Tag: United Kingdom
Peace Picks | April 26 – April 30, 2021
Peace Picks | April 26 – April 30, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
1. Supporting Sustainable Development in the Arctic: Estonia’s Role in Advancing Arctic Collaboration| April 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
There are many challenges in building sustainable and thriving communities in the Arctic while addressing the impacts of a warming and changing Arctic landscape due to climate change. As one of eight Arctic nations that comprise the Arctic Council, the United States, under the Biden Administration has called for an increase in international cooperation to address climate change in all facets of its domestic and foreign policy, including the Arctic. Estonia, a close neighbor of the Arctic, is applying for Observer status in the Arctic Council, is committed to mitigating the impacts of climate change, and advancing sustainable development in the Arctic. This discussion will offer an exchange of views by experts from the United States and Estonia on ways to promote collaboration to address the critical issues facing the Arctic, especially in the areas of research, environmental protection, and sustainable development.
Speakers:
Caroline Kennedy
Attorney, Author, Former US Ambassador to Japan
2. Soft Power and Practice of Diplomacy: A Conversation with Ambassador Caroline Kennedy| April 26, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Belfer Center| Register Here
In a conversation with Ambassador Caroline Kennedy, we will explore how she employed cultural diplomacy while serving as U.S. Ambassador to Japan (2013-2017), our key ally in Asia. Ambassador (ret.) Nicholas Burns, Harvard Kennedy School professor and Faculty Chair of the Future of Diplomacy Project, will welcome and introduce Ambassador Kennedy. Carla Dirlikov Canales, 2021 Advanced Leadership Initiative Fellow, will moderate the discussion.
Speakers:
Ambassador Märt Volmer
Undersecretary for European Affairs, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tarmo Soomere
President, Estonian Academy of Sciences
Ambassador David Balton
Senior Fellow, Polar Institute; Former Ambassador for Oceans and Fisheries, US Department of State
Ambassador Kaja Tael
Special Envoy for Climate and Energy Policy, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Aimar Ventsel
Associate Porfessor in Ethnology, University of Tartu
David M. Kennedy
Global Fellow, Polar Institute; Chair, United States Arctic Research Commission
Michael Sfraga
Director, Polar Institute; Director, Global Risk and Resilience Program
3. Russian Aggression in the Black Sea: Regional and International Responses| April 26, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
Russia’s largest military buildup since the 2014 annexation of Crimea is taking place along the Ukrainian border and in the Black Sea. Moscow has resorted to escalatory measures, announcing the closing of the Kerch Strait and the Azov Sea to foreign ships and cutting off Ukraine’s ability to export. In response, the West has reacted with warnings and invitations to dialogue while Turkey is trying to walk a fine line between Russia and Ukraine. To prevent further escalation of the crisis, much will depend on the Biden administration’s response.
Speakers:
Gen. (ret.) Philip Breedlove
Distinguished chair, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Yörük Işık
Non-resident scholar, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Iulia Joja
Senior fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Mamuka Tsereteli
Non-resident scholar, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Gönül Tol, (Moderator)
Director, Turkey Program; senior fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
4. Revitalizing NATO’s Political Cohesion | April 27, 2021 | 10:30 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here
In advance of the upcoming NATO Leaders Meeting, it is a timely moment to discuss NATO as a political forum and its future cohesion. NATO’s strength and resilience derive from Allies’ shared committment to the values and spirit of the Washington Treaty, namely the principles of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and the development of peaceful international relations. As NATO grapples with a challenging security environment, it must also confront an erosion of democratic norms within some member countries that undermines NATO’s unity. Will an updated strategic concept as well as a new U.S. administration provide an opportunity to prioritize transatlantic values and NATO’s political cohesion?
Speakers:
Ambassador Muriel Domenach,
Permanent Representative of France to NATO
MdB Omid Nouripour
Foreign Policy Spokesperson for the German Green party.
