Tag: United Kingdom
Stevenson’s army, August 12
– IEA says sanctions have reduced Russian oil production only 3%.
– Brookings has its analysis of a war over Taiwan.
– FP analyzes Liz Truss’ foreign policy.
– BU prof wants US to use wheat as a weapon.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Wishful thinking won’t end this war
I have a lot of respect for my SAIS colleague Chris Chivvis. He argues that Ukraine should start the reconstruction process as soon as possible (which the headline writer interpreted as “end the war” as soon as possible). To his credit, Chris admits that “…de facto acceptance of a divided Ukraine, even if not de jure, means a hostile, potentially disruptive Russia on the border.”
Rhetorically appealing
Chris’ argument is rhetorically appealing:
Ukraine wins by seizing the opportunity, while its still can, to immediately begin a massive, western-funded reconstruction effort that turbo-charges its political and economic integration into Europe, strengthens its security, and speeds it down the path toward a democratic future. Ukraine wins by demonstrating the extraordinary resilience of political and economic liberalism to the world and starting that process as soon as possible, not in five years when the country is destroyed and the world has moved on. Ukraine wins by stopping Russia from extinguishing its independence, which so far has been miraculously preserved, but remained at risk until the fighting stops. Ukraine wins by channeling the national energy that has been generated by the war into a better peace and a stronger, more prosperous nation.
Sounds great.
But it’s not realistic
If only all that were possible. The trouble is the enemy gets a vote. There will be no peace for Ukraine so long as Russia remains undefeated, an occupation power on Ukrainian territory. Moscow still controls several major ports and embargoes Ukrainian exports from the others.
If the war ends tomorrow, Moscow will use nonmilitary means to undermine Ukraine. Those will include cyber attacks, disinformation, economic manipulation, assassinations, terrorist incidents, violent demonstrations, support to organized crime and corruption, and a host of other measures I can’t yet imagine. But we have already seen all the ones I cite in the Balkans, Syria, and other places where Moscow has pretensions. Until it suffers a clear defeat, Russia will also use any letup in the Ukraine war to undermine Moldova (not a NATO member) and Poland (a NATO member. It will also raise the threat to the Baltic states as well as NATO aspirants Finland and Sweden. And it will intensify its destabilization efforts in the Balkans.
Western support will wane
I have no doubt President Zelensky would like to end the war as soon as possible. He has said as much from the first. He knows what Chris knows. The longer it goes on, the more politics in Europe and US will start to turn against Ukraine. Many of the West’s friends and enemies understand full well that democracies today find it hard to outlast autocracies. Support for Ukraine has so far held up well. But rising energy prices, more general inflation, a possible recession, and other domestic concerns will undermine support for Ukraine, which so far has held up well.
But the situation is not yet ripe
But now is not the time to throw in the towel and hope Moscow will leave Ukraine to its Western aspirations. The time to think about a negotiated end of the war is when Kiev and Moscow both think they can gain more at the negotiating table than by continuing the fight. That day has not yet come. Ending the fighting now is possible, but it won’t allow the kind of reconstruction and progress Chris wants. Wishful thinking and rhetorical appeal won’t end this war.
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Maybe smaller is better, for now
I’ve been getting questions lately about the EU-sponsored dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. Will it restart in earnest? Is it just moribund or stone cold dead?
Certainly it has been unproductive. We are approaching the 10th year since the Brussels “political” agreement of 2013. A decade of stasis in the Balkans risks unraveling regional peace and stability. Just listen to Dugin:
So is there hope for progress?
The moment is not propitious. Serbia has aligned itself with Russia, not only on Ukraine, and the Serb-ruled 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina is Moscow’s lap dog, as Dugin makes clear. The US, UK, and the European Union are preoccupied with helping the Ukrainians respond to Russian aggression. The Balkan region is way down the list of urgencies.
Besides, the 2022 and 2024 US elections will soon focus American attention on domestic issues. Everyone in the Balkans will be holding their breath to see if Donald Trump has a real chance of returning to the White House. If it looks good for him, Serbia will want to continue to pause the dialogue with Kosovo, as Trump was sympathetic to Belgrade’s territorial ambitions. If Pristina wants anything from the dialogue, it needs to get it soon.
Acknowledgement of abuses may be a non-starter
Listening to both Kosovo President Osmani and Prime Minister Kurti’s public statements, my sense is that they would both like Serbian President Vucic to acknowledge the abuses of the Milosevic regime in Kosovo in the 1990s. Vucic, who served in that regime, has been unwilling, both in public and in private. He suffers from a severe case of amnesia and “bothsideism.” Kurti, who spent time reading Sartre in a Serbian prison during the 1999 war, remembers well. Neither has a domestic political constituency that yearns for an agreement.
