Tag: Ukraine
Flipping SecState the bird
It’s been a bad few days for Secretary of State Kerry, on top of many bad weeks. On Sunday, he expressed the hope Egypt would take advantage of a critical moment in its transition to turn towards democracy. Then an Egyptian court popped that bubble with a trumped up verdict in a trumped up trial on trumped up charges against three Al Jazeera journalists. By Tuesday, SecState was pressing Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and Kurdistan President Barzani to proceed quickly to formation of an inclusive government. By today, Maliki said he had no such intention and Barzani is talking secession, more seriously than ever before.
This comes on top of the failed Middle East (that is, Israeli/Palestinian) peace process and Russian rejection of Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s proposed ceasefire. Not to mention the mess in Syria, where the President’s reluctance to intervene is all to obviously not pleasing to John Kerry. He has said repeatedly that a political settlement depends on changing the military situation on the ground. I won’t even mention the Asia Pacific, where China is again daring its neighbors.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that things are going badly for the Obama Administration in foreign policy. That’s precisely what the American people have decided, even if they support some of the President’s decisions on what to do and not do.
Daniels Larison and Drezner have been engaged in the why of this puzzle. Larison thinks it is due to the failure of the President to provide the resources needed to achieve his goals. Drezner thinks it is double think on the part of Americans: they want the country in general less engaged abroad (the outcome) but don’t like the specific consequences (the outputs).
I’ll leave the other Daniels to resolve that puzzle. I’m interested in what John Kerry is thinking. His behavior strikes me as out of keeping with past Secretaries of State, who have either been far more cautious in what they say or far more determined to get foreign leaders to salute when they say it. Most days, a lot of the State Department is engaged precisely in trying to line up “yes” from foreign leaders, in advance of a SecState “ask.” Secretaries don’t ask if they are not guaranteed a positive reply.
Kerry seems displeased but not angered when Maliki or Sisi says “no.” His attitude strikes me as more like that of a Senator than a Secretary of State. Senators are used to colleagues disagreeing. They are also used to being taken seriously for what they say, rather than for what they can do. There is always another day to try to win over opponents. Senators state their case but try not to burn bridges.
Hillary Clinton of course was also a senator before she was SecState, but she was notably more cautious in what she said. I don’t recall her ever hinting that she supported arming the Syrian revolutionaries, even though it is now known she did in secret. Kerry has been particularly bold in what he says publicly, but shy in deed, perhaps because there is so little Secretaries of State can actually do on their own authority other than speak. I guess that puts me more in the Larison than the Drezner camp about what is going on.
But whatever the reason, it is not good when other countries flip SecState the bird.
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Peace picks June 9-13
1. Shaping the Future? The Role of Regional Powers in Afghanistan and Pakistan Monday, June 9 | 9:00 am – 10:00 am Woodrow Wilson Center, Fifth Floor; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan and the presidential election there are taking place in a context of growing internal political and economic instability. Roberto Toscano, former Public Policy Scholar of the Wilson Center and former Ambassador to Iran and India, as well as Emma Hooper and Eduard Soler i Lecha, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, will discuss the reasons why the regional perspective on Afghanistan and Pakistan is relevant, and particularly so at this point in time.
2. Youth and Violence: Engaging the Lost Generation Monday, June 9 | 9:00 am – 11:00 am US Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This talk explores the factors that are pushing young people towards participation in various forms of violence, including participation in extremism or political violence. It will challenge pre-existing assumptions about youth peace building work and discuss policy changes necessary for new interventions that steer youth away from violence. SPEAKERS Anne Richard, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Department of State, Maryanne Yerkes, Senior Civil Society and Youth Advisor, US Agency for International Development, Rebecca Wolfe, Director, Conflict Management & Peacebuilding Program, Mercy Corps, Marc Sommers, Consultant & Visiting Researcher, African Studies Center, Boston University, and Steven Heydemann, Vice President, Applied Research on Conflict, USIP.
