Tag: United Nations
Education and change in Saudi Arabia
On Tuesday, Atlantic Council hosted a panel discussion entitled Saudi Arabia’s Scholarship Program: Generating a “Tipping Point”?. Panelists included Stefanie Hausheer Ali, Associate Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council, Dr. Rajika Bhandari, Deputy Vice President and Director of the Center for Academic Mobility Research and Impact, Institute of International Education, Samar Alawami, American University graduate of the King Abdullah Scholarship Program and researcher at the King Salman Center for Innovative Government Anne Habiby, Director, King Salman Center for Innovative Government, and Ambassador James Smith former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Ambassador Francis Ricciardone, Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, and Vice President, Atlantic Council, moderated. The panelists discussed the transformative impact of the King Abdullah Scholarship Program on Saudi society and put this program in the context of foreign exchange programs worldwide.
Ambassador Ricciardone opened the discussion by recounting his visit to Saudi Arabia in May. People think of Saudi Arabia as backward and conservative. He found young people with international exposure who wanted to effect change. Ambassador Ricciardone attributed this to the King Abdullah Scholarship Program, which has made it state policy to send Saudis abroad to study. It is similar to the Fulbright Program, which promotes American interests by sending Americans abroad to see how others think. He asked the question of whether, à la Malcolm Gladwell, Saudi Arabia is reaching a tipping point where returnees from the program will transform the country.
Ali explained that she started studying the King Abdullah Scholarship Program because she met a number of Saudis from the program while studying at GW. King Abdullah met with George W. Bush in 2005 and made the case that more Saudis should study in the US. Bush agreed, and the number of Saudis studying abroad has skyrocketed from 5,000 in 2005 to over 200,000 today. In 2014, only China, India and South Korea sent more students to the US than Saudi Arabia. Approximately 30% of participants in the King Abdullah Scholarship program are women. The program is merit-based and doesn’t just include wealthy Saudis. Approximately 11% of Saudi higher education students are educated abroad; the average time abroad is 5 years. In the US, they do ESL for a year or two, then a degree program. Over half come to the US, but Saudi students are studying in 23 countries. The program costs $6 billion/year or 3% of Saudi Arabia’s budget. Saudi students contributed $3 billion to the US economy in 2014 and help break down Americans’ stereotypes about Saudis. Such stereotypes may include:
Dr. Bhandari spoke about the rapidly expanding number of globally mobile students. Most study abroad programs focus on graduate students, because they provide a greater multiplier effect for their host countries, but the Saudi program involves many undergrads too. These programs often promote vertical mobility. Governments launch such programs for several reasons:
1. Promoting national development.
2. Increasing human capacity in key areas.
3. Reforming organizations or entire sectors.
4. Improving linkages with other countries.
5. Creating opportunities for disadvantaged societal groups.
More needs to be done in these programs to:
1. Engage alumni.
2. Provide students with re-entry support.
3. Study the impact of these programs.
Habiby spoke about the King Salman Center for Innovative Government. It is the first private, nonprofit, Saudi think tank focused on improving government performance. It tries to connect national government, local government and economics. There is a lot of research in Saudi Arabia, but the Center makes this research more accessible. Habiby stated that Alawami’s first project was to map the Saudi government from the 1920s to the present. They look at case studies of which Saudi institutions are working. The King Abdullah Scholarship Program is one of them.
Alawami explained that she is a product of the King Abdullah Scholarship program and obtained a bachelor’s in International Studies from American University. The program is transforming Saudi Arabia into a knowledge society and giving Saudis the opportunity to meet those from other backgrounds, increasing tolerance in a traditionally tribal society. Saudi Arabia starts teaching English in 6th grade, so the program improves participants’ English skills. Saudis also learn better problem-solving skills. They come back with best-practice advice for the Saudi education system. The program opens up areas of study unavailable in Saudi Arabia, such as International Studies, and women in the program can study Petroleum Engineering, which they can’t do at home. Saudis do internships abroad, which are uncommon domestically and provide essential practice. When the students return to Saudi Arabia, they transform existing organizations or create new ones.
Ambassador Smith explained that the exponential growth in Saudi students in the US wasn’t planned or foreseen. When he began his term in 2009, he figured that the King Abdullah Scholarship Program had plateaued and envisioned a focus on business, healthcare, and domestic education. However, early in his term he realized that visa wait times were a major issue. King Abdullah asked him to do what he could to make sure Saudi students succeeded. Ambassador Smith ensured that students would be first in line for visas, and streamlined the system to reduce wait times for visa appointments from 6 months to under a month. When the State Department switched to an online system, he streamlined the system further and the wait time was reduced to only a few days. This sent a message that the US cared about Saudis. Then in 2010, the US increased the number of Saudi students allowed in. In the past 15 years, Saudi went from 8 universities to 32. Many returnees from the King Abdullah Scholarship program become professors.
