Tag: United Kingdom
Deterrence is absurd and risky, disarmament difficult but necessary
Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA nuclear inspector, writes:
The use of nuclear weapons is at the core of NATO security policy. At the same time, their role continues to increase in the national strategy of all nine nuclear-armed states, both the five Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) (USA, Russia, China, UK and France), as well as the four non-NPT de facto nuclear weapon possessors (India, Pakistan, North Korea), and allegedly Israel. They all appear committed to retaining nuclear capacity for the indefinite future by adding new nuclear weapon systems or modernizing the existing ones, pledging at any opportunity that they retain a strong nuclear deterrence.
The rationality of nuclear deterrence is based on two fundamental characteristics of today’s advanced nuclear weapon systems: a) the capability of instantaneous counterattack and b) the immense destruction power they possess.
Thus, an intentional nuclear first strike should not be launched as a pre-emptive surprise attack to destroy the adversary’s nuclear weapon arsenal because the attacker would not survive either. The logical consequence of this reality is that the nuclear capacity of each nuclear weapon possessor establishes the definite deterrence to an adversarial nuclear first strike.
However, as in mathematics so in the nuclear world, there is no second without a first. The No-First-Use nuclear postures of the five NWS plus India include a critical footnote: the right to a pre-emptive nuclear first strike against any armed attack that would threaten their vital security interests, whether nuclear or conventional.
Additionally, two more nuclear first-strike possibilities arise from:
- The First-Use doctrines of North Korea (DPRK), Pakistan, and Israel. For DPRK, to pre-empt a regime decapitation. For Pakistan, as a desperate necessity against India’s Kashmir policy, and for Israel, as the strategic national survival choice.
- The probability of launching a nuclear weapon by accident, miscalculation, or a malicious/terrorist act. This probability is steadily increasing, as the nuclear arsenals are maintained, modernized, and eventually growing.
The continuously existing possibility of a nuclear first strike, for whatever cause, will instantaneously trigger a counter response. This makes the possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence only, i.e. for a forced second strike, a dangerous absurdity.
This situation fully reflects a dead-end reality, described in the game theory as the Nash equilibrium. Solving the Nash equilibrium in the nuclear deterrence analogy would require cooperation of the antagonists (an oxymoron condition) yet the only solution: lowering all armed-raised-hands before shooting at each other. In other words, abstaining from the absurdity of being the first attacker, the necessity of being the responder, or the danger of either side committing an error.
Moreover, maintaining weapons for strengthening states’ geopolitical objectives inspires would-be proliferators. While the NPT was in force since 1970, proliferation took place successfully in four non-NPT states: India, Pakistan, DPRK, and allegedly in Israel. Additionally, four more NPT states attempted proliferation: Romania (by 1989), Iraq (by 1991), Libya (by 2003), and “very likely” Syria (by 2011) [re: “Global Nuclear Developments”, by P. F. Ikonomou, Springer 2020, 4.4 Syria 2011-2020, page 55].
History also suggests that nuclear deterrence was again and again ineffective. Common irony: nuclear weapon holders after World War II lost several wars they entered; the UK at Suez (Egypt), France in Algeria, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the US in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Likewise, the UK and France could not hold on to their colonial possessions despite having nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union collapsed while sitting on the world’s largest ever nuclear arsenal.
In conclusion:
Nuclear deterrence is dangerous. It does not establish strategic stability, but rather prolongs global uncertainty, maintaining the possibility of two-party nuclear standoffs, single acts of despair and survival, or an accident, error, or terror. Pursuing weapons that can never be used without destroying your own country is irrational, dangerous, wasteful, and pointless.
Maintaining nuclear weapons for attaining geopolitical objectives inspires would-be proliferators.
Nuclear deterrence without attempting global and complete nuclear disarmament is nothing but a nebulous political stalemate. Global nuclear disarmament is not an easy process. It cannot be quick, quiet nor cheap. It is an extremely complex task, but it must be pursued before the last human error occurs.
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Stevenson’s army, September 18
– NYT has story about Israel’s killing of an Iranian nuclear scientist.
– NYT has more on secret diplomacy leading to AUKUS.
– And fascinating NYT story on how Russia manipulates its elections.
– FP says US wants regular bases in Australia.
-WaPo says Milley actions tend to politicize US military.
– Early examples of redistricting games.
