Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and its air campaign in Syria are threatening the transatlantic democratic architecture. Recalibration of Washington’s relationship with Moscow shifts the entire geopolitical landscape of the region and beyond. The growing autocratic environment in Russia and its undemocratic, uncertain and offensive build-up to create a new spheres of influence requires a Western response.

By isolating, countering and blocking the Kremlin’s gains in the neighborhood we might affect its calculations and create momentum for a trajectory change. But by treating the symptoms we might forget to ultimately understand and address the underlying causes of this new crisis: Russian national identity and great-power ambitions in a multi-polar world.

On Monday, 22 Feb, the Conflict Management Department of SAIS, together with the Center for Transatlantic Relations and the Transatlantic Academy, will organize a half day conference in Kenney Auditorium (SAIS, Johns Hopkins) on Russia’s Foreign Policy: New Spheres of Influence?. Two panels, one on Europe and the other one on Middle East, will discuss the regional implications of Russia’s more assertive positioning.

The first panel, from 9:30 am to 11:00 am, will discuss Russian influence in Europe, and feature former US Ambassador John Herbst, EU Deputy Head of Delegation Caroline Vicini, German Marshall Fund Vice President Ivan Vejvoda and Dan Hamilton, CTR Executive Director. It will be moderated by Buzzfeed World editor Miriam Elder.

The second panel, from 11:30 am to 1:00 pm, will discuss the Middle East and feature Washington Institute for Near East Policy Fellow Anna Borshchevskaya, Transatlantic Academy Senior Fellow Marie Mendras, George Mason Professor Mark Katz and SAIS Conflict Management Program Director Daniel Serwer. It will be moderated by Christian Caryl, contributing editor of Foreign Policy magazine.

If you are interested to attend, please register at Russia’s Foreign Policy: New Spheres of Influence? Tickets, Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 9:00 AM | Eventbrite

The conference is on the record. You will be able to follow the talk on Twitter: #CMRussiaFP.

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Dire

Iraq’s Kurdistan Region is making noises about conducting a referendum soon to decide its political future. A drafting committee is working on the wording of the proposition. President Barzani and his PDK are committed to conducting the referendum this year.

Whatever the wording, Kurdistan’s largely young Kurdish population will understand it to be about independence. Ditto the large Kurdish diaspora, which referendum advocates want to enfranchise. Most of Kurdistan’s now substantial Arab population of people displaced by war will not be able to vote.

The outcome is predictable: 90% and likely more will vote yes, whatever the precise wording.

The case for Kurdistan’s independence is on the face of it compelling. Saddam Hussein’s regime mistreated its population, chasing Kurds from their homes and even out of the country. Kurds were even gassed during the 1988 Anfal campaign. Kurdistan won a large measure of autonomy in the 2005 Iraqi constitution, but the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil has been at best rocky since then. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not received all the oil revenue it is entitled to, it has had to defend its own territory from the Islamic State without help from Baghdad and it faces demands from its population, most of whom no longer speak Arabic, for complete independence. The KRG claims to be a democracy and to treat minorities well.

So why shouldn’t it happen?

The geopolitical circumstances are not favorable. While Kurdistan has vastly improved its relations with Ankara, large parts of eastern Turkey were slated at the end of World War I to become part of a Kurdish state. Turkey will not want to see independence for its southern neighbor while it represses a violent Kurdish rebellion on its own territory, for fear of the irredentist consequences. Iranians feel even more strongly on this issue: what the Kurds call “eastern Kurdistan” is inside the Islamic Republic. Iran’s population is not much more than 50% Persian. Tehran will fear the Kurds won’t be the only ones looking to get out. The Baloch have been rebelling since 2004.

Iraqi Kurds naturally look to the Americans for support. Washington was vital to their survival in the 90s, when it protected them with a no-fly zone in northern Iraq. The Kurds supported the 2003 American invasion of Iraq and happily hosted American forces. The KRG has welcomed Iraqi Christians displaced by ISIS and maintains friendly relations with the US, even welcoming American investment and admitting Americans without the visas the Baghdad government requires. My Kurdish friends ask plaintively: don’t the Americans want a new friendly ally in the Middle East? One with at least a nominal commitment to multiethnic democracy?