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Women in countering violent extremism
Countering violent extremism (CVE) has become vital to national security. On Tuesday, the United States Institute of Peace explored women’s role. The panel included Zainab Hawa Bangura, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ambassador Anwarul K. Chowdhury, former Under-Secretary-General and High Representative of the United Nations, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, President of Women in International Security, Susan Hayward, Director of Religion and Peacebuilding at USIP and Jacqueline O’Neill, Director of the Institute for Inclusive Security. Kathleen Kuehnast, Director of Gender and Peacebuilding at USIP, moderated the event.
O’Neill talked about the importance of keeping our response to violent extremism in perspective. We often emphasize a securitized response, which undoubtedly is necessary. But a securitized response should not occur at the expense of solving broad, structural issues. We should not allow ourselves to be radicalized when countering extremism. A more appropriate approach would be to work on countering the “violent exclusion” of women and how that feeds into other problems.
Hayward explained the role of religion in CVE. She claimed it was critical to engage religious leaders and actors and use their authority to counter religion-based messages that legitimate and fuel extremism. In particular, she called for more women religious leaders to get involved. They can provide important psychosocial support, recognize radicalization and bridge religious divides.
Oudraat addressed three problems that dominate discussions on women and CVE:
- They ignore the gendered nature of security and are oblivious to the relationship between gender equality and status of women on one hand and violent conflict on the other hand.
- Many people have a misguided idea of the role and power of women in societies. There is a widespread idea that women are not visible in the public sphere, but are powerful in the private sphere, at home with their families, which makes them great agents for CVE. This is not true—a lot of women lack power even inside their families.
- Most of the discussions on women and CVE are not linked to the UN’s Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Gender equality is core to sustainable peace, so if we’re not linking CVE to the agenda, then we’re not taking the agenda seriously.
Chowdhury echoed Oudraat’s words and reiterated the importance of CVE as a component of the WPS. He said the agenda is centered on three pillars: participation, prevention and protection of women in conflict situations. The most important pillar is the first one, because if we have participation at all decision-making levels, it will ease the need for protection and prevention. Chowdhury emphasized maintaining a longer-term perspective in CVE. We often take the “hardware” approach to CVE by relying on military efforts. But we must also concentrate on promoting a culture of peace in which children grow up learning that they can resolve problems through non-violent means.
Chowdhury also called for a more determined and forceful approach towards inclusion of women. The world has paid “lip service” to women’s equality, but patriarchal attitudes have set us back time and again.
Bangura focused on women in ISIS, which understands better than state actors the importance of recruiting women and including them in governance. While the radical Islamic organization actively enlists smart women, we are still debating whether to include women in counterterrorism strategies. ISIS understands that when it targets women, it degrades, humiliates and destroys a society. In order to fight ISIS, we need to develop creative solutions, because our current tools are not sufficient. One solution is providing space for women in the counterterrorism effort, such as mothers who can provide insight on the radicalization process their children go through in order to join ISIS.
The panelists agreed that the international community must develop a more sophisticated understanding of gender dynamics as part of CVE. O’Neill and Oudraat pointed out that extremist groups’ ability to appeal to a man and woman’s sense of agency drives recruitment.
Chowdhury and Oudraat also stressed the value of National Action Plans (NAP) in future CVE efforts. These are plans that all UN member states are obligated to prepare, but so far only 43 out of 193 member states have prepared a plan. NAPs include each country’s comprehensive CVE strategy and bridge the distinction between what’s happening domestically and what’s happening internationally. These plans allow the international community to hold governments accountable for their CVE efforts, which is one way to extract national-level commitment. Tangible change should begin with serious treatment of women’s issues. Chowdhury warned that so long as millions of women are marginalized and impoverished, violent extremism will continue to spread.
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Legacy
We all worry about our legacy. President Obama must too. But unlike most of us he has a lot of people telling the world what his will be.
The current favorite is the Iran nuclear deal. I doubt that. Does anyone even remember that it was Bill Clinton who made a nuclear deal with North Korea? It fell apart in George W’s administration. Even that is not remembered, I suppose because the list of his failures is long.
If the Iran nuclear deal falls apart soon, sure it will tarnish the Obama brand. But let’s assume the implementation of the Iranian nuclear deal goes reasonably well. If 10 or 15 years from now Iran makes a dash for a nuclear weapon, will anyone blame Barack Obama, or will they understandably blame his successor’s successor? And credit him with delaying what was inevitable.