3. Re-Thinking Democracy Promotion Amid Rising Authoritarianism Monday, June 9 | 9:30 am – 5:00 Kenney Auditorium, Paul H. Nitze Building; 1740 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The crisis caused by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the threat to freedom posed by kleptocratic autocracies. The world is watching how the democratic community of nations responds to Putin’s brazen attack not only against Ukraine, but against the very concept of freedom and the ability of people to choose their own political destiny. Much is at stake, for authoritarian regimes pose a danger not only to their own populations through suppression of human rights but to others as well. This requires a re-examination of democracy promotion, the threats it faces, and how best to advance it. SPEAKERS Charles Davidson, Francis Fukuyama, Walter Russell Mead, Elliott Abrams, Michael Mandelbaum, Richard Haass, and more.
4. Nuclear Flashpoints: US-Iran Tensions Over Terms and Timetables Tuesday, June 10 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This event will explore key conflicts and possible trade-offs with Iran as the third round discussion hosted by a coalition of eight Washington think tanks and organizations. It will assess how many years an agreement could last, the breakout time, and when and how the U.S. will act. SPEAKERS Stephen J. Hadley, Chairman of the Board, USIP, Jon Wolfsthal, Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association, and Robert S. Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Academic relations, Director for International Security Studies.
5. Rhythms at the Intersection of Peace and Conflict: The Music of Nonviolent Action Tuesday, June 10 | 9:30 am – 1:00 pm United States Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This event brings together three individuals whose work meets at the nexus of music and nonviolent action: Arash Sobhani, an underground musician from Iran, Timothy O’Keefe, a music producer and co-founder of Freedom Beat Recordings, and Dr. Maria Stephan, one of the world’s leading scholars on strategic nonviolent action and Senior Policy Fellow at USIP. These three individuals will guide us through an exploration of nonviolent action, both past and present, through a musical lens.
6. WWI and the Lessons for Today Tuesday, June 10 | 12:30 pm – 1:30 pm Allison Auditorium, Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Victor Davis Hanson, Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow in Residence at Stanford University, will explore the lessons that the U.S. has learned since World War I and how the lead-up to the Great War has affected our government’s policies over the past 100 years. This event will be hosted by James Jay Carafano, Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and E. W. Richardson Fellow.
7. Researching the Middle East Tuesday, June 10 | 2:00 pm – 4:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND This panel will discuss the challenges of researching and writing on recent international Middle East history and U.S. policy in the region. Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Consulting Archivist, David Palkki, Council on Foreign Relations, Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor at George Mason University, Michael Eisenstadt, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Kevin M. Woods, Institute for Defense Analyses, will all discuss their own experiences and substantive findings studying conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq War, and the War in Afghanistan.
8. After Snowden: The Road Ahead for Cybersecurity Thursday, June 12 | 8:45 am – 1:15 pm American Enterprise Institute, Twelfth Floor; 1150 17th Street, NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Internet has been a remarkable force for freedom and prosperity, but it has faced challenges from individuals and governments intent on abusing its openness and interconnectivity. This conference will kick-start a national debate on America’s role in protecting and promoting free enterprise, personal security, and individual liberty in cyberspace. Jeffrey Eisenach, AEI, Michael Hayden, Chertoff Group, and Mike Rogers, Chairman of the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, will share their insights into the future of cybersecurity policy, and will be moderated by Mike Daniels.
9. The Many Faces of Tyranny: Why Democracy Isn’t Always Possible Thursday, June 12 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Heritage Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium; 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. History has not ended. Across the world today, we are witnessing both a heroic struggle for democracy and reform and the disturbing strength of tyrannical regimes and movements. Whether it be the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, the aggressiveness of Putin’s Russia or the increasing bellicosity of China, the forces of democracy and the forces of tyranny are in a dead heat. Waller R. Newell, Carleton University, examines how the West should respond and how we should make the difficult choice between better and worse kinds of non-democratic authority when overthrowing today’s dictatorship may only bring about a much worse totalitarian alternative tomorrow.
10. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy Thursday, June 12 | 12:00 pm Hayek Auditorium, Cato Institute; 1000 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In his new book, Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of Security Studies Program at MIT, explains why the dominant view among the nation’s foreign policy elites, what he calls “liberal hegemony,” has proved unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. His alternative – restraint – would resist the impulse to use U.S. military power, and focus the military’s and the nation’s attention on the most urgent challenges to national security. This discussion features comments by Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Blake Hounshell, Deputy Editor of POLITICO Magazine, and is moderated by Christopher Preble, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
11. Center for a New American Security Debate: War with Iran? Friday, June 13 | 9:00 am – 12:00 pm Willard Intercontinental Hotel; 1401 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Center for a New American Security and the Civis Institute invite you to attend a public debate featuring two of the country’s top collegiate debate programs – Georgetown University and the University of Michigan. The teams will discuss whether or not the United States should use military force against Iran if nuclear diplomacy fails. The debate will be followed by comments from Dr. Colin Kahl, senior fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at CNAS, and a moderated Q&A with the debate teams.
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Glad tidings
I’m counting the glad tidings today:
1. Egypt: Egyptians are staying away from the polls in an election conducted under conditions that are far from free and fair. General Sisi will be elected, but without the acclamation he had once expected. Maybe he’ll feel he has to work for popular approval, which would be a big change in Egyptian political culture.
2. Ukraine: Ukraine pulled off its presidential election and appears to be gaining an upper hand over separatists who made the mistake of seizing the Donetsk airport, where newly elected Petro Poroshenko was intending to land. While Russian President Putin is still capable of rejecting Poroshenko’s legitimacy, I doubt he’ll do it. He needs Poroshenko to garner the Western support that will enable Ukraine to pay its debts to Russia.
3. Afghanistan: President Obama has decided to leave 9800 American troops in Afghanistan at the end of this year’s withdrawal, but they too are scheduled to come out within two years (end of 2016). That’s a whole lot faster than some people feel comfortable with, but it is presumably intended to give the new Afghan government incentive either to defeat the Taliban or negotiate a political settlement with them.
4. Middle East: I don’t really expect the Pope inviting Presidents Peres and Abbas to the Vatican to bring peace, but in my book he did the right thing to pray at the separation barrier as well as at the Wailing Wall. I have no objection to the Israelis protecting themselves from suicide bombings, but the wall should be on an agreed border, not built unilaterally and all too frequently on territory the Palestinians (and most Israelis) believe belongs within their state.
5. Europe: Yes, the European parliament election returned lots of xenophobes and extreme nationalists, but not so many that the European project is at serious risk of anything more than demands to be more responsive to popular opinion and more aware of resistance to bureaucratic arrogance. Whoever tweeted that those who want change won everywhere but in Germany, which is the only country that can really change things, got it close to right. The government parties did relatively well in Italy too.
6. India/Pakistan: Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif attended Indian Prime Minister Modi’s swearing in and both came away from their meeting sounding notes of hope and conciliation. They will need a lot of both to overcome the problems that divide the two countries, but it was at least a start.
None of this good news comes even close to making the world what it should be, and much of it might be reversed tomorrow. Syria in particular haunts me. I can’t bring myself to praise the UN Secretary General for proposing humanitarian assistance be authorized by the Security Council directly into liberated areas from Turkey, knowing full well that Russia will veto any such move. But when we have a good day or two somewhere in the world, we should acknowledge it.
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Landslide
According to exit polls, Ukrainians Sunday gave Petro Poroshenko a landslide mandate in the presidential poll. While voting in the eastern provinces of Donbas was sparse, turnout elsewhere was high and the margin over also-ran Yulia Tymoshenko was so wide that it is difficult to see how even Russian President Putin could question the legitimacy of the result. The Ukraine crisis is not over, but Poroshenko’s election could open the way to a negotiated political settlement, which is his often expressed preference. Poroshenko has not favored NATO membership for Ukraine and has pledged to protect the rights of Russian speakers, but he also favors stronger ties to the European Union.
Russian President Putin has reason to be content. His red line is NATO membership for Ukraine. Poroshenko has indicated he will not cross it, though he occasionally suggests Russian intransigence will make him reconsider the proposition. Putin will plump for maximum self-governance in Donbas, to allow Russian speakers the kind of de facto ethnic independence Serbs have in Bosnia. He will also want Poroshenko to attract lots of money from the EU and the International Monetary Fund, so that Russia will get back the money it loaned Poroshenko’s predecessor.
