Tag: United Nations
Peace picks March 9-13
- Ukraine: Public Opinion Amid War | Monday March 9 | 11:00 – 1:00 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The survey of 2,000 Ukrainians, led by political psychologist Steven Kull at the University of Maryland and administered by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, was conducted Feb. 13-22, beginning one day after the latest ceasefire was to take effect and spanning the fall of Debaltseve to Russian-backed separatists. Conducted primarily through face-to-face interviews (telephone was used in some of the conflict areas), the poll also queries Ukrainians on how they think the United States, Russia, Germany, France and the EU are handling the crisis. Speakers will include Dr. Steven Kull, Director, Program for Public Consultation, and Senior Research Scholar, Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, College Park Professor, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland and former U.S. Secretary of Defense Representative to NATO and Amb. William B. Taylor, Acting Executive Vice President for USIP and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. Christian Caryl, Contributing Editor, Foreign Policy will act as moderator.
- A Conversation on the Middle East with Stephen Hadley| Monday March 9 | 1:00 – 2:00 | SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A conversation on the Middle East with Stephen J. Hadley, former U.S. assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli, senior fellow, Foreign Policy Institute. Stephen Hadley served as the National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush from 2005 to 2009. From 2001 to 2005, Mr. Hadley served as Deputy National Security Advisor. In addition to covering the full range of national security issues, he had special responsibilities in several areas including a U.S./Russia political dialogue, the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, and developing a strategic relationship with India.
- The Future of U.N. Peace Operations | Tuesday March 10 | 9:00 – 11:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon created the High-level Independent Panel on U.N. Peace Operations on October 31, 2014, to undertake a comprehensive review of peace operations. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace on March 10 for a discussion with a delegation from the U.N. panel co-hosted with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the Better World Campaign. The independent panel is charged with reviewing the broad range of issues, including the changing nature of peacekeeping environments, evolving mandates, good offices and peacebuilding challenges, managerial and administrative reforms, planning, partnerships, human rights, and protection of civilians. Participants in the discussion at USIP will include Nobel Peace Prize winner and former President of Timor-Leste, Jose Ramos-Horta, who chairs the panel, and many of the panel’s 17 distinguished members. A U.S. government official will give a keynote address.
- Combatting Terrorism: Looking Over the Horizon | Tuesday March 10 | 12:30 – 1:30 | SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Recognizing that a military approach alone is insufficient for eradicating terrorism, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Sarah Sewall will outline the United States government’s broad-based strategy to address violent extremism. Her remarks will explain why non-military foreign policy tools, such as development, stabilization efforts, humanitarian assistance, and peacebuilding are essential to current counterterrorism efforts and to prevent the rise of future threats. Under Secretary Sewall will also discuss the successful White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism, convened by President Obama in February 2015, and the vision for a multi-institutional approach – inclusive of governments, civil society, and the private sector – to operationalize the prevention strategy.
- Israel’s Upcoming Elections: What to Watch, What to Expect | Wednesday March 11 | 2:00 – 3:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Israelis go to the polls on March 17 to elect the 20th Knesset, and with it a new government. The Israeli electorate is divided over national security, economics, and the public role of religion, and as many as ten parties are expected to win seats in the next Knesset. The elections also come at a pivotal moment in Israel’s foreign relations: nuclear negotiations with Iran are approaching a decisive moment, Israeli-Palestinian relations are tense, and the Netanyahu and Obama administrations are squabbling. How important are these elections? What might the results mean for Israel’s future, U.S.-Israeli relations and Israel’s foreign policy? On March 11, the Center for Middle East Policy will convene a panel of Brookings experts to preview Israel’s coming elections and their broader significance. Speakers include Martin Indyk, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, Itamar Rabinovich, Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Natan B. Sachs, Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Director, Center for Middle East Policy.
- Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions | Wednesday March 11 | 3:00 – 4:00 | Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In shaping the institutions of a new country, what interventions from international actors lead to success and failure? Elton Skendaj’s investigation into Kosovo based on national survey data, interviews, and focus groups conducted over ten months of fieldwork, leads to some surprising answers. Dr. Skendaj will discuss his book, Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions, which highlights efforts to build the police force, the central government, courts, and a customs service. Speakers include Elton Skendaj, Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Miami and John R. Lampe, Professor Emeritus, Department of History, University of Maryland, College Park.