There have been lots of “legacy” proposals these past six months. The two most prominent, quite rightly focused on domestic policy, have been
- Obamacare, which survived its test in the Supreme Court;
- gay marriage, another Supreme Court win.
They will no doubt be counted as important milestones on the way towards a more just society, but really not legacy-defining.
A far stronger candidate in my view is this:
source: tradingeconomics.com
That’s a rapid recovery from the 2008 economic implosion, followed by six years of relatively steady if modest growth, likely to be extended to eight years while much of the rest of the world continues to stagnate. Simultaneously, US government debt has leveled off:
source: tradingeconomics.com
This good economic news is important for American foreign policy. Without it, there would be little hope that Washington could muster the resources needed to engage–even to the extent it has–on major issues like Moscow’s military challenge in Ukraine and Beijing’s somewhat less military challenge in the South China Sea.
In addition, there is the good news about US energy production:
source: tradingeconomics.com
Combined with the decline in global energy prices, this dramatic shift is denying resources to some of our adversaries and providing a serious boost to the American economy.
All that good economic news–rarely credited today but likely to be all to obvious in the future–should not however obscure the very real bad news from the Middle East. Apart from the failure of the Administration’s efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, we’ve got a civil war in Syria that has killed upwards of 300,000 people and displaced close to half the country’s population, sending 4 million abroad as refugees. We’ve also got a civil war in Libya, allowed to flourish in the aftermath of a successful intervention. And another in Yemen, where Washington is half-heartedly supporting a Saudi intervention that appears to be making things worse.
Just as important: the war against Islamist extremists that began in 2001 in Afghanistan has been notably unsuccessful. Fourteen years later, a few thousand extremists in two countries have metastasized to tens of thousands in more than a dozen countries, despite hundreds of drone strikes and air attacks.
Neither our military might nor our propaganda capabilities have succeeded in stemming the tide. They have arguably made things worse. The American non-governmental organizations are rightly protesting continuation of an approach that simply has not worked.
When it comes to foreign policy, these failures in the Middle East and in the fight against Islamist extremists are likely to be a bigger part of President Obama’s legacy than the nuclear deal. If he wants to worry about something, he should put these things at the top of his list. A serious effort now to enable Syrian moderates to begin governing inside Syria, coupled with a serious European effort to make sure the UN’s Libyan mediation unifies that country’s rival governments and parliaments, would do a great deal to fix the broken Middle East. These are largely diplomatic challenges, not military ones.
We would still be facing terrorist challenges elsewhere. If we want to deal with them, it is clear enough that military means will not suffice. We need a much stronger civilian mobilization, in partnership with other countries and international organizations. More on how to make that part of Barack Obama’s legacy in a later post.
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Big surprise is no surprise
The Middle East Institute published my piece this evening:
The Iran nuclear deal has only one big surprise: it is consistent with the April 2 “parameters” that preceded it and contains no surprises. No one caved. Nothing got walked back.
But there are some interesting additions. One is this: “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” This is a written confirmation of the Supreme Leader’s controversial “fatwa” against nuclear weapons. It was not so long ago that Iran’s critics in the United States were complaining that the fatwa was only oral and not written. I have not noticed anyone welcoming the written version.
The “reaffirmation” wouldn’t be worth the paper it is printed on except for the detailed limits and intrusive inspections that the agreement provides. No softie on Iran, Dennis Ross confirms that these fulfill previous Iranian commitments to limit centrifuges, enrichment, and enriched uranium; end all plans for separating plutonium; and no longer engage in any research and development related to a nuclear explosive device. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring will be more comprehensive and intrusive than for other countries. While no system is foolproof, nuclear weapons have never been developed within an IAEA safeguarded program.
That leaves the possibility of a clandestine nuclear program outside the purview of the IAEA. There is reason to believe that Tehran had such a program until 2003, when it was allegedly stopped. Iran, which previously stonewalled IAEA inquiries on this subject, has now committed in the nuclear deal to clarifying its past nuclear activities with “possible military dimensions” by October 15, with a final assessment due from the IAEA on December 15. This will be an important early milestone in implementation (or not) of the nuclear deal. It is not the first time the Iranians have promised clarification. Beyond that date, the IAEA can request access to locations of concern. Iranian objections can be overridden by five of eight members of a joint commission overseeing implementation of the agreement. That joint commission includes five Western members (the United States, the UK, France, Germany, and the EU) as well as Russia, China, and Iran.
