Tag: United Arab Emirates
Diplomacy for drawdown
Marc Lynch, after describing well the security dilemmas and state fragility that are driving Middle East conflicts, concludes:
US hegemony in the Middle East will never be restored because the region has fundamentally changed. Moving beyond the wars and political failures that followed the Arab uprisings will not be easy. The damage is too deep.
The question is: should Americans worry about that? Marc doesn’t answer that question, but Steven Metz does.
American interests in the Middle East are usually defined along these lines:
- Countering international terrorism
- Ensuring oil and gas can flow without hindrance to world markets
- Supporting friends and allies
- Preventing nuclear proliferation
Steven essentially says the threat of international terrorism is overblown, US energy vulnerability is vastly reduced (“Petroleum will not be weaponized”), and US friends and allies can (mostly) take of themselves. He doesn’t deal with the proliferation issue, but he really doesn’t have to, because he is talking mainly about military commitments. Military action has never been a good option for dealing with nuclear proliferation, since it would provide a very strong incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons.
Steven’s conclusion: the US should withdraw its military from the Middle East and rely instead on “off-shore balancing” to ensure that no rival hegemon is able to control the region and intervene only in the event that one threatens US interests. The savings could be gigantic: RAND estimated that in 2008 12-15% of the Pentagon budget was spent to securing oil from the Persian Gulf.
Washing our hands of the Middle East is an attractive proposition. Unfortunately it is one that President Obama tried, without a great deal of success. President Trump is tempted in the same direction. But withdrawal has left the many of the vacuums that Marc describes so well, generating security dilemmas and military responses that have left Syria, Yemen, and Libya in ruins and erstwhile American friends like Israel, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates at odds and hedging.
It is difficult to see how the United States can withdraw from the Middle East without a focused diplomatic effort to ensure that the region can restore a modicum of stability,or at least remove some of the drivers of instability. Offshore balancing won’t work if there is no balance but only chaos. The Trump Administration is said to be preparing for a Summit to restore some coherence to GCC next month. That makes sense: there will be no serious effort to counter Iran’s behavior in the region so long as Qatar is feuding with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
But the Administration also needs to end its own feuding with Turkey and restore some balance to its policy on Palestine to make it more palatable to Sunni Arab friends. And it needs to reconsider its position on the Iran deal, which threatens to seriously undermine relations with Europe.
So yes, I agree that we should draw down, if not completely out, from the the Middle East. But there is a lot of diplomatic homework required to make that possible. And a very real possibility that the Administration will focus instead on countering Iran, leading it to increase rather than decrease its military commitments in the region.
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Peace picks, May 28 – June 3
- The Malaysian Election Tsunami: What Happens Next? | Wednesday, May 30 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
The CSIS Southeast Asia Program is pleased to present ‘The Malaysian Election Tsunami: What Happens Next?’ a panel discussion featuring Dr. Meredith Weiss (Professor and Director of International Programs, University of Albany’s Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy) and Ambassador Joseph Y. Yun (US ambassador to Malaysia, 2013-2016). They will discuss the outcomes of 14th Malaysian general election, and what the election means for the state of democracy in Malaysia and the region.
- Asserting Taiwan’s International Space: The Challenges Ahead for Taipei’s Leadership | Wednesday, May 30 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Wilson Center | Register Here
Taiwan’s unique status in the world has come under greater pressure in recent months as China steps up efforts to challenge Taipei’s global standing. Taiwan remains a leading Asian economy and a vibrant democracy. Yet strained cross-Strait relations have made it increasingly difficult for Taipei to ensure its standing in the international arena. Join us for a discussion on the political, security, and social challenges ahead for Taiwan, and how Taiwan may be able to overcome some of its vulnerabilities to ensure a stable and prosperous future. Panel includes Irene Wu (Fellow, Wilson Center), Ian Reston (Research Fellow, Project 2049 Institute) and Gerrit van der Wees (Editor, Taiwan Communique and Lecturer, George Mason University).
- Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments | Wednesday, May 30 | 2:30 pm – 4:00 pm | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
In the past two years, the world has witnessed multiple crises in regions where nuclear weapons are present: the Korean peninsula saw heightened tensions throughout 2017; China and India were involved in a major border crisis; violence between India and Pakistan on the Line of Control in Kashmir has been the highest in 15 years and the U.S. and its partners in the Middle East now face a highly uncertain future vis-à-vis Iran.