- Between the Millstones: The Status of Iraq’s Minorities Since the Fall of Mosul | Thursday March 12 | 9:00 – 10:30 | POMED | REGISTER TO ATTEND | POMED, the Institute for International Law and Human Rights, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, No Peace Without Justice, and Minority Rights Group International invite to a public panel in conjunction with the release of a new report, Between the Millstones: The State of Iraq’s Minorities Since the Fall of Mosul. This report offers a detailed account of the humanitarian crises and abuses suffered by Iraq’s ethnic and religious minorities, women, and children since June 2014. It also provides an analysis of these atrocities within an international legal framework, as well as recommendations to various communities and stakeholders. Speakers include Johanna Green, Program Manager, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, Sarhang Hamasaeed, Senior Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace, Mark Lattimer, Executive Director, Minority Rights Group International, William Spencer, Executive Director, Institute for International Law and Human Rights.
- Israel’s Periphery Doctrine and Search for Middle East Allies | Thursday March 12 | 2:00 – 3:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Israel’s objectives of national security and stability amidst a complex geopolitical environment led it to pursue, shortly after the founding of the nation in 1948, an overarching foreign policy strategy known as the “periphery doctrine.” Author Yossi Alpher outlines this doctrine in his new book, Periphery: Israel’s Search for Middle East Allies (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). On March 12, the Intelligence Project at Brookings will host Alpher, a former Israeli intelligence officer, for a discussion of the components, successes, and failures of the periphery doctrine; the strategy’s recent revitalization; and how the doctrine should be adapted to meet new global challenges. Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
More Free Syria
My publication Thursday of a post marginally favoring creation of clearly defined liberated and protected areas inside Syria (“Free Syria”) has elicited, in addition to many laurels I would like to become accustomed to, some critical comments and misunderstandings. I thought I might respond and clarify.
First a clarification: I in no way think the UN is doing anything wrong by pursuing “freezes” in Syria. It is doing what it should be doing, given its institutional role and mission: taking advantage of any opportunity whatsoever to improve the lot of Syrian civilians by embarrassing the warring parties into treating them better. It cannot advocate protected areas that infringe on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a member state. It needs to respect Damascus’ authority, while trying to get it to demonstrate some restraint.
But from an American perspective, the freezes are not promising. Experience in the Balkans and elsewhere suggests security for those willing to cease their fire (or freeze the disposition of their forces) is vital to success. Nor are freezes likely to serve Washington’s first priority: weakening, containing and defeating the Islamic State (ISIS). The US should do nothing to detract from the UN effort, but it should also be thinking about its own options.
One highly experienced and knowledgeable diplomat commented to me that protected areas along the Turkish border would arouse strong opposition from the Gulf, whose monarchies don’t want to see Turkish influence expanded in an important Arab country.
I’m sure he is correct that the Arab Gulf will react that way, but I am not so sure they are right to do so.
What harm to Arab Gulf interests has greatly increased Turkish influence in Iraqi Kurdistan done? If Gulf countries are concerned, they should balance any Turkish inroads by supporting the protected areas themselves, with money, arms and if need be ground troops to back up the Free Syrian Army. The Turks would presumably be providing cover only from the air, along with the Americans. Saudi King Salman is showing, friends tell me, less hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood than his predecessor. A modus vivendi with the Brotherhood-led Turks that helps at least some Syrians may not be beyond reach.
The Turks are irrelevant to a protected area near the Jordanian border, where it would presumably get air cover from the Jordanians and the Americans. That is where the US-trained Free Syrian Army troops are being re-inserted. President Obama would be foolish to risk their rout, which would go down in the annals of American failures with the Bay of Pigs. He will have to provide air cover, or convince the Jordanians to provide it. Israel is already providing humanitarian and likely other assistance across its border with Syria, but expanding that to overt military aid seems to me a bridge too far, at least for now.