Washington might, but it has global concerns, which include maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, where Moscow is supporting breakaway territories in each of those countries. Independence for Kurdistan would open the proverbial Pandora’s box, strengthening Russian arguments and undermining the international consensus that has formed against independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the annexation of Crimea and the rebellion in Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as the aspirations of Transnistria. China will be no less opposed to Kurdistan’s independence than the Americans, for fear of the implications for Tibet.

Even inside Iraq, there are issues. The boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan are not agreed. While the KRG seized the so-called “disputed territories” during its offensive against the Islamic State in 2014, Baghdad has not agreed that they belong within Kurdistan. The KRG is offering to conduct referenda in these territories on whether they want to join with Kurdistan, fulfilling a provision of the Iraqi constitution. But doing that while the KRG is in control is unlikely to convince Baghdad that a free choice is being made.

At current oil prices around $30/barrel, the KRG is nowhere near having the financial resources to be independent. Baghdad isn’t providing the funding it should, but independence would leave Kurdistan even worse off. It is still an oil rentier state, despite its hopes for a more diversified economy. My guess is that oil prices in the future will have a hard time going over $70-80/barrel, because above that level massive quantities of unconventionally produced oil and gas (as well as other alternatives) will come on line. The KRG needs closer to $100/barrel to meet its financial requirements with oil production even well above current levels.

Advocates of an independence referendum are claiming that it would be prelude to a re-negotiation of the relationship with Baghdad, not necessarily a one-way street to independence. Anyone who knows young Kurds will doubt that after voting for what they think of as independence they will accept some sort of confederal arrangement to stay nominally inside Iraq. An independence referendum is far more likely to be prelude to still another war, in which Arabs (both Sunni and Shia) fight Kurds to determine the borders they have failed to agree on for more than a decade.

The implications of a referendum without prior agreement, both on the legitimacy of the process and on Kurdistan’s borders, are dire.

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Hagel uncontrollable and unpredictable

Frederick Kempe and Chuck Hagel. PC: Eddie Grove
Frederick Kempe and Chuck Hagel. PC: Eddie Grove

On Wednesday, the Atlantic Council hosted a conversation with former Secretary of Defense Hagel. He detailed the policy issues and challenges that arose during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, discussed his relationship with the Obama Administration, and provided advice to US policymakers going forward. Fred Kempe,  President and CEO, Atlantic Council, interviewed the Secretary and moderated the discussion.

 

 

 

Kempe began with some background about Hagel’s tenure as Secretary of Defense. He was the first Secretary of Defense in decades to face shrinking budgets at a time of increased demand for US military force. Sequester began on his third day in office. He also faced the Russian invasion of Crimea, the fight against ISIS, a difficult US-Egypt relationship, and the Iran negotiations.

Kempe asked Secretary Hagel to provide his thoughts on Iran’s capture and subsequent release of US sailors this week. Secretary Hagel said he doesn’t have the intelligence information he once had, but that the US is pleased with the sailors’ release. There will be an investigation of what happened and why. He strongly supported the nuclear negotiations with Iran. This incident put the deal in jeopardy, especially since the removal of sanctions commences this weekend. If the Iranians hadn’t released the sailors, they would have put sanctions relief in jeopardy.

Hagel described what he saw as a new world order developing now. We are witnessing the greatest diffusion of economic power in history combined with rapid demographic changes. The world order that the US and its allies built post-Word War II has done well; there has been no World War III or nuclear exchange.  These alliances will become even more important in this century. As the world has progressed, more people have greater expectations regarding what their rights are.

The world is unpredictable. Leaders need to build margins into their planning. While the US is the most powerful nation on earth, we shouldn’t dictate or impose. Most Americans were born after World War II and expect an America that dominates in every way. But we’ve made big mistakes stemming from not paying attention to other cultures. American leadership is indispensable, but Americans must be humble about this. We can’t fix every problem, but countries do rely on American leadership to bring them together.

American leadership is essential for global stability. We should remain engaged, but not be afraid of other countries becoming successful. We need to adapt to the world’s shifting demographics without abandoning our values. We shouldn’t impose our specific brand of Western democracy on all countries. As Kissinger has said, we need to help countries develop their own democracies for their own contexts. The common threads of all democracies are dignity for all, freedom of initiative, and incentives for hard work and responsibility.

The US has made some unfortunate mistakes.
In this recent Foreign Policy article, Secretary Hagel had some harsh words for the Obama Administration.
In this recent Foreign Policy article, Secretary Hagel had some harsh words for the Obama Administration.

