Tag: United Arab Emirates
How Libya might recover
Libya’s internationally recognized Prime Minister and Chair of the Presidential Council, Fayez al Sarraj, spoke today at SAIS, where I introduced him and my Foreign Policy Institute colleague Hafed al Ghwell moderated the Q and A. Sarraj leads the Government of National Accord (GNA) headquartered in Tripoli. This is my effort to summarize not what he said but my conclusions from it. I’ll post the video as soon as we have it.
Libya’s situation is dire. Former Qaddafi General Khalifa Haftar, having taken control of Benghazi and much of the east and south, launched an attack on Tripoli almost six months ago. His forces have bogged down fighting against an array of four or five militias defending the capital. In the meanwhile, Sarraj is trying to restore some sort of unified, democratic governance. He puts his hopes in political dialogue conducted in a National Conference. But political dialogue in Libya has failed more than once to resolve its conflicts, which are made worse by the substantial oil and gas resources at stake there. Oil production is up to 1.2 million barrels per day (from 150,000 when Sarraj took over three years ago).
Sarraj still insists on dialogue, approval of the draft constitution (or some variant of it), elections to decide who will govern, and a National Reconciliation Commission to manage transitional justice and accountability. Backed by Russian mercenaries, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, Haftar wants to take the country by force. He has repeatedly betrayed political agreements in favor of military efforts. Abu Dhabi and Cairo support Haftar with weapons and money (supposedly because they don’t like the Islamists who support Sarraj). Sarraj explicitly advocates a “secular” government and says his government continues contacts with the Emirates and Egypt.
Sarraj also says his government has a good relationship with the US, especially on fighting terrorism. The Americans conduct drone strikes in Libya and militias that support Sarraj fought the Islamic State in Sirte. But President Trump some months ago did take a phone call from Haftar and appeared to be leaning in his direction, until it became clear that the general was not going to succeed quickly. Sarraj hopes that good relations with the Americans at lower levels will prevail and suggests that the US could be more helpful in clearing away obstacles to the GNA’s success.
It was not clear how that success might be brought about, but there were hints. While now unwilling to continue to negotiate with Haftar, Sarraj sees some hope in talking with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HOR), which once upon a time authorized Haftar’s forces. Some of its members already meet in Tripoli and more might be convinced to do so. Separating the HOR from Haftar would undermine his political legitimacy, if not his military capability.
But the key to success is likely also to require realigning the international forces at work in Libya. Haftar’s supporters need to realize that he will not succeed militarily. If they then decide to back the UN-recognized GNA, the odds for its success would increase sharply.
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Libyans be damned
Reversing long-standing policy of supporting United Nations efforts in Libya, President Trump last week opted instead to back Khalifa Haftar’s “Libyan National Army” march on Tripoli from his Benghazi stronghold. Haftar is a former Libyan army officer who spent two decades in Virginia and became a US citizen. Trump says he backs Haftar’s counterterrorism efforts. Haftar’s idea of counterterrorism is killing anyone who opposes him. He doesn’t even pretend to be pro-democratic and is seeking to install himself as Qaddafi’s successor.
Few Libya-watchers think Haftar has the firepower to take Tripoli by force. So far militia resistance appears to be slowing his advance, causing him to resort to airpower presumably provided by his Emirati or possibly Saudi backers. Qatar and Turkey will be supporting Islamist forces intent on holding on to Tripoli, where the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is hunkered down. It is no paragon: it has failed to gain control even of the capital and has precious little sway in the rest of the country.
Trump’s move to back Haftar was a surprise only because the President had previously indicated the US would not get involved in Libya but instead leave it to the UN and the Europeans. That a would-be autocrat would appeal to Trump should be no surprise, especially one the Saudis and Emiratis support. The French and Russians will be pleased, as they too support Haftar, but the Italians were backing the GNA. Once again, Trump has demonstrated that he is prepared to turn US policy 180 degrees on a dime, especially to favor an autocrat, thus ensuring that everyone who deals with Washington–especially those committed to democracy–needs to hedge.
Washington will presumably let the Emiratis and Saudis try to ensure Haftar’s victory. US forces, not previously known to have been in Libya, have supposedly withdrawn, though it is of course possible that they are still clandestinely shifting to help Haftar. The Emiratis and Saudis have proven inept at best, catastrophically incapable at worst, in Yemen, where their intervention against the Houthi rebellion has stretched into a years-long war of attrition, rendering most of the country in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. Something similar could of course happen in Libya.
