Tag: United Nations
Is meeting Putin smart?
The White House has let it be known that President Obama will meet with President Putin next week at the United Nations. Is this smart diplomacy, or not?
The arguments against it are strong. Putin has invaded eastern Ukraine. His proxies there are failing to fulfill their commitments to a ceasefire and expelling humanitarian organizations as well as the UN. He is also deploying combat forces to Syria to protect the Alawite heartland along its Mediterranean coast and to protect the Russian port facilities at Tartous. Defiance and escalation do not merit the acceptance a meeting implies. Giving Putin the recognition he craves will only encourage further misbehavior intended to ensure that vital issues cannot be solved without Russian involvement.
The arguments for it are weaker. We need to reiterate the need for Moscow to live up to the September 1 ceasefire agreement in Ukraine. We need to hear directly from Putin what his intentions are in Syria in order to judge whether we can make common cause with him there against the Islamic State. The Ukraine-related sanctions are having an impact. It would be a mistake to leave any stone unturned in the quest for peaceful resolutions in both Ukraine and Syria. Putin is the one pressing for the meeting, which is just a meeting. It does not imply acceptance of Putin’s behavior or a great power role for Russia.
But there is another consideration: what is President Obama getting in exchange for this meeting? Have the Russians offered something of value?
I don’t know the answer. This is where the confidential nature of diplomatic exchanges makes it difficult to comment. A meeting might be worthwhile if it means Russia will permanently stop its advance in eastern Ukraine and abide by the Minsk 2 agreement. It would certainly be worthwhile if Moscow were seriously committed to a political transition in Syria that excludes Bashar al Assad from power.
The odds against both these propositions are long. Moscow is unquestionably feeling the pressure of lower oil prices, sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Putin wouldn’t be calling Elton John to discuss gay rights (yes, this time he really did) if he weren’t feeling the need to grab a headline or two and project an image of openness and reason. But Putin is a master at distracting attention from his perfidies with ultimately meaningless gestures. He can’t withdraw support for Assad and still hope to hold on to the port facilities at Tartous, which any opposition-supported successor government will feel compelled to banish. Retreat from Donbas, or even a serious effort to implement the existing agreement, would surrender Ukraine to the European Union and the West.
I’ll be glad to be proved wrong, but my sense is that Putin is prepared to stay the course both in Ukraine and in Syria, intensifying or toning down Russian military efforts as the situation requires but refusing to budge on the basic issues of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as support for the existing Syrian regime. If that is right, the best outcome from a meeting next week will be an American conviction that he is irredeemable and that only a shift in the military balance in both places will lead to serious political outcomes in Syria and Ukraine.
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Libya needs all the help it can get
I had an opportunity today to talk with Hill people about Libya. Here is more or less what I said:
1. It’s a pleasure to be here to talk about Libya, which is today a country in big trouble but with some hope of finding its way out.
2. I confess to a lot of sympathy with the revolution that started in February 2011. I visited Benghazi and Tripoli that September and again in July 2012, to observe Libya’s first national elections in almost 50 years.
3. I found Libya the friendliest Arab country I have ever visited. Libyans knew who saved Benghazi and appreciated it. They ran good elections in 2012 and were looking forward to a free and democratic future.
4. But the revolution began crashing in the fall of 2012. Three years later, Benghazi is chaotic, tribal tensions are causing sporadic violence in the south and only recently has the west begun to stabilize, due to exhaustion of the Misratan and Zintani militias.
5. The country has two parliaments and two governments. The internationally recognized one is based in Tobruk and Bayda, with support from militias gathered together in a coalition called Dignity. The other is based in Tripoli, with support from militias in the Dawn coalition.
6. The big change since I wrote “Libya’s Escalating Civil War” in May is the heightened prospect of a UN-brokered political agreement, hopefully to be signed before the end of this month.
7. The agreement would create a Government of National Accord (GNA) with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) elected in June 2014 as its legislature and an advisory State Council drawn mainly from Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC).
8. This would be a power-sharing arrangement that attempts to merge Libya’s two governments into one. That is a classic way for diplomats to try to resolve civil wars.
9. But it is not entirely symmetrical. The Tripoli-based GNC would become advisory.
10. That’s the main sticking point. The proposed GNC amendments to the draft agreement would make it a second house of a bicameral parliament, with virtually equal powers to the HoR.
11. That may be a deal breaker, but there is another way out of the current impasse. The GNC may be able to make up some of what it loses institutionally in the now ongoing bargaining over deciding who sits where: the positions of prime minister, deputy prime ministers and the two ministers who will be part of the Presidency Council are particularly important.