Rachel Ellehuus (Moderator)
Deputy Director of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
Heather A. Conley (Introductory Remarks)
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctica
5. African and South Asian perspectives on the Leaders Summit on Climate| April 28, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Under the Biden administration, the United States is making climate action a top priority. While the Trump administration failed to properly drive United States’ environmental policy towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the use of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, the Biden administration is set for unprecedented action on climate issues, even going as far as to pledge commitment to working with China to fight climate change and to help developing nations finance their efforts to lower their carbon footprints.
As part of his efforts to tackle the imminent threat posed by climate change, President Biden will host a Leaders Summit on Climate on April 22 and 23, to conclude days before our event. Some of the key themes of the summit are to explore the possibilities of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in order to mitigate the consequences of a global temperature increase over 1.5 degrees Celsius as well as financing vulnerable countries’ efforts to transition to clean energy economies.
Speakers:
Jairam Ramesh
Former chief negotiation for India, Copenhagen Climate Change Summit;
Former cabinet minister for rural development, Government of India;
Present member of parliament (Rajya Sabha)
Dr. Syed Mohammed Ali
Non-resident scholar, Middle East Institute;
Adjunct Professor, Johns Hopkins University
Ms. Ayaan Adam
Senior Director and CEO, AFC Capital;
Former Director of the Private Sector Facility, Green Climate Fund
Irfan Nooruddin (Introductory Remarks)
Director, Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center
Aubrey Hruby (Moderator)
Nonresident senior fellow, Atlantic Council’s Africa Center
6. The UK Integrated Defense Review: A Conversation with General Sir Nick Carter| April 28, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here
Please join the Center for Strategic and International Studies for a conversation with General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the UK Defence Staff. General Sir Nick Carter and Dr. Seth Jones, Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program, will discuss the UK Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, and how the UK military is prioritizing modernization.
Speakers:
General Sir Nick Carter
Chief of the UK Defence Staff
Dr. Seth Jones
Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program
7. Strengthening International Peace and Security | April 28, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | German Marshall Fund of the United States| Register Here
The German Marshall Fund of the United States would like to invite you to a timely conversation with Helga Schmid, the new secretary general at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The conversation, moderated by GMF’s Ian Lesser, will focus on Secretary General Schmid’s priorities in her new capacity at the OSCE. This includes a focus on OSCE efforts to address the far-reaching impacts of COVID-19 and Secretary General Schmid’s vision on how multilateral organizations, including the OSCE, can strengthen peace building, prevent conflict, and empower women and girls.
Representing 57 member countries, the OSCE holds a unique position in the international security architecture. Promoting a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects, the organization addresses a wide range of security challenges, including arms control, human rights, democratization, policing strategies, counterterrorism, and economic and environmental activities.
Speakers:
Helga Schmid
Secretary General, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Ian Lesser
Vice President, The German Marshall Fund of the United States
8. Putin’s Mediterranean gambit: Endgame unclear | April 29, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
A discussion on President Vladimir Putin’s successes in the Mediterranean, his broader objectives in the Mediterranean, the factors that have helped and hindered Putin’s achievement of these objectives and why the United States should be concerned and what it should do about growing Russian influence in the Mediterranean.
For more than 250 years, Russian leaders have sought to project power and influence in the Mediterranean region. Sometimes these efforts have met with a significant degree of success. At times, though, Russia has pulled back from the Mediterranean because of setbacks in the region, events in Europe, or convulsions inside Russia. These pullbacks, however, have never been permanent and have always been followed by renewed Russian efforts to gain influence in the region.
Speakers:
Christopher J. Bort
National Intelligence Officer for Russiaand Eurasia
National Intelligence Council
Laura K. Cooper
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia
United States Department of Defense
William F. Wechsler
Director, Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East ProgramsAtlantic Council
Mark N. Katz (Moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council
9. World order in the 21st century: Illiberal orders, a concert of power, or a Western revival?| April 29, 2021 | 6:00 PM ET | Chatham House| Register Here
In the years after World War I, many international affairs schools and think tanks opened their doors, dedicated to educating students, informing publics, and devising solutions to the problems of war, peace and international order.
A century later, political, socio-economic and geopolitical change has raised profound questions about whether today’s ideas and institutions, many of which emerged in the aftermath of World War I and World War II, are fit for purpose.
