Tag: United Nations
Why coming clean is important
The Middle East Institute published this piece last night under the heading Iran’s Nuclear Secrets Need to be Revealed. It puts me in agreement with hawkish views. But I think there is no escaping the need for Iran to come clean, at least to the IAEA.
Expert American opinion on the outcome of last month’s nuclear negotiations with Iran is sharply divided. Those who want Iran to give up all enrichment technology are relieved that a “bad” deal was averted. Pressure is building in Congress, especially but not exclusively among Republicans, for new sanctions.[1] Some would like to see Congress authorize the use of military force.[2] Others think an interim arrangement limiting Iranian enrichment (the November 2013 “Joint Plan of Action,”[3] which took effect January 20, 2014) is good enough for now and certainly better than no limits.[4] They resist the idea of new sanctions and hope for an agreement by the new July 2015 deadline that will provide as much as a year’s warning of any Iranian moves to produce the material needed for a nuclear weapon.[5]
Both perspectives focus on the overt Iranian nuclear program, which is monitored and safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). But no country since the IAEA was founded in 1957 has used an overt program or safeguarded material to obtain nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers India, Pakistan, and Israel never signed the NPT. North Korea signed but withdrew before testing a nuclear weapon, using material produced clandestinely. South Africa developed and tested nuclear weapons clandestinely before it became an NPT signatory in 1991, when it gave them up. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan had many Soviet nuclear weapons on their territory but transferred them out and joined the NPT in the 1990s, after the Soviet Union collapsed.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that clandestine and non-safeguarded nuclear programs are a much greater risk for proliferation than the ones the IAEA monitors.
Iran is an NPT signatory. Its safeguarded facilities are in compliance with its NPT obligations. It is also in compliance with the Joint Plan of Action. But Iran has not implemented all resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors or the UN Security Council, nor has it implemented the Additional Protocol that permits short-notice inspections of suspect locations. The IAEA’s bottom line is ominous:
The Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.[6]
The question of covert facilities is said to preoccupy some American negotiators, but the negotiations have focused on Iran’s overt, safeguarded program.[7]
The clandestine route to a nuclear weapon is far more likely. The IAEA has asked Tehran to explain research efforts that IAEA scientists associate with nuclear weapons research, including initiation of high explosives (to compress fissionable material) and neutron transport calculations (required to initiate a chain reaction).[8] Tehran has not yet provided a satisfactory response to these inquiries or access to facilities where unsafeguarded activities may have taken place in the past. American intelligence agencies have said publicly that they believe this weapons-related research ended more than a decade ago.[9] But earlier efforts that betrayed “possible military dimensions” remain a source of profound distrust of Iranian intentions, not only in the United States but also in Israel and elsewhere.
Iranians are quick to respond that the Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against production or use of nuclear weapons. This can be “secularized,” meaning it can be issued as legislation.[10] They also emphasize that Iran would be far less secure if it obtained nuclear weapons but in the process triggered Saudi, Egyptian, or other efforts to match the prize. Far better, some say in private, to gain the underlying technology but stop short of weaponizing, which is an expensive process of not only producing the weapons but also making them compact enough to be mounted on missiles and launched. [11]
Americans concerned about an Iranian clandestine nuclear program want Tehran to “come clean” about its past activities.[12] This is what Muammar Qaddafi did in 2003, when he opened up Libya’s clandestine (but still rudimentary) nuclear program to intense American scrutiny and removal. It is difficult to picture Iran doing as much as that. But it could, and should, go much further than it has so far in answering frankly the IAEA’s pointed questions about its past weapons-related research and development.
The United States can hope that the current negotiations on Iran’s overt nuclear program will put a year between any decision to get nuclear weapons and the result, in exchange for some measure of sanctions relief. It has to aim to do at least that well on the clandestine side as well. This will mean not only Iranian implementation of the Additional Protocol that allows surprise inspections, but also a clear and comprehensive account of past weapons-related nuclear research and development.
[1] Geoff Dyer, “Republicans Push for New Iran Sanctions,” Financial Times, November 25, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/70385cdc-74c3-11e4-a418-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3KrkTEhJA.
[2] Eric Edelman, Dennis Ross and Ray Takeyh, “A Nuclear Deal with Iran Will Require the West to Reevaluate its Presumptions,” The Washington Post, December 4, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-nuclear-deal-with-iran-will-require-the-west-to-reevaluate-its-presumptions/2014/12/04/b58748a2-7b30-11e4-b821-503cc7efed9e_story.html.