12. That the bargaining has gotten to this stage—the musical chairs phase of ending a war (who will get a good seat and who will be left standing)—is a good sign, though no guarantee of success.
13. But even success will be no more than what the State Department people are referring to as a “70% solution.”
14. Khalifa Haftar, who commands what he calls the Libyan National Army on behalf of the “Dignity” coalition, is not likely to sign on. Nor will some hardliners associated with the “Dawn” coalition.
15. A 70% solution without international peacekeepers is a dicey proposition. Thirty per cent is a lot of potential spoilers.
16. The key issue for success will be security arrangements, especially in Tripoli. Those arrangements have not yet been made, though I understand some of the militias have begun talking informally about them.
17. Even in the best of all possible worlds, that will take time, as building the confidence of HoR members required to get them to move to Tripoli will not be easy.
18. What about international peacekeepers, at least to secure Tripoli? The Italians have indicated a willingness to lead such an effort, but it will be vital that the initiative come from a legitimate Libyan government only after Tripoli is stabilized and the HoR has moved there.
19. Arab participation, which won’t be easy or quick to arrange, is vital.
20. That will leave a perilous transition period. The Islamic State affiliate in Libya is second only to the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in posing a threat to U.S. interests.
21. Though chased recently from Derna by other extremists, ISIS has established itself in centrally located Sirte, Qaddafi’s hometown. A rebellion there last month failed.
22. ISIS despises both Dawn and Dignity. It will try to destabilize a Government of National Accord.
23. So whatever forces back the GNA will need to be prepared to fight ISIS, in addition to other spoilers who refuse to acknowledge its authority.
24. What will the U.S. role be if the 70% solution goes forward?
25. First Washington has to be prepared to press the parties in Libya to adhere to the UN-brokered agreement. This will likely include sanctioning recalcitrants. It also needs to include support for those who are prepared to support the peace process, whether nationally or locally. It would be particularly important if the Misratan and Zintani militias can be convinced to come to a truce.
26. Second, Washington needs to help ensure Libya’s neighbors back the 70% solution to the hilt. The Tunisians and Moroccans, who have hosted some of the negotiating sessions, are on board.
27. The big question mark is Cairo, which under President Sisi has in the past backed Dignity and in particular Haftar. I am told the Egyptians are ready to abandon that support.
28. Third, Washington should support any international peacekeeping mission with air and sea logistics, intelligence and air strikes.
29. Fourth, Washington will need to train Libyan forces, especially for counter-terrorism.
30. This is more controversial than it sounds, because a previous U.S.-supported effort to train a General Purpose Force (GPF) came a cropper several years ago due to misbehavior of the Libyans involved. Some refused to return to Libya. Others did worse.
31. CT training and assistance will have to occur in Libya. It will be expensive and dangerous. Congressional support for the effort will be vital. I suggest we prepare to spend as much as the $600 million we planned for the GPF, over three to five years. That will be a hard sell.
32. But we have to decide whether we are serious about defeating the Islamic State or not. A failed UN political agreement in Libya could open the door to ISIS, which is still relatively weak there.
33. We know however how quickly and suddenly ISIS can expand and take over territory.
34. Libya is an enormous country with a small population–only 6.4 million when everyone is at home, likely no more than 5 million or so today. Its hinterland would be ideal as an ISIS safe haven, giving it strategic depth as it loses territory in Iraq and Syria.
35. The Libyans deserve better, in particular if they sign on to the UN-brokered agreement. I hope we’ll be prepared to support their efforts.
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The Russians are coming
Of course they’ve already been present in Syria for decades and throughout the current civil wars. They have been holding on tight to their naval facilities at Tartus, supplying Bashar al Assad’s forces with weapons, training Syrian forces, and protecting Syrian diplomatic interests, in particular at the United Nations. But now Moscow seems to be constructing a base for a thousand or so troops at on air field outside Latakia, 50 miles to the north of Tartus. What are they up to? What does this move signify?
Building a base of these dimensions is a serious deepening of Russian commitment to the Syrian regime. Secretary Kerry called it escalation. But it betrays the weakness of the regime more than its strength. Latakia is the heartland of Alawite support for Bashar al Assad. If it requires Russian troops for its defense, the regime is either in deeper trouble along the coast than many had imagine, or perhaps preparing to relocate Assad from Damascus. Either way, it wouldn’t be necessary if things were going well for Bashar. Those who had hoped (I once counted myself among them), that Moscow would realize the folly of its support for him are going to be disappointed.
