Tag: United Nations
How to degrade and destroy
President Obama has now clarified his goal in the war on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): it is to degrade and destroy. His model is what was accomplished against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That should be little comfort to those who live in areas where ISIL operates. A dozen years of war have rendered parts of the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan even more lawless and ungovernable than it was before the US intervened there starting in 2001. But it is fair enough to say that the remnants of Al Qaeda that remain there are little threat to the United States.
What will it take to defeat ISIL?
The military campaign will require a 360 degree effort against ISIL. This means an international coalition that includes not only those NATO members willing to engage but also the security forces of Iraq and Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan as well as Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), all of which are seriously threatened if ISIL is able to consolidate its position inside Iraq and Syria. The precise division of labor will have to be negotiated, but the United States should expect that its bombing of ISIL in both Syria and Iraq is only the tip of the spear. Iraq and the Syrian rebels will need to provide the biggest share of the ground forces. The others should be prepared to attack from the air or provide funding, advice and equipment.
The military campaign against ISIL will go much faster and much better if the mainly Sunni populations in the areas it controls rise against it. This is what enabled the American “surge” in 2006 and 2007 to succeed against Al Qaeda in Iraq. Then it was the Sunni tribes that rebelled and helped the Americans to destroy Al Qaeda. Any serious effort to destroy ISIL will need to make something similar happen now. But it won’t be easy: without boots on the ground, the Americans will be unable to organize or pay for a Sunni “awakening.” The Saudis and UAE have shown little aptitude in this direction, but it is high time they learned how to get what they pay for.
While confronting ISIL militarily, the coalition acting against it will need to weaken its sources of financing and recruitment. This is shadowy work that requires the best efforts of many intelligence agencies working together. The focus on foreign fighters coming from the US and Western Europe may be necessary to prevent their flow back to those places. But most of them appear to be coming from other places and need to be slowed or stopped, whatever their origins. This is an area where the Russians can contribute: Chechnyans play a significant role, as do others from the Caucusus. Rumors of Qatari financing have been rife. It is time to stop any supposedly private contributions going from Doha to ISIL or its supporters.
The toughest issue in dealing with ISIL will be preventing its return to the places where it is militarily defeated. President Obama may think leaving the border area of Pakistan and Afghanistan devoid of effective governance is all right, because eventually Kabul and Islamabad will fill in. But it is going to be a long time before Damascus or Baghdad can govern effectively in the eastern provinces of Syria or the western provinces of Iraq, respectively. If you want to degrade and destroy ISIL there you are going to have to make some provision for governance, justice and public services.
This cannot be done by remote control. Someone is going to need to establish a presence in the areas ISIS currently controls, unless we want to see it go the way of Libya, whose various militias are tearing the country to shreds. In Syria, it might be the moderate revolutionaries, but then they will need protection from Bashar al Asad so long as he rules Damascus. In Iraq, it will likely need to be Sunni Iraqis who take control and govern–initially at least–without much reference to Baghdad. International humanitarian and other assistance in both countries will be vital, unless we want to see them go the way of Libya, where militias are now battling each other for control of the state. The UN or maybe the Arab League had better get ready for big challenges.
Presidents have to deal with the world they are dealt, not the one they prefer. “Degrade and destroy” will take years, not months. Obama would prefer to do retrenchment. Maybe his successor will get the opportunity.
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Bombing is not sufficient
To bomb or not to bomb was yesterday’s question. Now most of Washington is agreeing that to stop the Islamic State bombing is necessary. The questions currently asked concern how much, whether to do it in Syria as well as Iraq, the intelligence requirements and how many American boots needed on the ground, even if not in combat.
Bombing may well be necessary to stop extremist advances, but it is certainly not sufficient to roll back or defeat the Islamic State. If you think the United States is at risk from the IS, you will want to do more than bomb. Quite a few people are proposing just that, though the numbers of troops they are suggesting necessary (10-15,000) seems extraordinarily low given our past experience in Iraq. Presumably they are counting on the Kurdish peshmerga and the 300,000 or so Iraqi troops the Americans think are still reasonably well organized and motivated. How could that go wrong?