Kempe wanted Hagel to review his recent article in Foreign Policy in which he criticized the way he was treated by the Obama Administration. Hagel did not want to rehash everything he said in the article, but stated that all administrations try to dominate their cabinets. In this sense, the Obama Administration is no different from previous administrations, but each successive administration in recent years has tried to dominate more.

This is unhealthy because it undercuts governing. Governing is not the same as domination. Every institution requires the support of good people and those in charge need to trust these people and rely on them to govern with them. The two most important jobs in every administration are the National Security Advisor and the Chief of Staff because all decision making flows through them. The Secretary of Defense doesn’t make policy but is the implementer and operator of the policies that the President wants. When the President dominates those whom he/she is supposed to rely on it impedes his/her ability to govern. In addition, there were too many meetings with too many people in the room; this creates chaos because everyone wants to talk and show how smart they are.  Every President faces challenges, uncontrollables, and unknowables.

POTUS must plan for the unexpected.

Every President also has his/her own style. But it’s hard to bring in the best people if they think they will be overloaded with meetings, micromanaged and second-guessed.

Given the fact that sequester began on day three of Hagel’s tenure, Kempe wanted to know how much time he spent on budgets and if the military has enough funding to ensure American security. Hagel reminded the audience that sequester remains in effect, though cuts to military spending have been adjusted. The Pentagon requires the certainty of long-term budgets on the order of 20 years to plan the purchase of weapons systems. Sequester meant an immediate $50 billion of budget cuts, so Secretary Hagel commissioned a review to understand what was most important in the budget, both from Pentagon officials as well as from field commanders. Secretary Hagel originally though he would have to furlough his employees for 21 days, but managed to cut this down to 3-5 days. He had to halt maintenance and training for a few months.

That was followed by a 16-day government shutdown, which was irresponsible on the part of politicians. Hagel refused to comply with the shutdown, though some employees were absent for 16 days. It is terrible to damage the security of the US to make a political point. It hurt the Department of Defense. The employees ultimately got paid anyway by virtue of the unions.

Budgets took up a lot of his time. We are perilously close to not having enough funds to defend our national security interests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have to testify in front of Congress to give their opinion on whether the current budget is sufficient to guarantee American national security interests; they are getting close to having to say no. We can do with fewer submarines, for instance, but that will come with a long-term price. Once we have two presidential candidates, they must be clear about what they think the US role in the world is and what our national security interests are. Read more

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The end is nigh, once again

Two years ago I published a post with this title. Remarkably little has changed since then in many conflicts:

  • South Sudan is suffering even more bloodletting.
  • The Central African Republic is still imploding.
  • North Korea is no longer risking internal strife but continues its belligerence on the international stage.
  • China is still challenging its neighbors in the East and South China Seas.
  • Syria is even more chaotic, with catastrophic consequences for its population and strains for its neighbors.
  • Egypt continues its repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and secular human rights advocates.
  • Israel and Palestine are no closer to agreement on a two-state solution.
  • Afghanistan has a new president but the Taliban are stronger in the countryside and the Islamic State is gaining adherents; money and people are still expatriating.
  • Al Qaeda is less potent in many places, but that is little comfort since the Islamic State has risen to take the leading role in Salafist jihadism.
  • Ukraine has lost control of Crimea, which has been annexed by Russia, and risks losing control of much of the southeastern Donbas region.

The only issue I listed then that is palpably improved is the Iranian nuclear question, which is now the subject of a deal that should postpone Tehran’s access to the nuclear materials required to build a bomb for 10 to 15 years.

Danielle Pletka of AEI topped off the gloom this year with a piece suggesting there are reasons to fear Putin’s recklessness could trigger World War III.

Without going that far, it is easy to add to the doom and gloom list:

  • Europe is suffering a bout of right-wing xenophobia (the US has a milder case), triggered by migrants from the Middle East and North Africa.
  • Mali and Nigeria are suffering serious extremist challenges.
  • The Houthi takeover in Yemen, and intervention there by a Saudi-led coalition, is causing vast suffering in one of the world’s poorest countries and allowing Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to expand its operations.
  • Civil war in Libya is far from resolution, despite some signatures on a UN-sponsored agreement to end it.
  • Turkey has re-initiated a war against Kurdish forces that had been in abeyance.
  • Even Brazil, once a rising power, is suffering scandals that may bring down its president, even as its economy tanks.