[4] Paul Pillar, “What Really Matters about Extension of the Iran Negotiations,” The National Interest, November 24, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/what-really-matters-about-extension-the-iran-negotiations-11732.
[5] See Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars event, “Iran Nuclear Extension: Key to Deal or an Empty Room?” December 1, 2014, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/iran-nuclear-extension-key-to-deal-or-empty-room.
[6] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, IAEA, November 7, 2014, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/gov-2014-58.pdf, paragraph 66.
[7] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “In Iran Talks, U.S. Seeks to Prevent a Covert Weapon,” New York Times, November 22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/world/middleeast/in-iran-talks-us-seeks-to-prevent-a-covert-weapon.html.
[8] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement.”
[9] James Risen and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Agencies See No Move by Iran to Build a Bomb,” New York Times, February 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/world/middleeast/us-agencies-see-no-move-by-iran-to-build-a-bomb.html?_r=0.
[10] Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “7 Reasons Not to Worry about Iran’s Enrichment Capacity,” Al Monitor, November 4, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/iran-nuclear-enrichment-uranium-iaea-fatwa-sanctions.html.
[11] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Assessing a Deal or Non-Deal with Iran,” CSIS, November 20, 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/141119_Assessing_an_Iran_Deal_or_Non-Deal.pdf.
[12] David Albright and Bruno Tertrais, “Making Iran Come Clean about Its Nukes,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304081804579559630836775474.
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Peace Picks December 1-5
- The Battle for Eastern Ukraine | Monday, December 1st | 12:00 – 1:00 | Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The battle for the future of Ukraine rages on. Despite a ceasefire negotiated in Minsk in September, in Donetsk and Luhansk in Eastern Ukraine, separatists supported by Russia continue to fight Ukrainian forces. Recently, the Russian military has again directly intervened across the border in support of the rebels. Recent elections in the two regions, won by Russian supported candidates, were described by Ukrainian President Poroshenko as a “farce.” As winter approaches, Ukrainians will be dependent for heat on Russian energy supplies, at rapidly escalating prices. What are the Obama administration, the European Union and NATO doing to support Ukraine’s national and territorial integrity? What does the winter hold for Ukrainians? The speakers are Luke Coffey, a Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, Peter Doran, Director of Research at the Center for European Policy Analysis, and Mykola “Nikolay” Vorobiov, a Ukrainian Journalist and Blogger.Helle C. Dale will moderate.
- Jerusalem in Crisis? A Conversation with Danny Seidemann | Monday, December 1st | 12:00 – 1:10 | Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Are we on the verge of another sustained Israeli-Palestinian confrontation along the lines of 1987-1992 or 2000-2004? Why has Jerusalem become the focus of the current tensions and violence, and what if anything can be done about it? A conversation with Danny Seidemann, leading expert on geopolitical Jerusalem and moderated by Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Distinguished Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
- Breakthrough or Extension: Implications for US and European Relations with Iran | Tuesday, December 2nd | 10:00| Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Expectations are rising that Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany will reach an agreement on key elements of a comprehensive nuclear agreement trading long-term curbs on Iran’s nuclear program for phased relief of economic sanctions. A breakthrough could significantly improve the chances for US and European cooperation with Iran in dealing with other regional challenges, particularly the rise of the group calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, and could also motivate Western businesses to sign new deals with Iran. Speakers will discuss the implications of a deal or a possible extension of negotiations for both political and economic relations with Iran. They will also comment on the possible ramifications of the midterm election results for an agreement with Iran and what impact it may have on the easing of sanctions. On the panel are Clifford Kupchan , Chairman of the Eurasia Group, Cornelius Adebahr, Associate for the Europe Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Erich Ferrari, Attorney at Law at Ferrari & Associates P.C., and moderated by Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow in the South Asia Center at Atlantic Council.
- The Outcome of the Iran Talks and the Next Steps | Wednesday, December 3rd | 9:30 – 11:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Negotiators from the P5+1 and Iran are racing toward a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear program by the November 24 deadline. Many issues, such as establishing a formula that verifiably limits Iran’s uranium-enrichment capacity, are still to be solved, but both sides of the negotiating table have stressed the need to reach an agreement. A briefing with George Perkovich, Karim Sadjadpour, Daryl Kimball, and Elizabeth Rosenberg on the outcome of the negotiations and next steps. Kelsey Davenport will moderate.
