Tag: United Nations
Hangups: why and who
The Syria peace talks did not begin as projected in Geneva today, though they are likely to convene before the end of this week. Secretary of State Kerry is doing his damndest to make it happen. What are the hang ups? Is he wise to press so hard?
There are two big hangups: why talk and with whom. Or in diplomatese: the agenda and the shape of the table.
Why is the bigger issue. The Syrian opposition, backed by Washington, wants to talk about transition of power away from Bashar al Asad to a “governing body with full executive powers.” That 2012 formula has been repeated ad infinitum since, either explicitly or implicitly (by reference to the June 2012 United Nations communique in which it first appeared). The regime has made it clear it will not negotiate about transition in Geneva. Nor did it last time the UN tried for a political solution, two years ago. Bashar al Asad’s delegation will stick with an anti-terrorist pitch, backed by the Russians and Iranians. The military gains the regime has made against its opponents since Russia’s intervention in the fall mean it is feeling little pressure to yield.
While the Russians never tire of saying that they are not wedded to Bashar al Assad, everything they do suggests the opposite. There is good reason for this. Moscow has no hope of a welcome in Syria by a serious successor to the regime, so the Russians are sticking with what they’ve got.
Iran even more so. Tehran has risked Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias it supports and Revolutionary Guard forces in Syria, certainly losing thousands. Though Syrians in my experience are little inclined to sectarianism, the approximately three-quarters of the population that is at least nominally Sunni is not going to easily forget what Iran and its proxies have done to prop up a dictator. Nor will the Alawites and Shia who have backed the regime want to find out what the majority population is inclined to do in retaliation. So having Iran at the table, entirely justified by its role in the conflict, is no easy formula for a solution.
In addition, there are other “who” problems. The fragmentation of the Syrian opposition, often cited as a serious obstacle, is not such a big problem this time around. With Saudi sponsorship, the main opposition forces other than al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State have chosen a High Negotiation Commission (HNC), headed by former regime Prime Minister Hijab, and a negotiating team. The main body of the opposition is, in fact, remarkably unified this time around, at least for the moment.
The problem is that there are forces claiming to be opposition that lie outside the HNC, which does not recognize them as such. They come in two flavors: Kurdish and so-called “internal” opposition, both heavily favored by Moscow.
The Kurds who count are affiliated with the Kurdish PYD militia who are fighting in northern Syria against the Islamic State with US support. Washington doesn’t want them excluded from the talks, even if they are affiliated with the Kurdish militia waging a rebellion inside Turkey. Moscow agrees, not least to give Turkey grief.
Moscow also backs elements of the “internal” opposition who aren’t regarded by the opposition forces represented in the HNC as real opposition. Russia is trying to force internal opposition figures into the HNC delegation, likely in exchange for allowing some of what Moscow regards as extremist groups also to join. From Moscow’s point of view, the more unmanageable and fractious the HNC presence in Geneva, the better. The last thing Moscow wants is for the Syrians to choose their own delegation, which would be heavily anti-Russian.
The HNC seems determined to reject Kurdish participation in its delegation, not least because the Kurds often clash with opposition brigades represented there and collaborate with the regime in territories the Kurds largely control. But of course that may mean separate Kurdish representation, which in some ways is precisely what the mostly Arab HNC should not want to see. Separate Kurdish representation in the talks could well favor Kurdish ambitions for a separate federal unit within Syria, like the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. The Syrian Kurds are calling theirs “Rojava.”
With all these complications, is Secretary Kerry wise to insist?
Richard Gowan argues that there are reasons to proceed, despite the odds: possible progress on humanitarian issues, keeping a peace process alive because it may eventually lead somewhere, and most of all the need Washington and Moscow are feeling to limit their recent competition and try for some cooperation in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal. Even a failure, in this view, has the virtue of trying.
My own inclination is towards skepticism, not least because failure at this point will likely mean another tw0-year hiatus. Secretary Kerry is a far greater risk-taker than most of his predecessors. He tried with Israel and Palestine far beyond the point at which others would have given up. The result is an impasse that may last a long time. He pressed forward with Iran on nuclear issues to good effect. Will his Syria effort look more like the former or the latter? More likely the former, with catastrophic consequences for millions of Syrians.
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Gulf style
Saudi Arabia’s decision to break diplomatic relations with Iran raises the question of how much worse things can get. It depends of course on Riyadh’s and Tehran’s objectives and what they are willing to risk to gain them.
Marc Lynch at Monkey Cage today suggests the Saudi motives for escalating its conflict with Iran by executing Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr are three: to isolate and contain Iran even as the nuclear deal proceeds, to distract from foreign policy failures and to rally regional Sunni support. He regards domestic repression as a relatively unimportant factor, which I find hard to credit. Only four of those executed last weekend are known to be Shia. The other 43 were presumably Sunni, many of them extremists responsible for attacks that occurred a decade or more ago. Someone is surely trying to send a strong signal to Sunni extremists about the consequences of targeting the Kingdom.
