Tag: United Nations
Smoke signals don’t count, guarantees do
The smoke signals from two days of P5 + 1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) talks with Iran are good: the Iranians proposed a solution to a crisis they claim is unnecessary, they met bilaterally with the Americans, they signed on to an optimistic statement with European Union High Representative Ashton, and new talks will convene in Geneva on November 7 and 8. The Iranians may even have given an interview to an Israeli radio station. This kind of open, cooperative and positive atmosphere marks a sharp improvement from the past.
But we need to be hardnosed. The Iranians are increasing their capacity to produce fissionable (bomb) materials rapidly, both by enriching uranium and by soon making plutonium. There is no reason to believe that they will back off recognition of what they term their “right” to enrich (and I imagine to reprocess). They are much closer to a nuclear weapons capability today than ever before.
The Americans meanwhile are under pressure not to allow in a negotiated settlement any enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of plutonium in Iran. That is almost surely not achievable. But lifting of sanctions in the U.S. Congress will require an airtight agreement that verifiably and irreversibly ensures Iran is not diverting nuclear material to a weapons project.
Common ground lies somewhere in the area of enrichment up to 5% inside Iran with shipment of higher enriched materials and plutonium out of Iran and tight, frequent and unannounced inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This would be significantly tighter than the arrangements Brazil, Argentina and many other potential proliferators have made with each other and the international community.
The military option, whether Israeli or American, is not attractive. It might set back the Iranian nuclear program by as much as five years, but Tehran would surely abandon its denials and redouble its efforts, precipitating a rush to nuclear weapons by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others. Repetition of military attacks with unintended and unpredictable consequences would be required at more and more frequent intervals. This is not a formula for a peaceful world.
Nor is containment of a nuclear Iran a good alternative. It would put nuclear war on a hair trigger: Israel would need to lanuch on warning against all of Iran’s nuclear assets if it wanted to survive, which it surely does. To imagine that Jerusalem and Tehran could reach the kind of modus vivendi that prevailed between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War is delusionary.
So we are on a good path, or at least a better one than the alternatives, but one that will not be easy to complete. The same split Congress that brought us budget crises will not roll over and play dead when President Obama brings it a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear threat. It will demand, as it should, ironclad guarantees that we haven’t been rolled and will not be tricked. But if the guarantees are good, the deal is one they should take. Smoke signals don’t count, but guarantees do.
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Yes, Virginia, there is a Syrian opposition
A colleague writes in reaction to the news of Syrian rebel groups abandoning the exile Syrian Coalition in favor an alliance with Islamist extremists:
Can it get any worse for the opposition? Can anyone provide a serious, authoritative read out on the opposition? Is there any ‘there there’?
Authoritative, no, but I’ve met with quite a few Syrian opposition people over the past couple of years. And I’ve supervised an effort to begin mapping Syrian civil society, which is varied, sincere and energetic if not robust.
There is a there there. Secular Syrian civil activists started the rebellion against Bashar al Asad and they have continued it, even as violence engulfs them. They have thought long and hard about the “day after.” They have examined options for governing Syria. They have formed political parties, councils and coalitions. They have lobbied for stronger US and other Western support. They have formed a Supreme Military Council and a political Coalition. Read more
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Fatwa diplomacy
President Obama mentioned Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei’s fatwa against nuclear weapons in his speech last week at the United Nations General Assembly:
Meanwhile, the Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons, and President Rouhani has just recently reiterated that the Islamic Republic will never develop a nuclear weapon.
This naturally brought joy to Iranian hardliners and disdain from American hardliners. Mike Doran tweeted:
US intel uncovered a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Therefore, the fatwa is baloney.
What are the merits and demerits of this fatwa, which is a legal opinion or ruling by an Islamic scholar?
It seems clear that a written text of the original fatwa has never been published. The most authoritative early reference to it appears to be an Iranian statement at the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005:
The Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued the fatwa that the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.
Thus the fatwa has meaning for the Iranian government, but there is no reason for the American government to regard it as any better than a unilateral statement of Iran’s intentions, albeit at a high level. It is not an internationally binding commitment. Nor is it a commitment that can be verified by international inspection.