But the military manpower question is not the only one. The first question that will arise in any areas liberated from the IS is who will govern? Who will have power? What will their relationship be to Damascus or Baghdad? How will they obtain resources, how will they provide services, how will they administer justice? The Sunni populations of Iraq (where they are a majority in the areas now held by IS) and of Syria (where they are the majority in the country as a whole) will not want to accept prime minister-designate Haider al Abadi (much less Nouri al Maliki, who is still a caretaker PM) or President Asad, respectively.
Bombing may solve one problem, but it opens a host of others. This is, of course, why President Obama has tried to avoid it. He heeds Colin Powell’s warning: you break it, you own it. The governance question should not be regarded as mission creep, or leap. It is an essential part of any mission that rolls back or defeats the IS. Without a clear plan for how it is to be accomplished, bombing risks making things worse–perhaps much worse–rather than better.
Sadly, the United States is not much better equipped or trained to handle the governance question–and the associated economic and social questions–than it was on the even of the Afghanistan war, 12 years ago. Yes, there is today an office of civilian stability operations in the State Department, but it can quickly deploy only dozens of people. Its budget has been cut and its bureaucratic rank demoted since its establishment during George W. Bush’s first term. Its financial and staff resources are nowhere near what will be required in Syria and Iraq if bombing of the IS leads to its withdrawal or defeat.
The international community–UN, European Union, NATO, Arab League, Organization of the Islamic Conference, World Bank, International Monetary Fund–are likewise a bit better at post-war transition than they were, but their successes lie in the Balkans in the 1990s, not in the Middle East in the 2010s. They have gained little traction in Libya, which needs them, and only marginally more in Yemen, where failure could still be imminent. Syria and Iraq are several times larger and more complex than any international statebuilding effort in recent times, except for Afghanistan, which is not looking good.
Even just the immediate humanitarian issues associated with the wars in Syria and Iraq are proving too complex and too big for the highly capable and practiced international mechanisms that deal with them. They are stretched to their limits. We don’t have the capacity to deal with millions of refugees and displaced Iraqis and Syrians for years on end, on top of major crises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and ebola in West Africa.
President Obama has tried hard to avoid the statebuilding challenges that inevitably follow successful military operations. He wanted to do his nationbuilding at home. We need it, and not just in Ferguson, Missouri, where citizens clearly don’t think the local police exercise their authority legitimately. But international challenges are also real. Failing to meet them could give the Islamic State openings that we will come to regret.
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Moscow’s best bet
I would normally await an official investigation before commenting on the downing of Malaysia Airlines 17, but it looks as if there never will be an opportunity to establish the facts in that way. The crash site is being trashed, rebels thought to have downed the plane have recovered the black boxes, and Moscow is failing to press the rebels to allow a serious inquiry, even while calling for one.
I am inclined to believe the emerging consensus in the West that Russian-assisted rebels in eastern Ukraine shot down the Boeing 777 thinking it was a Ukrainian military aircraft. No alternative hypothesis has yet emerged consistent with the location of the crash site, as well as the post-crash behavior of the rebels, which is clearly intended to obscure and not clarify the matter. The notion that the Kiev government brought down the plane thinking it carried Russian President Putin doesn’t pass the laugh test, despite its prominence in Russian media.
The question then is what should be done about Russian mendacity and potential culpability.
Insistence on a serious, internationally staffed investigation is still important. Even a hampered or partial investigation could turn up useful results. Ukraine is the “state of occurrence” and therefore in the lead. It has requested assistance from the United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Russian participation should be welcomed, but it cannot be a Russian-led investigation. Nor should the rebels be allowed to participate. Their “republics” are internationally unrecognized, even by Moscow. The Netherlands, which had many passengers on board, Malaysia (where the aircraft was registered) and the United States (where the aircraft was designed) will also need to be involved, as well as other interested parties.
Such investigations are often lengthy and sometimes equivocal in their outcomes. Some people still have doubts about what brought down TWA 800 in 1996, even after an investigation that lasted four years. For MH17, a great deal will depend on the willingness of Moscow to be transparent about which weapons it supplied to the rebels, who was in charge of them and whether any missiles were fired at the time of the occurrence. Ukraine will similarly need to specify where its anti-aircraft weapons were located and whether any were fired. Given Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s unequivocal statements on the subject, such clarity on the part of Kiev should not be a problem.
What is to be done in the meanwhile?
