Tag: United Nations
The Israel we need is not the one we’ve got
Yoram Peri, an Israeli patriot who has fought in three wars for his country and now directs the University of Maryland’s new Institute for Israel Studies, gave a post-service talk Friday night at our local synagogue. His family has lived in Palestine and Israel since the 1860s. What he had to say about the collapse of the Israel/Palestine peace talks and Israel’s politics may interest readers. Here is what I remember of his impassioned presentation.*
Contrary to what has been reported, Yoram understands that Mahmoud Abbas was prepared to make major concessions in the US-sponsored negotiations. Palestine would be demilitarized. Eighty per cent of the Jewish population living beyond the wall would remain in placed. Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem would not be disturbed. Israeli troops would remain in the Jordan River valley for five years and then be replaced by American troops for another five years. Israel would decide how many displaced and refugee Palestinians would be able to return to Israel proper.
Abbas was asking in return that Israel specify within a few months exactly where the border would lie (presumably based on swaps for land in the West Bank kept by Israel). Jerusalem would be Palestine’s capital. If Yoram mentioned other important Palestinian requirements, I am not remembering them.
Netanyahu rejected this offer. His coalition has too many hardline settler supporters to allow him to accept. Nor is he himself interested in making peace. He is more comfortable talking about the Holocaust.
But when Abbas made a strong statement on the Holocaust to mark Yom HaShoah, Netanyahu rejected it as public relations. Likewise, Netanyahu has complained for years that Abbas can’t deliver on peace with Israel because the Palestinian Authority he leads does not control Gaza. Now that Hamas, which does control Gaza, has pledged to join a Palestinian Authority government consisting of “technical” ministers, Netanyahu says he won’t negotiate because then the Palestinian government will include terrorists.
Yoram thinks Hamas, as part of a unity government, will have to accept the “Quartet” (US, Russia, EU and UN) conditions for participation in the peace talks: mutual recognition, acceptance of previous agreements, and ending violence as a means of attaining goals. Abbas has also said as much. If Hamas does accept these conditions, why wouldn’t Israel negotiate with it? Yoram suggests there is no harm in talking with them to see what is possible.
Israel’s reluctance to accept a good deal with the Palestinians is rooted in the evolution of its politics. The weight of the ultra religious has increased enormously. And what the ultra religious want has also changed. Whereas traditionally Jews are prohibited from praying on the Temple Mount (they pray only at the Wailing Wall at its base), some ultra religious militants are demanding not only to pray there but also to destroy the Dome of the Rock mosque and rebuild the ancient temple. Only a few years ago, only fringe lunatics held such views. Now they are entering mainstream discourse.
Israel officially accepts only Jewish orthodoxy as legitimate. There are few reform synagogues. Most of Israel’s Jews are either orthodox or secular. They know nothing of the more liberal Reform Judaism practiced in the United States. What is needed is a reverse birthright program: one that brings young Israelis to the United States to learn about modern Jewish practices.
Ultimately, Yoram suggests the problem for Israel is the one John Kerry made recent reference to: if it holds on to the West Bank, it cannot remain both democratic and Jewish. The demography will require it to deny equal rights to the Arabs who live there, thus eventually meriting the appellation “apartheid.” This is an opinion many Israeli leaders have expressed, so it is hard to understand why it caused such a furor recently in the US.
Israel faces a difficult future. A third intifada is a possibility, though the Palestinians seem weary of the violence associated with the first two. A nonviolent one is possible, a well-informed Arab journalist told me recently, but only after dissolving the Palestinian Authority, so it would not be faced with the difficulty of repressing the rebellion. Yoram suggested the BDS (boycotts, disinvestment and sanctions) movement will grow. Israel will increasingly stand alone against a world that regards it as extreme and uncompromising. Rather than being a beacon of hope, it will be isolated in a hostile environment.
Asked about the future of Israel’s Arabs, Yoram suggested that its national anthem “Hatikvah” (the Hope) could be amended to be more inclusive. This is the current version:
As long as deep in the heart,
The soul of a Jew yearns,
And forward to the East
To Zion, an eye looks
Our hope will not be lost,
The hope of two thousand years,
To be a free nation in our land,
The land of Zion and Jerusalem.
I have my doubts any amendment will satisfy Israel’s more than 20% Arab citizens, but the Israel that would at least give it a try would also be one that signed up for the deal Mahmoud Abbas was offering. That unfortunately is not the Israel we’ve got. But it is the Israel we need.
*Virtually all of what Yoram said about what the Palestinians were prepared to agree has now been published, based on American sources: Inside the talks’ failure: US officials open up.