But let’s examine the international factors and their consequences.
Executing a nonviolent Shia cleric isn’t a likely way to isolate or contain Iran. But Tehran helped the Saudi cause when it allowed Riyadh’s embassy to be sacked. That’s a surefire way of getting negative diplomatic attention, especially from the US and UK. Score one own goal for Riyadh. The Supreme Leader also threatened Saudi Arabia with God’s wrath. That puts him in good company with some right-wing American politicians who are likewise convinced that God acts on their behalf (and maybe even at their behest).
Riyadh is getting some regional support. Bahrain, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates have downgraded their relations with Tehran. That doesn’t count for much more than an improved field position in my book. Nor are the executions likely to distract much from foreign policy failures, and then only temporarily. The wars in Syria and Yemen are not going well from the Kingdom’s perspective. Riyadh is going to have to throw even more money and hardware into them, while encouraging others to do likewise, if it wants to have a serious impact.
The US failed to condemn the Saudi executions, though it regretted their contribution to increasing sectarian tensions in the region. Friends don’t condemn friends, I guess. It certainly would not have helped Washington’s relations with Riyadh, which are already tense because the Saudis are feeling sold out in the Iran nuclear deal. The question is how much longer friendship will trump honesty. The Americans are in no position to object to executions per se, but no one in Washington thinks much of the Saudi justice system. At least from what is readily available in public, it is hard to picture how anything al Nimr said would justify the death penalty.
The blowup between Iran and Saudi Arabia puts at risk the UN-sponsored Syria peace talks, which are scheduled to being January 25 in Geneva. But it also makes them all the more important. You wouldn’t know it from the headlines, but the Saudis and Iranians have a common enemy in the Islamic State. If only they could agree on how to fight it.
On BBC Five Live last night I was asked whether the current downward spiral could lead to war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It’s hard to rule that out, as breaking diplomatic relations can be a prelude to war and feelings are certainly running high. But both countries seem much keener to fight on third-country turf than on their own. Iran has Revolutionary Guard forces commanding and training in Syria, but most of the actual fighting is done by Hizbollah on Tehran’s behalf. The Saudis are bombing Houthi forces in Yemen, but they seem to have kept their ground forces mostly out of the fight. Some naval dueling in the Gulf, possibly involving tankers, might be in the offing, but proxy war through intermediaries is more the Gulf style.
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The UN leans forward
The UN last week leaned forward on two important conflicts. The Secretariat went ahead with a Libyan peace deal, despite the refusal of the chairs of the country’s two competing parliaments and some armed groups to sign. A couple of days later, the UN Security Council passed a Syria resolution endorsing the so-called Vienna 2 road map for a ceasefire, negotiations, a new constitution, transition and elections. Neither move ends either war. Optimists hope they are first steps in the right direction.
The roads ahead will be difficult. In Libya, many armed groups seem unready to end their struggle, which is more about control of oil, the country’s substantial sovereign wealth funds and patronage than it is about religion or identity. But that is little comfort. It is not clear whether the Tobruk-based parliament, recognized under the agreement as a powerful lower house, will be able to move to Tripoli. Nor is it clear that the Tripoli-based parliament, which is to become a kind of advisory upper house, accepts its reduced role. Without a substantial deployment of peacekeepers, there is little the international community can do beyond the threat of sanctions against individuals to change their minds. In the meanwhile, the Islamic State is expanding its presence and aiming to control Libya’s vital oil facilities. Maybe that will get the attention of the warring factions.
Syria is no less difficult. The United States and Russia may nominally agree that it should remain united and become a state in which its citizens decide how it is governed, but they differ on whether and when Bashar al Assad should go, who is a terrorist and what should be done to fight the Islamic State. Washington thinks Assad has to leave in order to enable a serious fight against terrorists. Russia thinks he is fighting terrorists but might eventually leave, if and when the Syrian people decide. Russia is mostly bombing people the Americans thinks are moderates vital to Syria’s future, not the Islamic State. Washington is beefing up moderate forces, but refuses to give them the means to end barrel bombing and Russian strikes. Even a ceasefire in Syria will be difficult. The Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra (an Al Qaeda affiliate) won’t participate. Who will monitor the ceasefire, reporting on violations and who commits them?
None of this means the UN is wrong to try. What it means is that our expectations should be tempered.