- Ebola: The Intersection of Cultural, Historical, and Political Dynamics in West Africa | Wednesday, December 3rd | 12:30 – 2:00 | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | Michael McGovern, associate professor of anthropology at the University of Michigan, will discuss this topic.
- American Views of U.S. Foreign Policy: Public Opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | Friday, December 5th | 10:00 – 11:30 | After the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations earlier this year and the devastating violence of this summer’s Gaza war, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are on the rise. Voices on both sides of the conflict question the United States’ traditional role as shepherd of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and Americans seem increasingly skeptical about their government’s engagements in the Middle East.It’s crucial to look beyond this skepticism to specifics. How much importance do Americans attach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to reaching a resolution? How do different communities in the United States—Democrats, Republicans, minorities, youth, older Americans—vary in their attitudes toward Israelis and Palestinians? Beyond the question of who is more “at fault” in the conflict, what kind of future for Israel and the Palestinians do Americans think the United States should support? The speakers are Shibley Telhami, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, and William A. Galston, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution. The moderator will be Tamara Cofman Wittes, Director for the Center for Middle East Policy.
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Yes, the time is ripe
Hamid Bayati of the Iran Times published an article yesterday based in part on an interview with me. The article accurately reproduces my views, as you can see from the interview below, but he skipped my important final point about a possible clandestine nuclear program:
Q: Reportedly, US President Barack Obama secretly wrote Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the middle of last month and described a shared interest in fighting ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Can the letter have a positive impact on the nuclear talks between Iran and 5+1 group or help facilitate the diplomatic efforts to reach a nuclear agreement by the Nov. 24 deadline?
A: I haven’t seen the whole text of the letter. What has been reported suggests that the Americans were holding out cooperation against ISIS as a “carrot” to induce Iranian agreement on a nuclear deal. But Iran has good reason to fight ISIS without any inducements, as the US does, and I’m pretty sure there is already some cooperation to try to avoid incidents between American aircraft and forces and the Iranians fighting in Iraq. If Iran signs on to a nuclear deal, it will have much more to do with removing sanctions and military risks than ISIS.
Q: Nuclear negotiators from Iran and the 5+1 group will meet in Muscat, Oman, on November 11 and then will resume talks in Vienna on November 18. So why do the Iranian and 5+1 delegates go to Oman before Vienna?
A: I don’t know why the meeting is in Oman.
Q: Professor Vali Nasr wrote an article recently saying we are in a position that it is the best time to have a nuclear deal with Iran. Or, Saudi Arabia’s intelligence organizations have claimed that Western powers are willing to reach an agreement with Tehran at any price. What is your analysis of the situation? Is it possible that the two sides strike a nuclear deal by November 24?
A: I agree with Vali that the moment is ripe: see No pain, no gain | peacefare.net. But the Saudis are wrong that the Western powers are willing to reach an agreement with Tehran at any price. Any deal that leaves open an option for Iran to get nuclear weapons is going to be unacceptable in the West, especially in Washington DC.
Q: There have been reports that Obama seeks to lift sanctions on Iran without Congressional permission. Are these reports true?
A: That would not be his preferred option, but I am sure he is considering the proposition.
Q: Can the mid-term Congressional election, in which the Republicans won the majority in the Senate as well, affect the nuclear talks in case Iran and the 5+1 group fail to reach an agreement by November 24?
A: Yes, the election outcome will have an impact. The President will have to convince the Congress that the United States is significantly better off in terms of blocking any route to nuclear weapons with the agreement reached than without it. I anticipate the constraints on enrichment and reprocessing will be clear and compelling enough. The big problem will be whether Iran can convince the world that it has no longer has a clandestine nuclear weapons program, see Aye, there’s the rub | peacefare.net.
Q: Some experts argue that it is not possible to reach a comprehensive deal by the November 24 deadline and therefore is it better that Iran and 5+1 group sign a “partial agreement.” How can a partial agreement work?
A: I don’t really know. It will be hard to get more sanctions relief from Washington without a complete agreement that clearly and unequivocally blocks all paths to nuclear weapons. It might be possible to extend the Joint Plan of Action for a few weeks. But the inclination in Congress will be to tighten sanctions if there is no agreement that satisfies the majority there by the deadline.