Iran will have to have a role in any solution in Syria. How would it react to protected areas? The demands of Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and the nuclear talks have already stretched Tehran’s military, financial and diplomatic capacities. Why wouldn’t the Iranians be relieved to see at least a portion of the Syrian opposition walled off in protected areas, which would necessarily be mostly Sunni and Kurdish? That could enable a focus on the fight against ISIS, in parallel with the US-trained Syrian forces, with reduced short-term risks to the Asad regime (though admittedly I wouldn’t have supported the idea if it didn’t increase the longer-term risks to Bashar).
Russia is the big problem. It will see in the proposal for protected areas the kind of slippery slope that allowed a NATO-led military coalition to take down Muammar Qaddafi. But Moscow is tired and broke. It prioritizes Ukraine. Moscow isn’t likely to allow a UN Security Council resolution to create protected areas until it sees a clear US commitment to do it, resolution or not. But it might then figure better to go along, in order to get a resolution that more strictly limits US and allied military action than was the case in Libya.
So yes, there are serious barriers to “Free Syria.” But they are surmountable, with serious US diplomatic and military commitment. That’s what has been lacking.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Free Syria: better than local ceasefires
SAIS hosted at noon a launch event for the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) report on “Examining Syrian Perspectives on Local Ceasefires and Reconciliation.” Ellen Laipson (Stimson) moderated with Mohammed al Abdallah (SJAC), Craig Charney (Charney Research), Joseph Bahout (Carnegie Endowment) and me as panelists. These are my speaking notes for the event:
1. First let me join Ellen in lauding SJAC and Craig for their truly heroic and fascinating report. People in conflict zones have surprising perspectives. It is important they be heard.
2. I am a vigorous supporter of the Syrian opposition, but it should give us pause that regime-controlled areas report relatively good conditions and services while rebel areas are struggling to survive. Bashar al Assad is not entirely wrong when he claims to be providing a measure of security and government services, especially in Damascus and along the Mediterranean coast.
3. While conditions vary, there is an area of consensus: Syrians, who (importantly) continue to identify as such, support the idea of local ceasefires. But the reasons differ. Pro-regime people think local ceasefires will strengthen the regime’s grip and expel foreigners. Anti-regime people want relief.
4. Both want freedom of movement and the universal desire of people in conflict: normal lives.
5. The devil is in the details. I know something of local ceasefires, having worked on the Bosnian Federation—where the ceasefire between Croat and Muslim forces largely held—while the Federation was fighting the Bosnian Serb Army in 1994-95.
6. But I also can’t forget Srebrenica, where UN forces stood by while Serbs massacred thousands of Muslim men and boys. Local ceasefires that amount to surrender could look more like Srebrenica than any of us would like.
7. The key to local ceasefires is security for both sides. In the Bosnian Federation, the often criticized UN peacekeepers provided that security by manning checkpoints set up between the Muslim and Croat forces. At Srebrenica, the Dutch UN forces failed to do so.
8. The problem is that there are no peacekeepers, UN or otherwise, in Syria and little prospect for deploying them. I don’t know any serious country that would consider putting its troops into the current fluid and perilous situation, even if a local ceasefire can be negotiated.
9. Nor, judging from the Charney interviews, are Syrians prepared to see coordination between the opposing forces, which of course is vital even if peacekeepers were available. But let’s suppose FSA and regime forces were willing to coordinate. Spoilers from Jabhat al Nusra or the Islamic State would likely intervene in ways that would make it impossible to continue.
10. So the usual techniques for achieving and sustaining local ceasefires are not available in Syria.
What do we do?
11. Faute de mieux, I am thrown back on a Turkish idea: protected areas that opposition Syrian opposition would govern and non-extremist Syrian forces would guard on the ground while the US-led coalition ensures protection from air and artillery bombardment.
12. I hesitate to call these “safe areas,” as they would not be safe. They would be target-rich environments that the regime would attack unless prevented from doing so.
13. Nascent areas of this sort already exist, both along the Turkish border in the north and on the Jordanian border in the south. What needs to be done is to declare them, draw clear lines around them, protect them, and begin to weave them together into a Free Syria.
14. This idea is different from local ceasefires and reconciliation across the divide between opposition and regime. I just don’t think there is much basis, even in this fairly optimistic report, for believing there is sufficient trust to achieve much in that direction, even at the local level.