The stumblings of liberal democracy, the onset of the digital economy, growing inequality within and among nations, the COVID-19 pandemic, mounting great-power rivalry and many other developments necessitate a re-evaluation of how best to preserve order in an interdependent world.
Speakers:
Professor Charles Kupchan
Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University; Senior Director for European Affairs, US National Security Council (2014-17)
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Director, US and the Americas Programme, Chatham House
Dr Anne-Marie Slaughter
CEO, New America; Director of Policy Planning, US Department of State (2009-11)
Professor Rana Mitter
Professor of the History and Politics of Modern China, St Cross College, Oxford University
Dr Robin Niblett
Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
10. Criminal justice reform in America: Policing and pretrial detention |April 30, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Brookings Institute| Register Here
The United States incarcerates more people per capita than any other country in the world. Recidivism rates continue to be high as millions of people cycle in and out of the criminal justice system and deal with a cumbersome pretrial detention process. Black people are disproportionately more likely to die from police violence, and racial and ethnic minorities are simultaneously over- and under-policed. After 50 years, it is clear there are a plethora of unintended consequences of the War on Crime and the War on Drugs, which have led to issues across the criminal justice system.
Speakers:
Rashawn Ray
David M. Rubenstein Fellow: Governance Studies
Brent Orrell
Resident Fellow: American Enterprise Institute
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The migrant specter: scary or not?
Jade MacRury, a content writer and correspondent for the Immigration Advice Service, an immigration law firm based in the UK & Ireland that provides invaluable legal support to migrants, writes:
The idea that immigration is a burden on the public purse is often heard, but is it correct? The intersection of immigration and the economy is deeply complex. In an issue of such significance, it vital for truth to prevail.
But for this to happen, the issue must be looked at closely and objectively. Does immigration truly bring no benefits to the host country at all? Do overseas nationals do nothing but take from British public services without ever contributing a single penny? Do they really exacerbate a budget deficit that is already unsustainable? Or are we viewing a chicken-and-egg scenario? Instead of the government creating the hostile immigration policy in response to the “migrant threat,” is it possible that it actually fans the flames of untruths in order to support harsh immigration policies?
The only way to answer such questions is to examine the evidence, which paints a more complicated picture than the one-sided narrative that dominates vast swathes of political discourse. Different studies and researchers use different methods, as they should, in order that the flaws of one study can be addressed by another. However, there is one deterrent to figuring out the truth: the fact that researchers cannot seem to agree on a basic definition of the word “migrant.”
Is a migrant anyone foreign born? Yes, that’s the simplest answer, isn’t it? Someone is a migrant because they migrated from one country to another. But what of their children born in the UK? Are they migrants too? They would never have arrived here if their parents hadn’t migrated but they didn’t actually migrate because they were born here and knew no other home.
And which migrants are we talking about? Are we focusing on those coming from the EU/EEA, outside the EU/EEA area or perhaps both? Did we want to study migrants who are in the UK as students? Or those who came here to work jobs that the UK can’t fill, such as fruit pickers or NHS carers? Or perhaps we want to know what contributions, if any, asylum seekers and refugees make to the British economy? Or are we looking at all of them?
Are we studying just one fiscal year? The entire life cycle of a full generation of migrants – maybe even two generations (if we’re counting even UK-born children as part of the migrant category)? Are we using actual data or extrapolating from them and jumping into the realm of assumptions and educated guesswork?
Also, how are we calculating contributions and costs? Yes, we always include income tax, National Insurance and VAT on purchases within migrants’ fiscal contributions, but sometimes we also include shares of taxes paid by UK businesses. In the same way, fiscal costs always include public services such as NHS care and education, but then sometimes we include government spending on defense as well, which wouldn’t change even if immigration were to stop instantly.
Finally, are we looking at any results for migrants on their own and treating them as absolutes? Or are we examining their fiscal impact relative to the UK-born population? Or perhaps we’re comparing one segment of migrants against another, as we do when we look at studies that compare the contributions of EU/EEA migrants against non-EU/EEA migrants as well as those of students against refugees and asylum seekers?