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Where humanitarian and strategic interests intersect
Thursday afternoon, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy hosted a policy discussion about US strategic interests and the humanitarian disaster in Syria. Featured speakers were former UK foreign secretary David Miliband, president of the International Rescue Committee, and Robert Ford, a US diplomat retiring after serving as ambassador to Syria (he left there in October 2011). Andrew Tabler, senior fellow at the Washington Institute, moderated.
Though it engulfs a large part of the Middle East, many people no longer want to talk about the Syrian crisis, Miliband said. It has become the defining humanitarian crisis of our time for all the wrong reasons. The humanitarian community has failed to rise to the challenge posed by dictatorship, sectarianism, and geopolitics.
Massive humanitarian efforts have failed because they don’t meet the needs. About 9.5 million people have been displaced from their homes. The UN says about 3.5 million Syrians are cut off from aid. Inside Syria the idea of “civilian” is lost. Everyone is treated as a combatant, which contravenes international law.
Neighboring countries are overwhelmed. Lebanon now has more than a million refugees. Jordan has 650, 000 registered refugees and an equal number of unregistered refugees. The refugees have been displaced multiple times within Syria before escaping. Currently there are 88,000 Syrian children in Lebanon going to school. This leaves 300, 000 Syrian children who have had no education for the last three years. The UN has appealed for $5.5 billion but only $1 billion has been committed.
With the political process stalled, the humanitarian situation is worsening. It took three years to get a UN Security Council resolution on humanitarian aid. Government restrictions on the UN and non-governmental organizations working in Syria have hampered aid to at least 12 of 14 governorates. With the winter over, the IRC is concerned with spring and summer, when infectious disease could become rampant. Lack of access and the humanitarian crisis are not an unfortunate byproduct of a war without law. They are the strategic result of a war without law.
Miliband urges every member of the UN Security Council and other interested countries to name a humanitarian envoy, a diplomat of distinction with support from the head of a government, to broker a ceasefire. Governments should also undertake cross-border humanitarian operations. If he had told an audience three years ago that 160,000 Syrians would die, several million would be displaced, and a large number would be tortured by their government, the response would have been, “We must do something.” We need make sure that our senses aren’t dulled.
Ford emphasized that the US government is hugely concerned about the crisis. It is the largest single donor to Syrian relief efforts, having committed $1.7 billion. Additional money is being provided to local communities where the regime has lost control. The US is providing rescue equipment and food, and now it is paying salaries of some teachers and police.
The situation is nevertheless deteriorating. People in refugee camps are the lucky ones. The ones that are really suffering are still inside Syria and under blockade. According to the latest UN estimates, Syrian government forces have 175, 000 civilians under blockade. They are located primarily in the Damascus suburbs. Blockading aid convoys contravenes the Geneva Convention. It is illegal and outrageous. The regime is starving people into ceasefires and eventually surrender. In return for armed opposition forces giving up heavy weaponry, the civilians are granted access to food. The blockades are a regime tactic that will continue as long as the regime is fighting for its life.
Some argue that both sides are blockading civilians. The opposition has wrongly blockaded some small towns, but those are not airtight blockades. The opposition does not fully control access. For example, food supplies come in from the north to pro-regime Kurdish areas. The opposition blockades are in no way justified, but they do not compare with the much more vigorous and extensive regime blockades.
If the fighting goes on for another three years, what kind of crisis will we face? What will the implications be for humanitarian assistance, state structures in the Levant, and the prevalence of extremists?
Miliband replied that the Syrian refugees he has spoken to know Assad will not be toppled tomorrow. They see the war lengthening. No one is expecting a quick resolution. Ideas about reconstruction have not really been developed. The dangers of communicable diseases will rise over time if the crisis continues. Public health risks are massive even with sufficient food supplies. There are obvious dangers of a humanitarian and political explosion in neighboring countries. What is Lebanon’s capacity? There is an influx of 750 refugees a day into Lebanon. Lebanese asking themselves, what gives? But there is no incentive for the regime to make necessary compromises. It is a very bleak situation.
Ford thought in 2012 that the regime’s days were numbered. What changed was assistance to the regime. Who could have imagined Hezbollah would send 5-6,000 soldiers? Russia has increased assistance as well. This has enabled the regime to take and hold the area from Damascus up to Homs and over to Latakia. In the short or medium term, the armed opposition will not be able to change that. The country is being cantonized. Different factions of armed groups control different territories. There are six opposition groups that divide control in Abu Qamal.
The war of attrition inside Syria is between minority and majority. But it is also a war of attrition regionally between Sunni and Shia states. Assad is not the majority on either side of those divides. Ultimately, he will lose. But in the meanwhile the war leaves vast spaces governed by no one in particular or by bad guys. If the moderates don’t prevail against extremists, we will see a much more serious problem, as we have seen in the past in Afghanistan.
