Tag: United Arab Emirates
Stevenson’s army, November 22
[This is the 58th anniversary of the assassination of President Kennedy.]
– FT has more on the Chinese hypersonic missile test.
– WSJ says US thwarted secret Chinese project in UAE.
– US warns allies of Russia attack on Ukraine.
– WaPo says DOD reviews NATO exercises, concerned they may be too provocative.
-NYT says Iranian nuclear programs revive despite Israeli attacks.
-Carnegie analysts see clash between US security and democracy interests.
– Sudan’s PM restored to position.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Normalization won’t normalize, but UAE and Russia will gain
Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian diplomat, and Venus Mohammed write:
The visit of the UAE Foreign Minister can be analyzed in two complementary ways:
- Washington’s silence reflects its disinterest in the Syrian file in general and also preparation for an upcoming strategic dialogue with Moscow in Geneva next week, which will focus on keeping the cross-border routes for humanitarian aid open. Washington is offering an initial reward to Moscow by remaining silent on the Emirati openness to Damascus and thus indirectly encouraging it tacitly. In return, Washington expects Damascus to reciprocate, with support or pressure from Moscow. This could mean a new step-by-step road map in Syria, which the US hopes will emerge in the meeting with Moscow next week.
- The visit came within the framework of coordination between Tel Aviv and the UAE to support Moscow, which coordinates extensively with Tel Aviv to target Iranian sites in Syria. Israel and Russia want to weaken Iran in Syria. Israel has three times within a week attacked storage sites for Iranian weapons, drones, and missiles in Damascus, at T-4 airport, Shayrat and Homs countryside, and even the coastal regiment In Tartous, where American reconnaissance aircraft are operating over the Syrian coast.
The Americans want to stabilize the balance of power in Syria as it is. Having lost influence Trump’s departure from the White House, the UAE wants to show itself useful to the Biden Administration. Abu Dhabi is trying in to tell Washington that it can provide services even if immoral, such as normalization with Assad. The UAE Foreign Minister had informed his American counterpart about this visit and its goals last week, which helped neuter the American position.
As Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has said, the situation in Syria is frozen. The UAE visit has some symbolic significance, but there will be no serious impact on the ground as long as Washington insists on the status quo until a ceasefire paves the way for a new political settlement. The UAE wants to be the main Arab country that has a relationship with the Assad regime so it can function as the link between Damascus and the West in general, hoping that it can influence the the Assad regime to change some of its behavior, in particular limiting the Iranian presence.
It is possible that Washington and the UAE can benefit in the short term by improving their own bilateral relations, but this does not spell the success for the Emirati efforts in achieving any results in Syria. The Iranian alliance with the Assad regime dates back four decades, when the Assad regime sided with the Iran against Iraq. Iran founded Hezbollah, which expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon. Iran also financed the construction of the Syrian nuclear reactor that was destroyed by Israel in 2007. Without the Iranian presence, the Assad regime would have collapsed years ago. The UAE has nothing to give Assad to pry him away from Iran. Normalization with the regime, including Assad’s return to the Arab League or the extension of a gas pipeline, will do nothing other than strengthen Iran in Syria, as has already happened in Lebanon and Iraq.
But if the UAE’s goal is to please the Americans by offering Syria as a gift to Iran in exchange for a return to the nuclear agreement, that is a different issue. Only time will tell if Washington’s reticence is Machiavellian.
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Stevenson’s army, October 24
–Turkey has PNGed 10 ambassadors, including US.
– But the Turkish opposition is unifying.
-Qatar wants to buy drone; USG delays.
– NYT says Al-Shabab is strongest in years.
– Biden & Manchin meet today in Delaware.
– Stanford researcher redrafts Cyber Command Vision.
[Makes you think, doesn’t it?]
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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No good options for Syria
The Assad regime is undertaking yet one more effort to suppress resistance in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. The brutality will no doubt be extreme, as it has been through more than 10 years of war against the civilian population. The question is Lenin’s: “What is to be done?”
Syria presents Washington with a quandary: American administrations from President Obama onwards find President Assad’s attacks on his own citizens odious and criminal, but they don’t see a risk to US national security that would justify putting American troops at risk to stop it. Once in a great while, Presidents Obama and Trump have used cruise missiles, which entail no risk to Americans, in response to Assad’s egregious use of chemical weapons, but without much effect.
American troops were sent to Syria, and remain there, to fight Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, not Assad. The Americans have sent lots of humanitarian assistance, but that does nothing to weaken or punish Assad. In fact, the portion of that assistance that goes through UN agencies via Damascus helps him a good deal. The Russians have been persistent in making it hard for aid to get to Syrian opposition-held areas from Turkey.
Anyone with even a modicum of human feeling would want to do more to save Syrian civilians from Assad’s depredations. So Josh Rogin and Andrew Tabler call for more, hoping an ongoing policy review will produce at least a special envoy. But a special envoy could be meaningless without a purpose, which Andrew would like to define this way:
a coherent political strategy, supported by the U.S. intelligence community, to isolate Assad and his regime’s facilitators and limit the malign influence of Iran and Russia.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-27/search-syria-strategy
How realistic is that?
More sanctions can be imposed–there is rarely a limit to those, but Assad and his enablers are not wanting to travel to the US or Europe and presumably know how to keep their finances under cover. The Syrian economy is already a shambles. Even if Assad is successful militarily, he will be unable to do any significant reconstruction. Iran and Russia already own him and will use their influence in ways the US and Europe consider malign.