The Russians have reason to be concerned. Syrian government forces have palpably weakened over the last two years. Regime-organized militias (National Defense Forces) and Lebanese Hizbollah, sometimes under Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps command, are now doing much of the fighting, as the regular army is disintegrating. The opposition has taken Idlib, 80 miles or so from Latakia, and much of the surrounding countryside.
They are within striking distance of Latakia, though the topography and demography will make getting there difficult. Alawite militias as well as Syrian regular forces, Hizbollah and now the Russians will defend Latakia and its approaches with vigor.
Moscow will portray whatever it is doing as support to a legitimate government fighting off a terrorist assault. The Russians I’ve talked with about Syria are fully committed to killing as many Sunni extremists as they can abroad, before they get to Mother Russia. The Islamic State has significant Chechen support. Moscow figures it is better to kill them in Syria than to risk their coming home to roost. The parallel with Bush Administration rhetoric should be noted.
Neither the regime nor Moscow will, however, make much distinction between the Islamic State and other more moderate forces that have taken up arms against Bashar al Assad. Their efforts on behalf of the regime are likely to radicalize the majority Sunni population of Syria further and help the Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra recruit cadres. Russian escalation will also sink American diplomatic efforts to bring about a political solution in Syria. Neither the regime nor Moscow has ever shown interest in a solution that displaces Bashar, which Washington regards as a sine qua non, in order to convince at least some of the rebels to stop fighting.
Moscow will enjoy acting to fight ISIS in defiance of the Americans, whose anti-ISIS Coalition has had only a modicum of success. The situation in Syria is the mirror image of the situation in Ukraine, where the Russians are supporting insurgents and the Americans are supporting a legitimate government. Great powers, Putin feels, can do as they like, not least because that is how he thinks the Americans behave. The many differences between the trumped-up rebellion in eastern Ukraine and the all too genuine (and initially peaceful) uprising in Syria are of little interest to Putin.
So rather than just an escalation, it is better to see the Russian base-building as a further deterioration of the Syrian situation. It means heightened fighting, more displaced people and refugees, and less hope for a political solution. Europe had better brace itself for a much greater flow of what it prefers to call migrants, especially in anticipation of winter. The Russians are coming is not good news.
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Do-over: the Special Court drama in Kosovo
Rrap Kryeziu, a Haverford rising senior who is spending the summer helping me out on Balkans research, writes:
Kosovo’s future direction depends on an impending vote in its parliament expected to take place Monday. The seven-year-old country faces a pre-teen crisis. Following a 2010 report by the Council of Europe that attributes inhumane crimes to high government officials and former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members, Kosovo’s Western allies as well as its Serb and Russian adversaries, are demanding accountability. Because the alleged crimes took place in the post-war period and some in Albania, they are not covered by the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which in any event is closed to new cases.
A constitutional amendment in the Kosovo Parliament would enable the creation of a Special Court in which internationals would try still unspecified indictees. On June 26, the amendment fell five votes short. The opposition, which vehemently opposes the amendment, did not vote at all. Seven members of the governing PDK did not support the constitutional amendment despite their party leader’s unequivocal public support for the Special Court. PDK leader, former Prime Minister and now Foreign Minister Hashim Thaci may himself be implicated in the accusations, according to the Council of Europe report.
Opponents of the Special Court are concerned with upholding the KLA’s freedom-fighting reputation. They fear the court will tranform the image of Kosovars from victims of ethnic cleansing to perpetrators of crimes against humanity. There are also concerns about national sovereignty. Members of Vetevendosje (VV)–the leading opposition party–now surprisingly praise the integrity and capacity of Kosovo’s justice system, which in the past they have criticized as the tool of the ruling elite. It is unclear how they expect the court system to prosecute people they previously accused of controlling the judiciary.
One part does not reveal much about the whole. There was no single mastermind behind the KLA, which was an organic resistance movement. Potentially finding a few KLA commanders guilty of war crimes should not tarnish the entire movement. Confronting uncomfortable allegations by bringing a handful of individuals to justice will instead clear a dark cloud that has been cast by the Council of Europe report. It will reflect political maturity on behalf of Kosovo.
The US ambassador to Kosovo has warned lawmakers of a cascade of political disasters if Kosovo does not allow creation of the Special Court. Kosovo will weaken its partnerships with Western allies, who will allow the Security Council to take up the matter. Russia, which does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, will have a big say in what happens there. It is also likely that new elections will ensue, as the current coalition had promised to establish the Special Court within six months of taking power.