Different starting points naturally produce different results. For example, a 2018 Oxford Economics study showed that, relative to the UK-born population, migrants from the European Economic Area (EEA) actually had a positive financial effect. During the 2016/2017 fiscal year, the UK born population generated a net fiscal cost of -£41.4 billion whereas the EEA migrants made a net fiscal contribution of £4.7 billion–a clear difference and a strong point in favor of migrants.
On the negative side of the spectrum, however, is a 2014 Migration Watch study which focused on the 2014/15 financial year. This study revealed that migrants actually cost the UK government rather than contribute to it. EEA migrants generated a loss of -£1.1 billion whilst non-EEA migrants generated a loss of -£15.6 billion. And the UK-born population? They didn’t include it in the study so no comparison could be made.
So, do migrants contribute to or cost the UK government? It’s hard to provide a single accurate answer but the truth is likely somewhere in the middle. And our response must reflect that reality. Any rhetoric that scapegoats migrants for all the ills Britain is going through must be tempered. We need none of Nigel Farage’s consistent demonizing of an entire group of people, none of the relentless xenophobia that was so closely tied to the Brexit vote. We need truth and objectivity to prevail.
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The nightmare is over, now the hard work begins
I spent an hour this morning on Zoom with Italian colleagues at the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) talking about the American election and its consequences for foreign policy. Here are the points I prepared for them,
most of them all too obvious I’m afraid:
- While Biden is better informed and experienced on foreign policy than any president in decades, his most immediate priorities will be domestic: first and foremost stopping Covid-19 infections and moving as quickly as possible to revive the American economy, which is still in bad shape, and fix our social cleavages, which are severe.
- That said, he is putting in place a formidable foreign policy team: Tony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, Avril Haines and Linda Thomas-Greenfield are among our finest. Janet Yellen at Treasury will make an excellent counterpart on the economic side.
- Jake and Tony are both strongly committed to a revived domestic economy and solutions to America’s social challenges as prerequisites for a strong international role. You can expect them to be less transactional but just as aggressive as Trump on trade and investment issues, where America will need to satisfy more of the demands of its domestic producers.
- Missing so far from the Biden team is the Secretary of Defense. I’d still bet on Michele Fluornoy, but I admit I have little idea why she hasn’t been named yet. Defense industry ties may be the reason.
- Whoever gets Defense, Biden will seek to reinvigorate trans-Atlantic ties. He has a basically positive attitude towards NATO and America’s allies, whom he views as force multipliers whose basic values are aligned with ours.
- He is not opposed, as Trump was, to the European Union. I doubt he will prioritize a free trade agreement with the UK and might even try to revive the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe, or something like it.
- Willingness of the US to return to the JCPOA will help his effort to renew the Alliance, but it will require reciprocal Iranian willingness to return to the status quo ante. I’m not convinced Tehran will be willing before the June presidential election, and maybe not even after.
- Biden will want to cooperate quickly with Europe in responding to Russia’s regional challenges in the Baltics, the Balkans, and especially Ukraine, though he will be hampered on Ukraine by the allegations against his son Hunter.
- The US will return, likely on Day 1, to the Paris Climate Change Agreement, which I trust will be a welcome move in Europe.
- The big looming problem for both the US and Europe is how to meet China’s global economic and political challenge. Biden will want to pursue both cooperation and competition with China.
- He is not interested in a new cold war, but he will be far more committed globally to democratic values and human rights than Trump has been. He will not be sword dancing in Riyadh, encouraging President Xi to imprison Uighurs, or staying silent about repression in Hong Kong.
- Renewed American support for human rights and democracy will unsettle relations not only with China but also with the Gulf, Israel, Brazil, and possibly with Hungary and Poland.
- Biden will not be able to restore everything to where things stood four years ago. He’ll need to prioritize.
- But I think all those who want to see American global leadership based on a rational assessment of both values and interests will feel a lot better about things on January 21 than they did on November 2. The nightmare is over, but the hard work is just beginning.
