Tag: United Nations
What the US should do in Syria
I found the above MEI event informative, especially Wael al Zayat’s proposals for shifting American policy. Starting about 39:30, he proposes:
- A general license for export of some priority goods and services to Syria, including in the finance and energy sectors. He says such licenses were issued for six months of earthquake relief in 2023.
- Humanitarian assistance for the Syrian people.
- Support to Syrian organizations concerned with transitional justice.
- Encouragement to the UN to return to Damascus for humanitarian, development, and political purposes.
These seem to me good ideas, if somewhat scattershot in presentation. Charles Lister goes on to note that the US is trying to engage. But he says delisting HTS as a terrorist organization will not happen quickly. It will be strictly conditional on HTS behavior.
US conditions
Secretary of State Blinken has outlined the conditions:
The United States reaffirms its full support for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition. This transition process should lead to credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance that meets international standards of transparency and accountability, consistent with the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254.
The transition process and new government must also uphold clear commitments to fully respect the rights of minorities, facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance to all in need, prevent Syria from being used as a base for terrorism or posing a threat to its neighbors, and ensure that any chemical or biological weapons stockpiles are secured and safely destroyed.
All this sounds reasonable, though it omits explicit insistence on pluralism. That will be a major issue, as HTS is an authoritarian organization that won’t readily tolerate political competition. While making friendly noises, it has already appointed a less than inclusive interim government to serve until March 1.
The Kurds, the Turks, and the Americans
Syria’s Kurds pose a knotty problem for the United States. The Americans have relied on Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the fight against the Islamic State. The Kurds involved are affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Both the US and Turkey have designated the PKK as a terrorist group.
Turkey wants the PKK at least 30 km from its border and east of the Euphrates. Turkish-supported forces called the Syrian National Army are pushing the SDF in those directions now. The Kurds have lost their last stronghold west of the Euphrates (at Minbij). They fear that the Turkish-supported forces are aiming for Kobani. The Kurds made a bloody and successful stand at Kobani against the Islamic state in 2014 and 2015.
Meanwhile, HTS and the Kurds are making nice. HTS has sent conciliatory messages and the Kurds have agreed to use the Syrian opposition flag on territory they control. But HTS is heavily dependent on Turkish good will. The Americans are less than reliable backers. They have used the Kurdish alliance against IS but don’t want to clash with NATO ally Turkey. The outcome of this menage a trois is not yet clear. Time is fleeting, as future President Trump has said he wants Syria left to the Syrians. If he means it, the Kurds will then be to the mercy of the Turks. That won’t be a good place to be.
Breaking the Iran connection and working the Russia angle
The success of HTS in toppling the Assad regime was a big defeat for Russia and Iran. But Moscow is already negotiating with HTS to continue its air and naval bases in Latakia and Tartus, respectively. Iran is hoping the HTS success will be temporary. Tehran is no doubt doing all it can to make it so.
HTS will have little use for the Iranians and will not let want them back in Syria. They may have property and contracts that will need to be respected. But Damascus will no long welcome the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Lebanese Hezbollah, or the other Iranian proxy forces.
The Russia angle is more equivocal. HTS will want the Russian air force out but may want to keep the Russian navy in. That would strengthen its bargaining position with the West. The US and Europe will want the Russians completely out. They’ll need to ante up to make it happen. Delisting could be part of the price.
A lot of moving parts
Diplomacy is difficult even when there aren’t a lot of moving parts. Add the change of the American administration into the mix and it becomes worse than the Three Body Problem. But there are big opportunities in Syria to make a better life for Syrians. Not to mention to weaken Russia and Iran.
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Will Syria stay together or fragment?
One of the threats to Syria now that Assad has fallen is fragmentation. In my experience, all Syrians say they want to preserve the country and its borders. But the conflicts among them and with neighboring countries can foil that goal and lead to partition.