But Vucic’s acknowledgement of the Serbian effort to ethnically cleanse Albanians from Kosovo and of the thousands of rapes by Serbian forces would open the way to improved cooperation, as exhorted in the 2010 General Assembly resolution that launched the dialogue. Kurti would need to acknowledge Albanian abuses against Serbs and Roma, even if much smaller in number. Such acknowledgements would need to be coupled with as full accounting for missing people by both governments as possible. That would clear the way for exchange of bodies and provision for appropriate memorialization in both countries.
License plates should be easier
There should be room to resolve the issue that caused a brouhaha last fall: mutual acceptance of license plates. So far negotiations for a permanent solution have failed, due to Serbia’s refusal to allow Kosovo plates to enter the country with indications of where they originate. The current practice–covering state symbols on both Kosovo and Serbian plates before allowing entry–is a modest improvement on Serbia’s prior requirement that Kosovo plates be replaced with Serbian ones, but it is still wasteful and juvenile.
Accepting license plates and Kosovo documents is not the same as recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state. The five non-recognizing members of the EU accept lots of Kosovo documents and also maintain diplomatic representation in Pristina. Serbia should do likewise.
Electricity is harder
Pristina wants the Serbs in northern Kosovo to start paying for electricity, which a Kosovo entity has provided free since 1999. This is reasonable, but if Pristina insists Belgrade may supply the electricity from Serbia, further detaching the northern municipalities from Pristina’s governance, an important Serbian objective. As tens of millions of euros are at issue, this one won’t be easy to resolve on its own. A broader financial settlement may be possible.
Hedging and bandwagoning
While these issues eat away at mutual confidence, Serbia has been re-arming itself and deploying forces near and around Kosovo. Belgrade tells Washington Serbian cooperation with NATO is much deeper and more important than cooperation with Russia. But the Defense Ministry vaunts a historical maximum in defense cooperation with Russia, which has provided fighter jets and tanks as well as lots of other goodies. Vucic has increasingly aligned himself politically and militarily with Moscow and Beijing, not only on Ukraine. He claims non-alignment, but hedging is difficult in an era of geopolitical tension. He has tilted way over to the East. Dugin knows of what he speaks.
By contrast, Kosovo has no hedging option so bandwagons with NATO, which is still responsible for defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pristina’s army, which the US and UK mentor, is slated to be fully operational in 2027. It will be NATO compatible. A few of its soldiers have already deployed with the Americans. Kosovo quickly welcomed Afghan and now Ukrainian refugees, aligns solidly with sanctions on Russia, and is providing de-mining training to Ukrainians.
So the dialogue is not just between Kosovo and Serbia, but also between West and East. As Lenin put it: “show me who your friends are, and I will tell you what you are.”
Maybe smaller is better for now
The situation is not “ripe” for a big agreement. Before 2010, when the more political version was launched, the dialogue focused on small, “technical” issues like Kosovo’s international calling code, return of cultural artifacts, and mutual recognition of diplomas. Maybe it is time to go back to those–including missing persons and license plates. Another possibility is a regional negotiation of basic principles of mutual behavior, which are sorely lacking. Neither idea is as grand as “normalizing relations” or mutual recognition. But maybe smaller is better for now.
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Putin is hesitating but not yet lost
Russian President Putin has given his military orders to prepare for the invasion of Ukraine, but he is hesitating to give the green light. The French claim he has agreed to a meeting with President Biden following on a meeting between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary of State Blinken February 24. For the Americans, all of this is contingent on the Russians not invading Ukraine. Moscow says there are no plans for a presidential meeting.
What is going on? There are several possible explanations:
- Military preparations are not yet complete.
- Putin is not satisfied with his domestic support in Russia and Donbas.
- The Chinese warning against invastion has given him pause.
- Diplomatic efforts are promising.
- The Western threat of sanctions is deterring action.
Military preparations
I’m no military expert, but journalists report that Russian commanders have everything they need to proceed. Blood supplies and field hospitals were already in place by last week. Putin was lying when he said Russian forces were drawing down. They are now up to 150,000, enough to seize and control a piece of the country but not enough to occupy its entire territory.
I still am not inclined to believe the Russian objective is to seize Kyiv. I think they aim to make the Sea of Azov a Russian lake. A movement toward Kyiv might make the Ukrainians draw down in the south. But a serious attack on Kyiv would cause devastation that would be difficult for the Russians ever to repair, not to mention Ukrainian hostility and resistance.
