Tag: United Nations
Stevenson’s army, July 12
– The House takes up the NDAA this week, with over 1200 amendments filed.
– GOP resists Democratic proposals for increased aid to UN to counter China.
– Big LDP win foreshadows revisions to Japan’s constitution.
– US says Iran is shipping drones to Russia.
– Putin goes to Tehran for meetings including Turkey.
– WSJ says US is working to reform WTO.
– WaPo says ISIS planned attacks in Western Europe.
– NYT sees Ukraine war turning into test of stamina.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Prospects for real peace in Syria: not good
The sixth pledging Conference for the Future of Syria and the Region met in Brussels yesterday and today. On the margins, Baytna, a Syrian organization committed to empowering civil society, hosted a discussion (Peace in Syria: possibility or fantasy?) assessing the prospects for a real, sustainable peace. Not good, in two words.
Justice and accountability
The UN Commission of Inquiry and its Independent, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IMMM) as well as the use of universal jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals in Germany are important tools. But they have not produced substantial results. Only a few political prisoners have been freed, out of well over 100,000. So far the accused are a few small fry. There will be a great deal more to do once the opportunity arises.
A political transition is vital. Justice goes beyond accountability, especially for women. A broader framework of rule of law and security is needed.
Failure to hold people accountable in Syria has encouraged Russian abuses in Ukraine. Impunity for Bashar al Asad has taught others that they can escape accountability.
The economy
The situation today is disastrous. The overwhelming majority of Syrians are poor and in need of assistance. That is partly due to international sanctions. Once real peace arrives, a strong central authority will still be needed to manage the economy. When the time comes for lifting of sanctions, the international community needs a plan to do it expeditiously. [I missed some of the presentation on the economy, so apologies for that].
Rights and government
Syria needs radical political decentralization. The constitution should limit the powers of the presidency. Elected local authorities should control education and some taxation authority. The government needs to respect the social, cultural, and political rights of minorities. We can learn from the recent constitution in Tunisia, which instituted decentralization as a principle of the state. The existing provisions for decentralization in Syria are not adequate.
Social cohesion and peacebuilding
Local actors are key. They have a deep understanding of how things really work at the community level. We need to understand their political and social agendas and respond to their context and priorities. Funding should be flexible and accessible, aimed at strengthening civil society organizations that set their own priorities, regardless of who the local authorities are. We should not create or impose risks on Syrians trying to meet local community needs.
On the pathway to peace, an audience member suggested Syrian representation is an issue. It is not enough just to exclude those “who have blood on their hands.” Inclusiveness has hampered negotiations. The course of the war in Ukraine suggests helping Syrians to defend themselves might help. Only the Syrian people will be able to remove the regime and rebuild civil society. It’s a long road. We need to invest in people inside Syria who will make a difference.
As my Arabic is miserable, I missed most of the discussion. But the bottom line was clear enough: prospects for real peace in Syria in the short run are not good.
Recognition can weaken Serbia’s leverage
Edward Joseph, a Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, writes:
It’s the Newtonian law of policy debate: every idea that challenges orthodoxy produces an equal and opposite reaction.
We, the co-authors of the recent SAIS-Wilson Center report, ‘From Crisis to Convergence: A Strategy to Tackle Instability at its Source’, welcome debate on our approach, which has generated at least 16 articles, interviews and two controversies, along with interest in key capitals. At the very least, it represents an original way of thinking about a region where the West has struggled for too long, despite holding the strategic advantage.
We will host a live critique of our recent SAIS-Wilson Center report – along with an assessment of just how bad the situation in the Balkans is — on-line this Tuesday, 15 February at 9:30AM ET. Sign up here.
This event will feature leading experts from: Bosnia-Herzegovina – Srecko Latal (Balkans Crossroads); Kosovo — Engjellushe Morina (ECFR); Serbia – Igor Bandovic (BCSP); Albania – Albert Rakipi (AIIS.) They will explore: ‘Balkans 2022: How Bad Can It Get? Is a Breakthrough Possible?’
The report’s co-authors — who hail from the countries most affected by the strategy, including two respected experts from Serbia and Kosovo – will respond.