The U.S. has an innate interest in preventing nuclear war around the world. Along with other strong powers, the United States has been proactive in managing crises in nuclearized regions, most notably in South Asia, which has seen repeated bouts of escalated tensions since the end of the Cold War. Yet, as great power competition resurges and U.S. interests in Asia pit it against actors like Iran, Pakistan, and increasingly China, the U.S. role in crises in nuclearized regions may become more complicated. What implications could this have for the probability of conflict and for U.S. influence as other strong powers compete more aggressively with Washington in these theaters, including possibly using crises as opportunities to overshadow the traditional U.S. role as crisis manager?
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace on May 30 for a discussion on the opportunities, challenges, and risks of crises in regional nuclear contexts and policy options for U.S. diplomacy. Panel includes Amb. Joseph Yun (Senior Advisor to the Asia Center, US Institute of Peace), Lora Saalman (Vice President, East-West Institute), Feroz Khan (Research Professor, Naval Postgraduate School), Moeed Yusuf (Associate Vice President, Asia Center at US Institute of Peace), and Gregg Zoroya (USA Today Editorial Board).
- Turkey’s Snap Elections and the Impact on U.S. – Turkey Relations | Thursday, May 31 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | Turkish Heritage Organization | Register Here
On June 24, Turkey will go to the polls for snap presidential and parliamentary elections that will mark the country’s transition to the new presidential system that was approved in an April 2017 referendum.
These elections come at a time when Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. – its NATO ally and foremost security partner – is facing numerous challenges. Turkey and the U.S. remain at odds over the latter’s support of the YPG in Syria, which Ankara considers to be a terrorist organization. Meanwhile, various pieces of recent Congressional legislation have proposed bans on weapons sales to Turkey in response to Ankara’s purchase of Russian military equipment and the continued imprisonment of American citizens in Turkey.
How will this critical turning point in Turkey’s domestic governance affect its vital relationship with the U.S.?
Join THO on May 31 for a discussion with Turkish and American experts on how developments surrounding these snap elections and Turkey’s transition to a presidential system could impact the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship. Panel includes Richard Leiby (Editor and Writer, The Washington Post), Ragip Soylu (Washington Correspondent, Daily Sabah), Shawn Turner (CNN National Security Analyst and Director of Communication, Center for a New American Security), Yusuf Erim (Turkey Analyst, TRT World) and Guy Taylor (National Security Team Leader, The Washington Times). Moderated by Prof. Herbert Reginbogin (Advisory Board Member, Turkish Heritage Organization).
- Military Challenges in the Asia Pacific: US Responses to Regional Competition | Friday, June 1 | 9:00 am – 10:30 am | American Enterprise Institute | Register Here
The Asia Pacific security environment is more contested today than at any time since World War II. China’s increased assertiveness and North Korea’s unpredictability are not symptomatic of America’s decline, nor do they necessarily signal great power conflict. Rather, recent developments demand a close look at the changing terms of regional competition and America’s responses to it. In this hypercompetitive environment, how will the US and its allies and partners ensure regional stability?
Join AEI as a panel of security experts discuss how the US can keep its competitive edge in the Asia Pacific. Panel includes Roger Cliff (Center for Naval Analyses), Thomas Donnelly (American Enterprise Institute), Nathan Freier (United States Army War College) and Lt. Gen. Wallace (Fmr. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs). Moderated by Philip Lohaus (American Enterprise Institute).
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Keeping our bases covered
The Persian Gulf region has seen a buildup in American military power in recent decades. With major bases in various countries – Kuwait (Ali Al Salem Air Base), Bahrain (headquarters of the Fifth Fleet), Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base), and the UAE (Al Dhafra Air Base) among them – the US has grown its military footprint across many of the Gulf.
Today, the operation of American bases has been complicated by the ongoing feud between Qatar and rival Arab Gulf states, most notable Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have cut diplomatic and trade relations since June of 2017. With the crisis showing no sign of resolution, the US is caught in the struggle between its Gulf allies, with America’s military bases put increasingly into question. Will the US follow the demands of its Gulf allies and cut its alliance with Qatar, as some in the White House have indicated?
