Tag: United Kingdom
Stevenson’s army, September 17
– China reacts by seeking to join TPP.
– Arms controllers get concerned.
-Latin American summit looks to replace OAS.
-LIndsey Graham looks to pull a Charlie Wilson.
And look at all the stuff Members want to put in the NDAA.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
If you hijack an airplane, you are a hijacker
Belarus’ hijacking of a Ryanair flight crossing its territory in order to arrest a dissident journalist is a quantum jump in contemporary autocratic behavior. No doubt autocratic governments will justify it on the basis of exerting national sovereignty over their own air space. But it endangered close to 200 innocent people and set a precedent for future actions of this sort. The punishment in most countries is life imprisonment or death.
What can be done about Belarus’ perfidy? The objectives should be the freeing of the journalist and making it clear that there is nothing to be gained from state hijacking of aircraft. The US, EU, UK, and other willing countries should engage as quickly as possible with both Minsk and Moscow to determine if there is any possibility of an early release of the journalist and to convey their willingness to take further action if he is not released right away.
That effort may well fail, so here are a few ideas of next steps to pressure Minsk:
- The US, UK, and EU could expand their travel and financial sanctions on regime figures and institutions in Belarus. These could include SWIFT restrictions on transactions involving Belarusan banks.
- They could end EU, World Bank and International Monetary Fund grants, lending, and programs in Belarus.
- They could prevent Belavia, the national airline, from landing on their territory.
- They could recall their ambassadors for consultations, expel Belarusan diplomats, or break diplomatic relations with Minsk.
- They could pledge to detain for questioning about the incident Belarusan officials found on their territory, including but not limited to President Lukashenko (yes, I know heads of state are supposed to have diplomatic immunity).
- They can insist on an investigation by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
While this hijacking was manifestly a threat to peace and security, convening the UN Security Council may not be useful, as Belarus can likely rely on Russia to prevent any serious action there, even a presidential statement. After all, that’s what the US did for Israel just in the past couple of weeks to prevent a statement on the Gaza war.
I am not advocating any of the above options, just pointing them out. The trick is to craft some reasonable combination of them and other ideas. Most important is that the US, EU, and UK act together. If they do, the message will be greatly amplified.
There is a real possibility that this is the beginning of the end of Belarusan independence. Russian President Putin, while nominally backing Lukashenko’s right to do what he did, might take the opportunity to defenestrate him (figuratively if not literally), knowing that the West won’t seriously object under current circumstances. Even before this incident, the Russians were taking over. Why not take advantage of the opportunity to complete the process?
President Biden now faces a second crisis situation he doesn’t want, following on the Hamas/Israel war. He looked reasonably adept in that instance. With Belarus, he should expect the EU to play a stronger role, but he has to be prepared to lead if need be. The world will notice if the West is unable to deal with state hijacking. Let’s see what Biden can do.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The path to ending the Kosovo conundrum
With apologies for the delay and thanks to Adam DuBard for getting it done, I am posting the report my students presented on Zoom Tuesday: Ending the Kosovo Conundrum (it is also now available on the SAIS website here). While our SAISers offered lots of interesting ideas about ways in which the EU-sponsored Belgrade/Pristina dialogue could be improved, they are not optimistic about the kind of comprehensive solution that the EU says is the objective of its Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. There is a stalemate, but it is hurting Kosovo more than Serbia, which is prepared to postpone–maybe forever–recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
This is understandable. Serbian President Vucic does not welcome the kind of rule of law and uncorrupt government the EU is demanding ever more insistently from potential new member states. Serbia got everything it asked for from Kosovo in the UN’s Ahtisaari Plan, which was intended as a prelude to Kosovo’s independence. Belgrade pocketed the concessions but refused recognition, even after the International Court of Justice advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law. Without the EU “carrot,” which Vucic is now disdaining, there is little hope of his changing his mind. Good neighborly relations are not going to be written on Vucic’s epitaph.
This leaves Kosovo in limbo, but not without a course of action: NATO membership is the key next step. This will require convincing four of the five EU countries that do not recognize Kosovo at least to accept it into the Alliance. Greece, Slovakia, Romania, and Spain are the holdouts, more or less in ascending order of difficulty. Cyprus is not a NATO member but cannot be entirely ignored because of its influence on Greece. That is the tail wagging the dog and will require a courageous Greek Prime Minister to get it to stop, but Greece already maintains an ambassadorial-level representative in Pristina and an office that is an embassy in all but name.