15. Sulha and musalaha, the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, require—as does reconciliation in the West—acknowledgement of harm and willingness to compensate.
16. Anyone who can see in Assad’s recent interviews willingness to acknowledge and compensate for harm is reading more between the lines than I am able to do. Nor would the Syrian government have anything like the resources required to compensate for the harm it has done.
17. Of course protected areas have their downsides. They could lay the basis for ethnic or sectarian partition. They could lead to abandonment of less protected areas, increasing displacement. They could open the door to pushing refugees back into Syria. They would require serious, coordinated efforts at protection, both on the ground and in the air.
18. But protected areas might also give refuge from violence to hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. If established along borders in the north and south they would enable humanitarian relief to be far more effective and prevent it from being exploited by the regime, as is common today. They would provide opportunities for the relatively moderate opposition to demonstrate that it can govern and counter extremists effectively.
19. Opposition success would also remove an important reservation in the international community, which wants to know “what comes next.” This is important for the US, which has prioritized the fight against the Islamic State. It will only support efforts that have potential to aid that fight.
20. Gradually expanded, Free Syria areas could present Assad with a serious rival, creating the necessary precondition for a national ceasefire, peace settlement and political transition.
21. For me, those advantages outweigh the disadvantages, though I admit it is a close call.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
When displacement isn’t temporary
Kammi Scheeler, a master’s student in my post-war reconstruction and transition course at SAIS, writes:
The World Bank hosted a panel Wednesday on the need for alternatives to refugee camps, as part of its three-day forum on Fragility, Conflict and Violence. Three themes emerged from the speakers’ presentations:
- Displacement should be treated as a development issue, not a humanitarian one. National development planning should take into account all populations in the area, including displaced persons.
- Displaced persons must be recognized as active participants in development with the capacity to contribute to host communities.
- Government capacities to process and support refugees in alternative ways need to be strengthened.
The first presenter on the panel was Steven Corliss, Director of the UNHCR Division of Programme Support and Management. He discussed UNHCR’s policy to seek alternatives to camps in as many circumstances as possible. Where not possible, the UNHCR still works to protect the rights of refugees and create living conditions that foster individual empowerment and dignity.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has said “anyone who thinks refugee camps are a good idea has never lived in one.” Camps will not disappear, as they remain needed to meet immediate needs in emergency situations. The problem, Corliss believes, is when camps are used as an automatic response to displacement, or when host governments do not have the tools to provide alternatives.
One of the primary pitfalls of camps is the loss of human capital. Typical refugee camps operate as temporary, emergency relief, providing little opportunity for inhabitants to utilize or develop skills. In protracted situations, their inhabitants lose the ability to manage their own livelihoods.
There is a persistent concern among hosts that allowing refugees to integrate will deter them from returning home. Camps will remain as host governments insist upon them. But when refugees are better integrated into local communities and labor markets, they are able to contribute economically and maintain independent livelihoods, encouraging earlier repatriation and better reintegration upon return.
The second speaker, David Apollo Kazungu, is the Commissioner of Refugees for the Ugandan Government. Uganda’s shared borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and South Sudan have led to a persistent influx of refugees escaping conflict since the 1950s. Uganda is now host to 415,000 refugees, with more expected from South Sudan in coming months. Refugees in Uganda are predominantly settlement-based, living alongside and sharing resources and services with Ugandan nationals. Although refugee status is meant to be a temporary solution, the persistent conflicts and instability of Uganda’s neighbors has led to more protracted situations.
This has necessitated a shift from humanitarian support to development support. Uganda’s Settlement Transformation Agenda is a uniquely comprehensive and progressive approach to refugee integration. Its key tenets include security enhancement, access to justice, settlement survey and planning, infrastructure development, refugee and host community empowerment, and peace building and conflict resolution initiatives.
Commissioner Kazungu stressed the importance of these last two programs saying, “refugeehood should be a chance to reconcile and learn to live side by side.”Since most of Uganda’s refugees fled their homes due to conflict, the government of Uganda is making a stronger effort to facilitate conflict resolution among diverse refugee populations so that they may create more stable communities upon return to their home countries. Although Uganda has shown a great deal of openness and commitment to receiving and integrating refugees, they face challenges such as encroachment, land inelasticity, and dwindling resources with no signs of decline in refugee inflows.