The pieces of the puzzle
Syria’s population is mixed. Ninety per cent of its population is Arab. The rest is mainly Kurdish and Turkmen. More than 70% of Syrians are Sunni Muslim. But there are also various denominations of Christians as well as Alawites, Druze, Ismailis, Shiites and others. Damascus was thoroughly mixed. Several concentrations of Kurds were found along the northern border with Turkey, along with Turkmen and Arabs. The Alawite “homeland” was in the western, Mediterranean provinces of Tartous and Latakis. But they were a plurality and not a majority there. More Sunnis have sought refuge there, as under Bashar al Assad, an Alawite, those provinces were relatively safe.
The war is superimposing on this hodge-podge an additional dimension: military control of territory. Hayat Tahrir al Sham, the leader of the uprising, will control much of Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. Turkey and its surrogates will control most of the northern border. They are trying to push Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) east of the Euphrates, an area the SDF already dominates. Other opposition forces will be in charge of the south and the Jordanian border. The Druze have long maintained their insular community in Suwayda. It is unclear who will dominate Damascus. The southerners are arriving there first, but it is hard to picture HTS settling for second fiddle there.
There are no clear pre-existing regional lines along which Syria might fragment, except for the provincial boundaries. But those do not generally correspond to ethnic or religious divisions. The pieces of the puzzle do not fit together. They overlap and melt into each other.
The divisive forces
That would be a good reason to avoid fragmentation. Homogenization of ethnic groups on specific territory would require an enormous amount of ethnic “cleansing.” Ordinary Syrians don’t want that. But there will be forces at work that might make it happen.
The Turkmen/Kurdish conflict has already removed a lot of Kurds from Afrin in the northwest and border areas farther east. Ankara backs the Turkmen and wants to prevent Kurdish access to Türkiye. This is because the Syrian Kurds have supported Kurdish rebels inside Türkiye. The Kurds have built their own governing institutions in eastern Syria. They might seek independence if they get an unsatisfactory political outcome at the end of the war.
The Alawites of Tartous and Latakia are dreading revenge from the rest of Syria for mistreatment under the Assad dictatorship. They could try to set up their own statelet, perhaps even attaching it to Lebanon. They could also try to chase the Sunni Arab population out, while importing as many Alawites as possible from Damascus. Many there served the Assad regime and will want out.
The unifying forces
Syria’s neighbors won’t want a breakup. Türkiye has the most clout because of its presence in Syria and support for HTS. Ankara will oppose even autonomy for the Kurds. Jordan and Iraq have less clout, but they won’t want fragmentation either. Nor will Russia and Iran, which supported Assad and are big losers due to his fall. Ditto Israel and the United States, which would fear radicalization of any rump Syria if its Kurds or Alawites secede. Israel doesn’t want a jihadist entity on its northern border.
HTS and other opposition forces will also resist fragmentation. They want to govern all of Syria, not a part of it. HTS has moderated its attitude toward non-Arab and non-Sunni Muslims. It has also tried to minimize revenge and has emphasized continuity of the Syrian state. But HTS is an authoritarian movement, not a democratic one. It remains to be seen how it will behave in practice.
The obvious solutions
The obvious solution is decentralization. Devolving authority to provincial and municipal institutions offers minorities opportunities to govern themselves, or strongly influence how they are governed. The Alawites and Kurds might be satisfied with decentralization, provided they also get reasonable representation at the national level. The Kurds already have their own institutions. Some non-Kurdish opposition areas in Syria have used local councils for governance since the 2011 uprising against Assad.
There are also power-sharing arrangements that can assuage minority concerns at the national level and lower levels. Quotas in parliament, reserved positions in the state hierarchy, and qualified majority voting in parliament or local councils. I’m not an enthusiast for these, as they often entrench ethnic warlords, but sometimes they prove necessary.
Syrians may invent mechanisms I haven’t considered. In any event it is they who should decide. The country will need a new constitution, then in due course elections. The existing road map for Syria’s political process is UN Security Council resolution 2254, which Assad stymied. HTS and the rest of the opposition can revive it and gain international support by doing so.