Here is where American diplomats need to earn their pinstripes. What is needed is for Moscow to come clean and recognize that continuing support to the rebels in Ukraine is putting at risk Russia’s claim to being a responsible member of the international community. We’ll get a hint of Moscow’s attitude today, when the UN Security Council discusses a draft resolution calling for a full investigation and for armed groups to allow access to the crash site.
It is increasingly apparent that the thuggish rebels do not have the kind of depth of support in the local community that was available to their counterparts Crimea, which nevertheless is already costing Russia a bundle of money. Moscow should be worried that rebel success in Donbas will cost much more, both in financial and reputational terms. The substantial flow of Russian military equipment back and forth across the Ukrainian border makes Moscow complicit, if not responsible.
The Americans and Europeans are slow act, but they are not stupid. They know the rebellion in eastern Ukraine would collapse if Moscow ceased its support. Brussels and Washington are running out of the easy sanctions that send a signal but don’t do much economic damage. It would be foolish for Moscow to court additional sanctions that hit hard at its banks and other financial institutions.
The credible threat of such sanctions is difficult to mount, not least because Russia is said to be prepared to torpedo the nuclear talks with Iran. But doing that would damage Russia’s interests even more than the West’s, as either a nuclear Iran or an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would diminish Russia’s role in a world already inclined to regard its behavior as roguish. Moscow’s best bet is to fess up on MH 17 and end support for the rebellion in Donbas.
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Peace picks June 16-20
1. Fifth Annual Conference on Turkey Monday, June 16 | 9:00 am – 5:00 pm National Press Club 529 14th Street, NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Center for Turkish Studies at The Middle East Institute presents its Fifth Annual Conference on Turkey. This year the conference will assemble three exceptional panels to discuss the country’s tumultuous domestic politics following recent elections, the future of democracy in the country, and Turkish foreign policy. The event will feature a keynote speech by Efkan Ala, Turkey’s Minister of the Interior. SPEAKERS Amb. Robert Ford, Ibrahim Kalın, Amb. Robert Pearson, Judith Yaphe, Gönül Tol, and more.
2. What to Expect from the Al-Sisi PresidencyMonday, June 16 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was sworn in on June 8. In his inauguration speech, al-Sisi spoke of his intent to lead Egypt in an inclusive manner. Following the resignation of the interim cabinet, al-Sisi will form a new cabinet. Marina Ottaway of the American University in Cairo and Emad Shahin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will share their opinions of what the future of Egypt will hold.
3. U.S. Middle East Policy and the Region’s Ongoing Battle over the Muslim Brotherhood Monday, June 16 | 12:30 pm – 2:00 pm Center for American Progress 10th floor, 1333 H St. NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND In the three years since popular uprisings swept across the Middle East, the status of the Muslim Brotherhood has become a deep point of contention among regional states. Key countries in the Middle East and North Africa are sharply divided over the status of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. During this time, U.S. policy has been hesitant as the United States has sought to define its position in reaction to both the uprisings themselves and the new era of competition among regional states they produced. The uneven U.S. responses to the Arab uprisings and the regional competition that has been sparked offers several important lessons learned for U.S. policy in the future. SPEAKERS Peter Mandaville, Professor, George Mason University, Haroon Ullah, State Department Policy Planning Staff, and Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress.
4. Transparency, Oversight and Accountability in the UN System: Problems and How to Fix Them Monday, June 16 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Associated Press reported this year that that the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services failed to pursue a number of cases of corruption over the last five years. How emblematic are these incidents of the UN system? What has changed, what still needs doing, and what levers are effective in pushing reform? SPEAKERS Robert Appleton, former Chairman of the United Nations Procurement Task Force, and Special Counsel to the UN Iraqi Oil for Food investigation, Edward Patrick Flaherty, Senior Partner, Schwab Flaherty & Associates, and James Wasserstrom, Senior Advisor on Anticorruption, U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
5. How to Unwind Iran Nuclear Sanctions Monday, June 16 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Atlantic Council; 1030 15th St NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND With the deadline for an Iran deal fast approaching, a key element will be how to coordinate US and European sanctions relief with Iranian confidence building measures. The Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force invites you to the launch of two papers outlining options for unwinding nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. Authors Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service and Cornelius Adebahr of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will explore US and EU sanctions, respectively, looking at the evolution of sanctions over the past decade and the most feasible path to providing meaningful relief in the event that Iran agrees to significant curbs on its nuclear program.