The remaining panelists included Niels Harild, the lead social development specialist for the World Bank’s Global Program on Forced Displacement, who reiterated the importance of viewing displacement as a development issue rather than merely a humanitarian one. The second half of the event provided examples of alternatives in action, with World Bank project leaders sharing data from programs in Turkey and Azerbaijan. In Turkey, the Bank is assessing the impact of Syrian refugees on host communities and recommending policies for integrating refugees outside camps. Azerbaijan has approximately 600,000 internally displaced persons supported by a Social Fund for the Development of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This project provides settlements and services to raise the standard of living for IDPs and also creates income-generation opportunities. Both cases highlight the range of possible ways to incorporate displaced persons into longer-term national development planning.
PS: In response to a comment on this piece, here is Killian Kleinschmidt at TedX Hamburg:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Drums don’t win wars
A president who was trying to extract America from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is now preparing to escalate the war in Ukraine and the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Yesterday, his nominee for Defense Secretary made it clear he supports sending lethal armaments to the Ukrainian government to fight off Russian aggression, a position also advocated by former officials. The White House is also preparing to send Congress a request for an authorization to use military force (AUMF in Washington parlance) against ISIS, something the administration is already doing.
Both these moves fall in the inevitable category. We’ve pretty much run out of alternatives.
ISIS is universally regarded as not only a threat to vital interests but also one with which it is impossible to negotiate. They seem intent on proving that with the immolation a month ago of a Jordanian pilot whom they then feigned being prepared to exchange for an Al Qaeda terrorist. If we are going to fight ISIS whenever and wherever, it is certainly proper that there be a Congressional authorization. Hawks will want it broad. Doves will want it narrow. But both will want it, even though it will make little difference to what the US actually is doing.
In Ukraine, the government is losing control of the southeastern Donbas region and could lose control of even more of its territory to insurgents fully backed by Russia’s substantial military might. I’ll leave to military experts assessment of whether American assistance with lethal but defensive weapons will have a serious impact at this point. It could take a year or more before any significant materiel and training is deployed on the battlefield. In the meanwhile, Moscow will use any American decision to arm the Ukrainians as an excuse to redouble its own efforts.
So neither of these noisy headline issues is likely to have any quick impact. Drums don’t win wars. And these two wars are not only conventional force-on-force clashes between organized military forces, even if they involve some battles of that sort. Both involve counter insurgency, the kind of war (known in the Pentagon as COIN) the US loves to forget.
I’ll leave to the COINistas the analysis and policy prescriptions on the military side. The important point for me is that COIN necessarily involves an important civilian component. You win the war against insurgency by protecting the civilian population. You have to win the peace over a decade or more by ensuring a continued safe and secure environment, establishing the rule of law, ensuring stable governance, growing the economy and meeting social needs. If you fail to do those things in the aftermath of war, you end up with Libya: a weak state that has collapsed now into civil war, leaving breeding grounds for extremists.
The civilian efforts required are in the first instance the responsibility of the governments involved. But their capabilities are at best limited and at worst nonexistent. In Ukraine, even a government victory would likely require peacekeepers to ensure stability in Donbas and avoid reignition of conflict. In Iraq, it is hard to picture the Baghdad government’s security forces welcomed in Anbar and Ninewa provinces. Some kind of local governance with its own security forces (the proposed National Guard?) will be needed. In Syria, Bashar al Asad has shown no sign of willingness to govern fairly or effectively in areas the government retakes. There too some kind of local governance will be needed.
The international capacity to contribute to these efforts is also limited. The State Department has shrunk its civilian conflict and stability operations capability, which was never substantial. The European Union has grown weary and leery of deploying its much more substantial capacity. The UN is stretched thin. OSCE is doing a yeoman job of observing the much-violated ceasefire in Ukraine, but it is a giant step from that to peacekeepers and monitoring implementation of a peace agreement.