The problem right now is that Tehran is only slowly answering questions about its past activities with “possible military dimensions,” which are discussed between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency. That hesitation raises serious question about a possible clandestine nuclear weapons program.
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Aye, there’s the rub
A nuclear deal with Iran is looking more likely than ever before. The P5+1 or EU3+3 (either way it is the US, Russia, UK, France, China and Germany) are making progress on issues related to enrichment and plutonium production and reprocessing. Verifying that fissile material, which can be used in an atomic bomb, is not diverted from those processes is a routine responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). If Iran will agree to limits on the number of its centrifuges, the degree of enrichment and the quantity of plutonium produced as well as fulfill its Safeguards commitments, the IAEA can verify that the limits are not exceeded and material is not diverted to a weapons program. If Iran were nevertheless to decide to “break out,” it would require six months to a year for it to do so, leaving time for both diplomatic and military efforts to prevent it from doing so.
The crunch issues lie in a different direction: undeclared nuclear material and the related question of possible military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran’s past nuclear activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been making little progress getting from Tehran clarification of past activities that appear to have aimed at design of high explosives and other research on initiation of a nuclear explosion. Nor has it been able to ascertain that there are no nuclear materials lying outside its purview. The IAEA concluded in September (and repeated Friday, despite recent meetings at which PMDs were discussed):
the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
In other words, a nuclear deal–even one with tight constraints on known facilities–could leave material and activities unaccounted for that are directed specifically at building a nuclear weapon in secret. Construction activity at a suspected site of clandestine nuclear activities (Parchin) has raised suspicions that Tehran is covering up past nuclear weapons research.
Some would like to forget about Iran’s past misbehavior, which reportedly stopped in 2003 in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq (when at least some in Tehran thought the Americans might come their way next). Ignoring past behavior and the possible existence of undeclared nuclear material would be unwise. Judging from past performance in other countries, development of nuclear weapons is far more likely to take place in parallel, secret efforts than in nuclear plants and activities under IAEA surveillance. If Iran wants the rest of the world to believe that it has seriously and permanently foresworn nuclear weapons, it needs to convince everyone that it either never did have a clandestine program or had one and gave it up.
This is difficult for Iran because of its government structure. President Rouhani is responsible for the nuclear negotiations. But the most likely sponsor of a clandestine nuclear program (past, present or future) is Supreme Leader Khamenei, who controls ample resources for such a purpose, including the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). That’s why President Obama writes Khamenei secret letters. The Supreme Leader has reportedly forsworn nuclear weapons in a fatwa:
the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.
The trouble is Islamic jurisprudence allows a fatwa, which generally has no official written form, to be changed or reinterpreted. This one was published in an official government press release in 2005 that has evaporated from the worldwide web. That does not inspire confidence. So one well-connected Iranian commentator living in the US suggests it be “secularized” as a criminal statute. Of course that could be changed as well, but the notion of getting Iran to pledge formally that it will not seek nuclear weapons could certainly be part of a nuclear deal.
It would not substitute for what some might regard as impossible: proving the negative proposition that Iran does not have clandestine nuclear materials or a clandestine nuclear research program. “Coming clean” about past nuclear activities would certainly help. Continuing to stiff the IAEA on PMDs and the construction (now stopped) at Parchin does not. President Obama is presumably ready to justify to Congress and the American people a nuclear deal with Iran that allows it to continue peaceful activities (including enrichment) under tight IAEA surveillance, but he won’t get far unless he can also persuade them that there are no clandestine nuclear activities in progress. That’s what will give him pause.
PS: Tony Cordesman discusses in detail the difficult issues associated with clandestine research and development for nuclear weapons here.
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The ADD nation fights ISIS
Last Wednesday American University’s School of International Service hosted its professor and former ambassador Akbar Ahmed, Politico correspondent Susan Glasser, and Washington Post columnist, David Ignatius to discuss Fighting ISIS: The Future of American Foreign Policy in the Middle East. David Gregory, the former moderator of Meet the Press, presided.
President Obama some weeks ago stated his goal of degrading and defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with air power and a dynamic, committed coalition but the campaign thus far has been unimpressive. Ignatius defended the President stating, “wars often start badly” but questioned whether the President has a concrete strategy to accomplish his goal. While President Obama sought to turn the page of America’s legacy in the Middle East, he has been “sucked back” into the region. The President’s insistence on changes to the Iraqi government as well as demands for regional actors to become involved are promising first steps. Although the coalition does not have a UN mandate, it avoids the “go it alone ethos” of the Bush administration or the lead from behind approach in Libya.