On April 5, the American Security Project held an event to discuss US military bases in the Persian Gulf region, and their role in furthering American strategic interests in the wake of this crisis. The event featured the Inspector General of the Qatari Armed Forces, Staff Major General Nasser AbdulAziz Al-Attiyah. Joining him were USMP (Ret.) David Des Roches, Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies, and Brigadier General (Ret.) Stephen Cheney, CEO of the American Security Project, along with Asha Castleberry, Professor at Fordham University, who served as moderator in the discussion. Watch a full video recording of the event here:
Takeaways:
The Qatari government is very eager for U.S. bases to remain open. As Asha Castleberry and Stephen Cheney opened the event, they noted that it was put together rather quickly, predicated upon the participation of their Qatari guest. Nasser Al-Attiyah, for his part, repeated that the government of Qatar has been a friend and steadfast ally to the US for over 20 years, as exemplified by readiness to accept American air forces after pressure from Saudi Arabia forced them to move in 2003. Al-Attiyah emphasized Qatar’s value to the United States in both economic terms (as the 2nd-largest global buyer of American weapons) and strategic (as Qatar plans to expand Al Udeid Air Base and construct a new US naval base in coming years). His government sees its relationship with the US “as one of our top priorities,” echoing the views of the Qatari palace.
Qatar has been a particularly comfortable host of American troops in the Middle East. Both Stephen Cheney and David Des Roches noted the tricky nature of hosting military bases in the Middle East. The US government insists on legal immunity for American soldiers, despite the Mideast’s distaste for “capitulations” to foreign powers. Bilateral relations can easily become strained. Qatar has given the US few headaches. American soldiers face fewer restrictions based on cultural taboos than other bases in the region (in contrast to Saudi, in particular). The air base at Al Udeid has been notably comfortable for American troops, with ample creature comforts and enough capacity to handle America’s largest aircraft.
The gains of keeping military bases abroad outweigh the liabilities. The speakers listed the benefits of having military bases distributed around the world: ability to respond to situations quickly, maintaining readiness for larger operations, training with allied nations, and allowing public diplomacy to the host country. But there are drawbacks too. Host countries can gain a certain amount of leverage over the United States by threatening to deny troops’ freedoms, but this is only possible when base residents were highly dependent on local infrastructure (as in Panama).
US strategy in the Persian Gulf benefits from keeping an array of regional allies. Building on Stephen Cheney’s comment that withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would be “inherently foolish” given US interests, Des Roches argued that keeping a “constellation of bases” in the region is an asset in case access to any one is suddenly rescinded. While Al-Attiyah assured that Qatar had agreed to lease its base at Al Udeid to the US until 2023, his promise was couched with the caveat that “in our region everything can be changed overnight.”
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A weakened America
Is America stronger after 11 months of Donald Trump or not?
It is demonstrably weaker, mainly because of his diplomatic moves and non-moves, but also because Trump has done nothing to reduce American military commitments and a good deal to expand them. Let me enumerate:
The diplomatic front:
- Trump withdrew from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) early in the game. The remaining negotiating partners have X-ed out the provisions the US wanted on labor and environmental protection and are preparing to proceed, without American participation. TPP was America’s ace in the Asia Pacific.
- He is withdrawing as well from the Paris Climate Change accord. That is also proceeding without the US, which will be unable to affect international deliberations on climate change unless and until it rejoins.
- He has withdrawn from UNESCO, which excludes the US from participation in a lot of cultural, scientific and educational endeavors.
- He hasn’t announced withdrawal from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but the negotiations on revising it are thought to be going very badly, mainly because of excessive US demands.
- He has refused to certify that the Iran nuclear deal is in the US interest, which is so patently obvious that the Republican-controlled Congress is making no moves to withdraw from it.
- His ill-framed appeal to the Saudis to halt financing of terrorists has precipitated a dramatic split among US allies within the Gulf Cooperation Council.
- Through his son-in-law he encouraged the Saudis to try to try to depose Lebanon’s prime minister and embargo Qatar, making the prime minister more popular than ever and shifting Doha’s allegiance to Iran.
- He has continued American support for the Saudi/Emirati war effort in Yemen, while at the same time the State Department has called for an end to the Saudi/Emirati blockade due to the humanitarian crisis there.
- His decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem heightened tensions between Israel and the Palestinians, undermined his own peace initiative, and obstructed the rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia he hoped for.
- He has done nothing to counter Iran’s growing influence in Iraq and Syria, or Russia’s position in Syria and Ukraine.
- He initially embraced Turkey’s now President Erdogan but has watched helplessly while Turkey tarnishes its democratic credentials and drifts into the Russian orbit.
- He has also embraced other autocrats: Philippine President Duterte, China’s President Xi, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to name only three.
- He has failed to carry the banner of American values and preferred instead transactional relationships that have so far produced nothing substantial for the US.
The military front:
- Use of drones is way up.