While likely to oblige Putin’s interest in getting his money back, Poroshenko has his work cut out for him. He has pledged to visit Donbas first, including to thank the Ukrainian security forces who have tried–without much success–to restore order there. Parliamentary elections are not due until 2017. There appear to be no plans to bring that date forward. The parliament has been an important player since previous President Yushenko abandoned his post. Its slate of priorities will be daunting: Ukraine needs to phase out its expensive energy subsidies, attract private investment, end oligarchical cronyism and cut back on corruption.
Europe has some serious thinking to do in light of the Ukraine crisis. Its dependence on Russian natural gas, its weak military forces and its diplomatic clumsiness–all closely related–should make not only Brussels but the 28 member state capitals think harder about what it takes to sustain a coherent and successful foreign and security policy.
If in fact the Ukraine crisis now heads in the direction of a peaceful denouement, the Obama administration will have reason to boast that its low-key diplomatic approach has produced a decent result. Particularly important was the decision not to listen to experts who advised agreeing with Putin to postpone the election.
But even if things go well now with Ukraine, Washington needs to rethink policy towards a Russia bent on expanding its hegemony in what it considers its “near abroad.” NATO expansion in particular needs presidential attention: Montenegro and Macedonia are technically qualified and could be admitted at the Summit in Cardiff, Wales in September, but Macedonian membership will require President Obama to deliver bad news to Athens. A broader package of moves closer to NATO would be ideal, one that includes Kosovo, Bosnia, Sweden and Finland. I am hesitant about Georgia, a country NATO is in no way capable of defending. But letting Putin know that NATO is determined to expand to those countries that it can defend, that meet the membership criteria and that want to join will limit his ambitions and encourage those who seek a democratic future.
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This is important
Russia’s President Putin says he will respect the outcome of Sunday’s presidential election in Ukraine. This is important, if true.
There is good reason to doubt his word. Moscow in general and Putin in particular have prevaricated throughout the crisis in Ukraine. Underhanded would be a compliment to the stealth Russian takeover and eventual annexation of Crimea. Russian troops remained on the border with Ukraine, despite Putin’s insistence that they were withdrawn. His security services have sometimes led and often fed the takeover of government offices in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, where he could readily create disorder this weekend. His policy has essentially been one of promoting disorder, then complaining about it and portraying Russia as the only hope for preventing harm to Russian speakers.
Why might Putin behave differently this time around? It is hard to know exactly who is saying what to whom, but it appears that the Europeans and Americans have mounted a reasonably credible threat of more severe financial sanctions if Russia or its surrogates disrupt the election. Putin has acknowledged that the targeted sanctions already imposed have hurt Russia. Sentiment in Donbas, as the most affected provinces are known, is mixed, with considerable loyalty to Ukraine.
Both the leading candidates, Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, were rivalrous protagonists in the post-Orange Revolution scandals of 2005. Both also supported the pro-European Union popular uprising that chased former President Yanukovych from office. Putin never had much use for him and has kept him at arm’s length since he abandoned his post in Kiev.
Putin’s acceptance of the outcome of Sunday’s voting would pull the rug out from under the pro-Russian separatists, who conducted an ambiguous “referendum” on the political status of Ukraine earlier this month. But it would only be the start of a long and difficult transition in Ukraine, which is a semi-failed state. Since 1989, it has done not much better than mark time, with an economy that shrank in the 1990s, grew until 2007 and then struggled again. This year will be awful. Energy subsidies and lack of domestic production from ample resources have made Ukraine heavily dependent on Russian natural gas and transit fees for gas shipped to the west.
Governance is even worse than the economic figures suggest. Corruption is rampant. Yanukovych is widely believed to have stolen billions. The administration is still highly centralized, but without the capacity to govern effectively or deliver services in the provinces. The authorities, especially in the relatively industrialized east and south, lack legitimacy with a population that feels deprived and alienated.