Someone in Iran was working on nuclear weapons when the effort was suspended in 2003. But the fatwa, whatever it says or doesn’t say, was issued after that, so Mike’s argument is illogical. The fatwa would be baloney only if it had been issued before the program was uncovered, not afterwards. All the blather about taqiyya, the Islamic doctrine of dissembling is really irrelevant.* Sure the Supreme Leader might be lying, and then again he might have made a serious commitment that he intends to keep. We really don’t know.
The Administration is not relying on the fatwa. What it is trying to do is use the fatwa as a bridge to a more solid and verifiable commitment. This is good negotiating technique, not gullibility. If my enemy is willing to say out loud what I would like him to say, I’d be a fool not to start with that and see if I can get it in writing with the kind of inspections that would give me confidence the commitment is being kept.
Of course those who are convinced the Iranians will never keep such a commitment no matter how tight the verification and don’t want the Administration even to start down this road, for fear the negotiation will provide time and cover for Iran to proceed with its nefarious intent. Some prefer a military solution. Others are prepared to live with containment, if negotiation fails.
Neither one meets my criterion for a satisfactory outcome: a more peaceful world than the one we live in now. I don’t want to live in a world where Iran is a nuclear power, or bombed back to the stone age. The former is a very dangerous world, because Israel would not only target a nuclear Iran but would launch on warning. With a very short transit time (10 minutes?) and no reliable communications between Tehran and Jerusalem, the odds of nuclear war would be higher than any of us would find comfortable. Bombing Iran back to the stone age is pretty much what you’d have to do to prevent them from reconstituting their nuclear program and redoubling their efforts after an initial military attack, even if it were successful.
The fatwa has no value in and of itself. It only has value if the Iranians will put it in writing and make a serious, irreversible and verifiable commitment. That’s what fatwa diplomacy should aim to do.
*I’ve decided an earlier version of this post with a reference to Kol Nidre was erroneous and disputable. So I’ve removed it. Credit to @JeffreyGoldberg for calling me out on this.
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Moscow can deliver Damascus
Edward P. Joseph, my colleague here at SAIS and in the Center for Transatlantic Relations, offers:
US policy towards Syria rests on the premise that Russia can deliver the Assad regime to surrendering its chemical stockpile and to hoped-for talks in Geneva for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. While much has been said about Russia’s willingness to press Damascus, Moscow’s ability to bring its influence to bear has received less scrutiny.
While the subject is clouded in secrecy, there is every reason to believe — based on the dynamics of patron-client relationships — that Moscow does, in fact, command substantial, even decisive influence in Damascus.
Consider America’s own relationship with a Middle East client: Egypt. As was abundantly clear during the military’s ouster of then-President Morsi, Washington danced an awkward line, refraining from labeling the military action a “coup” because this would trigger a mandatory cut in substantial US foreign assistance to Egypt. Instead, Washington expressed its concern over Cairo’s anti-democratic direction in gingerly fashion, by delaying the delivery of four F-16. This was a symbolic step, but hardly one that inflicted serious hardship on the military-led government. Egypt faces serious internal security issues, especially in the Sinai, none of which are amenable to attack by the latest fighter aircraft.
There was no mystery why Washington didn’t take a harder line. Had it cut foreign assistance, Cairo could plausibly have turned to Saudi Arabia for more assistance. The Saudis — animated by the departure of the despised Muslim Brotherhood — pledged to make up any cuts to Egypt by both the US and EU. Riyadh proved to be as good as its word, putting together a total aid package with other Gulf States topping $12 billion. In other words, the client, Egypt, held an (oil) barrel over the head of its American patron, thanks to the availability of an alternative, namely, Gulf states flush with cash.
Who can Damascus turn to if Moscow decides to amp up the pressure or ramp down support? Answer: no one, including Iran. Tehran is itself attempting to emerge from international isolation and internal weakness. Besides, it does not hold a permanent seat on the Security Council. Iran can continue to supply cash, personnel, materiel and regional support (directly through Hezbollah and indirectly through Baghdad), but in no way, shape or form can Tehran substitute for the support that Russia can provide. Russia provided Syria this spring with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, designed to complicate potential Western military action such as a no-fly zone. Russia is the ‘sole source protector’ of Syria at the strategic level; Iran operates mostly at the regional level.