Kosovo is slated to complete the transformation of its security forces, a few of which have already deployed to Kuwait with the Iowa National Guard, into an army by 2027, with assistance from the US and UK. So there is ample time for the US and UK to convince the non-recognizing allies to accept Kosovo, even if they do not formally recognize it. NATO membership will require in addition that Kosovo meet the Alliance’s criteria:
a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority
populations; a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to make a military
contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutions.
These criteria are entirely compatible with EU membership, which is further off because Kosovo will have to in addition adopt and implement the acquis communautaire, an elaborate and extensive set of legal requirements.
This then is the strategy I would propose for the Kosovo government:
- focus on preparation for NATO membership, including resolution of conflicts with Serbia on issues like missing people and financial settlements but without expecting recognition anytime soon;
- improve relations with the Kosovo Serb community, whose interests are not identical with Belgrade’s, throughout Kosovo, including by providing it with access to the dialogue with Serbia for those who are not tied to Belgrade, better economic opportunities, protection of property rights, and continued efforts to recruit Serbs for the Kosovo armed forces;
- disavow any prospect of union with Albania, because it is incompatible with NATO membership, as Ed Joseph suggests;
- build capable state institutions, including a Defense Ministry committed to civilian control;
- protect media freedom, continue cooperation with civil society, and ensure an independent judiciary;
- begin to examine objectively the pre-independence fight for liberation from Serbian rule.
Many Kosovo Albanians are disappointed in the fruits of their efforts since declaring independence in 2008. But the distance ahead to NATO membership is far shorter than the time since independence. The government now has what should be a stable majority. Sovereignty depends on governing capacity. It is time to intensify efforts to build a worthy state, leaving the question of Serbian recognition to the day there is leadership in Belgrade that really cares about EU membership and realizes its own European future depends on it. Because it does.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What if World War I had ended without US intervention?
SAIS Professor Charlie Stevenson writes:
Philip Zelikow, academic, diplomat, and executive director of the 9/11 commission, has written an excellent book with a deeply tragic story. The Road Less Traveled [Public Affairs, 2021] analyzes Woodrow Wilson’s failed effort to launch peace talks that could have ended the bloody conflict in Europe and kept the United States out of the war.
Zelikow knows how government works from the inside. He also co-authored the second edition of Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision, the landmark work on bureaucratic politics analysis. He uses that background to explain the many ways in which good intentions for peace were scuttled by zealots for war.
Among his assessments:
- Woodrow Wilson wanted to shepherd a peace conference but didn’t understand how to craft the diplomacy. He was more angry with Britain than Germany as late as January 31, 1917.
- Wilson was undermined by his close adviser, Edward House, who miscommunicated many of Wilson’s views to European diplomats and personally wanted to join the war in support of Britain.
- Wilson was also undermined by his senior State Department officials, who also favored joining the war with the Allies and who failed to turn Wilson’s goals into a plan.
- Germany’s civilian government desperately wanted peace and offered substantial concessions, but they were ultimately overruled by the military high command, who promised the kaiser a quick victory through submarine warfare.
- The British government was ready to accept peace talks in the fall of 1916, only to be out-maneuvered and then replaced by David Lloyd George, who privately believed the war couldn’t be won yet publicly vowed a fight to the finish. [His plan for victory envisioned battles in the Balkans and Turkey.]
- The French and Russian governments faced growing public opposition to continuing the war and would likely have agreed to a status quo ante bellum peace.
If only experienced career diplomats had developed a plan for launching peace talks…
If only Wilson had pushed ahead and forced his subordinates to act on that plan…
If only the British had recognized their desperate financial situation and acted while Asquith was still prime minister…
If only the German Chancellor had persuaded the kaiser to delay the return to unrestricted submarine warfare…
The United States would not have entered the war. [Wilson had already cut off British access to US loans.]
Russia might not have had its revolutions and ultimately a communist takeover.
Postwar Europe would not have been so disrupted by political unrest and military conflict.