A serious ceasefire in all of Syria isn’t likely. Some parts of the country may calm, but the international community will need to settle for “fight and talk,” a time-honored tradition. Agreement on transition isn’t likely either. The day Bashar al Assad agrees that at some future date he will be leaving power will be the day he leaves power. The notion that he will preside over a credible democratic transition is bozotic. He intends to remain in power and will likely be able to do so as long as the Russians and Iranians back him.
In Libya, it is unlikely that the UN-sponsored accord will be implemented without some sort of international peacekeeping presence, to secure at least Tripoli so that the united government the agreement foresees can safely meet and deliberate. That may be neccessary, but not sufficient, since the Islamic State threat is not in Tripoli (yet), but rather in Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte, and civilians in Benghazi need protection even more than those in Tripoli. Washington isn’t going to bother with Libya, except when it targets an Islamic State militant or two (or two dozen). If Libya is to be stabilized, the Europeans will need to step up to the task, or convince Arab countries to do it. Italy is attached by umbilical pipelines to Libyan gas production. France also enjoys Libyan oil and gas. Europeans with interests need to stop talking and start acting if they want their investments and energy supplies saved.
The UN is also leaning forward in Yemen, where the more or less Shia Houthis allied with forces loyal to former President Saleh are fighting the Saudi- and Emirati-backed effort to restore President Hadi to power in Sanaa. The effort to get a ceasefire and political settlement there is just beginning, without much initial success. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is expanding and enjoying relative immunity in Yemen’s vast hinterlands. The Islamic State can’t be far behind.
The seemingly shy and hesitant Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is proving to be a bold risktaker. The UN is doing the right things. If it didn’t exist, we would have to invent it. American politicians should be more appreciative.
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Over the low bar
I could easily cheer the climate change agreement reached yesterday in Paris: it is the first to gain universal adherence, it starts the process of limiting greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, it makes a big down payment on helping poorer countries join the process, it sends a strong signal to finance and industry about future directions, it is a big win for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry, and it arguably initiates a process that will ratchet up restraints on emissions for decades to come.
But the sad fact is that the agreement does not do what many scientists think necessary to avoid catastrophic outcomes: limit future increases in global temperatures to 2 degrees centigrade or less. So yes, the agreement may be a turning point, and it is certainly a remarkable example of global governance aiming to meet the challenge of a long-term problem. It may even avoid the worst of the impacts global warming might have caused. But it won’t prevent island countries from being inundated and even submerged, or ferocious storms from ravaging many parts of the world. Nor will it prevent the United States and other countries with long coastlines from needing to spend fortunes to protect property and infrastructure, if they don’t want to lose to both to rising sea levels.
This is one of those triumphs that needs to be seen in perspective. Both what it achieves and what it fails to achieve are significant. But no agreement would have been far worse. Failure would have poisoned the subject for another decade or more, as politicians would have hesitated to revive it once more from its deathbed.
So the bar may be low, but getting over it is better than not getting over it. In foreign policy, that is cause enough for celebration.
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Real with consequences
This week’s Paris meeting on climate change will move a lot of electrons heralding action on climate change. But the outcome is guaranteed to be disappointing if you are worried about the consequences of continuing to burn fossil fuels. The national pledges (known in the trade as “intended nationally determined contributions” or INDCs) will fail to stop global warming short of the 2 degrees (centigrade) that would be required to avoid a substantial increase in sea levels and worsening of the storms and heat extremes that have already become all too common. Some will say this is a good start, as it will stop global warming at perhaps 3 degrees.
I’m less patient. I was a United Nations young staffer in 1972 at the first UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. The “greenhouse effect” and global warming were already well-known then. So too were the difficulties of coming to grips with an issue that threatens global economic growth and pits already wealthy fossil fuel burning countries against aspirants from what we then termed the Third World. Who would bear the burden of cutting back on greenhouse gases? Would it be those who have already benefited from fossil fuels, or those who would like to do so in the future? And how will efforts to cut back on emissions affect prospects for economic growth worldwide?
The issue has gotten worse since then: China, not a “rich” country, has become a major contributor to the global load of carbon dioxide, overtaking the US in 2005. Its pledge in Paris will entail peaking emissions by 2030, or perhaps few years earlier. Still very poor India’s will continue rising to 2030, possibly making it a bigger contributor to global emissions than either China or the US. While the US has contributed a great deal to the problem to date, its emissions are already declining. Washington aims for a 28% reduction from 2005 levels by 2025.
But none of this will enable the world to escape the consequences of global warming. They are not all bad. Nor are they necessarily all induced by human activity. But a lot of them will require major adjustments, especially for land areas lying close to sea level. I won’t be investing in beach-front property for my grandson. It could well be submerged, or the beach carried off by storms, well before he inherits. More seriously: Bangladesh, Mauritius and other poor, vulnerable countries may well find themselves without the land they cherish, or suffering far worse consequences from tsunamis than they did in the past.
