Tag: United Arab Emirates
Leverage without a fulcrum
The International Peace Institute published this piece today on its Global Observatory under the title “With Democracy, Security at Stake in Egypt, How Should the West Respond?”:
Diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the confrontation in Egypt have so far failed. The refusal of coup leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, now the defense minister, to go along with diplomatic de-escalation, and the excessive force used by security agencies signal that they do not aim at repressing only the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian army is trying to frighten the general population and restore autocratic rule to an Egypt that has tasted freedom and expressed itself repeatedly at the ballot box since 2011.
The US and Europe want to get Egypt back on a more orderly democratic path. This entails restraining the Egyptian security forces, maintaining relative openness, and moving towards an inclusive polity with Islamist, and, if possible, Muslim Brotherhood, participation. It also means restoring a modicum of order and stability so that ordinary Egyptians can go about their business without fear of violence or intimidation.
The security forces are continuing their violent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which is pledging to continue its protests against the July 3 military takeover. Some Islamists are resisting with arms. About 1,000 people have been killed. What can the United States and the international community do to mitigate the situation?
Analysis
The civilian government the Egyptian army installed after the coup has pledged an amended constitution by the end of the year, to be approved in a referendum and elections early next year. This is a fast timeline. What can the international community do to try to ensure it is met?
The United States has already postponed delivery of F16s to Egypt and canceled joint military exercises scheduled for the fall to protest General Sisi’s crackdown. Inevitably the question of America’s $1.5 billion in aid to Egypt will now arise in Washington. It would make sense to refocus the civilian assistance of about $250 million tightly on democratic objectives. Those most concerned with getting Egypt back on a democratic path are recommending suspension of the military portion ($1.2 billion).
This will be opposed by those more concerned with security issues, including maintenance of the peace treaty with Israel. A proposal in the US Senate to redirect all Egyptian aid to domestic American priorities was defeated last month by a wide margin (86-13), but that was before the worst of the crackdown. The margin would likely be much closer next month.
Even if the US Congress or the Administration acts to suspend military aid to Egypt, the financial impact will not be immediate. This year’s tranche has already been transferred. It will be the better part of another year before money can be blocked. More weapons scheduled for delivery can be delayed, but American industry will spend the year lobbying hard against a funding cut-off, as much of the money is actually spent on US contractors who supply the Egyptian military with materiel and services.
Europe provides much more assistance to Egypt than the United States. Its 5 billion euro (more than $6 billion) mainly economic package is now under review. This was intended to support the transition to democracy, which is now in doubt. Europeans concerned with their own economic problems may well see suspension of aid to Egypt as an opportunity.
The international financial institutions are another important part of the picture. Egypt has been negotiating for many months a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. The US and Europe can block or delay that loan.
But both Europe and the United States need to consider the broader international context in deciding what to do about bilateral and IMF assistance. They are not the only players on the world stage. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have already pledged $12 billion, dwarfing both the American and European assistance packages. Russia will likely try to take advantage of any opening and provide military aid if the Americans suspend theirs.
Egypt clearly has alternatives to Western assistance, even if the Gulf states are notoriously slow and unreliable, and the Russians significantly less attractive to a military that has been getting advanced American weapons. If they want to see a democratic outcome in Egypt, the Americans and Europeans will need to convince the Gulf states—no paragons of democracy—to back the timeline for a return to democratic governance.
Widening the aperture farther, the Arab and Muslim worlds are watching what the international community does about Egypt. Will it insist on a return to a democratic path and an inclusive polity that allows Islamist participation on the timeline that Egypt itself has defined? Or will it settle for delay or a security solution that allows the army to remain the arbiter of Egypt’s fate? A lot depends on the skillful use of diplomatic and assistance leverage in a context where there are many players with diverse and even conflicting objectives.
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Syria: is there hope?
Salon.com asked me to review recent events in Syria and their significance. They published it today under the heading “Has the Syria threat cooled?”:
Watching Syria is like looking through a kaleidoscope. The picture seems to change dramatically in response to the slightest jolt, but the components remain the same. The past week has seen lots of jolts, but no real change in the elements that make up the sad picture.