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Shooting yourself in the foot
I’ll be on Al Hurra this afternoon discussing the American failure to give an Iranian diplomat a visa to come to New York to represent his government at the UN. Yesterday, Eli Lake and I exchanged barbs on the subject:
An Iranian diplomat participated in hostage taking in 1979, 35 years later he can’t get a visa. Typical neocon, guilt-by-asociation smears.
What if the Vietnamese had taken your approach to Pete Peterson as US ambassador there? Would you have supported Hanoi?
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Requirements for a final Iran nuclear deal
Although Iran and the P5+1 seem to be adhering to their Joint Plan of Action, both sides face pressure to reach a final nuclear deal before the end of the six-month interim agreement, which began implementation in January. On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted a panel discussion to discuss the Iran nuclear negotiations. The panelists were Senior Fellow Robert Einhorn, former special advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; Dennis Ross, counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Frank N. von Hippel, professor of public and international affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. Brookings Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated.
Robert Einhorn: It is important to ask ourselves what the main goal of the agreement ought to be. Some argue that the main goal of an agreement should be to eliminate Iran’s capability to produce nuclear arms. Given its technical knowhow, experience, and resources, Iran already has a nuclear weapons capability.
An agreement could however deter Iran’s leaders from ever making the decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would have three basic requirements:
- It would provide confidence that any steps by Iran to break out of an agreement and move towards nuclear weapons, whether at covert or at declared nuclear facilities, would be detected quickly.
- It would ensure that the period of time between initiation of breakout steps and the production of enough fissile material for a single nuclear weapon would be long enough to enable the international community to intervene decisively to stop Iran.
- As a result of actions taken outside an agreement, Iran would get the clear message that any attempt to break out and make nuclear weapons would be met with a firm international response, including military force.
Each of these points is discussed in Bob’s Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran: Requirements for a Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement.
Reaching an agreement that meets these three requirements will not be easy. Both President Obama and President Rouhani face strong domestic opposition that will limit their room for maneuver. No agreement that emerges from current negotiations will be ideal.
The true test for any agreement is how it compares to alternative approaches for dealing with the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program. One alternative is to ratchet up the sanctions until Iran makes major concessions. Another alternative is use of military force. Before we turn to these, we should make every effort to achieve an agreement that deters Iran by making the pathway towards acquiring nuclear weapons as detectable, lengthy, and risky as possible.
Dennis Ross: Bob’s report made a reference to the possible military dimensions of the Iranian program. He also mentioned the difficulty of getting Iranians to admit their weapons program. It is critical to expose what has been done in the past. It is difficult to forge an agreement if there are certain aspects of the program that are hidden. The Iranian narrative claims it is a peaceful program. It is not. If the deal does not take place, this should be part of the Western narrative: all along the Iranians had a program that was not peaceful. That will help to justify some of the steps we may take.
Bob makes the case that this is going to be an agreement where Iran will be able to enrich uranium in a limited way. This is important because in the event that diplomacy fails, we must demonstrate to the international community that what we offered was credible. If the Iranians turn the offer down, it will mean they are not satisfied with peaceful nuclear energy. We need to be in a position to unmask the Iranians if diplomacy fails.
Another way to affect the Iranians and strengthen deterrence measures is to lengthen the breakout time. If extended to twelve months, their program would be set back far enough that the steps they have to take would be daunting. A longer breakout time will reduce their temptation to cheat.
To deter the Iranians from cheating, the consequences of cheating need to be clear. Bob mentioned a Security Council resolution, IAEA involvement, and Congressional authorization for the president to use force. The clearer we are on the consequences of cheating, the greater likelihood we will produce an agreement.
The key for the negotiations to be successful is to demonstrate to the Supreme Leader the consequences of not reaching an agreement. Historically, the Islamic Republic has only adjusted its behavior when the costs were high. The Supreme Leader needs to realize that the economic costs would be intolerable and the failure of diplomacy would trigger the use of force.
Frank von Hippel: The monitoring of Iran’s centrifuge production is not a traditional part of safeguards, but it is critical. As the US intelligence community says, a sneakout is more likely than a breakout. A sneakout would involve the production of extra centrifuges and installing them in an undeclared location. We need confidence in the IAEA’s ability to keep track of all the components and centrifuges.
Iran’s enrichment program is symptomatic of a more general problem with the current nonproliferation regime. Centrifuge enrichment plants are inherently dual purpose. As long as it is considered legitimate for countries to build and control them nationally, the potential for nuclear weapons breakouts will spread to more countries.
Confrontation and negotiation between Washington and Tehran are only part of the story. There are also parallel confrontations and negotiations within Washington and within Tehran. Those who are working for a diplomatic solution have to be aware of the domestic political constraints of their counterparts on the other side. Compromise will be necessary.