The Americans can cause some discomfort to both by maintaining their small military presence in eastern Syria, which supports the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) there. But the Americans have been unable and unwilling to do much to stabilize the situation even where they are present, as that requires risk-taking they want to avoid. Hope that the SDF might develop into a serious military and political challenger to Assad seems to have expired quietly.
Just maintaining Assad’s current isolation requires a good deal of diplomatic heavy lifting. Some Arab countries–most notably Jordan and the United Arab Emirates–have wanted to ease up on Assad. To bolster its lagging economy, Jordan would like to open its border and allow trade with Syria. The UAE sees Assad as a bulwark against the Islamists that Abu Dhabi dreads and loathes. Greece, anxious to avoid another outflux of Syrian refugees, has sent its Ambassador back to Damascus as an “envoy.” Other Europeans may be tempted, or blackmailed, to do something comparable.
The UN political process for Syria, focused on a committee that is supposed to be writing a new constitution, is essentially moribund. Initiative for years has fallen instead to the “Astana powers” (Iran, Russia, and Turkey), none of which are prepared to push for a political solution. All three are relying on their military forces to get what they want in Syria. Iran gets a bridge to Lebanese Hizbollah as well as a new confrontation line with Israel, Russia gets its bases and a foothold in the Middle East, and Turkey gets to repress the Syrian Kurds, some of whom have supported insurgency inside Turkey.
I am not appealing for inaction, just highlighting how difficult it is to think of anything that can be done to affect the situation in a serious way. That is even before we come to discussing Biden Administration priorities, which include reentering the Iran nuclear deal, withdrawing at least some US forces from the Middle East, and refocusing on strategic competition with Russia and China while managing the challenges posed by North Korea, Venezuela, and other bad actors. Never mind the domestic priorities. Syria looks distant in Biden’s perspective.
So sure, a special envoy if you like, but what will s/he do? Talk is cheap, and not bad. But there are no good options for Syria.
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The UAE as peace brokers
In this episode of Battlegrounds, H.R. McMaster and Yousef Al Otaiba discuss the Abraham Accords, the threat from Iran, and great power competition in the Middle East. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below:
Yousef Al Otaiba: United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ambassador to the United States (US)
H. R. McMaster: Fouad and Michelle Ajami Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University
The Abraham Accords and Normalization with Israel
The defining feature of the discussion between Ambassador Otaiba and McMaster was the rapidly evolving dynamics of both the Gulf and the Middle East writ large. Nowhere is that more true than with respect to Israel and the recently signed Abraham Accords. Otaiba in particular stressed that people in the region are tired of decades-long conflicts and are increasingly desirous of new approaches to old problems. One indication of how widespread this desire for change is is how quickly three countries followed the UAE’s lead in normalizing relations with Israel.
McMaster called attention to an op-ed penned by Otaiba prior to the Accords in which he argued that annexation would critically inhibit the ability of countries like the UAE to negotiate with Israel. Both agreed that the signal sent by the publication of this opinion piece–which was also published in Hebrew–served as an effective opening salvo of signaling that ultimately facilitated the negotiations that generated the Accords.
Iran, the Gulf, and Extremism
McMaster pointed to the name of the Accords themselves as an attempt to transcend the religious and sectarian divisions that have plagued the region in recent decades. He also pointed to Iran as an actor that has consistently complicated these aims. In particular, he identified Iran’s support of proxy actors in conflict, attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf, and the promotion of ideological justifications for sectarianism and theocracy as ways in which Iran has complicated the dynamics of peace processes in the region.
Otaiba also identified Iran’s support for violent extremists as a significant complicating factor in peace processes. Notably, he argued that it was not only the rise of Shia extremism at issue, but also the way in which Iran’s rhetoric has motivated Sunni extremism as well. Otaiba pointed to the UAE’s work to combat extremism as an important step in this regard. For example, the UAE invited the Pope to visit the country and developed a complex that included a synagogue, mosque, and church. By doing so, the country aims to challenge the perception among some that extremists are the true guardians of community and society.
The Future of the Region
Otaiba argued that the way in which Iranian rhetoric has reinforced Sunni extremism is indicative that the future of the region will not be defined by a Sunni-Shia fault line, but rather a debate over the role of religion in governance. This fault line will be divided, according to Otaiba, between those who believe in a separation between church and state–as he does–and those who believe that religion ought to be incorporated into governance.
McMaster and Otaiba also believed that the Biden administration will differentiate itself from the conciliatory approach to Iran that characterized the Obama administration. This difference in outlook is largely attributed to the Trump administration’s policy of maximum pressure, which has given this new administration a stronger hand with which to leverage more concessions out of Iran. While both were fairly optimistic that the Biden administration will maintain a strong line against Iran, Otaiba expressed some concern about the prospects of the administration’s push for peace and withdrawal in Afghanistan. The UAE has taken some steps away from this theater in recent years, diminishing its ability to leverage its role as a broker to achieve peace. While Otaiba expressed that the UAE was willing to accept the outcome of any agreement between the US, the Taliban, and the government, he also expressed disbelief that all three parties could come to a durable agreement.
To watch the event in full, please click here
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Stevenson’s army, April 16
Longtime WaPo reporter Walter Pincus tells how technology is driving intelligence.
FDD has new site following Biden foreign policy.
NYT explains thinking behind Russia sanctions. Russia retaliates.
NYT notes new Russia sanctions will affect Russian banks.
Lawfare parses sanctions in terms of cyber policy. Politico says US won’t send ships into Black Sea. Administration approves new arms sale to UAE.
NYT says US military is looking at neighboring sites after Afghan withdrawal. Trust in US military drops slightly, Bloomberg reports.
Biden keeps Trump’s low refugee cap.
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