6. Whistleblowers: A Critical Anti-Corruption Tool & Challenge Tuesday, June 17 | 11:45 am – 2:15 pm AU Washington College of Law; 4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Whistleblower laws, incentives and protections are critical to fighting corruption, but implementation in practice is a challenge. Professor Robert Vaughn, noted scholar and author of “The Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Laws” and James Wasserstrom, Anti-corruption Advisor, US Embassy Kabul Afghanistan and a whistleblower on corruption in Kosovo, will discuss best practices and pitfalls.
7. Is the US AWOL in the ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America? Tuesday, June 17 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm AEI; 1150 17th Street, NW Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND Mexico and Central America are struggling with rampant organized crime, fueled by US demand for illegal drugs. Central American nations are too weak or too complicit in criminality to confront the powerful, multibillion-dollar criminal enterprises that collaborate with Colombian cocaine smugglers, a Venezuelan narcostate, illegal arms smugglers, and Hezbollah to threaten the security and well-being of the Americas. Rep. Matt Salmon (R-AZ), chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, will assess the threat to US interests and recommend policy options, and a panel of experts will discuss. SPEAKERS Jerry Brewer Sr., Criminal Justice International Associates LLC, Richard J. Douglas, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats, and Iñigo Guevara, CENTRA Global Access.
8. 2014 Global Peace Index: Measuring Country Risk and Opportunity Wednesday, June 18 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Center for Strategic and International Studies; 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND What is the state of global peace in 2014? What are the risks that threaten the peacefulness of nations and communities? How can our foreign policy and aid interventions better prioritize the mitigation of risk? The 2014 Global Peace Index discussion will explore these questions, detailing recent trends in militarization, safety and security, and ongoing conflict. It will also include a presentation of a new country risk framework, which quantifies current knowledge around the structural drivers of peace and conflict to identify countries most at risk today of falls in peacefulness. SPEAKERS Gary J. Milante, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Paul B. Stares, Council on Foreign Relations, Alexandra I. Toma, Peace and Security Funders Group, Daniel Hyslop, Institute for Economics and Peace. Moderated by Robert Lamb, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
9. Assessing Threats Facing the U.S.-Korea Alliance Wednesday, June 18 | 12:00 pm – 6:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel will deliver the keynote address of the second annual U.S.-Korea dialogue hosted jointly by the Wilson Center and the East Asia Foundation of Seoul. Register for this half-day conference, where opinion leaders from Korea and the United States will discuss their concerns for the future and seek ways to increase cooperation and mutual political, economic, diplomatic, and security benefits. SPEAKERS Daniel Russel, Jane Harman, Ro-Myung Gong, Thomas Fingar, Cheol-hee Park, and more.
10. Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War Thursday, June 19 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Pakistan’s army has dominated the state for most of its 66 years, locking the country in an enduring rivalry with India over Kashmir. To prosecute these dangerous policies, the army employs non-state actors under the security of its ever-expanding nuclear umbrella. Based on decades of the army’s own defense publications, Christine Fair’s book argues that the Pakistan military is unlikely to shift its strategy anytime soon, and thus the world must prepare for an ever more dangerous future Pakistan. Other speakers include David Sedney, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, and Michael G. Waltz, President of Metis Solutions and former Special Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney.
11. Mideast Shi’ites Defy Iranian Domination? Thursday, June 19 | 12:00 pm – 2:15 pm American Enterprise Institute; 1150 17th Street NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Iran’s Islamic Revolution unleashed a wave of sectarianism, which has flooded the Middle East. But while many have characterized Middle Eastern Shi‘ites as under the sway of the Islamic Republic, Shi‘ites from countries like Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, and Azerbaijan have worked to resist Iranian influence. Join analysts from the United States and across the Middle East to discuss strategies to preserve communal independence and how the United States can successfully work with Shi‘ite communities outside Iran. This event will coincide with the release of a new report based on firsthand fieldwork in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and Azerbaijan. SPEAKERS Abbas Kadhim, Brenda Shaffer, Michael Rubin, Ahmed Ali, Ali Alfoneh, Kenneth M. Pollack, and more.