Inside Syria, the regime’s forces have started an ethnic cleansing campaign in the west intended to clear Sunnis from areas its Alawite supporters want to secure for themselves. The regime has also successfully pushed south toward the Jordanian border. In much of the rest of the country, there is lots of fighting but only marginal changes in the confrontation lines, which run through many urban areas, or between the urban centers and the countryside. Almost 7 million Syrians are now thought to need humanitarian assistance. The number could rise dramatically during the rest of the year.
Secretary Kerry’s visit to Moscow this week revived, once again, hopes for a negotiated settlement. He and the Russians agreed to try to convene a conference, even before the end of the month, that would include both the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime. The prospect of this conference will relieve President Obama of any need for a quick decision on unilateral action in Syria, since it would hardly be appropriate to preempt the conference. That is likely what both the Russians and the Americans wanted: more time.
Pressure had been building for action, including possible direct American shipment of arms to the opposition, safe areas for displaced people, a no-fly zone, or an attack on Syria’s air force and missiles, which are being used against civilians. Evidence that the regime has used chemical weapons put President Obama on the spot, as he has several times said that crossing this red line would change his calculus. American credibility, some thought, was at stake.
The ink was barely dry on the allegation of chemical weapons use when Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss member of a U.N. human rights inquiry for Libya, suggested that she knew of evidence that chemical weapons were used by the opposition rather than the regime. This allegation has little credibility, not only because of the technical difficulties involved but also because Del Ponte has a record of sensational allegations that are difficult to prove (or disprove).
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Is the Middle East only about oil?
Increasing energy demand in the East, decreasing energy demand in the West, and North America’s shale energy revolution have sparked debates regarding the future of OPEC and US-Arab relations. But focusing on energy risks neglect of non-energy dimensions. This week’s National Council on Arab Relations discussion hosted by the international law firm Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP discussed the myths and realities surrounding US-Arab energy relations. Paul Sullivan of NDU, former Shell President John Hofmeister and former Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy Randa Fahmy Hudome pariticipated. The discussion focused on the following questions:
1. Will increasing domestic energy supply cause the the US to disengage from the Middle East, jeopardize US-Arab relations and reduce American influence in the region?
Shale oil and gas have significantly boosted US prospects for attaining energy self-dependence. Projections suggest the US will become a net oil exporter by 2030. Natural gas will replace oil as the country’s main fuel. BP goes so far as to declare the US will become 99% energy self-sufficient by 2030. With this increased supply the US has reduced its oil and gas imports from every Arab country except Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Despite the reduced imports, Middle Eastern stability and protection of the energy resources there remain a US priority. Because the oil market is a global one, the US still has an interest in continuing its role as protector of the choke points, sea-lanes of communication and stability needed to secure world access to Middle Eastern energy resources.
Paul Sullivan emphasized the importance of “virtual energy.” China imports 90% of its oil from the Middle East. A disruption in that flow would affect the price and access to imported Chinese goods. Any US import from China (or India, or Japan, or South Korea, or Europe for that matter) is a “virtual” import from the Middle East. Reduced dependence on Middle East energy imports will not end the strategic importance of the Middle East or strong relations with the Arabs for the US.
2. Is there more to the US-Arab relationship than oil?
The energy dimension represents only one aspect of US-Arab relations. The US and Arab nations cooperate in the defense, military, intelligence sectors, on cyber security and financial markets. If strengthened, these aspects could ensure the survival of strong US-Arab relations despite the decreased relevance of the energy relationship.
Fahmy Hudome noted that OPEC too has begun to invest heavily in renewables. Saudi Arabia plans on generating a third of its electricity from solar energy by 2030, and has formed a joint venture with the US SolarReserve to pursue this goal. The UAE is investing in nuclear energy and signed the 123 Agreement with the US. Fahmy Hudome suggested policymakers view the relationship between the US and the Middle East as cooperative, not adversarial.
3.With the evolution of natural gas as a transport fuel, will OPEC lose its relevance in the energy market?
John Hofmeister was adamant that OPEC’s price-setting days are numbered. He argued that reduced US dependence on oil imports and China’s unilateral approach to energy security through cash-for-oil undermines the cartel. Natural gas will replace oil as a cheaper, more available alternative. Liquid natural gas could increase train and freight mobility in the US and compressed natural gas could fuel the trucking industry. Natural gas can also be converted into methanol, a cheaper, more-efficient alternative to ethanol. With natural gas’s comparative practicality and affordability there is no question the cartel will lose relevance, Hofmeister argued.