The International Monetary Fund and the European Union are stepping in with substantial funding, but they risk throwing good money after bad if they don’t insist on reform. Tymoshenko on this score was an enormous disappointment during her time as prime minister. She is unlikely to win the election. Chocolate King Poroshenko is believed to be the front runner, with some possibility of meeting the 50% threshold required to be elected in the first round.
Putin can live with Poroshenko, who would hopefully attract enough Western support to enable Ukraine to pay its substantial debts to Russia. Moscow will press for constitutional reforms that allow Donestsk and Luhansk to establish themselves as an autonomous region, akin to the all-but-independent Republika Srpska in Bosnia. That would be going too far for the EU and US, but ample decentralization on a non-ethnic, geographical basis is certainly part of the solution in Ukraine. The West will prescribe national dialogue, constitutional reform and parliamentary elections, staples of today’s efforts to re-establish legitimate authority in failed and failing states. That is not an easy road, but if Sunday’s election embarks Ukraine on that path it will be doing far better than if Putin diverts it to more instability and conflict.
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Ukraine: civilian instruments fall short, again
The presidential election May 25 will be decisive for Ukraine. The main presidential candidates are Petro Poroshenko, a chocolate magnate with high-level government experience, and Yulia Tymoshenko, a heroine of the Orange Revolution and former prime minister with a reputation for corruption and extreme pragmatism, including cooperation with Vladimir Putin. Poroshenko is believed to be in the lead.
The outcome of the presidential election that day is not as important as whether the election occurs in the eastern and southern provinces where pro-Russian paramilitaries have taken over government facilities. Two oblasts (Donetsk and Luhansk) supposedly voted May 11 in referenda on autonomy, but both the opaque (and illegal) process and vague referendum proposition cast doubt on their significance. A decent election May 25 would confer at least a veneer of legitimacy on the government in Kiev, which was installed after the president fled and parliament took over in February.
The prospects are not good. A successful election would at least temporarily hinder Russia’s ambitions in the eastern and southern provinces and provide an opportunity for Kiev to negotiate an accommodation with at least some of the political leadership there. Few doubt that decentralization and strengthening of local and provincial governance is part of the solution in Ukraine. But getting there from the current tense and polarized standoff between a government in Kiev anxious to assert its authority and Russian-speaking rebels in eastern Ukraine will not be easy.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is supporting a national dialogue process led by former Presidents Kuchma and Kravchuk that had a rough start yesterday. OSCE has also deployed 230 human rights monitors (with authorization to more than double that number) as well as 100 election monitors, with more on their way. Russia, which is an OSCE member, could conceivably exploit its presence to try to ensure correct treatment of the Russian speakers in Ukraine and end the current crisis.
I’m not holding my breath for that. While President Putin has turned down the rhetoric in the last week or so, his objective is all too clearly to make eastern and southern Ukraine come under Moscow’s umbrella, even if they remain formally outside of Russian sovereignty. He has not moved Russian troops away from the border with Ukraine. Many of the rebels in Ukraine appear to be getting Russian support and encouragement sub rosa. Some are Russian officials. Putin’s maneuvers may be reactions to a rapidly evolving situation, but Russia’s 2013 foreign policy concept makes it clear Ukraine was slated for a key role in reviving Moscow’s influence in the former Soviet states.
European and American sanctions have already done some damage to the Russian stock market, currency and investment flows. Moscow will hesitate to do anything overt to disrupt the election in order to stave off tightening and broadening of the still finely targeted sanctions. But so long as it can plausibly deny a hand in any disruption of the May 25 election, it can bank on European hesitation to bite the hand that sends money and natural gas west.
NATO is rightly not prepared to go to war to defend non-member Ukraine. The best it has been able to do is forward deploy some minimal forces to Poland, the Baltics and other concerned member states to signal determination to protect the Alliance, should it become necessary. This is one more crisis where military means simply do not fit the bill. The civilian means required look to be beyond current capabilities. The number of monitors required in a country with a population of 46 million is easily ten times the number currently authorized. OSCE is stepping up as best it can, but it will be no surprise if its best falls short. The lesson here is clear: we need to strengthen the available civilian instruments, not only in Europe but elsewhere as well.
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