I’m still not ready to throw in the towel. Some successes of two years ago continue and others have begun: Colombia‘s civil war is nearing its end, Burma/Myanmar continues its transition in a more open direction (even though it has failed to settle conflicts with several important minorities), Kenya is still improving, ditto Liberia, which along with Sierra Leone and maybe Guinea seems to have beaten the Ebola epidemic, and much of the Balkans, even if Kosovo and Bosnia are going through rough patches.

I still think, as I said two years ago:

If there is a continuous thread running through the challenges we face it is this:  getting other people to govern themselves in ways that meet the needs of their own populations (including minorities) and don’t threaten others.  That was what we did in Europe with the Marshall Plan.  It is also what we contributed to in East Asia, as democracy established itself in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and elsewhere.  We have also had considerable success in recent decades in Latin America and Africa, where democracy and economic development have grown roots in Brazil, Argentina, Ghana, South Africa, and other important countries.  I may not like the people South Africans have elected, but I find it hard to complain about the way they have organized themselves to do it.

This is what we have failed to do in the Middle East:  American military support for autocracies there has stunted democratic evolution, even as our emphasis on economic reform has encouraged crony capitalism that generates resentment and support for Islamist alternatives.  Mubarak, Asad, Saleh, Qaddafi, and Ben Ali were not the most oppressive dictators the world has ever known, even though they murdered and imprisoned thousands, then raised those numbers by an order of magnitude as they tried to meet the challenge of revolution with brute force.  But their departures have left the countries they led with little means of governing themselves.  The states they claim to have built have proven a mirage in the desert.

If there is reason for doom and gloom, it is our failure to meet this governance challenge cleverly and effectively.  We continue to favor our military instruments, even though they are inappropriate to dealing with most of the problems we face (the important exceptions being Iran and China).  We have allowed our civilian instruments of foreign policy to atrophy, even as we ask them to meet enormous challenges.  What I wish for the new year is recognition–in the Congress, in the Administration and in the country–that we need still to help enable others to govern themselves.  Investment in the capacity to do it will return dividends for many decades into the future.

 

 