Hudome was less convinced. She rejects the idea that the shift in global energy demand and supply represents a zero-sum game between the US and the Middle East. The US and its Arab partners can both gain from the rise of natural gas and renewables. She argued world energy supply and demand projections base themselves on difficult to predict variables: shale oil, the rise of renewable energy, and the future regulatory environment in the US. All these factors will influence OPEC’s future role in the global energy market.
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This week’s peace picks
Our suggested events begin and end with Egypt, but on Tuesday there are four overlapping discussions of Afghanistan. Thoughtless think tanks?
1. Revolution in Progress: Will There be a Democratic Egypt?, Monday December 10, 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM, U.S. Capitol Visitor Center
Venue: U.S. Capital, U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, Congressional Meeting Room North, Washington, DC 20510
Speakers: Nancy Okail, Steven Cook, Charles Dunne
With President Mohammad Morsi claiming widespread new powers leading to massive public protests the future of Egyptian democracy remains in the balance. Bitter fights continue over the distribution of authority. NGO workers, including those of Freedom House, continue to face prosecution for their work. The role of human rights, women, and religion in the new Egypt remain unclear. And these defining struggles are taking place in a near-institutional vacuum, in which the law, the constitution, and the relations between branches of government are all up for grabs. How these issues are settled will determine Egypt’s future— and its relationship with the United States.
Register for this event here.
2. Muslim-Majority Constitutions and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief, Monday December 10, 6:00 PM – 7:30 PM, Karamah
Venue: Karamah, 1420 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Elizabeth Cassidy, Mohamed Abdel Aziz Ibrahim, Knox Thames
A representative from the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and an expert on Muslim constitutions will present and discuss USCIRF’s recent report entitled, “The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Majority Muslim Countries and Other OIC Members.” At this time when many nations are rewriting their foundational documents, the report provides a comparative analysis of religious freedom provisions in the constitutions of majority Muslim countries and other members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
Register for this event here.
3. Is America Still Exceptional? Foreign Policy over the Next Four Years, Monday December 10, 8:00 PM – 9:30 PM, Marvin Center Ampitheater
Venue: Marvin Center Ampitheater, 800 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Henrey Nau, Daniel Deudney, James Goldgeier
This event features a debate between Henry Nau (GWU) and Daniel Deudney (JHU) on the future of American foreign policy. Moderated by James Goldgeier, Dean of AU’s School of International Studies.
Register for this event here.
4. Syria in Transition: An Insider’s View, Tuesday December 11, 12:15 PM – 1:30 PM, New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 400
Speakers: Mohammed Ghanem, Ilhan Tanir, Leila Hilal
While fears of chemical weapons and of an impending “failed state” dominate discussions on Syria, a narrative is being largely lost: civil leaders inside Syria who are taking matters into their own hands.
Civilian administrative councils have emerged throughout Syria in so-called “liberated zones.” Civilians are organizing for purposes of administering basic municipal services and law and order as they prepare for a post-Assad future.
What do these pockets of self-governed territory look like and how can they be sustained? What is the relationship between the civilian councils and the military brigades? How can the United States most effectively help civilian units prepare for a post-Assad future?
Please join the New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force for a conversation with Ilhan Tanir, Washington correspondent for Vatan, and Mohammed A. Ghanem, senior political advisor at the Syrian American Council, who has just returned from Syria. Ghanem and Tanir will discuss how Syrian civilians are creating a government of their own and how this movement may impact the country’s future.
Register for this event here.
5. Elections, Reconciliation, and the Final Two Years of Afghanistan’s Transition: Perspectives from the International Community, Tuesday December 11, 1:00 PM – 4:30 PM, USIP
Venue: United States Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Steve Coll, Jim DeHart, Thomas Lynch, Clare Lockhart, Thomas Ruttig, Francesc Vendrell, Scott Warden, Scott Smith, Andrew Wilder
As the clock winds down on the final two years of Afghanistan’s security transition, where does the accompanying political transition stand?
The main elements of the political transition are the 2014 presidential elections and the attempt to forge a political reconciliation with the Taliban. These issues are interrelated. Some say that there can be no effective elections unless a reconciliation process can first ensure adequate security conditions. Others say that reconciliation is impossible until there is a newly elected government in Kabul.