One of the more thoughtful critiques of our report appeared in Dan Serwer’s Peacefare post of 19 January. To summarize, Dan supports convergence by the European states that don’t recognize Kosovo, and, critically, he acknowledges the threat from “Serbian irredentism” in the Balkans. Dan then questions the impact of convergence – even NATO membership for Kosovo – on Belgrade’s policies. Instead of altering Serbia’s “strategic calculus,” as we state, Dan believes it will “incentivize Serbia in the opposite direction.”
Anti-democratic Serbia is the problem
Dan’s post raises essential and under-examined questions: what drives Serbia’s posture in the Balkans? Why does only Serbia (and its proxies) reject the liberal Western order for the region?
Let me begin with a challenge to Peacefare readers:
How do you explain that more than three-decades after the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia began, the region is not just stagnant – but going backwards, with open talk of “war” from responsible international and regional figures alike? Bear in mind that, unlike in Ukraine, the US, NATO and EU hold the strategic advantage in the Balkans.
We give our answer in the report. The Balkans is not a ‘morass’ of intractable ethno-national tensions. Instead, those ethno-national tensions – which stand in the way of the fight against corruption and the fight for rule of law and democracy – are a function of two factors: national power and strategic orientation.
And that’s the crux of the problem: the largest Western Balkans state – Serbia – has polities in four neighboring states, and is oriented towards the illiberal powers: Russia and China. In power for a decade, the Vucic regime has methodically rolled back Serbia’s weak democracy. The regime is protected within the EU by the leading European illiberal power: Hungary.
In sum, no matter how many Special Envoys are sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, fundamental reform will remain out of reach as long as this condition in Serbia continues. To put it another way, don’t expect democratic progress in BiH or its neighbors, with an anti-democratic Serbia.
Serbia’s leverage
But that only addresses Serbia’s strategic orientation. Where does the Vucic regime get the power to subvert its neighbors – and confound US and EU diplomats? Why do capable, dedicated US officials assail corruption and organized crime in Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo – but are generally quiet on official corruption in Serbia? Why do US officials in Serbia repeatedly laud a regime that openly – on billboards – promotes Beijing, and backs Moscow over Ukraine as, “the political and economic leader” in the region? Why was Serbia invited to the ‘Summit for Democracy’ after US officials stated clearly that it would not be invited? Why did the EU give Serbia a pass on rule of law standards?
The source of the leverage
We believe the answer is clear: Serbia has leverage over Kosovo, and through it, over the US and EU. The source of that leverage is the four NATO non-recognizers. The best way to understand Serbian leverage is by comparison with Bulgaria and North Macedonia. As an EU member, Sofia can unilaterally block the opening of Skopje’s EU accession negotiations. Similarly, Belgrade can unilaterally block Pristina’s pathway to NATO and the EU – even though it’s not a member of either organization. The reason: the non-recognizers have, effectively, handed their proxy to Belgrade: ‘we won’t recognize Kosovo, until Serbia does.’
Kosovo cannot advance until Belgrade, with the proxy of the non-recognizers, says so. The status quo – no settlement between Pristina and Belgrade – inflicts pain on only one side. Indeed, the status quo is beneficial for the Vucic regime as it insulates it from Western scrutiny.
In short, the West is participating in Vucic’s charade. Belgrade’s main aim in the EU-led Dialogue is simply to avoid being blamed for lack of progress, so that the Vucic regime can continue the pretense of interest in making EU reforms and becoming a member. Meanwhile, the regime draws Western praise, even as Vucic – through others – promotes what they call the ‘Serb World.’
The way forward
The way forward is also clear: Western strategy should focus on eroding Serbia’s leverage, reducing the illiberal Vucic regime’s ability to project its destructive vision in the region and domestically. Rather than “incentivizing Serbia in the wrong direction,” we see precisely the opposite: reducing regime power incentivizes it to scale back its destructive aspirations and cooperate. In other words, this is about power dynamics, not incentives. EU membership has incentives ample enough to attract Serbia’s neighbors, Albania and North Macedonia. Tirana and Skopje are desperate simply to have the same right that Belgrade already enjoys and exploits.
Eroding Serbian leverage is not a binary event, i.e. either full recognition by the four NATO non-recognizers, or nothing. Instead, we see Belgrade’s obsessive bid to isolate and weaken Kosovo – evidenced in its own words and actions – as proof of its vulnerability. That’s why senior Serbian officials run nervously to Greece and Spain to shore up – as officials openly state – non-recognition of Kosovo. That explains why at a time of grave European crisis, Serbian Foreign Minister Nikola Selakovic last week visited – of all places – Equatorial Guinea! – praising the country for not recognizing Kosovo. Same with the visits to dangerous countries like Iran and obscure ones like Suriname – all mainly in the name of isolating Kosovo.