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Peace picks, December 14-18

  1. Reflections on Global History in the 20th Century: Towards a New Vision for the 21st Century | Monday, December 14th | 2:00-5:00 | Center for Strategic & International Studies | RSVP to attend | Join us for a dialogue among leading scholars of global history on the legacies of the 20th Century and the prospects for developing a more stable and prosperous world order in the remainder of the 21st Century. On this 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, participants in a CSIS research project will summarize key findings from a series of workshops and papers to be published in an edited volume in 2016. Speakers include: Yuichi Hosoya, Professor, Keio University; Satoshi Ikeuchi, Associate Professor, University of Tokyo; Sebastian Conrad, Professor of History, Freie Universitat Berlin; William Inboden, Associate Professor, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas-Austin; Jian Chen, Hu Shih Professor of History for U.S.-China Relations, Cornell University; Cemil Aydin, Associate Professor of History, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill; and Michael J. Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS, and Chair in Modern and Contemporary Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy, Georgetown University. The event will conclude with a conversation with Zbigniew Brzezinski, moderated by John Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS.
  2. The Wisdom of a Grand Nuclear Bargain with Pakistan | Monday, December 14th | 3:30-5:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND |Earlier this year, various news outlets reported that the Obama administration was exploring a nuclear deal with Pakistan. The deal would work to better incorporate Pakistan into the global nuclear order, exchanging legitimacy for its accepting nuclear constraints. Many analysts believe Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program poses a substantial threat to international and South Asian security. One of four nuclear weapons states outside the normative and legal apparatus of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pakistan is assessed to have the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world.The South Asia Center will convene a panel of experts including Dr. Toby Dalton, Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dr. Sameer Lalwani, Deputy Director of Stimson’s South Asia Program, and Dr. Gaurav Kampani, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, to discuss policy options to address international concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The discussion will be moderated by Dr. Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.
    On Twitter? Follow @ACSouthAsia and use #ACPakistan.
  3. Tajikistan’s Human Rights Crisis: Responses to Dushanbe’s Political Crackdown | Tuesday, December 15th | 10:00-12:00 | Freedom House | RSVP to Nigina Valentini with ‘Tajikistan Roundtable’ in the subject line | Tajikistan’s human rights situation has deteriorated precipitously over the past two years amid an ongoing crackdown on the freedoms of expression and religion, censorship of the internet, and aggressive attempts to jail all political opposition. Following violent skirmishes in September 2014 between Tajik government forces and alleged Islamist militants that made worldwide headlines, President Rahmon stepped up his campaign against the political opposition, ordering the closure of Central Asia’s only legally registered Islamic political party—the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT)—arresting at least 78 of its members, and declaring the IRPT a terrorist organization. At the same time, political opponents abroad, including from the opposition “Group 24,” have been faced with extraditions, kidnappings, enforced disappearances and even assassinations in Russia, Turkey, and other neighboring states. In addition, the crisis is expanding rapidly, with a mass exodus of political activists from the country, and arrests of lawyers, journalists, and others from civil society.The speakers will provide new, fresh research from the field on Tajikistan’s current human rights crisis. They will also offer recommendations for policy responses by the US government, EU, and other international partners. The round table will be led by representatives of Tajikistan’s embattled civil society as well as experts on the human rights, political, and religious context. They include: Catherine Cosman, senior policy analyst, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom; Muhitdin Kabiri, Chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan; Nate Schenkkan, Project Director Nations in Transit, Freedom House; Steve Swerdlow, esq., Central Asia researcher with Human Rights Watch; and Sobir Valiev, deputy head of Group 24, and deputy head of the Congress of Constructive Forces of Tajikistan.
  4. Turkey-Russia Conflict: What’s Next? | Tuesday, December 15th | 11:30-12:30 | Center on Global Interests | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The escalating tensions between Turkey and Russia—brought to a head with the Turkish downing of a Russian Su-24 bomber jet in late November—have exposed the competing objectives that presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin are pursuing in Syria. Since that incident Russia has adopted sanctions and restricted tourism to Turkey, while Moscow and Ankara have lobbied mutual accusations of collusion with the Islamic State. This is set against a historic backdrop of centuries of competition between the two states on the Eurasian stage.
    With their ongoing disagreement over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, along with Russia’s recent move to punish those who deny the disputed genocide of Armenians during WWI, the latest tensions now threaten to spill over into the Caucasus. What motivates each side in the dispute, and where can we expect it to go in 2016? How do domestic politics play into each president’s posturing? And what implications would a protracted Russo-Turkish split have on Eurasian, and Transatlantic, security? CGI is pleased to invite you to a discussion on this timely topic. Speakers include Michael Cecire, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Kemal Kirişci, Brookings Institution; and Maria Snegovaya, Columbia University; Anya Schmemann, Council on Foreign Relations, will moderate.
    This event will take place at Johns Hopkins’ SAIS, Rome Building, and is on the record. Join the discussion with @CGI_DC
  5. Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in the Nordic/Baltic Region | Tuesday, December 15th | 12:00-1:30 | Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Northern Europe is currently experiencing escalating political and military tensions that are rekindling fears of war between Russia and NATO. Any such conflict would inherently include a risk of nuclear weapons use. The Stimson Center, partnered with Project High Hopes, is examining the results of such nuclear exchanges and, more importantly, developing initiatives to avoid such catastrophes. This event includes a briefing of Stimson’s new report, “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in the Nordic/Baltic Region.” Participants include Barry Blechman, Co-Founder, Stimson Center; Alex Bolfrass, Stimson Nonresident Fellow, Managing Across Boundaries; and Laicie Heeley, Stimson Fellow, Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense.