Both processes are affected by Afghanistan’s many uncertainties. Yet some recent developments have settled some questions and opened new opportunities. The re-election of President Obama has settled the question of who is responsible for US policy. The recent release of Taliban leaders by Pakistan could indicate a willingness on the part of Islamabad to play a more active role in supporting a negotiation. The consolidation Salahuddin Rabbani as the Chairman of the High Peace Council may yield greater progress in talks with the armed opposition. The setting of the election date by the Independent Election Commission fulfilled a longstanding demand by the political opposition, but also raised questions about the feasibility of holding elections.
The press of time will force the international community to take a number of positions on a number of complex issues in Afghanistan. Please join USIP for two panel that will look at both processes of the political transition.
Register for this event here.
6. Afghanistan: Endgame or Persisting Challenge with Continuing Stakes?, Tuesday December 11, 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Speakers: Martin Indyk, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ronald E. Neumann
After more than a decade of great effort and sacrifice by the United States and its allies, the Taliban still has not been defeated, and many Afghans believe that a civil war is coming. In 2014, foreign forces will complete the handover of security responsibility to their Afghan counterparts, international financial flows will radically decrease, and Afghanistan’s presidential elections will intensify political uncertainties. These challenges are mounting at a time when Afghanistan is dealing with rising insecurity, dysfunctional governance, rampant corruption and ethnic factionalization, while the regional environment is not easily conducive to stability in the country. With the U.S. and international publics tired of the war, fundamental questions about any remaining stakes in Afghanistan and the efficacy of any persisting stabilization efforts are increasing.
On December 11, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host the launch of a new book, Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan (Brookings, 2012), by Brookings Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown. Aspiration and Ambivalence analyzes the past decade of U.S. and international efforts in Afghanistan and offers detailed recommendations for dealing with the precarious situation leading up to the 2014 transition and after. In her book, Felbab-Brown argues that allied efforts in Afghanistan have put far too little emphasis on good governance, concentrating too much on short-term military goals to the detriment of long-term peace and stability. Felbab-Brown will be joined by Ronald E. Neumann, president of the American Academy of Diplomacy and former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (2005-07). Vice President Martin S. Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience.
Register for this event here.
7. The United States and South Asia After Afghanistan, Tuesday December 11, 3:30 PM – 5:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Root Room A/B/C
Speakers: Alexander Evans, Husain Haqqani, Karl F. Inderfurth, Cameron Munter, Wendy Chamberlin
U.S. interests in South Asia are evolving. An intense focus on counterterrorism and Afghanistan since 9/11 is giving way to a broader range of interests. Washington takes India’s global status seriously and is working closely with New Delhi on a range of regional and global issues. China’s rise, often neglected as a factor in South Asia policy, is encouraging a more strategic U.S. approach to Asia policy as a whole. As a result, a significant opportunity now exists to rethink U.S. South Asia strategy.
An upcoming report by Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Fellow Alexander Evans draws on over 90 interviews with a range of current and former U.S. policy practitioners from the State Department, National Security Council, Congress, and the intelligence community to consider how the United States can achieve an integrated South Asia policy following the 2014 military drawdown in Afghanistan. The report, which benefits from the expertise of the Asia Society Advisory Group on U.S. Policy toward South Asia, includes recommendations for better incorporating expertise into policy planning.
In conjunction with the report’s release, please join us for a discussion on the prospects for achieving a strategic U.S. approach to South Asia and the hard choices an incoming Administration will need to make to get there. An event will also take place in New York on December 12, Islamabad, Pakistan on December 18, and New Delhi, India on December 20.
RSVP for this event to AsiaDC@AsiaSociety.org.
8. Prescriptions for Peaceful Transitions: Is Democracy Mandatory?, Tuesday December 11, 4:00 PM – 5:30 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500
Speakers: Carl Gershman, Cynthia Irmer, Marina Ottaway, William Zartman
Carl Gershman, president of the National Endowment for Democracy; Cynthia Irmer, special assistant in the Office of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Humans Rights at the U.S. Department of State; Marina Ottaway, senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and I. William Zartman, SAIS professor emeritus, will discuss this topic.
RSVP for this event to RSVP@ipsinstitute.org.