- So is deployment of US troops in Europe, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, not to mention ships and planes in the Asia Pacific.
- The Islamic State, while retreating in Syria and Iraq, is advancing in Afghanistan, where the Taliban and Al Qaeda are also holding their own.
- Allies are hesitating to pitch in, because the president is erratic. Japan, South Korea, and the Europeans are hedging because the US can no longer be relied on.
- The US continues to back the Saudi and Emirati campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, precipitating a massive humanitarian crisis.
- Cyberthreats to the US, including its elections, have increased, without any counter from the administration.
- Promises that North Korea would not be allowed to develop a missile that could strike the US have gone unfulfilled, and Trump did nothing effective once it accomplished that goal.
- Military options against North Korea, which are all that Trump seems to be interested in, will bring catastrophic results not only for Koreans but also for US forces stationed there and in the region.
- Russia continues to occupy part of Ukraine, with no effective military or diplomatic response by the US, and Moscow continues its aggressive stance near the Baltics, in the North Sea, in the Arctic, and in the Pacific.
The diplomatic record is one of almost unmitigated failure and ineffectiveness, apart from new UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea. The military record is more mixed: ISIS is defeated on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, but that is a victory well foreshadowed in the previous administration. It is also far from reassuring, since ISIS will now go underground and re-initiate its terrorist efforts. None of the other military pushes has done more than hold the line. Anyone who expected Trump to withdraw from excessive military commitments should be very disappointed. Anyone who expects him to be successful diplomatically without a fully staffed and empowered State Department is deluded.
The US is more absent diplomatically than present, and more present militarily than effective. We are punching well below our weight. This should be no surprise: the State Department is eviscerated and the Pentagon is exhausted. Allies are puzzled. Adversaries are taking advantage.
Where will we be after another three years of this?
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It may not last
I spent three days last week in Baghdad: two talking with people from all over the Middle East (with the important exception of Turkey) about the current situation and one talking with Iraqis.
First Baghdad: It is looking and sounding far more peaceful than it did six years ago, when I last visited. No detonations, lots of trees and other plants, heavy traffic, and bustling sidewalks. I didn’t get out of the Green Zone a lot, but we did stop in Kadhimia and Adhamiyah to see the main mosques. Apart from the all too evident sectarian character of both (the former Shia and the latter Sunni), there was nothing remarkable: just people going about normal life shopping, chatting, praying, strolling, and honking. What a change from 2004-2011, when I visited a couple of times per year. Adhamiyah during part of that time had to be surrounded with T-walls and checkpoints to protect its population from slaughter.
The Iraqi leadership: We of course only met a few people in high places, including the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of parliament, and one minister, in addition to a member of parliament and some of the prime minister’s staff. All are happy to see the Islamic State defeated on the battlefield and all are concerned not to allow it to revive. All are also looking to make cross-sectarian or cross-ethnic alliances in advance of next year’s May 12 election. None were waving sectarian or ethnic identity as their main calling card. This data suggests why (sorry for the size–Wordpress won’t scale it up):
In the general population, sectarian and ethnic identities are still terribly important. While Ayatollah Sistani’s call for volunteers roused some Sunnis to the cause of fighting ISIS, the Popular Mobilization Units he spawned are mostly aggressively Shia and believed to harbor political ambitions. Nor has the Kurdish retreat from pursuing independence reduced popular Kurdish enthusiasm for their own, independent state.
But the leadership has come to understand that gaining a majority in parliament and thereby control of the state requires, under the somewhat ramshackle 2005 constitution, coalitions. Besides, most Iraqis are looking for civil or secular technocrats to run the country. That reduces the relevance of ethnic and sectarian identity, of which Iraqis seem to have had their fill, at least as qualifications for governing.
None of this means the competition among the elite is finished, or even attenuated. To the contrary: all the main sectarian and ethnic blocks are fragmenting. The Kurds are no longer as united as once they were, among the Shia both the Dawa party and what used to be the Supreme Council are split, and there is no clearly dominant figure among the Sunnis. This should make cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian alliances a far more important factor than they have been in the past.
The other Middle Easterners: The mood among the other Middle Easterners attending this session of the Middle East Institute’s Dialogue was likewise more sanguine and friendly than I would have anticipated. All, like the Iraqis, are glad to see the Islamic State dealt defeat in Iraq and Syria, even if they anticipate that it will go underground and re-emerge as an insurgency. All disapproved but seemed more puzzled than angry about President Trump’s announcement on moving the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. All were happy to see Iraq in a better place.