– Good advice for writing policy memos and op-eds from Todd Rogers of Harvard:
1. Make it shorter.
2. Simplify the language.
3. Use formatting to direct attention.
4. Make key information obvious to skimmers.
5. Make the response as easy as possible.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, September 17
– China reacts by seeking to join TPP.
– Arms controllers get concerned.
-Latin American summit looks to replace OAS.
-LIndsey Graham looks to pull a Charlie Wilson.
And look at all the stuff Members want to put in the NDAA.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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If you hijack an airplane, you are a hijacker
Belarus’ hijacking of a Ryanair flight crossing its territory in order to arrest a dissident journalist is a quantum jump in contemporary autocratic behavior. No doubt autocratic governments will justify it on the basis of exerting national sovereignty over their own air space. But it endangered close to 200 innocent people and set a precedent for future actions of this sort. The punishment in most countries is life imprisonment or death.
What can be done about Belarus’ perfidy? The objectives should be the freeing of the journalist and making it clear that there is nothing to be gained from state hijacking of aircraft. The US, EU, UK, and other willing countries should engage as quickly as possible with both Minsk and Moscow to determine if there is any possibility of an early release of the journalist and to convey their willingness to take further action if he is not released right away.
That effort may well fail, so here are a few ideas of next steps to pressure Minsk:
- The US, UK, and EU could expand their travel and financial sanctions on regime figures and institutions in Belarus. These could include SWIFT restrictions on transactions involving Belarusan banks.
- They could end EU, World Bank and International Monetary Fund grants, lending, and programs in Belarus.
- They could prevent Belavia, the national airline, from landing on their territory.
- They could recall their ambassadors for consultations, expel Belarusan diplomats, or break diplomatic relations with Minsk.
- They could pledge to detain for questioning about the incident Belarusan officials found on their territory, including but not limited to President Lukashenko (yes, I know heads of state are supposed to have diplomatic immunity).
- They can insist on an investigation by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
While this hijacking was manifestly a threat to peace and security, convening the UN Security Council may not be useful, as Belarus can likely rely on Russia to prevent any serious action there, even a presidential statement. After all, that’s what the US did for Israel just in the past couple of weeks to prevent a statement on the Gaza war.
I am not advocating any of the above options, just pointing them out. The trick is to craft some reasonable combination of them and other ideas. Most important is that the US, EU, and UK act together. If they do, the message will be greatly amplified.
There is a real possibility that this is the beginning of the end of Belarusan independence. Russian President Putin, while nominally backing Lukashenko’s right to do what he did, might take the opportunity to defenestrate him (figuratively if not literally), knowing that the West won’t seriously object under current circumstances. Even before this incident, the Russians were taking over. Why not take advantage of the opportunity to complete the process?
President Biden now faces a second crisis situation he doesn’t want, following on the Hamas/Israel war. He looked reasonably adept in that instance. With Belarus, he should expect the EU to play a stronger role, but he has to be prepared to lead if need be. The world will notice if the West is unable to deal with state hijacking. Let’s see what Biden can do.
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The path to ending the Kosovo conundrum
With apologies for the delay and thanks to Adam DuBard for getting it done, I am posting the report my students presented on Zoom Tuesday: Ending the Kosovo Conundrum (it is also now available on the SAIS website here). While our SAISers offered lots of interesting ideas about ways in which the EU-sponsored Belgrade/Pristina dialogue could be improved, they are not optimistic about the kind of comprehensive solution that the EU says is the objective of its Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. There is a stalemate, but it is hurting Kosovo more than Serbia, which is prepared to postpone–maybe forever–recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
This is understandable. Serbian President Vucic does not welcome the kind of rule of law and uncorrupt government the EU is demanding ever more insistently from potential new member states. Serbia got everything it asked for from Kosovo in the UN’s Ahtisaari Plan, which was intended as a prelude to Kosovo’s independence. Belgrade pocketed the concessions but refused recognition, even after the International Court of Justice advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law. Without the EU “carrot,” which Vucic is now disdaining, there is little hope of his changing his mind. Good neighborly relations are not going to be written on Vucic’s epitaph.
This leaves Kosovo in limbo, but not without a course of action: NATO membership is the key next step. This will require convincing four of the five EU countries that do not recognize Kosovo at least to accept it into the Alliance. Greece, Slovakia, Romania, and Spain are the holdouts, more or less in ascending order of difficulty. Cyprus is not a NATO member but cannot be entirely ignored because of its influence on Greece. That is the tail wagging the dog and will require a courageous Greek Prime Minister to get it to stop, but Greece already maintains an ambassadorial-level representative in Pristina and an office that is an embassy in all but name.