The agreement provides for sanctions to be lifted once Iran implements its obligations or passes certain time limits in compliance with the agreement. No sanctions get lifted without implementation, and some—like the arms embargo—remain in place for five or eight years (depending on the weapons involved). While most restrictions are lifted within 15 years, some remain in place in perpetuity, including strict IAEA safeguards and the prohibition on nuclear weapons research and development.
The question is what happens if one or another obligation is breached. There is an elaborate, but quick-paced (I count 35 days), dispute resolution mechanism. At that point, UN Security Council sanctions would be reinstated, unless the Council votes within 30 days to continue lifting them. This is a “snapback” mechanism, unprecedented so far as I know in the Security Council. It would give the United States (and other permanent members) a veto over sanctions lifting. Iran has stated that it would treat reinstatement of sanctions as grounds to cease performing its commitments.
So, is this agreement a good thing or a bad thing?
It depends on what you think the alternative might be. At worst, it would be no constraints on the Iranian nuclear program, no IAEA monitoring, and no multilateral sanctions, as the EU and China are champing at the bit to do business with a cash, oil, and gas-rich Iran. At best we might in the absence of an agreement be able to sustain the sanctions for a while but not likely the IAEA monitoring and technological constraints, giving others in the region reason to initiate their own programs to produce weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. War might set back the Iranian nuclear program for a few years, but it would also give them incentive to finish the job and unleash even more chaos than the region is currently enduring.
Relief from sanctions will unquestionably provide the Iranians with resources. Tehran is owed upward of $100 billion that will flow into its coffers, in addition to whatever its renewed exports will bring in today’s bearish oil market, likely to go down further because of Iran’s reentry into it. The Islamic Republic is a profoundly anti-Western regime that even without much available cash has managed to contribute to instability in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Its anti-Americanism may sound hollow after this agreement, which engages Iran in a continuing process involving the United States and three of its allies as well as the European Union, but unless there is a dramatic and unexpected change of heart at the top in Tehran we can anticipate more trouble from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies in the region and even beyond.
America’s friends in the Gulf will therefore be nervous about the implications of this agreement, though the United Arab Emirates was quick to say it welcomed it. Israel denounced it even before the ink was on the page. But soon enough both the Gulf states and Israel will become keen about insisting on fulfilling its every letter, as they have with the interim agreement currently in effect.
The debate in Congress will be vigorous. Most Republicans and a good number of Democrats will oppose the deal on the grounds that it licenses Iran to become a nuclear threshold state, ignoring the Obama administration’s conviction that this would happen faster and with fewer controls in the absence of an agreement. But the opponents are unlikely to muster the two-thirds majority in both houses required to override a presidential veto. The Supreme Leader is thought to have given the green light for this deal, but he has not yet pronounced on it. Assuming he says a dramatically reluctant “yes,” the Iranian Majlis will not block it.
The saga of implementation has not yet begun. It will last 10-15 years. If the agreement holds and prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, it will have made an enormous contribution to peace and stability. If it fails, we will have to deal with the ugly consequences: war or a nuclearized Middle East.
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What I’ll be looking for
I’ve pledged a piece on the Iran nuclear deal to the Middle East Institute, once it is done. I claim some competence in the matter, as I earned a master’s degree in physical chemistry at the University of Chicago (and a doctorate on the history of radiation protection at Princeton) and spent seven years as a science counselor in American embassies working on non-proliferation issues.
Here are some key things I’ll be looking for:
1. Does the deal meet provisions laid out in the April Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program?
The parameters were unprecedented in what they would require a potential bomb-building country to do. The Americans published them, but the Iranians in the end did not formally object to their contents (and the Iranian Foreign Minister implied the document was accurate). Does the new agreement (presumably called a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) faithfully reproduce and implement its provisions?
2. Are the verification mechanisms sufficiently intrusive to ensure that we will know if Tehran cheats?
This is in some respects the most important issue. The parameters promised inspections at uranium-producing facilities for 25 years and surveillance of centrifuges (and their production) 20. How will these provisions be implemented? What provisions have been made to ensure access to suspicious military sites? There is no history of nuclear nonproliferation using facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Can we be reasonably certain of discovering if Iran initiates a clandestine nuclear program outside the purview of the IAEA?
3. How are sanctions to be lifted?
Does lifting of sanctions follow verified implementation? Which sanctions are to be lifted and how? Will the architecture of sanctions remain in place, as pledged in the parameters?
4. What provisions have been made for “snap-back” of sanctions in the event of violations?
Who decides when there is a violation? How is it decided that sanctions will be reimposed? What is the promised “dispute resolution mechanism”?