How will ISIS be defeated in Syria? In Iraq? While there are plans for the CIA and military to train guerilla fighters in Syria, Ignatius notes that history shows us this approach is rarely successful. With internal conflicts plaguing both Syria and Iraq, a coherent strategy is lacking. This will be a test for President Obama as he faces a group that has an “apocalyptic view.” Ignatius noted Osama Bin Laden and the writings of his final days, in which he outlines his feelings of failure and his intention to rename Al-Qaeda. The Muslim leaders whom he respected had come to hate Al Qaeda, which its leader feared would lead to its downfall. Ignatius believes the same goes for the “savagery” of ISIS, hated by both the Muslim world and the West.
While all three speakers underlined the President’s reluctance to become involved, Glasser focused on the public debate that transpired between the President and the Pentagon. This friction has largely gone uncovered. Glasser believes the United States is in a quagmire that will not end well.
Ahmed believes that the US has forgotten the lesson of Afghanistan, where it entered without any understanding of tribal wars. There is a parallel situation in Iraq, but along sectarian divisions. ISIS vaunts the golden age of early Islam but Ahmed disputes this. He instead believes “justice, knowledge, equality and tolerance” are embedded in Islam, none of which are included in the ISIS movement.
Gregory asked a question that went largely unanswered. What are we protecting the US and our allies from? Ignatius believes that ISIS is such an aggressive adversary that we should have seen it coming. While there is no current intelligence that ISIS is planning an attack on the United States, ISIS poses a serious threat to Jordan’s monarch, a key US ally.
Ignatius refers to the media as playing to an “ADD nation,” with a dwindling attention span to critical foreign affairs. The consequences of not being patient will hurt the United States. There is no overnight solution. Stability will not be achieved until there is reconciliation between Sunni and Shia and between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Proxy wars are “eating up” the Middle East, which will need restoration of strong security institutions.
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Best to err doing too much, not too little
UN envoy Stefano de Mistura appeals for help for Kobane:
The Turks are saying the right thing: there should be a comprehensive, coalition-backed effort. But they are doing the wrong thing by withholding military assistance. They are not even allowing reinforcements, supplies and ammunition to reach the Kurdish fighters. Turkish tanks sit idle just across the border, outside the town.
The differences go beyond Kobane. It is, as Ankara asserts, a mistake for the coalition not to target regime forces in Syria, which continue to bombard civilian populations. But allowing ISIS forces to decimate the Kurdish town is an odd way to object to inadequate action against Bashar al Assad.
Coalition warfare is not pretty. The members often differ in objectives, strategy and tactics. They may even compete for turf. But what is happening right now in Syria is uglier than usual. A NATO ally is refusing to up the ante against ISIS when it can readily do so with few or no losses. Ankara is also failing to come to the aid of people closely related to an important minority community inside Turkey. That isn’t going to help settle issues with Turkey’s own Kurdish insurgents.
America too often loses its wars away from the battlefield. General Allen, the new American envoy for the fight against ISIS, has been in Turkey for two days trying to sort out the situation. Apparently to no avail. That seems extraordinary to me. Either President Erdogan or President Obama needs to bend. Both would be my preference: the Turks at least to allow resupply, the Americans to at least begin to target regime forces that attack civilians.
At least in public, the Obama administration is framing the Kobane situation as a public relations problem. So it is, but it is also more. Failure to save Kobane will leave a long stretch of the Syrian side of the border with Turkey in ISIS hands. It would be surprising if the jihadists didn’t take advantage of that not only to resupply themselves but also to infiltrate Turkey.
Even if Kobane is not militarily strategic, defeating the ISIS effort there could deprive it of manpower and blunt its momentum, which is strong not only in northern Turkey but also in Iraq’s Anbar province, where ISIS forces are expanding their areas of control.
The fight against ISIS, which is proving a capable enemy, can’t be won quickly. But it can be lost in these early stages, when Syrian and Iraqi resistance to ISIS is still weak, poorly trained and inadequately armed. The air attacks can also inadvertently help Bashar al Assad. President Obama should err on the side of doing too much, not too little.
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