Kosovo is slated to complete the transformation of its security forces, a few of which have already deployed to Kuwait with the Iowa National Guard, into an army by 2027, with assistance from the US and UK. So there is ample time for the US and UK to convince the non-recognizing allies to accept Kosovo, even if they do not formally recognize it. NATO membership will require in addition that Kosovo meet the Alliance’s criteria:
a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority
populations; a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to make a military
contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutions.
These criteria are entirely compatible with EU membership, which is further off because Kosovo will have to in addition adopt and implement the acquis communautaire, an elaborate and extensive set of legal requirements.
This then is the strategy I would propose for the Kosovo government:
- focus on preparation for NATO membership, including resolution of conflicts with Serbia on issues like missing people and financial settlements but without expecting recognition anytime soon;
- improve relations with the Kosovo Serb community, whose interests are not identical with Belgrade’s, throughout Kosovo, including by providing it with access to the dialogue with Serbia for those who are not tied to Belgrade, better economic opportunities, protection of property rights, and continued efforts to recruit Serbs for the Kosovo armed forces;
- disavow any prospect of union with Albania, because it is incompatible with NATO membership, as Ed Joseph suggests;
- build capable state institutions, including a Defense Ministry committed to civilian control;
- protect media freedom, continue cooperation with civil society, and ensure an independent judiciary;
- begin to examine objectively the pre-independence fight for liberation from Serbian rule.
Many Kosovo Albanians are disappointed in the fruits of their efforts since declaring independence in 2008. But the distance ahead to NATO membership is far shorter than the time since independence. The government now has what should be a stable majority. Sovereignty depends on governing capacity. It is time to intensify efforts to build a worthy state, leaving the question of Serbian recognition to the day there is leadership in Belgrade that really cares about EU membership and realizes its own European future depends on it. Because it does.
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What if World War I had ended without US intervention?
SAIS Professor Charlie Stevenson writes:
Philip Zelikow, academic, diplomat, and executive director of the 9/11 commission, has written an excellent book with a deeply tragic story. The Road Less Traveled [Public Affairs, 2021] analyzes Woodrow Wilson’s failed effort to launch peace talks that could have ended the bloody conflict in Europe and kept the United States out of the war.
Zelikow knows how government works from the inside. He also co-authored the second edition of Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision, the landmark work on bureaucratic politics analysis. He uses that background to explain the many ways in which good intentions for peace were scuttled by zealots for war.
Among his assessments:
- Woodrow Wilson wanted to shepherd a peace conference but didn’t understand how to craft the diplomacy. He was more angry with Britain than Germany as late as January 31, 1917.
- Wilson was undermined by his close adviser, Edward House, who miscommunicated many of Wilson’s views to European diplomats and personally wanted to join the war in support of Britain.
- Wilson was also undermined by his senior State Department officials, who also favored joining the war with the Allies and who failed to turn Wilson’s goals into a plan.
- Germany’s civilian government desperately wanted peace and offered substantial concessions, but they were ultimately overruled by the military high command, who promised the kaiser a quick victory through submarine warfare.
- The British government was ready to accept peace talks in the fall of 1916, only to be out-maneuvered and then replaced by David Lloyd George, who privately believed the war couldn’t be won yet publicly vowed a fight to the finish. [His plan for victory envisioned battles in the Balkans and Turkey.]
- The French and Russian governments faced growing public opposition to continuing the war and would likely have agreed to a status quo ante bellum peace.
If only experienced career diplomats had developed a plan for launching peace talks…
If only Wilson had pushed ahead and forced his subordinates to act on that plan…
If only the British had recognized their desperate financial situation and acted while Asquith was still prime minister…
If only the German Chancellor had persuaded the kaiser to delay the return to unrestricted submarine warfare…
The United States would not have entered the war. [Wilson had already cut off British access to US loans.]
Russia might not have had its revolutions and ultimately a communist takeover.
Postwar Europe would not have been so disrupted by political unrest and military conflict.
I’ve spent a lot of time over the years studying the outbreak of war in 1914. Since historians usually only write about things that have happened, it’s rare to have such a solid work about something that almost happened. Zelikow has profound lessons for practitioners on how ideas get turned into policies and policies processed into accomplishments.
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