Our strategy
Our strategy is entirely pragmatic. Steps towards ‘convergence’ beginning, for example, with returning Slovak and Spanish troops to KFOR, bringing Kosovo into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, aided by continuing movement from Greece, and steps by Romania as well, will have immediate impact on the regime’s posture. Greece’s role is particularly significant because Athens has its own clearly stated strategic reasons for moving toward recognition of Kosovo.
The Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council are no match in this regard. A pathway to NATO membership is far more meaningful for Kosovo than UN membership.
Let’s finally bring the curtain down on the three-decade crisis over Yugoslavia, where it began – in Kosovo. Convergence is the way. Most current approaches, including the fight against corruption, and building a regional common market, continue under convergence — empowered by a US and EU that can finally apply the same standards across the region. Join us on Tuesday to hear how experts from the region process this argument!
A necessary and unavoidable but constructive failure
The UN’s Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP 26) ended yesterday with a lengthy, consensus declaration. The Glasgow Climate Pact includes something for just about everyone and not enough for anyone. That’s what you expect from a consensus document purporting to represent the views of 197 countries that are collectively fouling the global commons. Nor is it surprising that the current commitments of the parties, despite significant strengthening before and during the conference, will not achieve the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees centigrade.
The implications are dire. At higher temperatures than that goal, global warming will raise sea levels enough to drown some island countries and deprive many others of their current coastlines, generate even more dramatic storms and forest fires than we are already seeing, shift agricultural patterns in ways that hinder growing enough to meet global demand, and make parts of the planet even more uninhabitable than they already are. The costs will be astronomical. The human implications tragic. There is nothing to celebrate about COP 26 if you are looking only at the physical implications of what was decided in Glasgow, even if you welcome the substantial agreements reached on methane and deforestation.
The conference was however a success in another sense: without it, things would have been worse. Glasgow upped the ante on climate change. No government on earth can now ignore it entirely. Even laggards like China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and India have been announcing new goals and counter measures. President Biden has put climate change high on his agenda, reversing President Trump’s foolish and counterproductive effort to ignore it. Island nations whose physical existence is threatened had their voices magnified. Less developed countries had their needs acknowledged, if not yet fully funded. None of this is enough, but much of it would not have happened without Glasgow.
This is typical of large international conferences. The UN is doing what it can and should. Such conferences serve to mobilize public opinion and shift attitudes, even if they fail to solve the problems they aim to solve. The key now is to maintain the momentum and raise the political pressure. The parties have agreed to meet again next year in Egypt, where no doubt the appeals for action and money will be heightened. Expanding economies in what we can hope will be the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic will likely make the prospects for meeting the goal of 1.5 degrees centigrade even dimmer than they are today. Don’t expect good news, but next year’s conference will again be a necessary, unavoidable but constructive failure.
That’s how the international system works. Get used to it. This is going to go on for decades.
Libya is taking baby steps in the right direction
Wolfgang Pusztai writes:
In order to end the conflict and to achieve security and stability in Libya as a basis for peace and state-building, first and foremost an executive – a government – and a legislative – a parliament – legitimated by credible elections are required.
There was nothing really new at [last week’s] International Libya Stabilization Conference, which was organized by Libya’s Foreign Minister Najla Al Mangoush. There was not even a common final statement, because the delegations could not agree about some key points like the withdrawal of foreign forces. However, the final drive to the elections must now come from the Libyans themselves anyway.
On the security side reliable supervision of the ceasefire is necessary, but I doubt that 60 civilian UN observers will be sufficient. A secure environment must be also established in the greater capital area, where there is fighting between the various militias (who are all considered part of the GNU’S security forces) almost every week.
On the political side regionalization and an agreement about the distribution of the oil revenues between the central state and the three historic provinces are without any realistic alternative.
Security and political stability should help to stabilize the oil and gas production, but Libya still needs foreign know-how and foreign investors. Most companies are still very hesitant to return. Therefore Libya also needs to build credibility, honor obligations from the past and find settlements with the many companies who lost a huge amount of money during and after the revolution (not only with the Turkish ones). Such agreements should help to build trust again.