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Proactive would be better
Tehran is justifying its barrage of more than 300 drones, cruise and ballistic missiles fired at Israel last weekend as “proportional” to the provocation. That provocation was an Israeli attack on an Iranian consular facility in Damascus that killed high-ranking officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Israel is justifying its 6-month attack on Gaza that has killed more than 30,000 Palestinians as proportional to its military objective. That is to destroy Hamas. Proportionality is obviously in the eye of the beholder
It shouldn’t be so
This is a serious limitation of the international regime. It sets up norms like proportionality but then leaves compliance to interested belligerents. Some Israelis will no doubt argue that proportionality requires a further response to the Iranian attack with more than 300 flying weapons. Assuming the Israelis are technically better and luckier in their targeting than the Iranians, an Israeli attack with even fewer could kill a lot of Iranians. Then the Iranians would want to kill just as many Israelis. The escalation ladder has no obvious limit.
The international system needs a better way of dealing with proportionality. It should not be left to belligerents to decide. Nor should a decision on proportionality come during court proceedings likely many years after the military action. We need norms, along with a way of convening a discussion of how to apply them to particular circumstances during a crisis.
It’s not only proportionality
Proportionality is today’s issue, but there are many others when it comes to military action and mass violence more generally. The UN has defined aggression, but like proportionality “aggression” may also be in the eye of the beholder. The Russian attack on Ukraine is aggression from President Zelensky’s perspective, but not from President Putin’s.
“Genocide” is likewise well-defined, but application of that definition to particular cases arouses a good deal of debate.
Ditto “responsibility to protect,” a UN General Assembly-endorsed doctrine. It requires states to protect their own civilian populations or risk international intervention that the Security Council authorizes.
The lawyerly approach to such issues is to rely on case law. Decisions in particular cases become precedents for future cases. But that process leaves a great deal of uncertainty and delay. What we need is a much more timely, even anticipatory process.
Proactive would be better
That is not impossible. The legal profession could provide mechanisms that provide guidelines and press belligerents to follow them even during a conflict. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is trying something of this sort with the Gaza conflict. It has responded with unusual speed to the South African complaint against Israel for violation of the genocide convention.
A less formal process might also work. The ICJ of necessity requires elaborate judicial proceedings. The Elders, a group of former world leaders already engaged on conflict issues, could become less reactive and more proactive. The UN’s International Law Commission could likewise take on this responsibility. The legal profession could also constitute an international nongovernmental group to advise on conflict issues before the shooting starts. Proactive would be better.
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Stevenson’s army, February 3
– Politico says Air Force plans major reorganization
-Semafor says Iran tried to use an NGO to influence US
– WSJ details UNRWA links to Hamas
– Politic says Biden trade policy splits Democrats
– WSJ explains how a rogue billionaire could build a bomb
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My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, January 31
-Lawfare has update on the Philippine-Chinese war wars
– Additional pieces convince me that Congress doesn’t need to authorize strikes on the Houthis; customary international law on piracy already does that, as does the right of self-defense
– WSJ explains the 3 stage pause proposed for the Gaza war.
– Despite denials, FT says Zelensky will fire top general; NYT has background.
– State Dept minimizes significance of cut to UNWRA
– FP looks at history of Hungarian resistance to outsiders
-Last night I heard Jake Sullivan discuss US China policy at CFR. His talk persuaded me that the US has a robust, whole of government effort at work, the kind needed for great power competition and cooperation.
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My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Breaking up Bosnia is not the thing to do
Ismet Fatih Čančar is an independent researcher, a former Partnership for Peace Fellow at NATO Defence College, and a former advisor to the Minister of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He writes:
On August 30, The Spectator published an article by Swansea law professor Andrew Tettenborn in which the author exults in the break up of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He believes this is a natural course of events, the inevitable ending of “the pantomime horse democracy.”
He is wrong. The break up of Bosnia is not a safe roadmap to sustainable peace in the Balkans. His argument is consistent with nationalist Serb and Croat actors who claim Bosnia is an aberration with no future, due to its ethnic differences and diversity.
Ignoring the law…
The complexities of the constitutional and political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the power-sharing structure under the Dayton Agreement, and the division of the society along ethno-national groups are well-known. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled against this system August 29 in Kovačević vs Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court identified a series of systemic, institutional discriminations that need to be amended if Bosnia wants to progress on the Euro-Atlantic path.