I’ve spent a lot of time over the years studying the outbreak of war in 1914. Since historians usually only write about things that have happened, it’s rare to have such a solid work about something that almost happened. Zelikow has profound lessons for practitioners on how ideas get turned into policies and policies processed into accomplishments.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks | April 26 – April 30, 2021
Peace Picks | April 26 – April 30, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
1. Supporting Sustainable Development in the Arctic: Estonia’s Role in Advancing Arctic Collaboration| April 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
There are many challenges in building sustainable and thriving communities in the Arctic while addressing the impacts of a warming and changing Arctic landscape due to climate change. As one of eight Arctic nations that comprise the Arctic Council, the United States, under the Biden Administration has called for an increase in international cooperation to address climate change in all facets of its domestic and foreign policy, including the Arctic. Estonia, a close neighbor of the Arctic, is applying for Observer status in the Arctic Council, is committed to mitigating the impacts of climate change, and advancing sustainable development in the Arctic. This discussion will offer an exchange of views by experts from the United States and Estonia on ways to promote collaboration to address the critical issues facing the Arctic, especially in the areas of research, environmental protection, and sustainable development.
Speakers:
Caroline Kennedy
Attorney, Author, Former US Ambassador to Japan
2. Soft Power and Practice of Diplomacy: A Conversation with Ambassador Caroline Kennedy| April 26, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Belfer Center| Register Here
In a conversation with Ambassador Caroline Kennedy, we will explore how she employed cultural diplomacy while serving as U.S. Ambassador to Japan (2013-2017), our key ally in Asia. Ambassador (ret.) Nicholas Burns, Harvard Kennedy School professor and Faculty Chair of the Future of Diplomacy Project, will welcome and introduce Ambassador Kennedy. Carla Dirlikov Canales, 2021 Advanced Leadership Initiative Fellow, will moderate the discussion.
Speakers:
Ambassador Märt Volmer
Undersecretary for European Affairs, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tarmo Soomere
President, Estonian Academy of Sciences
Ambassador David Balton
Senior Fellow, Polar Institute; Former Ambassador for Oceans and Fisheries, US Department of State
Ambassador Kaja Tael
Special Envoy for Climate and Energy Policy, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Aimar Ventsel
Associate Porfessor in Ethnology, University of Tartu
David M. Kennedy
Global Fellow, Polar Institute; Chair, United States Arctic Research Commission
Michael Sfraga
Director, Polar Institute; Director, Global Risk and Resilience Program
3. Russian Aggression in the Black Sea: Regional and International Responses| April 26, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
Russia’s largest military buildup since the 2014 annexation of Crimea is taking place along the Ukrainian border and in the Black Sea. Moscow has resorted to escalatory measures, announcing the closing of the Kerch Strait and the Azov Sea to foreign ships and cutting off Ukraine’s ability to export. In response, the West has reacted with warnings and invitations to dialogue while Turkey is trying to walk a fine line between Russia and Ukraine. To prevent further escalation of the crisis, much will depend on the Biden administration’s response.
Speakers:
Gen. (ret.) Philip Breedlove
Distinguished chair, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Yörük Işık
Non-resident scholar, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Iulia Joja
Senior fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Mamuka Tsereteli
Non-resident scholar, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Gönül Tol, (Moderator)
Director, Turkey Program; senior fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
4. Revitalizing NATO’s Political Cohesion | April 27, 2021 | 10:30 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here
In advance of the upcoming NATO Leaders Meeting, it is a timely moment to discuss NATO as a political forum and its future cohesion. NATO’s strength and resilience derive from Allies’ shared committment to the values and spirit of the Washington Treaty, namely the principles of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and the development of peaceful international relations. As NATO grapples with a challenging security environment, it must also confront an erosion of democratic norms within some member countries that undermines NATO’s unity. Will an updated strategic concept as well as a new U.S. administration provide an opportunity to prioritize transatlantic values and NATO’s political cohesion?
Speakers:
Ambassador Muriel Domenach,
Permanent Representative of France to NATO
MdB Omid Nouripour
Foreign Policy Spokesperson for the German Green party.
Rachel Ellehuus (Moderator)
Deputy Director of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
Heather A. Conley (Introductory Remarks)
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctica
5. African and South Asian perspectives on the Leaders Summit on Climate| April 28, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Under the Biden administration, the United States is making climate action a top priority. While the Trump administration failed to properly drive United States’ environmental policy towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the use of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, the Biden administration is set for unprecedented action on climate issues, even going as far as to pledge commitment to working with China to fight climate change and to help developing nations finance their efforts to lower their carbon footprints.
As part of his efforts to tackle the imminent threat posed by climate change, President Biden will host a Leaders Summit on Climate on April 22 and 23, to conclude days before our event. Some of the key themes of the summit are to explore the possibilities of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in order to mitigate the consequences of a global temperature increase over 1.5 degrees Celsius as well as financing vulnerable countries’ efforts to transition to clean energy economies.