If instead Haftar is able to conquer the capital and move on to the west, the picture will be different but not likely pretty. Islamist militias will go underground to continue their resistance and Haftar will react with the kind of blunt force used in Benghazi, where he demonstrated little concern for collateral damage to civilians. Even as civil war has raged on and off over the past eight years, Libyans have enjoyed self-government at the municipal level, where they are in the midst of holding elections. It seems unlikely Haftar, if he succeeds in chasing the GNA from Tripoli, will tolerate even that much democracy. He has been actively stacking local governments in areas he already controls.
President Trump certainly won’t be one to press Haftar, who if he wins will be beholden to the absolute monarchies in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The President has found another autocrat he likes, in addition to Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping, Rodrigo Duterte, Vladimir Putin, and others. Libyans be damned. Full steam ahead.
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Doha impressions
I’ve been slow to write my impressions of Doha, where I spent four days last week after four days in Riyadh the week before (my impressions there are reported here). It’s fitting though that I should publish on Qatar the very day that its soccer team won the Asian Cup, defeating Japan 3-1 after triumphing in the semifinal 4-nil over arch-nemesis United Arab Emirates (in addition to beating Saudi Arabia).
The Qataris are riding high, at least in their own estimation and not only on the soccer field. They have more than survived what they term the blockade by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed in June 2017. After an initial panic that emptied grocery stores, cut off family and other personal ties with compatriots, and caused a sharp fall in central bank reserves, the Doha government triggered a successful emergency response planned since the 2014 flare-up of their frictions with the Saudis and Emiratis.
The costs have been high, but the plan stabilized the situation and enabled Qatar to take advantage of its natural gas-derived wealth to make alternative arrangements and also begin to stimulate domestic production to replace imports. People recount the story of flying in 3000 cows for milk production with smiles on their faces. Saudi food supplies, which dominated the market before the “blockade,” are no longer missed.
Relations with Iran and Turkey have improved. Turkey is often credited as having prevented a Saudi invasion early in the Gulf crisis by deploying 3000 troops. The massive US air base at Al Udeid is seldom mentioned, but Qataris clearly treasure their close relations with Washington. Outreach around the world to other countries has grown. Qataris regard the Gulf crisis as a “blessing in disguise,” a phrase heard repeatedly. It compelled Qatar to diversify and strengthen its ties around the world.
The result is pride and allegiance, including (from my limited contact) among the 90% of the population that is expats. Qataris and foreign experts think the government has done well and that the country’s star is rising. Portraits of the Emir, once ubiquitous, are still much in evidence, despite government instructions to remove them. World Cup 2022 preparations are said to be going well. Criticism of labor conditions on the many construction projects has declined, as accidents have proven much less common than some had predicted. The $6-7 billion of direct World Cup spending is only a drop in the bucket, as the government is building another $200 billion or so in new infrastructure. That’s on top of already lavish spending over the last two decades.
The ideological underpinnings are not, of course, democratic. Qatar is an autocracy that does not permit political organizations of any sort. But a lot of people we talked with are convinced that the traditional system of tribal consultations enables the top to hear from the bottom and the bottom to register its discontents. There is talk of elections this year or next for a newly empowered Shura Council, which now issues legislation on behalf of the Emir. But there are also concerns that elections will give the largest tribes dominance that the current system does not permit, thus reducing the diversity of voices and narrowing the political base of the monarchy.
Why did tiny, non-democratic Qatar support the Arab Spring and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood? The most common answer is that Doha supported the political forces it thought Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, Tunisians, Libyans, and others wanted. It has dialed back on that support and blocked private financing of radical groups, monitored by the US Treasury.
Doha claims to be a strong supporter of economic and military integration through the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose work has been disrupted. But Qataris want to conduct an independent foreign policy, not one dictated by Saudi Arabia or least of all by the UAE, which is believed to still resent Qatar’s choice to remain independent and not join the other sheikhdoms. Bahrain is the paradigm for what the Qataris do not want: a country forced to follow in the Kingdom’s footsteps wherever it goes.
What about Al Jazeera, the TV news channels that spare only Qatar and not its Gulf neighbors from criticism? Qatar’s neighbors view Al Jazeera Arabic in particular as promoting rebellion and extremism. At least some Qataris are willing to contemplate modifications in editorial policy, but all assume Al Jazeera is not going away, as the Saudis and Emiratis would like. Though said to be privately owned, it is under the government’s thumb and can be reined in when and if need be.