Fortunately there is a drive towards the elections. Several persons have announced officially to run for presidency. Fathi Bashagha, ex-Minister of the Interior and promising presidential candidate from Misrata committed already to accept the outcome of the elections. The others should follow his example to ensure a broad acceptance of the election results.
Libya really needs a man of integrity as president, well-rooted in Libyan tradition, but with good connections to international actors and who stayed preferably out of day-by-day politics in Libya during the last years.
Wolfgang also discussed the Libya situation with last night on VoA with Mohamed Elshinnawi.
Syria: no attractive propositions, so Biden is staying the course
Secretary of State Blinken at a press conference with the Israeli and UAE foreign ministers today said more about Syria than I remember since the beginning of the Biden Administration, in response to a question about normalization that other countries are indulging in:
…let me talk about Syria first and then come to the second part of the – the first part of the question second.
First, to put this in focus, these initial nine months of the administration we have been focused on a few things when it comes to Syria: Expanding humanitarian access for people who desperately need that assistance, and we had some success, as you know, with renewing the critical corridor in northwestern Syria to do that; sustaining the campaign that we have with the coalition against ISIS and al-Qaida in Syria; making clear our commitment, our ongoing commitment to demand accountability from the Assad regime and the preservation of basic international norms like promoting human rights and nonproliferation through the imposition of targeted sanctions; and sustaining local ceasefires, which are in place in different parts of the country. So this has been the focus of our action for these last nine months.
As we’re moving forward, in the time ahead, keeping violence down; increasing humanitarian assistance and focusing our military efforts on any terrorist groups that pose a threat to us or to our partners, with the intent and capacity to do that. These are going to be the critical areas of focus for us, and they’re also, I think, important to advancing a broader political settlement to the Syrian conflict consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.
What we have not done and what we do not intend to do is to express any support for efforts to normalize relations or rehabilitate Mr. Assad, or lifted [sic] a single sanction on Syria or changed [sic] our position to oppose the reconstruction of Syria until there is irreversible progress toward a political solution, which we believe is necessary and vital.
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-israeli-alternate-prime-minister-and-foreign-minister-yair-lapid-and-united-arab-emirates-foreign-minister-sheikh-abdullah-bin-zayed-al-nahyan-at-a-joint-press-availab/
This is a restatement of well-established US priorities: humanitarian assistance, reduction in violence, counter-terrorism, and irreversible progress toward a political solution before reconstruction or normalization.
So nothing new. What’s missing? should always be the next question.
Tony fails to deal with the threat of a serious military clash between NATO ally Turkey and the Kurdish-led forces that are conducting the campaign against both terrorists and the regime in northeastern Syria, with American support. He is silent on concerns about Iran using Syrian territory to threaten Israel. Nor does he indicate that the United States opposes normalization by others, in particular Jordan and the UAE. And he is silent on brutality-laced Russian and Iranian support for the Syrian regime, which in due course may become capable of challenging the Kurdish presence in the northeast and the Turkish presence inside Syria’s northern border. So yes, continuity of a policy that is silent on important issues and has so far failed to produce substantial results.
Is there a better approach? We could certainly tighten sanctions so that jet-setting scions of the Syrian elite don’t roam Los Angeles in Ferraris, but that won’t change anything in Syria. We could help the Germans mount a “universal jurisdiction” case against President Assad himself, in absentia, but that would set a legal precedent that might boomerang on prominent Americans. We could try harder to mediate some sort of accommodation between the Syrian Kurds and Turkey, as we did once with a modicum of success between the Iraqi Kurds and Turkey. Or we could try to negotiate autonomous status for the Kurds within Syria in return for US withdrawal, though the regime would be no more likely than the Taliban to stick to the terms of a withdrawal agreement. The Kurds would likely revert to attacking inside Turkey as well as Turkish-controlled Syria in order to curry favor with Assad. It suits the Kurds and Turkey to have the Americans remain in Syria.
I won’t even bother with military options against the Russians or the regime. The Americans take some shots against the Iranians and their proxies in Syria, but they aren’t going to risk war with Russia or the civilian casualties that taking on the regime would entail.
So no, there are not a lot of attractive propositions in Syria. Especially after the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Administration can ill afford a comparable mess in Syria, never mind an influx into the US of tens of thousands Syrian Kurds and Arabs who helped the US during the past decade and have legitimate claims to asylum. No wonder Biden is staying the course.