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All deliberate speed, please
UN Secretary General Ban is marking the third anniversary of the Syrian uprising, which by my reckoning is March 15, by appealing to Russia and the US to revive peace talks. That’s his job, but prospects are not good.
The Asad regime continues to make slow progress on the battlefield. The opposition continues to insist that he step down to initiate a transition to democracy. There is no “zone of possible agreement.” Asad is preparing to conduct what he will call an election this spring to reconfirm his hold on power. The conditions in regime-controlled areas will not permit the election to be anything like free or fair. The conditions in liberated and contested areas won’t allow an election to occur at all. But Asad will claim legitimacy. Russia will concur.
In the US, consciousness of the horrors occurring in Syria is growing. The recent reports of the Save the Children and UNICEF boosted the case for humanitarian relief. The US has already been generous, even to a fault, as it appears to be buying tolerance for the failure to bring about a political resolution of the conflict. Russia, more committed to realpolitik, continues to arm, finance and provide political support to the regime. The crisis in Crimea leaves little oxygen in Washington for Syria. There is an argument for replying to Putin’s moves in Ukraine by strengthening opposition efforts in Syria, but I am not seeing signs that it is winning the day.
Some key members of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (Etilaf) will be in DC next week making the case for more support, including to the more moderate fighters. What Etilaf needs to do is convince the Obama Administration that vital American interests are at risk in Syria. The two most striking are the risk of extremism putting down deep roots in Syria and the risk of state collapse, both of which would affect not only Syria but its neighbors, especially Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. Perhaps eventually also Turkey and even Israel, whose boundary with Syria in occupied Golan could become hotter than it has been for many years.
Etilaf has not yet convinced Washington that it can be an effective bulwark against these threats. The Coalition has precious little control over even the relative moderates among the fighters. It has little to no capacity to counter Jabhat al Nusra or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the former the official al Qaeda franchisee and the latter its Iraq-based competitor. Etilaf favors preservation of the Syrian state, but with every passing day that becomes less likely. Nor has Etilaf demonstrated a lot of traction with the ad hoc administrative councils that pop up in liberated areas.
Where Etilaf showed itself to best advantage was at the Geneva 2 talks, where it outmaneuvered the Asad regime and scored lots of good points in favor of a managed transition and against the horrors of what Asad is doing. There is irony then in Etilaf emphasizing the limits of diplomacy, which is the arena in which it has done best.
That is not however a good reason to revive the talks, which really went nowhere. Nor can they be expected to, given what is happening on the battlefield. Until Iran and Russia are convinced that they risk more by continuing to support Asad rather than abandoning him, Tehran and Moscow will provide the edge he needs to continue to gain ground, albeit slowly. This is a formula for more war, not less.
A couple of weeks ago, the Obama Administration was thought to be looking at new options for Syria. There is no sign they have emerged from the “interagency” labyrinth. That’s not surprising. It took 3.5 years for something meaningful to emerge from the National Security Council in Bosnia, and depending on how you count at least that long in Kosovo. Only in Afghanistan and in Iraq have such decisions proved quick, mistakenly and disastrously so in Iraq.
Deliberation is wise. But if it takes too long, vital American interests in blocking extremists and maintaining the states of the Levant may suffer irreparable damage. Not to mention the harm to Syrians, who deserve better. All deliberate speed, please.
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Left and right are shooting blanks
Hayes Brown over at ThinkProgress suggests five ways the US can respond to Russia invading Ukraine without going to war.
It’s a brave attempt. But nothing he cites will suffice to get the Russians out of Crimea:
- Suspending Russia’s membership in the G-8 would be a pinprick to Moscow. It has never cared as much about the G-8 as we would have like it to. In any event, the G-8 has yielded economic leadership to the G-20 and hasn’t produced much in the 8 years since it first met in Russia. President Putin boycotted the 2012 meeting at Camp David. He cares that much.
- Placing travel bans on Putin and his family is symbolic, not substantial. The Europeans likely won’t go along. The man doesn’t vacation a lot in the US.
- Trade (and I would say financial) sanctions are a serious proposition, but there are real limits to what we are permitted to do by our World Trade Organization obligations and by our concern about damage to the global financial structure. Trade and financial sanctions won’t have much impact unless a good part of the rest of the world goes along with them, which isn’t likely.
- Suspension of NATO cooperation and participation. The Russians have never much appreciated their post-Cold War relationship with NATO. Few in Moscow would cry over this spilled milk.
- Accelerate missile defense. This would require a dramatic turnaround both in the US and Europe in favor of missile defenses few think are terribly important or will work. And it would cost a bundle. Read more
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