Nor are rich countries immune: remember Hurricane Sandy’s impact on New York City? Not necessarily caused by global warming, but still a clear harbinger of what is becoming more likely in the future, including in China’s prosperous coastal cities. Climate change is already costing the US Federal government over $20 billion per year. States and local governments are spending billions more to prevent the worst consequences.
No doubt the White House staff is busily working on making the Paris meeting a successful one for President Obama, who is wisely attending for two days at the opening (as invited by President Hollande). The main diplomatic drama will occur behind the scenes at the end of the 12-day affair. No one there will have forgotten the clamorous failure of negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009, where the President was personally embarrassed. The obvious answer to the equity issues global warming raises is money. The President has pledged $3 billion to a Green Climate Fund for developing countries that has already topped $10 billion. That’s not small change, but it barely scratches the surface of the total financial requirements, as the Indians are quick to point out.
A key issue in Paris will be whether the voluntary national commitments already made will be legally binding. That’s what the French, and I imagine the Europeans more generally, want. It’s hard to picture, at least with respect to the emissions targets or financial commitments. Making them legally binding would virtually guarantee non-approval of any international legal instrument in the US Senate, where there is still a lot of skepticism about global warming. Some marginal, procedural changes to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, negotiated parallel to the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), may still be possible. The big procedural issue is when the next review of INDCs will take place: the US wants it in five years, to keep the pressure on, while developing countries prefer ten.
Somehow the White House will make the President’s two days in Paris sound like a resounding success. But no one should be fooled: global warming is not only real, it will also continue far beyond the point at which most reputable scientists believe it will cause catastrophic effects.
PS: a SAIS climate change guru read this critically, which inspired me to make some changes in the original. The changes are in bold.
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Unwise
Its Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU signed, Kosovo is currently campaigning to join UNESCO. This would enable its educational and cultural institutions to benefit from international privileges reserved in practice to UNESCO members. The General Conference, which convened Monday in Paris, is expected to vote on the issue this month, perhaps as early as Monday.
That at first glance is about as far as you can get from a war and peace issue. But unfortunately it matters, mainly because Serbia is trying to block Kosovo’s move with an intense diplomatic countercampaign. Belgrade sees international organization membership for Kosovo as a back door to recognition of its sovereignty.
That’s silly. Recognized by 111 states, Kosovo is already a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as other “country” clubs. That is surely more testimony to its sovereignty than membership in UNESCO, which comes with obligations as well as privileges. Someone in the Serbian Foreign Ministry must get a point for every blocked Kosovo effort to enter an international organization.
UNESCO membership for Kosovo is particularly appropriate. The country has elaborate obligations to protect Serbian religious and cultural property under the Ahtisaari plan that paved the way for Kosovo independence. Belgrade rightly expects Pristina to fulfill those obligations. Its leadership is committed to doing so. Since declaring independence in 2008, it has substantially done so. But extremism is gaining in Kosovo, as it is throughout the Balkans. Denying Kosovo membership in UNESCO would strengthen more radical political forces there and increase potential threats to Serbs and Serb cultural and religious property.
The authorities in Pristina will have to be ready to meet those threats effectively, but even better protection would come from improved relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the local communities in which Serbian churches and monasteries are located. Albanians and Serbs of good will should be trying to ensure proactively that the local population appreciates this commitment and that the local authorities and police give high priority to ensuring its fulfillment.
The Serbian Orthodox Church has taken a position against Kosovo membership in UNESCO, enunciated here in reasonable terms by Father Sava, for whom I have a lot of respect:
This I don’t buy. A sovereign Kosovo can’t be put in the position of taking every issue Belgrade suggests to “the dialogue” the EU has sponsored. That is explicitly aimed at normalizing bilateral relations. Multilateral acceptance of Kosovo needs to proceed in the normal fashion, decided in accordance with each international organization’s normal procedures.
Kosovo is still struggling to gain full international recognition, which is an issue the more nationalist forces use against its current government. Failure to get into UNESCO will encourage this bad habit. There is nothing that could set that cause back more dramatically than a repeat of the disgraceful pogrom of March 2004, in which Albanians strove to drive Serbs out of Kosovo and destroyed churches and other Serb monuments. Most Kosovo Albanians understand and appreciate this now. But there will always be a fringe that wants revenge against Serbs for the injustice and crimes done to Albanians in the past. It is up to Kosovo’s citizens and police to prevent them from acting in ways that most Kosovars would disapprove.
But it is up to Belgrade to appreciate that denying Kosovo membership in an organization devoted to culture, education and science undermines the responsibility and accountability the Pristina authorities and the majority of moderate Kosovo citizens need to accept as their own. UNESCO membership does nothing to hurt Belgrade. Opposing it is unwise and should stop.
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