Tag: United Nations
Par for the course
E-International Relations published this piece yesterday:
UN and Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi adjourned the so-called Geneva II peace talks on 31 January without any substantial agreement. He is hoping to reconvene the talks on February 10.
While the press has been bemoaning the lack of progress and the prospect of collapse, this session went about as well as could be expected. The homicidal Syrian government is finding itself cornered by a moderate opposition that went to Montreux and then Geneva fragmented politically, weakened on the battlefield and holding a losing diplomatic hand. But the opposition has managed to take advantage of Damascus’ unforced errors. The result is not peace. But it is a clear indication of who stands in the way of peace.
The basic problem with Geneva II was congenital. The meeting was born of a joint American/Russian desire to do something. But Moscow and Washington have been unable to agree on precisely what the something is. Washington thinks it is creation of a transitional government formed by mutual consent, which therefore excludes President Bashar al Asad from power. Moscow mouths agreement with the June 2012 “Geneva I” agreement that calls for such a transitional government with full executive powers but denies that this means Asad has to step aside.
Neither Moscow nor Washington has been prepared to yield on this fundamental point. Moscow, while claiming not to be wedded to Bashar al Asad, continues to supply him with vital weapons, financing and diplomatic support. Washington might like to find a compromise. President Obama regards the Syrian conflict as a distraction from his main objective: blocking Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. But the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) that Washington supports and nurtures insists that Bashar al Asad step down, aside or out. So too do the opposition fighters. Even if the SOC were to compromise, the fight would go on.
The Syrian government tried hard in its overly lengthy and aggressive opening statement last week to change the subject. It wants Geneva II to focus on terrorism, by which it means any armed resistance to its brutal attempts to crack down on dissent. Meanwhile, Asad is preparing the way for spring elections in government-controlled areas guaranteed to return him to office. Iran is backing him to the hilt. Excluded from the Geneva II meeting, Iran’s President Rouhani took advantage of the annual Davos conclave to project his moderate image. But Tehran continues to provide both Revolutionary Guard Corps advisers and Hizbollah fighters to make up for the Syrian regime’s dwindling army and other security forces.
The fractious opposition had a hard time agreeing to go to the Geneva II talks and arrived there without command and control over most of the forces fighting the Asad regime (and each other). But by insisting on the transitional governing body as the subject of the conference, the opposition hit the Syrian regime at its most sensitive point. Damascus is unwilling to negotiate any transition away from Bashar al Asad. That makes it the main obstacle to a political solution and the peace that would presumably ensue.
UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi at one point was meeting separately with the delegations in Geneva. This was interpreted in the press as a setback, because the original plan was for them to meet in the same room but talk separately to Brahimi. But from a diplomatic perspective, meeting separately with Brahimi, a procedure known as “proximity” talks, is preferable. That way he can probe each side out of the hearing of the other on their bottom lines and on what each might be able to offer to save the talks from collapse.
A one-off prisoner exchange and local ceasefires are the most likely candidates. The intelligence value of prisoners declines rapidly after their capture. Even if their treatment is abysmal, they still need to be guarded and fed. Failing to provide them with minimal sustenance brings the wrath of the international community. So getting rid of prisoners you are holding is a plus in wartime, especially if you can get some of your own people released in exchange, thus alleviating pressure from your own side.
Local ceasefires are far less likely to be successful. Where they have occurred, the Syrian regime often disrupts them with shelling by artillery, rockets and bombs. International monitors are lacking. There is no third party to assign responsibility for breaches or to facilitate communications. Sustained ceasefires are therefore unlikely, though short-term humanitarian windows for delivery of humanitarian supplies or evacuation of vulnerable people may sometimes be possible.
At this stage, the talks cannot achieve much more. The Asad regime thinks it is winning and wants to continue the fight, even if it is unlikely to be able to put all of Syria back under Asad’s control. The opposition is battered and weary, but still willing to do battle. It may look like a stalemate to outsiders, but it has not reached the “mutually hurting” stage: “ripeness” requires that both sides have to conclude that they will do better by ending the fight rather than continue it.
When all else fails, an agreement to meet again is trumpeted as success. The important thing is that if talks collapse, or fail to agree anything substantial, they do so in a way that causes little harm and leaves open the possibility of reconvening. Even if reconvened talks lead to prisoner releases and local ceasefires, the fighting will continue, as should the talking. This is par for the course. If peace agreements were easy, we wouldn’t have wars.