5. Will the arms embargo on Iran be lifted?
The parameters promised lifting of all UN Security Council resolutions “on the nuclear issue.” Does this mean the arms embargo, which among other things has blocked Russian sales of advanced air defenses to Tehran, will be lifted and if so how and when?
Other issues
US representation in Tehran: This deal is so far-reaching and complex, it is difficult to see how it can be implemented effectively without an official US presence in Iran. Are provisions being made for return of US diplomats and technical experts? Does this mean re-opening of a US office (if not an embassy), or will the Americans work out of the embassy of Switzerland, which has represented the US there since we broke diplomatic relations in 1980?
Iran’s behavior in the region, support for terrorism and human rights record at home. Both Democrats and Republicans will raise these issues during the 60-day Congressional review period. The Obama Administration has been reluctant to press those concerns as hard as it might while the nuclear negotiations were ongoing. Will that policy now change? Will the US be more prepared to push back against Iran’s forces or their proxies in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Lebanon? Will Iran use the funds it gains from sanctions relief to make even more trouble, and how will the Administration react to that.
Regional security: Wars are currently raging in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Iran and the US are both directly or indirectly implicated in all of them. Can the nuclear deal somehow lead to a regional accord that includes Saudi Arabia and Turkey and enables a more effective effort against ISIS as well as restoration of state integrity and effective governance?
I look forward to getting some answers, maybe tomorrow.
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Talking with terrorists
“The United States does not negotiate with terrorists” is a phrase engraved in every American’s mind because of its common use in the media and government statements. Replete with the idea that Americans will not lower themselves to the terrorists’ level, the phrase has created an implicit international standard that negotiation with terrorists is unacceptable. On Wednesday, June 24, Jonathan Powell, former Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Tony Blair, challenged this notion at a talk with Ian Wallace, Senior Fellow of the International Security Program at the New America Foundation. The talk was based on Powell’s new book, Terrorists at the Table.
According to Powell, every government claims it will not negotiate with terrorists, but ultimately does so. He finds this “collective amnesia” frustrating when government actions clearly show there’s value in talking to terrorists. Powell asserted that people’s opposition to negotiation stems from three beliefs—talking to terrorists appeases, legitimizes and rewards terrorists for their behavior.
These beliefs, however, are completely unfounded. Powell argues that talking to terrorists is not equivalent to agreeing to their terms and only legitimizes them in the short-term, which is a worthwhile sacrifice if the result is long-term peace. Moreover, the idea that talking to people is a reward and not talking to them is punishment is a childish approach. Powell emphasized the importance of an “adult” approach towards such a grave issue.
Powell’s call for communication stems from a desire to reduce the common mistrust between the governments and terrorists. A conversation allows terrorists to share their stories and grievances and opens a process that can lead to a resolution. Otherwise, the vacuum fills up with more violence.
These insights are partly a result of Powell’s experience negotiating with the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, which culminated in the Good Friday Agreement. The 1998 Agreement followed three failed negotiations, which Powell used as an example to highlight the importance of persistence. Initial setbacks shouldn’t deter governments from pursuing channels with terrorists, because failed agreements serve as building blocks for a successful future agreement.
Conditions for fruitful negotiations are a “mutually hurting stalemate” and strong leadership within opposing parties. The former refers to the point at which both parties have exhausted the will and resources to continue fighting, which gives them to communicate with each other in nonviolent ways. Reaching this point can take a while, even with increased military engagement between the two parties. But Powell urged governments to initiate communication channels, because history shows that leaving communication too late renders it useless. Powell cited General Petraeus who admitted that in Iraq, the US government delayed too long before talking to those “with American blood on their hands.”
Powell also mentioned the value of third parties in negotiations. Often governments are reluctant to involve a mediator, because they don’t want to lose control of the discussion. The UN can be the third party in situations demanding conflict resolution, but Powell thinks it has little success. Instead, he pointed to the effectiveness of smaller governments and NGOs, which can be more discrete.
Powell believes there is potential to negotiate with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Critics of this belief make the distinction between old terrorists and new terrorists, claiming that the latter’s religious drive precludes them from being rational counterparts in a negotiation. But Powell is convinced there’s room for communication, especially because the alternatives are bleak. The Kurdish and Shia’ forces have gained ground in Iraq and Syria, but they can’t make a transformative difference without foreign boots on the ground, which is not an option. This means there is no effective strategy unless a negotiating channel is opened.
PS: Powell was preaching to the about to be converted, as President Obama announced yesterday a policy allowing (but not requiring) talking with terrorists about hostage issues. But it will be hard to confine the talks to only those.
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