Critics oppose implementation of this verdict, stating that any implementation, or even the mere thought of reforming or upgrading the Dayton Agreement, will lead to conflict and Bosnia’s break up. Discarding such a landmark decision is a brazen attempt to undermine the significance of the verdicts of an international court, in this case the highest legal and judicial institution in Europe in charge of implementation and protection of basic human rights.
The opinion of the ECHR in the case of Kovačević vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a lethal blow to the foundations of the discriminatory, ethno-national, backward oriented, immoral social contract embodied in the Dayton Agreement, which deprives a large number of Bosnian citizens of their basic civic rights. This is the greatest strength of the verdict: it directs Bosnia and Herzegovina to reject a system that subordinates individual citizens’ rights to the priorities of the country’s three major ethnic groups.
The argument that Bosnia cannot exist if it is not strictly an ethnic electoral system is a lazy, watered down excuse of anti-Bosnian actors who receive support from Moscow and wish to keep the country trapped in the chains of ethno-national politics. The alternative, a citizen-based civic model for Bosnia and Herzegovina, requires more political will and resources, but it is the best path towards a functional constitutional democracy like those other European citizens enjoy across the continent.
…and the facts
In an attempt to make the idea of Bosnian break up more digestible, domestic actors and international observers often display ignorance towards basic historical facts. Contrary to the statement that Bosnia and Herzegovina is “an entity set up following Bill Clinton’s brokering of the Dayton Accords in 1995,” Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina derives its continuity from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted into the United Nations three years earlier, in 1992. Before that it was for centuries a stable European state with borders defined by natural geographical features and state structures. It was the Bosnian Kingdom in the Middle Ages, Bosnia during Ottoman rule, a Corpus separatum during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and one of six republics within Socialist Yugoslavia. The claim that Bosnia’s diversity has produced animosity of “historical memories” lacks substance. Its civilizational space and international subjectivity are historic constants. Diverse religions and beliefs have coexisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina for centuries in peace and harmony.
The problems come from Serbia and Croatia, not Bosnia
The constant effort to break Bosnia up comes mainly from Serbia and Croatia, which have throughout history sought to annex parts of its territory. The source of the problem in the Balkans is not the allegedly irreconcilable religious, ethnic and national differences among people, but rather the “Greater-state” ambitions of Serbia and Croatia.
A series of judgments of international courts have unequivocally established the fact that the war pillage and destruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted from the political projects of Belgrade and Zagreb to ethnically clean territories. They used both ethnic and religious factors to inflame interethnic hatred, mistrust, and instability, culminating in mass war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide.
These ambitions continue to serve as the political focus of Serb and Croat nationalist and secessionist actors, thus slowing nationbuilding in Bosnia. To save peace in the Balkans, the US and EU should raise their voices against the ethnonationalists, who deny genocide and glorify war crimes and their perpetrators.
Bosnia and Ukraine
The main reasons to reject the idea of breaking up Bosnia are not historical, but moral and political. Accepting Bosnia’s breakup would legitimize genocide and ethnic cleansing, posing a dangerous precedent for similar campaigns of killing and persecution. Such a precedent could also serve as a potent initiator of militant ethnocracy on European soil, which can easily consume other hotspots across the continent in pursuit of ethno-national exclusivity. The logic of blood and soil would return Europe to the 1930s.
It would be hypocritical for the democratic world to insist on defending democratic ideals under attack in Ukraine, while permitting the break up of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Ukrainian struggle is also the Bosnian struggle. The secessionist leader of the Bosnian Serbs has openly praised and publicly awarded Putin for the atrocities he has committed against Ukrainians. The recent visit of members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Kiev conveyed the right message. The campaign of Russian “denazification” of Ukraine is a campaign that Bosnia and Herzegovina also went through in its struggle towards freedom and international affirmation.
Principles of justice and legality, inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect for human rights, and the promotion of peace and security are of crucial importance for the European continent. They need to be defended in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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