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We are not there yet
Word from Geneva this morning suggests that the Syria peace talks are deadlocked over the issue of forming a transitional government with full executive powers, which is the key goal set in a June 2012 UN communique’. This is no surprise. Bashar al Asad shows no sign of stepping down, aside or out. His Iranian and Russian supporters, while claiming they are not wedded to him, are still not prepared to compel him, or even provide incentives. They continue to provide ample military and financial support.
The opposition is no readier to make peace. Its negotiators went to Geneva 2, as these talks are known, in parlous shape. The regime has been pressing its military advantages near Damascus and in Homs. The opposition military forces are fragmented and fighting each other. The negotiators representing the opposition in Geneva have precious little control over the armed revolutionaries, who are fragmented and fighting with each other. There was also a significant political minority within the Syrian Opposition Coalition, which leads the delegation in Geneva, that opposed going to the talks.
Given these disadvantages, it is remarkable that things have gone pretty well for the opposition in Geneva. Unforced regime errors are part of the explanation. Its chief negotiator, Foreign Minister Moallem, came out of his corner overly aggressive, not only against the opposition but also against UN Secretary General Ban. Beating on the referee is not a good way to win a boxing match. Moallem essentially rejected the notion that the talks aim at forming a transitional government. The regime prefers to forge ahead with spring elections at which Bashar al Asad is guaranteed victory. Read more
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Talk and fight
This post was originally published in the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.
The opening of the Geneva II Syria peace conference yesterday was a painful affair. Even before it convened, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon found himself in the awkward position of having to withdraw an invitation to Iran. The public opening statements in Montreux showed no signs of compromise. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem insisted Bashar al Assad is a legitimately elected national leader who will not be displaced, claiming that Assad is fighting terrorists, not his own people. Ahmed al-Jarba, president of the Syrian Opposition Coalition, underlined recently documented atrocities against thousands of Syrian citizens and called for the creation of a “transitional governing body with full executive powers,” as provided for in the June 2012 Geneva I Communique.’ Under this proposal, Bashar al Assad would have no role in Syria’s governance. Read more
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The merits don’t count
The UN invitation to Iran now withdrawn because it failed to acknowledge the June 2012 Geneva 1 communique call for a transitional governing body with full executive powers, the Geneva 2 peace conference began today in Montreux with “bitter speeches.” While the acidity is unusually high in this instance, most peace conferences begin with this kind of venting. The Syrian government representative was anxious to establish Bashar al Asad’s legitimacy while the opposition focused on his atrocities, newly documented in a frightening graphic report purporting to include official photographs of torture victims.
Can anything good come of this Montreux opening and the next few days of meetings? The primary candidates are a prisoner exchange and humanitarian access. The former is much more likely to come off well than the latter.
Holding prisoners is not easy or rewarding. Their usefulness as sources of information declines rapidly after their capture. In addition, warring parties face strong pressure from families and fighters on their own side to get at least an accounting for prisoners, if not also their freedom. It is hard to maintain morale if your people know you can’t even get their comrades and relatives back from the opponent. Supervision of such prisoner exchanges, usually by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), is a well practiced art. Read more
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Shambolic
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s invitation today to Iran to attend threw the scheduled opening of peace talks on Syria Wednesday in Montreux into doubt. The United States says it wants Iran to accept publicly as the purpose of the conference creation of a transitional governing body with full executive powers (TGBFEP), as provided for in the June 2012 “Geneva 1” communique. Iran has said it won’t do that, but the Secretary General says Tehran understands what the meeting is about. The Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), which Saturday voted to attend in Montreux and the subsequent “Geneva 2” meeting, says it won’t come if Iran does without withdrawing its troops from Syria and its support from Bashar al Asad. That won’t happen.
This is a mess. The merits of an invitation to Iran are clear. Tehran’s direct military engagement with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as well as its sponsorship of Hizbollah to fight on behalf of Bashar al Asad makes it indispensable to any substantial progress in the talks. But it is hard for the SOC to attend if Iran does. Going to Montreux to sit at the table with Iran could further discredit its relative moderates and lead to resignations, thus reducing further its already minimal usefulness as a negotiating partner. Read more
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What else we can do
The UN-led Syria peace talks known as Geneva 2 are scheduled to convene in Montreux January 22 for a public session and continue in Geneva with only the Syrian warring parties (regime and opposition), under the aegis of UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi. I’ve betrayed my lack of enthusiasm for Geneva 2, but it is legitimate to ask what else can be done, or what might be done at the talks that would be useful. Let’s assume direct US military action is out of the question, because it is unless Al Qaeda manages to set up a haven in Syria used to launch attacks against the US or its allies.