  6. Can South Sudan End Two Years of War? | Tuesday, December 15th | 12:30-2:00 | US Institute of Peace (on Facebook) | REGISTER TO PARTICIPATE | The peace agreement signed by South Sudanese government and opposition forces on August 26 promised to end nearly two years of brutal war. But fighting has continued, contributing to a delay in establishing a transitional government.The world’s youngest nation plunged into violence on December 15, 2013 during a power struggle, and soon ethnic rivalries dominated the conflict. Poor infrastructure, a severe economic crisis, and more than two million displaced people present significant challenges to implementing the peace process.USIP has designed this chat, via Facebook, to include South Sudanese citizens inside the country and abroad. Please join USIP experts and representatives from the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan as they offer analysis and take questions. You can also post questions in advance on USIP’s Facebook page or on Twitter (#SouthSudanUSIP). Participants include Ambassador Donald Booth, @SUSSESSS, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, U.S. Department of State; Susan Stigant, @SusanStigant, Director of Africa Programs, USIP; and John Tanza @VOASouthSudan, South Sudan in Focus, Voice of America, who will moderate.
  7. Implementing the Iran Nuclear Deal: What’s Next? | Thursday, December 17th | 8:00-4:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Atlantic Council and The Iran Project invite you to a symposium on implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the historic agreement reached with Iran by the United States and other world powers earlier this year.The conference will examine how the implementation of this accord will impact the future of Iran’s nuclear program; the ways in which the lifting of sanctions will affect Iran’s economy and the US approach to implementation; and how implementation will impact US and Iranian bilateral and regional relations. The Conference will seek to develop a bipartisan approach to verification and the incentive dimensions of the implementation phase. Adam Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, US Department of Treasury, will give the morning keynote address, and The Hon. Stephen Mull, Lead Coordinator for Iran Nuclear Implementation, US Department of State, will speak at lunch. Please see here for a full list of panels and participants.
  8. The Revolutionary Path to Reform for Ukraine’s National Police | Tuesday, December 15th | 4:00-5:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Among the many reforms underway in Ukraine, the effort to modernize the country’s police force stands out as a particular success. Ukraine’s police has had a reputation for corruption since Ukraine’s independence. Following the Euromaidan revolution, the Ministry of Internal Affairs with support from the US Department of State, replaced Kyiv’s police force in July 2015. Odesa and Lviv followed suit in August 2015 with plans to carry out similar reforms across Ukraine’s major cities. Since the reform began, 4,800 new police officers have joined the police force, and public support for the new police force remains high. The success of the police reforms signals that rapid and radical reforms are possible to achieve in a short time.The newly-appointed Chief of the Ukrainian National Police, Khatia Dekanoidze, played a critical role in launching Ukraine’s police reform. Ms. Dekanoidze will join the Atlantic Council to discuss her strategy to restructure, reform, and train the police force, as well as her plans to capitalize on the success and transform Ukraine’s police forces. Prior to her appointment, she served as an adviser to the Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov, playing a critical role in launching Ukraine’s patrol police reform. John Herbst, Director at Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council, will moderate the conversation.
  9. Women and Elections in Saudi Arabia | Thursday, September 17th | 12:00-1:30 | Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On Saturday, December 12, women voted for the first time in Saudi Arabia’s municipal elections, with over 900 women running as candidates. This marks an opportunity to assess the advancement of women’s empowerment in Saudi Arabia.AGSIW Senior Resident Scholar Kristin Diwan will lead a discussion with Dr. Hatoon Al Fassi, a scholar, long-time women’s rights activist, and leader of the Baladi campaign pushing for women’s enfranchisement in the Kingdom, Dr. Rasha Hefzi (via Skype), Municipal Council candidate from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Dr. Aziza Youssef, Professor of Computer Science at King Saud University and leading proponent of the women’s driving campaign in Saudi Arabia. They will discuss the political life and overall status of women in Saudi Arabia: What has been the experience of women candidates in the election and what challenges have they faced in their campaigns? How have women voters responded to the elections? Despite the newness of the democratic process in Saudi Arabia and the council’s short history and limited powers, is there potential for women to use the council as a platform to elevate their concerns?
  10. The Kremlin’s Actions in Syria: Origins, Timing, and Prospects | Friday, December 18th | 8:30-1:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The conference brings together a distinguished group of experts and opinion leaders from the United States, Russia, and the Middle East to engage in a strategic dialogue on the consequences of Russian intervention in Syria. The first panel will explore the evolution of the Syrian crisis and implications of Russia’s new policy, followed by a second panel discussion on the impact of Russia’s policy and its prospects. Please see here for a full list of speakers.
  11. India’s Security Interests in Southeast Asia | Friday, December 18th | 10:00-11:00 | Center for Strategic & International Studies | RSVP to attend | Join CSIS for a discussion featuring Jonah Blank, senior political scientist, RAND Corporation; and Vikram Singh, vice president for national security and international policy, Center for American Progress.
    Blank will discuss the key findings of his recent report on India’s emerging partnerships in Southeast Asia, “Look East, Cross Black Waters,” and Singh will give his perspectives on the opportunities and challenges that India’s growing strategic interest in Southeast Asia will bring for the United States.
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