In addition to foreign policy, the Italians pressed me on the future of the Republican Party and reports that black men and Hispanics shifted towards Trump. I responded more or less this way:
- The numbers are still iffy, but at least some of the shift among Hispanics was due to mostly white Venezuelans and Cubans who fled socialist countries and were frightened when Trump told them Biden was a socialist. Some Latinos in Texas appear to have shifted as well, possibly due to the employment impact of border wall construction.
- The Republican Party now has a choice to make between continuing as a right-wing extremist and racist party or reverting to right-of-center social and economic conservatism. Trump will try to keep the party on the former track and can boast of an enormous turnout of voters, and relative victories in the House races, to help him. So far, only Senator Romney seems courageous enough to point in the direction of more conventional conservatism. We’ll have to wait and see which direction Republicans choose.
On the domestic side, I also emphasized the importance of the January 5 Senate run-off elections in Georgia, which will determine how far Biden can go on the legislative front.
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High hopes for Biden in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ismet Fatih Čančar gave this interview, originally published in Politicki.ba:
Q: Why are US presidential elections important for Bosnia and Herzegovina?
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the defeat of the Soviet Union, the global order was marked by American hegemony, which gained its greatest momentum during the 1990s. A good part of those nineties was marked by the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina, first through aggression against our country, and then in the post-Dayton period. The United States has historically been involved in these processes. First, they stopped the war through the Dayton Peace Agreement. In the post-Dayton period, a new process of “state-building” began, which has not yet been completed.
The upcoming US presidential election is an opportunity to continue this process for several reasons. First due to the fact that the Democratic presidential candidate Joseph Biden is one of the last active politicians in the United States who has a personal connection and experience with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secondly, as early as in 1993, Biden has correctly identified, in his speech on “Face the Nation,” war criminals in Bosnia, clearly warned about genocide, and then, as he is today, was a strong advocate of a more proactive American role in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Biden’s vision of Bosnia and Herzegovina was too ambitious and too radical for the Clinton administration. For our country, that vision is far-sighted and far-reaching. It is still the same vision that Biden wholeheartedly defended behind the speaker podium of the Senate. Back then he explained it as a national interest and a moral obligation of the United States in the post-Dayton framework. Biden reaffirmed that vision in his recently published program. The founding idea of this program is to building a civil state based on the experiences of a multicultural and multiethnic democratic society.
And that is why the presidential elections in the United States are an opportunity for a turning point in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where we have been witnessing a general deterioration of conditions, both political, economic and social, for some period now.
Q: Biden has announced his vision which he intends to pursue when it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is good and what is bad in that document?
Biden’s vision that has been published is substantially positive. In any case, it is good that such document has come to life. This is perhaps the first concrete signal in the last decade of bureaucratic autopilot by both the US and the EU that the very top of the US leadership is putting the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the agenda, as well as the Balkans which have seen increased instability, growing appetite for redrawing borders, an increasing number of right-wing populist movements.
This document, of course, has its own political context. It is an expression of Biden’s own election campaign; promoting democracy as the most effective social order, but also restoring the credibility of American leadership in the world as a reliable partner that can constructively and successfully solve extremely complicated problems. The character of the Bosnian state – a sui generis state – is such that cosmetic changes cannot help this country, but which rather requires serious structural reforms, which first imply the reform of the Dayton Constitution, and then a strong step forward towards NATO and EU membership. Biden’s vision recognizes a more efficient approach and its engagement means including Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Atlantic Pact, protecting Bosnia from foreign malignant influences such as Russia and China, and preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The document itself would have had a much stronger appeal if it happened in some normal circumstances, when no political career is being auctioned and in the midst of the presidential campaign. Hence, there is some doubt as to how high Bosnia and Herzegovina will be on the list of American politics even after the presidential election.
However, there is one dimension that is rarely talked about. Biden’s document testifies that in the American heterogeneous society, the Bosnian community has become visible, for whose interest are fighting both sides of the political spectrum, the Democrats and the Republicans. I appreciate that this is a positive phenomenon. These are our great national resources and opportunities that exist in interstate relations, which we do not know how to use. Or at least not yet.
Q: What if Trump wins?