It is time for a re-run. The result will signal whether Kosovo is heading West, or astray.
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Europe at sea
On Monday, the Hudson Institute hosted a conversation with Rear Admiral Chris Parry, Royal Navy (Ret.), entitled Europe at Sea: Mediterranean and Baltic Security Challenges. Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, moderated. Admiral Parry spoke about the challenges that Europe faces, given that it is surrounded by water on three sides, and outlined several alternative political futures for Europe.
The threats to Europe from the sea are not new. In 1983, the USSR had a plan to attack Europe through the Central Front plus the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas. Understanding the way the Russians view the Black and Baltic Seas is crucial to understanding Putin’s motives. They have a very short coastline on the Baltic Sea. Until they took Crimea, they had a short Black Sea coast as well. This has always made the Russians nervous. Russia and the Scandinavian countries also have competing claims in the Arctic. Russia’s claims extend far beyond the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and Russian icebreakers now escort vessels through the Arctic.
Europe, however, is more worried about the Mediterranean because of unstable states in North Africa and the Levant, as well as migration both by sea and overland through Turkey. There is a risk for the return of Barbary piracy, as well as for seaborne terrorist attacks on coastal tourist areas. Northern Europe believes that it is the responsibility of Southern European countries to deal with this. The EU is not set up to make political decisions because it is an economic union with political pretensions. The effort needed to run the EU saps energy from efforts to address seaborne security threats.
Parry spoke about how influence has shifted, such that the important global players are now the US and the East Asian countries. The US is well-placed to benefit from globalization. If Europe isn’t careful, it will decline and become strategically irrelevant. In the future, Parry sees:
- An increase in the use of state power by non-Western countries.
- Small amounts of high-quality force will be decisive.
- Increased proxy activity, because states don’t want to directly confront each other.
- WMD proliferation.
- Increased terrorism.
- Diffusion of technology and weaponry.
There will be both irregular threats from terrorism, criminality, disasters and disease, as well as renewed threats from China, Russia, ISIS, Marxist revivalists (in Greece, for example), regional aspirants and weapons proliferation. Europe will need to contain a Middle Eastern equivalent of Europe’s Thirty Years War, ensure access to natural resources, and adapt to climate change.
Though Putin constitutes an existential threat, Parry noted that defense expenditure in Europe is declining. NATO countries still however spend more than non-NATO countries. It spends far more to shoot down a cheap missile than the missile costs; this unsustainable cost ratio must decrease. NATO has failed to resist coercion in Ukraine. Hitler knew he would win at Munich because he knew the British and French wouldn’t go to war. Putin is using traditional hard power and is confused by our lack of response. Russia’s Baltic Sea exercises are designed to resist NATO forces.
Scandinavia is nervous. Europe has become strategically dependent on the US; some European countries have armies that aren’t prepared to go to war. The UK is investing in new aircraft carriers but is hollowing out the rest of the Royal Navy. To resist coercion at sea from Russia, a change in attitude is needed.
Parry also spoke about the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The Iran deal represents what is possible, rather than what is desirable. China and Russia have been keen to maintain Iran as a client state and suppress its nuclear ambitions. In the rush to welcome Iran into the global economy, we need to be careful about the security dimensions. As a result of the Sunni-Shiite conflict in MENA, the “Great Satan” tag will shift from the US to Saudi Arabia. China has invested heavily in new trade routes. It may get the bulk of its future oil and gas from Shiite Iran and Shiite-dominated Iraq. But China could also move into the Southern Gulf States if the US and Europe reduce their commitments there.
Like Russia, China is increasing its naval presence, sometimes disregarding the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. There are increasing numbers of Chinese warships in the Indian Ocean as well as Chinese ships in the Mediterranean and Chinese icebreakers in the Arctic. China views its oil rigs as sovereign territory, which means that it believes it can base missiles and surveillance off of them. This is illegal under international law.
Parry outlined three different potential futures for Europe:
- A Eurasian future: the US drifts to the Pacific and Europe pursues economic cooperation with Russia and China.
- A maritime future: Parts of Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Korea together control trade on the seas. The sea is the physical equivalent of the World Wide Web and controlling it is vital for international trade.
- A fragmented future: There are no eternal friends or enemies, just interests, and each country pursues its own interests. Europe’s separatist movements could also lead to a fragmented future.