12. How to Bring a Dictator to Justice: The Hissen Habré Trial Thursday, June 19 | 3:00 pm – 4:00 pm National Endowment for Democracy; 1025 F Street NW, Suite 800, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND From 1982 to 1990, Chad witnessed thousands of political killings under the regime of its former president, Hissen Habré. Twenty-four years after the end of his rule, litigation against Habré has finally gained critical momentum in Dakar. As a member of the international team of lawyers prosecuting the case, Delphine Djiraibe is well placed to tell the story of how Habré was brought to trial and to explore the potential impact on transitional justice in Chad. She will reflect on the legal process thus far, discuss where the trial stands today, and consider next steps in Senegal and beyond. Her presentation will be followed by comments by Dave Peterson, of the National Endowment for Democracy; the discussion will be moderated by Sally Blair of the International Forum for Democratic Studies.
13. The Solution to the Cyprus Problem: Famagusta, Energy, and Public Relations Friday, June 20 | 12:00 pm – 1:45 pm Hudson Institute; 1015 15th Street NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND 2014 marks the 40th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Following numerous failed attempts to reach a settlement, a Joint Declaration agreed to in February has galvanized new reunification efforts. The Hudson Institute hosts an important conversation on this situation with Alexis Galanos, Mayor of the city of Famagusta and former Speaker of the Cyprus House of Representatives. As the mayor of a city in the northern, Turkish-occupied part of the island, Galanos will share his unique perspective on current and future prospects for the reunification of Cyprus. Hudson Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for American Seapower, Seth Cropsey, will moderate the discussion.
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Dull
Kosovo’s election this coming Sunday has garnered virtually no ink (or electrons) in the United States. This is mainly due to the many other issues Americans are wrestling with. There is a long list of international issues before we even get close to the Balkans: withdrawal from Afghanistan, nuclear negotiations with Iran, failure of Middle East peace talks, Chinese naval challenges to US allies, the Syrian war and its spillover, Libya’s implosion, restoration of military autocracy in Egypt. Even within the Balkans, Bosnia’s stagnation would outrank any problem Kosovo is currently posing.
But inattention to Kosovo’s election is also merited: Kosovo is becoming a normal country. Why should Americans care who gets elected? Four major Albanian parties are contesting the election. Serbs and other minorities will participate, running for 10 guaranteed seats and hoping for a few more. The electoral mechanism, whose integrity was compromised in a number of places during the last poll, is thought to be in better shape. At their municipal elections last fall, the citizens turned out a lot of incumbents. It is unclear whether that will happen again. To me, not knowing the outcome of an election in advance is a good sign.
The big issue these days in Kosovo is creation of its armed forces, which will require a two-thirds majority in parliament. This gives the Serbs, who generally oppose Kosovo acquiring an army, a strong incentive to vote. They are unlikely to be able to block the constitutional changes required, but they could influence them. So could Belgrade: if it were to recognize Kosovo, or at least allow it to become a UN member, Pristina could settle for a smaller force less focused on the threat from Serbia, which has to be taken seriously so long as Belgrade has not recognized Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
I don’t mean to say everything is hunky dory in Kosovo, or likely to become so any time soon. The economy is far from generating enough jobs for its young and growing population. Poverty and youth unemployment are high. Corruption is widely thought to be rife. Nepotism and cronyism are common. Inter-ethnic relations, though much improved since the war ended in 1999, are far from warm. Many Kosovo Serbs still do not accept the fact of Kosovo’s independence. Many Albanians see Serbs as disloyal to the now six-year-old state. Implementation of the agreements intended to reintegrate the four northern, Serb-controlled municipalities with the rest of Kosovo is lagging.
This is what relative success looks like in international interventions and statebuilding. Perfection is far off. Differences are settled by political rather than military means. Responding to the needs of citizens becomes a priority, even if one observed more in the breach. To see relative failure, you need only look as far as Bosnia and Herzegovina, where its multiple governments have failed utterly to meet the serious challenge of its recent floods. Serbia, whose governments are well-established if not well-resourced, has also had difficulty with the response and relief effort. Kosovo was fortunate. The rains didn’t hit as hard there.