Support in Russia and in Donbas
Russia’s parliament has already urged Putin to recognize the independence of the Russian proxy authorities in Donestk and Luhansk, as he has done for South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. The de facto authorities in Donbas have ordered an evacuation of civilians, many of whom have been getting Russian citizenship.
But they are for the most part not departing, even though the rebel military forces have ratcheted up the bombardment of Ukrainian targets to provoke a response. The popular mood in Russia does not favor full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But extending Russian control in the Donbas area would not prove highly problematic either in Russia or in the insurgent portion of Donbas.
Chinese opposition
President Xi did not give Putin the full-throated endorsement he sought for invasion of Ukraine when they met at the opening of the Beijing Olympics. Then last week the Chinese Foreign Minister used the occasion of the Munich Security Conference to back Russia’s position on keeping Ukraine out of NATO but also to pull the rug out from under Putin’s invasion plans.
China favors continued diplomacy instead. Russia will desperately need China to help in sanctions-busting if the invasion proceeds. Beijing however wants to avoid further aggravation of relations with the US. Putin needs again to seek and get Chinese reassurance.
Diplomatic efforts
There is little sign that diplomatic efforts are bearing fruit. According to French President Macron, Putin has agreed to meet with Ukraine and the OSCE. But that is thin gruel.
The US has rejected Russia’s demand that Washington guarantee no NATO membership for Ukraine. Moscow has continued to insist. The Americans have tried to shift the diplomatic agenda to mutual arms and conventional force limitations. They hope Russia will view those as responsive to Moscow’s effort to roll back NATO forces from its borders. Putin however isn’t buying. He wants Russian forces right on the borders of the Baltics, Poland, Belarus, or Ukraine.
Sanctions
Sanctions are a likely factor in Putin’s hesitation. Britain is prepared to end Russia’s access to pounds and British property. The Americans are presumably ready to do likewise. For a country that depends on oil and gas exports, both normally denominated in dollars or another hard currency, that is major.
We don’t know what German Chancellor Scholz said to Putin during his visit last week to Moscow. But President Biden has repeatedly asserted that the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline (completed but not yet operational) is toast “one way or the other” if Russia invades. We don’t know what that means. Scholz likely does. He has shown no sign of disagreeing with Biden.
Bottom lines
Putin holds his cards close, but he is hesitating. I’d give sanctions and the China factor each 40% as factors in his hesitation. Support in Russia and Donbas as well as military preparations I’d each put at 10% each. The diplomatic factor is important only insofar as Blinken continues to reassure Putin that the Americans are still willing to negotiate. That gives him reason not to hurry while he gets China and sanctions-busting fixed.
Still, invasion is more likely than not. Putin is hesitating, but he is not yet lost.
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Stevenson’s army, January 24
Lots of leaks following the Camp David meeting to discuss Ukraine options. Most strike me as authorized, rather than an effort by those losing the interagency debate. NYT says US might send more troops to Baltics. WaPo says US plans heavy sanctions to prevent transfer to Russia of US semiconductors and aircraft parts.
– Meanwhile, US & UK have begun withdrawals of dependents and some staff from Ukraine.
– FT suggest all the publicity has undercut effectiveness of deterrent.
– WSJ sees Russia angle in US sale of F16s to Turkey.
– NYT writer says Pakistan army wants US back in region.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Long live the dialogue, even if it is stalled!
Two interviews I gave last month were published in Kosovo, in Serbian and Albanian respectively, over the weekend.
Veljko Nestorovic of Kosovo Online did this one:
Q: Was 2021 an unsuccessful year when it comes to the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina?
A: Yes the dialogue is stalled and will continue to be stalled at least until after the Serbian elections in 2022.
Q: With the appointment of the UK Special Envoy, as well as two US Envoys for the Western Balkans, will the US and the UK take the lead in dialogue?
A: The US continues to want the EU to lead, but I think both the UK and US will be more prepared to work in tandem with the EU than was at times true in the past.
Q: How do you view US sanctions. Are you expecting new names on the US list?
A: Yes, I imagine there will be more people named.
Q: Prime Minister Kurti has repeatedly stated that the issue of the missing must be resolved. At the moment, about 1,600 people are listed as missing, but in addition to Belgrade, given that one-third of the missing are non-Albanians, most Serbs, does Pristina have a responsibility in the search for those missing?