According to Parry, the US now faces choices as well. Unconventional oil and gas have been a game-changer for the US economy. The US has to decide whether it will use this money to remain strategically dominant or turn inward. The 2016 election will be crucial. In the future, if it becomes clear that help isn’t coming from the US, European countries will seek accommodation with Russia and East Asian countries will seek accommodation with China. This will have major geostrategic consequences.
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The truth in criticisms of the Iran deal
Here are some criticisms of the Iran deal that contain at least a kernel of truth. I thought I might go over these, for the sake of clarifying some of the arguments pro and con:
1. It will give Iran a lot of money to do bad things with. That is true. It’s not as much money as some are claiming: perhaps $50 billion fairly quickly the US Treasury thinks, rather than the $100-150 billion deal opponents cite. Since the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates has lost a great deal (two-thirds of the country’s centrifuges and virtually all of its enriched uranium, not to mention a plutonium-producing reactor filled with concrete), the pressures to compensate it with both money and freedom to do bad things in the region will be enormous. That means more money for shipping arms to Bahrain, Yemen and above all Syria as well as compensating Hizbollah for its losses. Only by countering Iranian moves in those places can the US hope to avoid some of the consequences.
2. All the agreement does is buy time. Yes, that is the main thing it does, by pushing Iran back from a breakout time (the time it needs to get the fissile material needed to build a singular nuclear weapon) of 2 months or so to a year, and preventing any shortening of that breakout time for 10-15 years. But that is not all it does. The verification mechanisms put in place will be the strictest and most comprehensive installed anywhere and will last forever. The obligation Iran takes in the agreement not to pursue nuclear weapons is binding and permanent. The military option so many critics implicitly favor remains an open should Iran move in the direction of getting a nuclear weapon.
3. The verification measures are inadequate. It is difficult to prove a negative, as we all know. That is what the verification measures are asked to do. But no country has ever made nuclear weapons in facilities monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as Iran’s will be. Iranian facilities will be covered by the tightest monitoring scheme ever devised, with the real capability of detecting diversion of any nuclear material. Still, a clandestine nuclear program is possible, conducted outside monitored facilities. That is why Iranian delivery to the IAEA of answers to questions about its past activities with “possible military dimensions” (PMDs) is so important. That is due October 15, with an IAEA report due December 15. If you want an early indication of whether this agreement will be effective, watch that space.
4. Lifting of sanctions cannot be “snapped back.” Existing contracts will be grandfathered, so the legal impact of any reimposition of sanctions–which can be decided by the US and its allies over Russian, Chinese or Iran objections–will not be immediate. That’s true. But the fact of reimposition will be much more significant than the legal impact. Companies that do business with Iran will immediately dial it down, if not out, should sanctions be reimposed, if only to avoid getting into trouble with US and European financial regulations. In the longer-term, Iran will be less vulnerable to sanctions if it invests its money well and is able to develop its oil and especially gas resources. That is an inherent part of the deal.
5. The deal allows industrial-scale nuclear facilities that make Iran a threshold nuclear state. I wouldn’t rank 5000 or so centrifuges or a few hundred kilos of light enriched uranium as industrial scale or nuclear threshold. But fine if you do, because Tehran has much more than that now and would be under no obligation to give any of it up if there is no deal. Are we better off with numbers two and three times as large as will exist if the deal is not approved? Not to mention that without a deal we can expect Iran to accelerate its nuclear efforts.
6. The sanctions will hold even if the US withdraws from the agreement. It is true that the US can make life extremely unpleasant for any company or bank anywhere in the world that does business with Iran if Washington says no. But there is a high price to be paid for extraterritorial extension of our sanctions: other governments don’t like it and Iran will build an elaborate network to get around it, as they have with the existing sanctions. Especially on the Repubican side of the aisle, it should be appreciated that anti-market restrictions are unlikely to be watertight or last forever.
7. The arms and especially missile sanctions should not have been lifted. The UN Security Council imposed them in order to get Iran to negotiate on nuclear issues. Iran expected them to be lifted as soon as it had implemented its portion of the nuclear constraints. Instead they will remain in place far longer than we had a right to ask. I’d prefer they not be lifted too, but I never got a pony either.
I’m reasonably confident the Congress will not muster the 2/3 majority in both houses required to kill the deal. But if they do, we can expect most of the world (that’s everyone but Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu) to think us deranged and to refuse American leadership on Middle East and many other issues for a long time to come. All those Gulf countries complaining about the deal now will make much more noise if the deal falls through and Iran acquires the material for a nuclear weapon in the next couple of months. Remember President Wilson, the League of Nations and the period between the World Wars? This would be at least as bad.
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