We are embarking on another long period of war. We should be strengthening not only our military capacities, but also our civilian ones.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Can the Libyans find peace in Geneva?
After the first round of talks earlier this month left observers cautiously optimistic, key Libyan stakeholders were back in Geneva today to continue to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the bloody conflict in the country.
The main objective of the Geneva talks is creation of a national unity government, as well as solidification of the ceasefire declared by a number of armed groups following the first session on January 14-15. A boycott of the negotiations by the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) and sporadic outbreak of violence in Eastern and Southern parts of the country has perturbed the meager successes of the first round of negotiations, but the majority of delegates are now back at the talks.
The UN-sponsored mediation track still faces a number of difficulties. The most serious is the failure to bring all the relevant actors to the table. The GNC boycott means that only one of the two main political parties to the conflict, the Tobruk-based government, is fully represented. Tripoli is indirectly represented through a number of boycotting members of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives and other civil society members (including Nihad Maiteeq , the sister of former prime minister Ahmad Maiteeq). There have also been consultations between UN envoy Bernardino Leon and the GNC leadership. Nonetheless, the lack of formal participation by the GNC arguably harms the legitimacy of any agreement in Geneva – particularly any agreement about a national unity government.
A related problem is the perceived preference by the international community for the Tobruk-based government. The basis for this preference is an election in which fewer than 20% of Libyans participated, the results of which were voided by the Libyan Supreme Court. That government’s close relationship with general Khalifa Haftar, whose military campaign against the entire spectrum of Libyan Islamists has greatly contributed to the polarization of Libyan politics, makes this one-sided recognition difficult to defend.
Jason Pack, a Cambridge University researcher and analyst of Libyan political affairs, points to the problems of this one-sided approach in a recent New York Times Op-Ed:
Western governments are reluctant to acknowledge the implications of the Supreme Court ruling because many of them are secretly cheering for the Tobruk faction to either reconquer the country or dominate a national unity government. After all, the Tobruk government claims to be fighting Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi — the very same group that killed the American ambassador, Christopher Stevens, in 2012. Perversely, the West’s ability to act as a neutral party and promote compromise is hindered by the fact that it has already recognized Tobruk as Libya’s sole sovereign.
Western backing of the Tobruk regime also seems to rest on a simplistic narrative of the Libyan conflict as a clash between republican secularists and radical Islamists. This binary perspective fails to identify the multiple forces that operate and gain from the conflict and, as one analyst has pointed out, empowers the hardliners on either side that have most to lose from a negotiated settlement.
Even more problematic than Western one-sidedness, however, is the strong support afforded to the local adversaries by regional allies. The Egyptians and Emiratis support Khalifa Haftar’s anti-Islamist campaign. Qatar and Turkey support the Islamists in Tripoli. This has aggravated the conflict, fueling a destructive polarization of Libyan politics. Instead of bringing the parties to the table, the foreign support has emboldened these forces, while simultaneously eroding the legitimacy of both parties in the eyes of ordinary Libyans. Further military support is likely to aggravate the situation further. The dangers of a longer term proxy war in Libya should not be taken lightly.
In spite of the monumental difficulties that the UN mediation efforts are facing, some indicators point in the right direction. Bernardino Leon and his team at the UN Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) seem to have made up for the GNC’s non-participation with the engagement of a wide spectrum of political actors and civil society representatives. Following the current round, representatives of Libyan municipal councils will meet on Wednesday to discuss confidence building measures at the community level. Although no date has been provided, it is hoped that this will be followed by discussions between key militia leaders. This multi-track approach may help the UN instigate results that can be implemented on the ground.
The political and economic situation should provide a sense of urgency that may help ripen the conflict for a negotiated settlement. The bloody fighting that characterized much of the second half of 2014 has now turned into a stalemate, with no one side appearing to have a decisive advantage. Tripoli and Tobruk are rapidly running out of money. In both cities the politicians know that Libyan state revenue is the glue that holds their militias together. Once these revenues disappear, many militias might find it more advantageous to pursue their own agendas, further fragmenting the Libyan political landscape.
The great challenges of the current Libyan conflict cannot be resolved in a few days in Geneva. But progress in the talks could stop the situation from deteriorating.
RSS - Posts