A: Yes of course. Pristina should be accounting for any missing on which it has information. That should include any victims of the KLA or of other Albanian armed groups.
Q: Is there a possibility for an agreement and a new meeting between Kurti and Vučić during 2022?
A: There is always a possibility, but I doubt it before the Serbian elections.
Q: Do you expect visa liberalization for Kosovo in 2022?
A: I’d be foolish to expect it, but I do hope it will happen in 2022. The French and Dutch need to tell Pristina why they have hesitated and give Pristina an opportunity to satisfy them.
Q: Do you expect a greater role of the USA in the Western Balkans during 2022 when it comes to dialogue, but also BiH [Bosnia]?
A: The US is already more focused on BiH than it has been in the past and will likely continue its diplomatic efforts there in 2022. But let me be clear: the right direction for the US should be more respect for individual rights in BiH. Nothing the US does should strengthen the stranglehold of ethnic nationalist political parties on power. They are the problem, not the solution. A more civic state would be a more functional state in BiH.
Besnik Gashi of Lajmi.net did this one:
Q: The first issue that I would like to discuss is the steps that Kosovo has taken in recent years in the framework of the dialogue with Serbia. I would like to ask what do you consider to be the most progressive and regressive agreements since the beginning of the technical dialogue between the two countries, where they were mediated by Brussels?
A: I’m not going to answer your question, for a good reason. There is no definitive evaluation of the agreements and their impact, despite the laudable efforts of civil society organizations in both Kosovo and Serbia.
This is not good. I believe the US and EU should regularly issue progress reports on implementation, obstacles to implementation, and impact. These should be based on close cooperation with civil society and government organizations in both countries.
Speaking more broadly, I think the dialogue has had a positive impact on Kosovo’s international standing by putting it on an equal and symmetrical basis with Serbia in the EU context, even though it has had a negative impact by allowing Serbia to encourage countries to delay recognition while the dialogue proceeds.
Q: Since we are talking about Brussels, it should be noted the achievement of the Agreement on the formation of the Association of Municipalities by Kosovo is facing full opposition from the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti. According to him, the agreement has been achieved by previous governments and is endangering the “Bosnianization” of Kosovo, in the sense of building a new Republika Srpska.
What is your opinion about the Association and the opposition that is being made to it by the Prime Minister?
A: The Prime Minister is doing something I think is a good negotiating tactic: holding back on Serbia’s top priority because Serbia is holding back on Kosovo’s top priorities, namely recognition and UN membership. The Association issue would look very different if Serbia were prepared to recognize Kosovo and tell Moscow and Beijing to allow Pristina into the UN.
Q: On the other hand, the US has issued a sort of ultimatum to Kosovo to reach a comprehensive agreement with Serbia during the term of the current Kosovo government, which culminates in mutual recognition of the two countries. What do you think, can the mentioned agreement be finalized within 3 or 4 years?
A: It can be finalized in 3 or 4 months once there is the political will on both sides to make the necessary compromises. But there is no sign at all of that from Serbia, and little of it from Kosovo.
Q: There has also been rumours of active US involvement in the dialogue, or even direct, in order to speed up a final agreement. Do you think such a thing should happen?
A: It can happen, but if it triggers Russian involvement it would not be a good thing.
Q: The US, namely the U.S Department of the Treasury, has recently targeted smuggling and criminal groups in Kosovo, some of them politicians. Do you think that there is a example of similar actions that the US has implemented in other countries and will follow them in the case of Kosovo, as well as whether the politicians of the countries in the region can be spared?
A: My understanding is that the US sanctions for corruption are and will continue to be global, not just the Balkans. No one guilty should be spared.
Q: In an interview last year, you told that Grenell is not a friend of Kosovars. Does this opinion still stand, given that Grenell during this year, following the diplomacy in the shadow of Kosovo, came to visit and said that he would take care of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and the implementation of the Washington Agreement?
A: Grenell should be avoided by anyone in either Serbia or Kosovo who wishes the dialogue well. He is a grifter, not a diplomat. The Washington Agreement isn’t worth much more than the two separate pieces of paper it was typed on.
Q: We are nearly in the end of this year and next year is expected to be more promising for Kosovars when it comes to visa liberalization. Hope has been raised with the arrival of a new chancellery in Germany, which in their political program for the Western Balkans also envisage visa liberalization for Kosovo. Do you think that Germany will be active enough to convince the skeptical countries of the EU Council?
A: I certainly hope so. Kosovo merits the visa waiver. Germany is the de facto leader of the EU in the Balkans. Berlin needs to make its weight felt.
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