Speakers:
Jairam Ramesh
Former chief negotiation for India, Copenhagen Climate Change Summit;
Former cabinet minister for rural development, Government of India;
Present member of parliament (Rajya Sabha)
Dr. Syed Mohammed Ali
Non-resident scholar, Middle East Institute;
Adjunct Professor, Johns Hopkins University
Ms. Ayaan Adam
Senior Director and CEO, AFC Capital;
Former Director of the Private Sector Facility, Green Climate Fund
Irfan Nooruddin (Introductory Remarks)
Director, Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center
Aubrey Hruby (Moderator)
Nonresident senior fellow, Atlantic Council’s Africa Center
6. The UK Integrated Defense Review: A Conversation with General Sir Nick Carter| April 28, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here
Please join the Center for Strategic and International Studies for a conversation with General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the UK Defence Staff. General Sir Nick Carter and Dr. Seth Jones, Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program, will discuss the UK Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, and how the UK military is prioritizing modernization.
Speakers:
General Sir Nick Carter
Chief of the UK Defence Staff
Dr. Seth Jones
Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program
7. Strengthening International Peace and Security | April 28, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | German Marshall Fund of the United States| Register Here
The German Marshall Fund of the United States would like to invite you to a timely conversation with Helga Schmid, the new secretary general at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The conversation, moderated by GMF’s Ian Lesser, will focus on Secretary General Schmid’s priorities in her new capacity at the OSCE. This includes a focus on OSCE efforts to address the far-reaching impacts of COVID-19 and Secretary General Schmid’s vision on how multilateral organizations, including the OSCE, can strengthen peace building, prevent conflict, and empower women and girls.
Representing 57 member countries, the OSCE holds a unique position in the international security architecture. Promoting a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects, the organization addresses a wide range of security challenges, including arms control, human rights, democratization, policing strategies, counterterrorism, and economic and environmental activities.
Speakers:
Helga Schmid
Secretary General, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Ian Lesser
Vice President, The German Marshall Fund of the United States
8. Putin’s Mediterranean gambit: Endgame unclear | April 29, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
A discussion on President Vladimir Putin’s successes in the Mediterranean, his broader objectives in the Mediterranean, the factors that have helped and hindered Putin’s achievement of these objectives and why the United States should be concerned and what it should do about growing Russian influence in the Mediterranean.
For more than 250 years, Russian leaders have sought to project power and influence in the Mediterranean region. Sometimes these efforts have met with a significant degree of success. At times, though, Russia has pulled back from the Mediterranean because of setbacks in the region, events in Europe, or convulsions inside Russia. These pullbacks, however, have never been permanent and have always been followed by renewed Russian efforts to gain influence in the region.
Speakers:
Christopher J. Bort
National Intelligence Officer for Russiaand Eurasia
National Intelligence Council
Laura K. Cooper
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia
United States Department of Defense
William F. Wechsler
Director, Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East ProgramsAtlantic Council
Mark N. Katz (Moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council
9. World order in the 21st century: Illiberal orders, a concert of power, or a Western revival?| April 29, 2021 | 6:00 PM ET | Chatham House| Register Here
In the years after World War I, many international affairs schools and think tanks opened their doors, dedicated to educating students, informing publics, and devising solutions to the problems of war, peace and international order.
A century later, political, socio-economic and geopolitical change has raised profound questions about whether today’s ideas and institutions, many of which emerged in the aftermath of World War I and World War II, are fit for purpose.
The stumblings of liberal democracy, the onset of the digital economy, growing inequality within and among nations, the COVID-19 pandemic, mounting great-power rivalry and many other developments necessitate a re-evaluation of how best to preserve order in an interdependent world.
Speakers:
Professor Charles Kupchan
Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University; Senior Director for European Affairs, US National Security Council (2014-17)
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Director, US and the Americas Programme, Chatham House
Dr Anne-Marie Slaughter
CEO, New America; Director of Policy Planning, US Department of State (2009-11)
Professor Rana Mitter
Professor of the History and Politics of Modern China, St Cross College, Oxford University
Dr Robin Niblett
Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
10. Criminal justice reform in America: Policing and pretrial detention |April 30, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Brookings Institute| Register Here
The United States incarcerates more people per capita than any other country in the world. Recidivism rates continue to be high as millions of people cycle in and out of the criminal justice system and deal with a cumbersome pretrial detention process. Black people are disproportionately more likely to die from police violence, and racial and ethnic minorities are simultaneously over- and under-policed. After 50 years, it is clear there are a plethora of unintended consequences of the War on Crime and the War on Drugs, which have led to issues across the criminal justice system.