There the commonalities seemed to end. The Iranians, who in the past have sometimes appeared irascible, were calm and analytical as well as concerned that their victory in Syria brought responsibilities they would rather avoid and anxious for a political solution in Yemen. They also seemed concerned that Iran’s effort to defend itself by supporting Shia proxy forces in the region was at its limit.
The Saudis and Emiratis were enthused about the new direction Riyadh is taking not only in Iraq but also in Yemen and in domestic Saudi policy. Others from Arab countries (Egypt and Jordan) were more reflective and a bit unsure what to make of the “new” Saudi Arabia. Several were concerned that the war is not really over: an Israeli or American attack on the Iranians or Hizbollah there could renew hostilities, not to mention the risk of an American clash with the Russians.
Unfortunately there were neither Turks nor Kurds in these group discussions. Had there been, the atmosphere and substance would have been more contentious. The uncertainty about American policy towards the Syrian Kurds is still big: will the Americans restrain them from attacking inside Turkey, or helping the Kurdish insurgents there? Will the Americans try to take back the heavier weapons they provided? Will the Americans withdraw precipitously? There are a lot of known unknowns that could affect the situation in Syria dramatically.
The extra-regional great powers: While a Moscow-based participant was quick to suggest that Russia had defeated ISIS, the Russians and Chinese were concerned, not happy, that post-ISIS Syria is their responsibility. They want the US involved, for both political and financial reasons. The Americans are showing no such inclination. Their assumption is that the Astana/Sochi process run by the Russians with cooperation from Iran and Turkey has superseded the Geneva process run by the UN to resolve the political conflict in Syria. They see no reason beyond defeating ISIS and possibly countering Iran for the American presence in Syria.
Bottom line: Despite the war in Yemen and the uncertainties surrounding how the war is ending in Syria, there is more reason to be sanguine about the region than people in Washington perceive. The bad news is it may not last.
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The longer he lasts, the weaker we get
I spent yesterday getting home from Baghdad, so missed the opportunity to say anything quick and trenchant about the Administration’s National Security Strategy. The main takeaways are these:
- It is closer to establishment thinking than anticipated given the predilections of the President for upsetting the apple cart;
- Still, it is more hostile to China and less realistic about Russia than many of us might like;
- It bears little resemblance to what the President has been saying and doing.
He wasn’t even able to read from the Teleprompter “principled realism” and converted it to “our new strategy is based on a principle, realism.” Credit to @PeterBeinart for that observation.
As in most documents of this sort, what was left out is as interesting as what is included.
Everyone is noticing the absence of climate change, which the Administration continues to deny despite the obvious and devastating hurricanes that hit Texas and Puerto Rico this year as well as the current fires burning in California. Sure it could all be random variation, but we know that isn’t likely because of the long secular record scientists have been able to construct. The planet is detectably warming–witness the melting of sea ice in the Arctic–with serious implications for US national security, whether or not human activity is the cause. The Administration is ignoring the problem because it would cost more money than the Republicans want to spend and block the dismantling of Obama’s energy-related regulatory actions.
Other things missing, as Max Boot notes, are free trade, democracy promotion, and international cooperation, in particular in the form of expanding the rules-based international order.
More immediately concerning in my view is any serious consideration to what happens after the defeat of the Islamic State. There is reference to helping fragile states to avoid threats to the US homeland, but that could mean simply strengthening their security forces and ignoring governance, economic and social issues that lie at the root of extremism. Dictatorship is no cure for what ails the weak states of the Middle East. It is what brought about the Islamic State and we won’t be able to eradicate it using only force.
But in the end, the main problem with this document is that it doesn’t jibe with what the President himself says and believes, as Max documents in some detail. Last week in Baghdad, I found this divergence between the Administration and the President the single biggest concern among Middle Easterners (including Iraqis, Saudis, Iranians, and Emiratis). Their consternation about the move of the US embassy to Jerusalem was no greater. The world is used to clear US positions. Their absence creates an enormous vulnerability, one that even the Russians and Chinese find unsettling. When other countries cannot count on what the President says, they hedge in ways that weaken the US.
A well-crafted national security strategy won’t fix that problem. Nor will any amount of adult guidance from Generals McMaster, Mattis, and Kelly. The President can’t get it right even from a Teleprompter. He lacks the mental discipline and depth of experience to understand the implications outside the US of what he says and does not say. Even if the national security strategy were 100% on target, the longer this presidency lasts, the weaker the US will get.
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