At times in Doha and Riyadh, I felt I was in a hall of mirrors: both claim leadership in modernizing the Arab world, both see the Gulf conflict as a struggle over what one Saudi termed “seniority” in the region and many Qataris termed Saudi/Emirati “hegemony.” In both Saudi Arabia and Qatar these days conservatism is bad, diversity is welcome, dialogue and consultation are promoted, and freedom to organize political activity is restricted. These are absolute monarchies with the deep pockets required to buy their way into the 21st century.
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Riyadh impressions
I spent four days in Saudi Arabia last week, which is wholly insufficient to do anything but scratch the surface. But I’m not without those superficial impressions. The SAIS study trip was focused on the GCC conflict, but I won’t comment in detail on that today. Caveat emptor: I am not agreeing with the Saudi perspectives, only trying to render them faithfully.
Here are my more general impressions:
- Saudis in government and government-influenced institutions (which are the only ones I visited) sincerely support the domestic reforms the Crown Prince has undertaken and believe they will lead to profound and badly needed changes in opening up and modernizing the society.
- The Saudi elite is not prepared to question the Crown Prince on anything, including his foreign policy moves like the rift with Qatar and the war in Yemen. They emphasize forcefully the justice of the grievances against Qatar and humanitarian assistance provided to Yemen. They of course see Iran as a serious threat throughout the region.
- While appreciating the ample support of the Trump Administration and good citizen-to-citizen feelings (due mainly to the many Saudis who study in the US), Saudis have doubts about the Administration’s reliability that were not much alleviated by Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit last week. Many people in Riyadh view American withdrawal from the region as highly likely if not inevitable.
The inclination in Riyadh to accept top/down decisions on reform is palpable and often attributed to tribal attitudes: consultation and discussion are welcomed, but in the end it is the sheikh’s responsibility to decide and everyone else’s to obey. Constraints on executive power by an independent judiciary or other regulatory bodies, separation of powers, or a press free of government pressure are ideas that have little resonance.
Saudi Arabia’s justice system is viewed as fair, though many are aware that it is subject to scathing international criticism. The Saudi teenager who escaped to Thailand and has found refuge in Canada is viewed as someone who failed to take advantage of existing human rights mechanisms in the Kingdom. The murder of Jamal Khashoggi is viewed as a matter for the courts, which will decide whether the accused are guilty in open hearings with adequate defense attorneys. The women activists who protested the driving ban stand accused, it is said, of other crimes having to do with passing information to foreign governments or accepting foreign assistance (no one seems clear about which). Protection for foreign workers, all hired under contracts approved by their own governments, has been enhanced.
There are discontents. The conservative religious establishment comes in for frequent criticism (again, by people associated with the government). The Muslim Brotherhood looms menacingly. Fear of youth radicalization is palpable. Anxiety about terrorism and disorder, both in the Kingdom and in the region, is high. Sectarianism is bad. The government is sponsoring active efforts to counter extremism and promote dialogue among Saudis of different stripes.
There are good things as well. Pluralism, even if more apparent in ancient ruins we visited in Al Ula than in Riyadh, is good. Islam and Sharia law are good, when properly understood. The solidarity of the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in the Gulf conflict is good, as is the Gulf Cooperation Council, especially its military cooperation (which still includes Qatar, Saudis claim). Moderation, often defined as allowing everyone to modernize at their own pace, is good. Israel might be okay, but only if it does right by the Palestinians and accepts the Arab Peace Plan.
But above all, stability is good and worth sacrificing for. The nearby examples of Syria and Yemen are glaring. Even the one success of the Arab spring, Tunisia, is tottering. It is critical to counter the big de-stabilizing factor–Iran–and to avoid any new sources of Middle East strife. That Crown Prince is the key to stability as well as reform in the Kingdom and merits, the Saudis I talked with think, the wholehearted support he is getting, the internationals be damned.