No need to dramatize. We already have four years of experience of Trump’s mandate behind us. Nothing radical has happened in the region, although attempts have been made from all directions to push through a new, much more dangerous and insidious plan to redraw the borders and exchange territories between Kosovo and Serbia; a plan which would have very bad consequences for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Under Trump’s mandate, US leadership in the world has weakened significantly. The image of democracy has been destroyed through the constant undermining of the basic principles of multilateralism, disregard for human rights, and the encouragement of autocrats and nationalist movements. In addition, the importance of the alliance and the historical partnership between the US and the EU has been weakened. The so-called “soft power” has been undermined and an unprecedented level of polarization is caused in all fields.
Regardless of the outcome, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to continue its work to improve the security framework for all its citizens and peoples, through the joint work of all relevant institutions and international partners. It is certain that Bosnia and Herzegovina will have the support of the US administration in this process.
Q: All polling shows that Biden is the winner and the next resident of the White House. What preparatory work should Bosnia and Herzegovina do?
First of all, we should wait for the election results. All polling showed Hilary Clinton’s victory in 2016 and we received a surprise instead.
However, it is true that our country has a unique opportunity to capitalize on this moment that could come from the Biden administration. Pro-Bosnian patriotic forces should take the initiative, in terms of creating a program and a roadmap for the radical changes identified in Biden’s document.
One should not be deceived that Bosnia and Herzegovina will so easily and so quickly position itself within the priorities of American foreign policy. From our side, it is necessary to purposefully engage all our resources that are available in American academic and business circles. This also requires a sophisticated diplomatic way of involving our traditional friends and partners in the project. A mitigating circumstance for achieving these goals is that Biden was personally and heavily involved in the Bosnian case and that his political influence and image in the world were partly built on it.
All this together requires the creation of a diplomatic orchestra that could meet these demanding tasks.
It is important to note that the foundations already exist. Through the actions of the US Embassy so far (previous and current Ambassadors) we could sense the possible development of the political concept of reforms. A civil democratic state, modeled on the example of dozens of modern European states, is the only possible solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Western Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina must uncompromisingly insist on such principles.
Q: Trump has two special envoys for the Balkans. Does Biden need (at least) one? Is the Embassy enough?
The fact is that the outcome and effectiveness of a program or initiative does not largely depend on how many actors are involved. Especially in this case, efficiency is based on commitment, determination, and strength of material, political and diplomatic support put into the project.
During his visits, Special Envoy Matthew Palmer has on several occasions expressed a clear position on the indivisibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina, US support for our country’s Euro-Atlantic path, and the continuation and development of the partnership between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United States. The goal is to raise this relationship to a higher level.
I still think that the two envoys for the small Balkans are a little too much. If we go back to the history of the 1990s and compare it with the mission of Holbrooke and the Clinton administration, who managed to create the Dayton Peace Agreement in a relatively short time, but in much more difficult war conditions, we can conclude that quantity is not crucial in these processes.
In addition, the question of both the Peace Implementation Council and its role in all of this arises. We are witnesses that the mandate of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been derogated for a long time and that it is at a very low level. Perhaps it would be more economical, politically profitable for the US administration to focus on the function of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina instead of creating new initiatives. I am deeply convinced that resolving the Bosnian issue opens the way for the complete integration of the Balkans into the Western currents of the advanced democratic world.
Q: Given that Biden will work closely with the EU, how much will that prevent him from implementing this plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina?
It is clear that Biden has identified the EU as a necessary partner in this process, with a desire for the Western bloc to act in a coordinated manner. At the same time, I think that will be the biggest challenge for Biden. How to successfully bring partners together in a Europe that, although there has been increased rhetoric about European independence, suffers from even larger internal lines of division. There is also the United Kingdom, which, as the most loyal partner in the transatlantic alliance, is looking for its place in the post-Brexit space and I believe that they can play a very important role in key processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina together with the United States.