9. Finish the Job: Jump-Start Afghanistan’s Economy – A Handbook of Projects, Tuesday December 11, 5:30 PM – 7:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Kenney Auditorium
Speakers: S. Fredrick Starr, Adib Faradi, Geoffrey Pyatt,
S. Fredrick Starr, CACI chairman; Adib Faradi, CACI visiting scholar and former deputy minister of Commerce for Afghanistan; and Geoffrey Pyatt, principal deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. Department of State’s South and Central Asia Affairs Bureau, will discuss CACI’s new report, “Finish the Job: Jump-Start Afghanistan’s Economy.” Note: A reception will precede the event at 5 p.m. Members of the media who want to cover this event should contact Felisa Neuringer Klubes in the SAIS Communications Office at 202.663.5626 or fklubes@jhu.edu.
RSVP for this event to saiscaciforums@jhu.edu.
10. Egypt on the Brink (Again), Friday December 14, 12:30 PM, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Venue: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 1050
Speakers: Steven Cook, Shalom Cohen, Eric Trager
Nearly two years after throngs filled downtown Cairo to demand the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, tens of thousands are back demanding the ouster of his elected successor, Muhammad Morsi. For the ruling Islamists, winning the planned December 15 national referendum on a new constitution would be the turning point that ends the current crisis; for their opponents, the hastily scheduled referendum only stokes more fury at a democratic transition gone terribly awry.
To discuss the fast-moving events in Egypt and their implications for U.S. policy and regional security, The Washington Institute invited Steven Cook, Shalom Cohen, and Eric Trager to address a Policy Forum luncheon in Washington, DC, on Friday, December 14, 2012, from 12:30-2:00 p.m. EST.
Register for this event here.
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The Gaza war in regional context
While the news media is mainly focused on the exchanges of rocket and air attacks between Israel and Gaza, my guess is that the broader regional picture will be decisive in determining the course and outcome of this latest outbreak of war in the Middle East. Here is a rundown of that broader picture:
1. Egypt: Cairo is trying to broker a ceasefire, with rhetorical support from the Arab League, but the Egyptian Prime Minister’s visit to Gaza Friday made it clear that the Muslim Brotherhood-led government will be more sympathetic to Hamas than Hosni Mubarak. Still, Egypt is in a tight spot: continuation of the war will attract militants to Gaza and the Sinai as well as send an already weak Egyptian economy into a tailspin. While Hamas has roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, a democratic regime in Egypt has to worry that Egypt’s citizens, sympathetic as they are to the plight of the Palestinians, will not want to sacrifice too much on their behalf. A ceasefire could restore Egypt’s role as a key regional player.
2. Syria: There has already been an exchange of artillery fire between the Syrian regime and Israel, something that hasn’t happened in a long time. Bashar al Asad may well look to military action on the Golan front in an effort to rally his remaining support and try to divert attention from his war against the Syrian revolution, now more than a year and a half old. The Syrian army won’t have a lot of spare capacity to challenge Israel, but it won’t want to be left out of the fight if the war continues.
3. Jordan: The protest movement against the rule of King Abdullah has intensified. The monarchy will not want to divert security forces to a fight against Israel, with which it maintains good if not warm relations. If the protests are successful, the king will be weakened further. A more constitutional monarchy might well be less friendly to Israel, but still unwilling to risk conflict.
4. Hizbollah: On the Lebanese front, Hizbollah is the main military force. It is already heavily engaged fighting against the revolution in Syria, but it could presumably make Israel’s situation more difficult by joining in the rocket barrage. Its record fighting Israeli ground forces is significantly better than Hamas’, so the Israelis would hesitate to engage on both fronts. But Hizbollah will be reluctant to aid Hamas, which has fallen out with the Syrian regime Hizbollah is supporting.
5. Gulf Cooperation Council: The Saudis and the other GCC states have not generally engaged directly against Israel, but the visit last week of the Emir of Qatar to Gaza (and his promise of financing) suggest that they may play a behind the scenes role bankrolling Hamas and others willing to challenge Israel. This could significantly attenuate the quiet but growing accommodation between Israel and the Sunni Arab world.