The question Kosovo citizens should be asking themselves as they go to the polls is who can ensure that their state will respond well if catastrophic floods, or a big earthquake, or an epidemic, were to strike? Who will increase accountability and transparency? Who will crack down on corruption and nepotism? Who will enable the economy to generate more jobs? Those are not a heroic questions. Some might even consider them dull ones. They won’t much interest Americans, but I hope they still interest Kosovo’s electorate. They are what governance should now be about.
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There is more thankless work to be done
Lakhtar Brahimi, the UN special envoy for Syria during the better part of the last two years, resigned yesterday, with appropriate apologies to the Syrian people. In many obvious senses, the UN has been a colossal failure in Syria:
- it has failed to bring about a political settlement between the regime and its opposition,
- it has not prevented 150,000 deaths and millions of people displaced,
- it hasn’t even managed more than local ceasefires,
- it delivers humanitarian aid mostly behind regime lines, and
- it has been unable to get concerted regional or great power action to end the war.
But looked at from a different angle it has also managed to do quite well: even before Brahimi’s appointment, it put forward a plan for an end to the fighting, it deployed international monitors, it withdrew them when it became apparent they weren’t doing any good, it managed two Geneva conferences (the first in 2012 at least produced a joint US/Russian plan and the second got the warring parties to the same table), it has helped managed the process of eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons, it has documented human rights abuses, and it has provided absolutely vital humanitarian assistance to large numbers of vulnerable civilians.
The UN is only as good as its member states allow it to be. It is not a miracle worker. But it is also not finished yet, even if Brahimi deservedly wants to withdraw.
So what should it do next? Given the failure of the Geneva 2 talks, and the apparent fruitlessness of further efforts along those lines, what should the UN and its specialized agencies do to alleviate suffering, protect civilians, increase the odds of an eventual political settlement (or hasten its arrival) and reduce the likelihood of a burdgeoning conflict that engulfs Lebanon, Iraq and maybe even Turkey and Jordan?
There are several options, not mutually exclusive:
- Deliver 360 degree aid: The bulk of UN humanitarian assistance has gone people in need in regime-controlled territory. The UN agencies could join many nongovernmental organizations in providing ample humanitarian assistance across borders from Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, thus enabling it to deliver more to rebel-held areas.
- Facilitate regional dialogue: While they have embassies in each others’ capitals, the Saudis and Iranians are barely on speaking terms and conducting a proxy war in Syria; refocusing them on common interests like countering violent extremists and maintaining state structures in the Levant could improve the situation. It is a good sign that the Saudis yesterday invited the Iranian foreign minister for a visit.
- Begin planning for post-war reconstruction and transition: When the war ends, as it inevitably will, the UN will be called upon to support reconstruction; it should be thinking about that now, helping to negotiate local ceasefires where possible and to build the local governing structures and civil society that can support the reconstruction process. Efforts of this sort are vital to improving the prospects for a democratic transition in Syria.
- Provide a moral compass: the UN could do more to publicize war crimes and crimes against humanity, it could take a strong position against the presidential “election” Assad is planning to conduct under thoroughly unfair and unfree conditions June 3, it could insist more loudly on protection of civilians and humanitarian access, it could get religious leaders to insist on observance of the laws of war.
- Cut off regime and terrorist financing: The sanctions on the Syrian regime are not nearly as tight as they might be, and terrorist organizations like ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) as well as Jabhat al Nusra are still receiving international funds as well as arms and other assistance from abroad. A more concerted effort to reduce the availability of resources could help de-escalate the conflict and reduce the harm to civilians.
There are arguments against all these propositions. The UN generally requires the permission of the host country to deliver aid from any direction. The regime could conceivably boot the UN from Damascus if it tries without permission. It is not easy for the UN to get the Saudis talking, as they tend to be both secretive and hierarchical. Local level reconstruction efforts to establish a minimum of governance and civil society require a capillary international presence in rebel-held areas, where security is dicey. He who holds a moral compass will not always be welcomed by those–on both sides of the war–who don’t.
But the UN is a reflection of ourselves. If we want these things done, the organization will find at least some people and means to get them done. The soft-spoken and precise Brahimi, well-suited to the high political level he has been dealing at, would not have necessarily been the best person for these tasks. The US needs to lead an effort to ensure that Brahimi’s departure does not end the UN’s focus on Syria. There is more thankless work to be done.
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