Under the Obama administration, transatlantic ties have been successful or very successful through a number of joint programs in Europe. With the arrival of Biden, the caliber of people who would return to leading foreign policy positions would be consistent with that alliance. The US and the EU need each other, and the current experience of the Trump administration is an exception. To Democrats, this is proof of the value of the alliance. Hence, we can expect that Biden will work on renewing that alliance, but also on restoring American leadership on the European continent. This means reaffirming NATO’s role as the most effective security umbrella in the world, a closer relationship with Brussels for a coordinated approach, a tougher stance towards Russia and further investment in democratic processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU-led “structural dialogue” in Bosnia has shown all the shortcomings in its actions. American leadership is therefore a necessary corrective factor.
In addition, it is important to point out that the main motivator of US cooperation with the EU is not Cold War nostalgia, but rather the understanding in Washington that – America alone – is a weak America, and that in a more competitive world we face, Europeans are still the most important American allies.
All this is a complex process. I appreciate that in the efforts to implement fundamental reforms and build lasting peace and prosperity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, partnership and close cooperation between the United States and the EU is desirable for the realization of this project.
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The emerging tetrapolar mad world
Pantelis Ikonomou, former nuclear IAEA inspector, writes:
Nuclear weapons are a vital but latent dimension of the growing geopolitical competition. Nuclear capabilities continue to constitute a prime source of power in shaping global power relations amid dangerous non-nuclear conflicts and military confrontations. New power balances are forming.
The main emerging poles are two well-established ones, the United States and Russia, and two emerging ones, China and Europe (led by France as the EU’s last remaining nuclear power post-Brexit). The US and Russia have failed in efforts to engage China in new nuclear and ballistic missile agreements. France is trying to exercise leadership in Europe and the Mediterranean. French President Emmanuel Macron has offered to open a “strategic dialogue” with willing European states prepared to accept the central role of France. He pointed out that “Europe should reinforce its strategic autonomy in the face of growing global threats and stop relying solely on the United States and the Transtlantic Alliance for its defense”
Any excited system will sooner or later reach a state of equilibrium. A tetrapolar structure is emerging around the leading nuclear weapon states: the US, Russia, China and France. These four nuclear powers are flanked by others based on criteria of pragmatism and strategic necessity. The whole process is guided more by bilateral agreements than existing treaties and international institutions. The new tetrapolar world order appears as follows:
- Around the US superpower stand nuclear UK as well as Israel, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and several European NATO states. The connecting force within this pole is American geopolitical primacy and its ambition to strategically control East and South Asia.
- Around Russia will stand India, several former Soviet states, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and sometimes Turkey and Egypt. This pole’s source of cohesion is nuclear deterrence against the Chinese threat, as well as geopolitical influence in the Middle East region.
- Around China are Pakistan, North Korea and the majority of the developing countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In this nuclear pole the predominant parameter is China’s nuclear deterrence of its US, Russian, and Indian adversaries as well as Chinese economic, military and political assistance.
- France would be flanked by several southern European, Middle East and African states (and occasionally by Israel). The prevailing link in this alliance, besides historical and cultural references, is strategic influence on the wider region and security against a rising adversary, Islamic extremism.
Once a stable equilibrium is achieved, this new tetrapolar nuclear world order might allow the leading nuclear powers to realize the vast global threat they pose to humankind through their bilateral standoffs. Nuclear disarmament as requested by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, Art. VI) and emphatically repeated by the international community in the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty of July 2017 should be a top priority. De-escalation of the current nuclear race and terminating weapons “modernization” ought to be the initial objectives of the world powers aiming eventually to complete and irreversible global nuclear disarmament.
The current nuclear threat to humanity arises from the suicidal so-called MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) nuclear strategy, It ought to be abolished. The threat of a nuclear apocalypse, whether by intent, accident, or miscalculation, will be at its highest level ever so long as MAD prevails in this tetrapolar world.
* This article draws on the author’s book “Global Nuclear Developments – Insights of a former IAEA nuclear inspector,” Springer, May 2020.
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Stevenson’s army, July 25
– Intelligence warning yesterday — Russia, China, & Iran are trying to interfere in US elections this year.
Here’s the brief text.
– There’s the British parliamentary committee’s report on Russian interference in the UK
– In order to sell drones, US is evading the Missile Technology Control Regime. Here’s background on MTCR.
– Here are two assessments of Pompeo’s China speech — Fred Kaplan and James Palmer.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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