Speakers:
Rashawn Ray
David M. Rubenstein Fellow: Governance Studies
Brent Orrell
Resident Fellow: American Enterprise Institute
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The migrant specter: scary or not?
Jade MacRury, a content writer and correspondent for the Immigration Advice Service, an immigration law firm based in the UK & Ireland that provides invaluable legal support to migrants, writes:
The idea that immigration is a burden on the public purse is often heard, but is it correct? The intersection of immigration and the economy is deeply complex. In an issue of such significance, it vital for truth to prevail.
But for this to happen, the issue must be looked at closely and objectively. Does immigration truly bring no benefits to the host country at all? Do overseas nationals do nothing but take from British public services without ever contributing a single penny? Do they really exacerbate a budget deficit that is already unsustainable? Or are we viewing a chicken-and-egg scenario? Instead of the government creating the hostile immigration policy in response to the “migrant threat,” is it possible that it actually fans the flames of untruths in order to support harsh immigration policies?
The only way to answer such questions is to examine the evidence, which paints a more complicated picture than the one-sided narrative that dominates vast swathes of political discourse. Different studies and researchers use different methods, as they should, in order that the flaws of one study can be addressed by another. However, there is one deterrent to figuring out the truth: the fact that researchers cannot seem to agree on a basic definition of the word “migrant.”
Is a migrant anyone foreign born? Yes, that’s the simplest answer, isn’t it? Someone is a migrant because they migrated from one country to another. But what of their children born in the UK? Are they migrants too? They would never have arrived here if their parents hadn’t migrated but they didn’t actually migrate because they were born here and knew no other home.
And which migrants are we talking about? Are we focusing on those coming from the EU/EEA, outside the EU/EEA area or perhaps both? Did we want to study migrants who are in the UK as students? Or those who came here to work jobs that the UK can’t fill, such as fruit pickers or NHS carers? Or perhaps we want to know what contributions, if any, asylum seekers and refugees make to the British economy? Or are we looking at all of them?
Are we studying just one fiscal year? The entire life cycle of a full generation of migrants – maybe even two generations (if we’re counting even UK-born children as part of the migrant category)? Are we using actual data or extrapolating from them and jumping into the realm of assumptions and educated guesswork?
Also, how are we calculating contributions and costs? Yes, we always include income tax, National Insurance and VAT on purchases within migrants’ fiscal contributions, but sometimes we also include shares of taxes paid by UK businesses. In the same way, fiscal costs always include public services such as NHS care and education, but then sometimes we include government spending on defense as well, which wouldn’t change even if immigration were to stop instantly.
Finally, are we looking at any results for migrants on their own and treating them as absolutes? Or are we examining their fiscal impact relative to the UK-born population? Or perhaps we’re comparing one segment of migrants against another, as we do when we look at studies that compare the contributions of EU/EEA migrants against non-EU/EEA migrants as well as those of students against refugees and asylum seekers?
Different starting points naturally produce different results. For example, a 2018 Oxford Economics study showed that, relative to the UK-born population, migrants from the European Economic Area (EEA) actually had a positive financial effect. During the 2016/2017 fiscal year, the UK born population generated a net fiscal cost of -£41.4 billion whereas the EEA migrants made a net fiscal contribution of £4.7 billion–a clear difference and a strong point in favor of migrants.
On the negative side of the spectrum, however, is a 2014 Migration Watch study which focused on the 2014/15 financial year. This study revealed that migrants actually cost the UK government rather than contribute to it. EEA migrants generated a loss of -£1.1 billion whilst non-EEA migrants generated a loss of -£15.6 billion. And the UK-born population? They didn’t include it in the study so no comparison could be made.
So, do migrants contribute to or cost the UK government? It’s hard to provide a single accurate answer but the truth is likely somewhere in the middle. And our response must reflect that reality. Any rhetoric that scapegoats migrants for all the ills Britain is going through must be tempered. We need none of Nigel Farage’s consistent demonizing of an entire group of people, none of the relentless xenophobia that was so closely tied to the Brexit vote. We need truth and objectivity to prevail.
RSS - Posts