6. Turkey: Turkey and Israel seemed headed for rapprochement that would cure the 2010 rift over the Israeli attack on a Turkish aid flotilla headed for Gaza. This now seems much less likely. Turkey’s Islamist government will have to give at least verbal support to Hamas and hesitate to appear to paper over its differences with Tel Aviv.
7. Iran: Many of the larger rockets in Hamas’ arsenal come from Iran, which must be enjoying watching the Israelis engage in Gaza rather than carrying out the threat to destroy Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Iran will no doubt provide Hamas, Hizbollah and Syria as much assistance as it can spare in its sanctions-weakened state, hoping to keep the Israelis preoccupied.
8. The wider Arab world: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen and Sudan all have their own problems that preclude more than rhetorical engagement in the Palestinian cause. Marc Lynch notes that mobilization in the Arab world so far is limited but could well intensify. The Arab street, which presumably has a louder voice today than before the Arab awakening, is certainly sympathetic to the Palestinians. And it is far more likely to support Hamas’ more aggressive military approach to Israel than the Palestine Liberation Organization’s diplomatic push for membership for membership in the United Nations.
Bottom line: Egypt likely has the decisive role in determining whether this war remains, like the one in 2008/9, a bilateral affair or turns into a wider conflict with more permanent consequences. But Iran, Hizbollah, and Turkey are also important players. If Israeli ground action lines up all the regional forces in favor of Hamas, the unintended consequences could be dramatic.
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George W. Bush’s playbook
I can do no better in summing up Mitt Romney’s foreign policy speech today than he does himself in the penultimate sentence:
The 21st century can and must be an American century. It began with terror, war, and economic calamity. It is our duty to steer it onto the path of freedom, peace, and prosperity.
Here’s the problem: the terror, war and economic calamity Romney refers to occurred not on Barack Obama’s watch, but on George W. Bush’s. And Governor Romney’s foreign policy prescriptions, like many of his domestic policy prescriptions, are drawn from George W. Bush’s playbook.
The few innovations in Romney’s speech at Virginia Military Institute today are hardly worth mentioning. He wants to see the Syrian revolutionaries get more arms, in particular anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, but he fails to say how he will prevent these from being used against us, except to say that those who receive them will have to share our values. That should fix everything in the arms bazaars of the Middle East.
He says he will support a two-state solution for peace between Palestine and Israel. Nice to see him return to the mainstream from the extremist wings of Israeli and American politics, which is where he was during the “47%” fund-raising dinner in Florida when he suggested we would kick the can down the road and maybe skip the two-state solution altogether. Trouble is, the people he pitched that line to are supporting his campaign with fat checks. He says there will be no daylight between America and Israel, which is code for saying that the Jewish settlements will continue to expand, since that is what Netanyahu’s Israel wants. I fail to understand an American presidential candidate who outsources U.S. policy on the Palestinians to Israel.
In Libya he’ll track down the killers of our personnel, which is exactly what Obama promises to do. I’d just be curious how those 15 Navy ships he plans to build each year will help in the effort.
He pledges to condition aid to Egypt but makes the conditions both vague and easy to meet: build democratic institutions and maintain the peace treaty with Israel. There are lots of problems with President Morsy’s Egypt, but you won’t be able to hang him for either of those offenses, yet.
In Afghanistan, he calls the withdrawal the president has pledged a retreat but makes it clear he is not proposing anything very different.
Then there is this on foreign assistance:
I will make further reforms to our foreign assistance to create incentives for good governance, free enterprise, and greater trade, in the Middle East and beyond. I will organize all assistance efforts in the greater Middle East under one official with responsibility and accountability to prioritize efforts and produce results. I will rally our friends and allies to match our generosity with theirs.
The trouble here is that the Ryan budget guts the foreign affairs budget, including foreign assistance. There won’t be any American generosity to be matched with theirs if Romney is elected. This is where Romney departs definitively from Obama and shows his reliance on George W.’s playbook.
I hasten to add that I’d be all for organizing our assistance efforts in the greater Middle East under one official. That would be a good idea.
One last issue: with all this overload of American values as the basis for our foreign policy, I’m curious what Romney plans to do about Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco and other less than fully democratic friends in the region? They get no mention in this speech, but of course they really can’t be mentioned in a speech that gives unequivocal backing to both our friends and our values. What would Romney do when there is a choice between the two? Keep silent would be a good guess.
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