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The Middle East wants reform
On Tuesday the Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted the presentation of the latest Middle East Public Opinion poll by James Zogby. Polling was conducted in 10 countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Iran. Zogby, Co-founder and President of the Arab American Institute and Director of Zogby Research Services, presented a summary of the data and key points before a panel discussion that featured Paul Salem, President of MEI, Kate Seelye, Vice President of MEI, Alex Vatanka, an MEI Senior Fellow, and Steven Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Throughout the Middle East citizens expressed discontent with the policies of their governments. Only in the UAE did a majority of respondents indicate that their country was on the right track. This discontent spanned the rough divide opened by the Arab spring. Egypt and Tunisia both followed the “democratic track” after successful revolutions in 2011, but a majority of respondents there believe their countries to be on the wrong track, joining Iraq and Palestine as states with majority disapproval. In Egypt the drop included the military, whose confidence levels have fallen 50 points since 2013. Government reform was ranked 3rd overall in the list of political priorities, topping extremism, foreign enemies, health care, and personal rights. This contradicts a common narrative, which justified the failure of the Arab Spring by claiming that the people desired only improved economic and security conditions and cared little for political reform as long as those conditions were met. Downplaying the desire for reform may have been simply wishful thinking by authoritarian leaders in the region. The survey conveyed a sense of foreign policy pragmatism. Regarding Syria there was growing support for a national unity government with participation of Bashar al Assad. Regarding Iran, while majorities supported the Trump administration’s move to pull out of the nuclear deal, in every country except Tunisia and Egypt the majority believe that peace between Iran and the Arab world is “very possible” or “somewhat possible.” Eight out of ten countries, including Iran, held the majority view that it is important to bring Iran into a regional security arrangement with the Arab countries to help bring peace to the region. One exception to this pragmatism is the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A growing majority in 5 out of 7 Arab states were opposed to a partnership with Israel, even if Israel returns occupied Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative. Palestinians themselves remained overwhelmingly prepared for peace with Israel if the refugee issue is solved and Israel returns to its pre-1967 borders, but a growing number believe the Israelis would never agree to those terms. Given the growing struggle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey for regional influence, the polling reflected just how close the competition is. Turkey surpasses the Saudis for favorability in Tunisia, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, and tightened the gap in Egypt. A majority of Arab countries view Turkey as playing a more positive role than Saudi Arabia in both Iraq and Syria. Public opinion of America has fallen in the region. The EU, Russia and China all fared better than America. The panel believed that this drop in opinion was largely due to the perception of the American government as inept. The polling indicates a continued sense of unrest in the region. With little faith in their own institutions, the people of the Middle East remain largely uninspired by the jingoistic foreign policies of their governments and continue to seek an end to costly civil wars, in order to focus on domestic reforms and economic improvement.Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Divided
The midterms confirmed what we all knew: the United States remains sharply divided. Democrats won the House, though without the landslide Blue Wave they had hoped for. Republicans held the Senate, with a few gains for which President Trump will take credit (and may even declare a Red Wave). Democrats would have won many more seats in the House were representation proportional to their votes. But gerrymandered districts give the Republicans a boost in seats that is greater than their votes.
Winning the House is a big deal. Democrats will now have the power in the House to convene hearings and subpeona witnesses in order to investigate Administration malfeasance, which has been endemic. But Republicans will continue to approve Trump-appointed judges and other officials in the Senate. Legislation will be difficult for both parties. The next two years may amount to little more than a prolonged and painful campaign for the presidential election in 2020.
The House Democrats are expected to lean against continuing support for the Saudi/Emirati war in Yemen, against Vladimir Putin’s various efforts to project power, and against war with Iran and other American adventures abroad. Those positions may get some headlines, but the Administration can still do pretty much as it wants, unless Republicans join with Democrats in passing legislation to back up their preferences. The President retains control over foreign policy.
House investigations of the Administration may produce the most important results from these midterms. If, as many of us suspect, Trump real estate ventures have relied heavily on Russian money-laundering, that will come out. So too will any “dirt” the Russians may have on Trump. The Special Counsel investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 election, which would have been in peril had the Republicans retained control of the House, is likely now the least of Trump’s worries.
The Democrats are still fighting an uphill battle. There are some important races undecided, including Stacey Abrams’ bid in Georgia to become the first black woman to be elected governor. But both Beto O’Rourke, the Democrats high hope for Senate in Texas, and Andrew Gillum, their strong candidate for governor in Florida, lost. They can be comforted by a string of victories in the Midwest and Pennsylvania, where court-ordered redistricting undid Republican gerrymanders.
The election confirmed that Trump now owns the Republicans. Those who wholeheartedly backed Trump on the whole won. Those who tried to distance themselves from the President generally lost. With the retirement of several Republicans who were occasionally critical of the White House, Trump is set to command his party with little to no opposition. He will be emboldened, not chastened.
So divided we are, a bit more than the day before yesterday. I doubt we will fall, but we won’t exactly stand either. America divided is America unmoored. The consequences aren’t likely to be good.
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