First is to consider whether convening the talks on the date foreseen is a good idea. The situation on the ground in Syria is in flux. The regime and the opposition may have reached a kind of complex territorial equilibrium, in which neither side can gain much by further fighting. But within the anti-regime forces a lot is happening. The fog of war is still thick, but it appears more moderate Islamist and secular fighters are confronting and at least for the moment undoing the most extreme forces associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, sometimes ISIL for Levant), at the behest of the population in areas that ISIS has brutalized. This development could solve one of Washington’s biggest problems: it has hesitated to support the opposition with lethal assistance for fear it would fall into the hands of extremists, helping them to take control of a post-Asad Syria. But the outcome of the fight is by no means certain and it may presage greater instablity or even extremist strengthening.
Wisdom suggests awaiting the result before proceeding with peace talks on what might turn out to be false premises. Postponement for a month or so might be wise. Timing is vital in diplomacy. The situation on the ground–who holds power where–is a vital ingredient of any diplomatic resolution. Trying get a resolution before the situation is clear can be a big mistake.
In the meanwhile, one possibility is to try for local ceasefires, since a country-wide ceasefire is bound to be violated quickly by armed groups not at the negotiating table. Both sides of the fight are exhausted in Aleppo. It may be possible to arrange for all sides to suspend the fight, provided the regime doesn’t wreck the prospect by bombing or rocketing. The Russians would have to make it clear to Bashar that doing so would have consequences.
Another possibility is to insist that the regime demonstrably implement freedom of the press and association before it gains the legitimacy that necessarily derives from its presence in Montreux/Geneva. There are brave Syrians trying every day to exercise their rights. Enabling them to do so was an integral part of Kofi Annan’s plan, observed more in the breach. Moderate Syrians would pour into the streets if they thought they would be safe.
A third option would be to formally break diplomatic relations with Damascus and recognize the recently formed Syrian Opposition Coalition government as the legal representative of the Syrian state. Only one or two countries have done this so far. Washington could lead an effort in this direction, including a challenge to the Damascus’ credentials at the UN.
But if, as I suspect, no one at the State Department wants to go tell John Kerry that his hard-won initiative should be postponed, what can still be done constructively on January 22 and 23?
A step that would be much appreciated on both sides would be prisoner releases. If the opposition negotiators can come home from Geneva 2 having arranged for several hundred of their compatriots to return to their families, that would remove at least some of the stigma associated with attending an international conference that will disappoint most Syrians.
The United States can make it clear that it backs a strict interpretation of the Geneva 1 communique, which provides for a transitional governing body with full executive authority (TGBFEA). It won’t be possible to get that this month, but Washington should leave no one in any doubt that its strategic goal is removal of all power from Bashar al Asad, even if he nominally stays in office (which really isn’t possible once he loses control of the security apparatus). The current wishy washy line is that we are starting a peace process that is intended to lead eventually to a TGBFEA. That line undermines the opposition and encourages the regime.
The United States could put it bluntly to the Russians that they can’t support a peace process that leads to Bashar’s removal from power and arm the Syrian regime at the same time. They need to choose. If they choose to continue supplying weapons that are used against civilians, then the Americans should make it clear they will expand arming the opposition, trying of course to ensure that the weapons are not used against civilians. It would also be possible to offer the Russians something they value in exchange for their defenestration of Bashar. Some flexibility on anti-missile defense in Europe might go a long way.
Geneva 2 could also be an appropriate place to discuss humanitarian access, but the issue should be put clearly. The regime is blocking humanitarian access, not the revolutionaries. There should be no quid pro quo for allowing relief to reach civilians from all of Syria’s neighbors. Both sides have been attacking civilian populations. They should be told to stop, first in a communique from Geneva 2 but then in a vigorous UN Security Council resolution.
The predictable failure of Geneva 2 to move forward on creating the TGBFEA puts the opposition in a difficult spot. Only Bashar stepping aide or down would justify attendance in the eyes of most of the opposition, but the more moderate figures associated with the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Free Syrian Army will have no choice but to attend if they want to get continuing American support. One option is a walkout, coordinated with Washington (or at least foreshadowed to Washington). This could save face for those opposition moderates who feel compelled to attend in Geneva but worry about how it will weaken their standing inside Syria. Some lower-level officials might be left behind to deal with humanitarian issues, which could benefit from detailed coordination.
The purpose of a meeting like Geneva 2 should not merely be negotiation, or to start a process. Washington needs to think hard about what can be achieved that will improve the situation. It needs clarity about its goals and the means it will bring to bear to achieve them.
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