Cautious China has shown no willingness to overstep Moscow’s high-profile role on Syria, preferring to follow its lead in the Security Council. Beijing shares Moscow’s allergy to military intervention, particularly where democratic uprisings are involved. But Beijing does not share the array of compelling interests that make Syria a significant Russian client.
Therefore the regime in Damascus, which is locked in a fight for its life, must listen carefully to the directions of its Russian patron. Does that necessarily translate into absolute, instant remote control from Moscow? Of course not. Perhaps like President Karzai in Afghanistan, Assad understands that his patron’s interests are tethered to his or at least his regime’s survival. But unlike either Cairo or Kabul, Assad has in Moscow a patron far less encumbered than Washington. Vladimir Putin does not need to worry about congressional oversight or even public opinion in his dealings with a petty foreign client like Syria. Indeed, Putin has shown utter ruthlessness dealing with domestic opponents, so why would he suddenly find scruples in dealing with Assad?
Syria is a long-standing client of Russia’s. This means that Putin, who hails from the KGB, has penetrating insight into the dynamics within the regime and what they mean for Assad’s own internal vulnerabilities, facilitating the exercise of Russian influence. Moscow can avoid clumsy threats in favor of a more precise pressure points. If we believe that Moscow has, in certain instances, been demonstrably unable to get the Assad regime to do what it wants, we should ask if and how it pressured him to do so.
To believe that Moscow cannot, in the end, have its way in Damascus is to call into question the whole rationale of partnering with the Russians in the first place. If Russia cannot deliver the Syrians, then we are engaged in a colossal waste of time and effort. Empirical evidence tells us that this is not so. Assad himself in the span of 24 hours went from evading the question of chemical weapons with Charlie Rose to accepting (nominally, at least) international control of his stockpile after an apparent snap Russian decision.
While we must remain ever vigilant about Russian intentions, we should presume — remaining open to well-founded evidence to the contrary — that Russia does indeed hold sway in Damascus. When it comes to Syria, the general rule should be that what counts is Russia’s will, not its ability, to direct its Syrian clients.
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Heartbreak and loveless marriages
Wedenesday morning’s event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was yet another panel focused on Syria, focused on the interests and perspectives of the domestic and international parties currently involved in the crisis. Moderated by Marwan Muasher of the Carnegie Endowment, the discussion included Ambassador Nasser al-Kidwa, deputy to Arab League Envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi, Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment, Paul Salem of the Carnegie Middle East Center, and Andrew Weiss also of the Carnegie Endowment.
Ambassador al-Kidwa focused his remarks on the future of negotiations in Syria. He believes the Geneva Communiqué drafted last June is still relevant today and provides practical solutions for Syria. The US decision not to strike on Syria but rather focus on placing Syria’s chemical weapons under international control shows its commitment to the Geneva Communiqué. The framework agreement on chemical weapons between the US and Russia is a positive development.
The UN is currently working on a resolution that will mostly likely incorporate much of the strong language used in the US-Russia agreement. Al-Kidwa believes that it will be adopted under Chapter 7 with some language regarding using necessary force if there is no compliance from the Assad regime. He sees a real possibility for negotiations between the opposition and the Assad government. He argues that regional players and the international community have an unusually important role. Read more
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Don’t bank on diplomacy yet
President Obama last night tentatively accepted Putin’s paddle and began his effort to paddle away from military action, which faced rejection in the Congress, towards a diplomatic denouement. This latest turn will disappoint and frustrate opposition Syrians who wanted a decisive military intervention.
But that was not in the cards, and the President’s move cheers those who believe that chemical weapons are the main issue Americans should be concerned about in Syria, as it offers a potentially better outcome than bombing. Certainly an endstate in which the international community gains control over Syria’s gigantic stockpile of chemical weapons (estimated at 1000 tons) and destroys them safely and securely is better than the uncertainty of a punitive bombing campaign, pinprick or not.
I see two problems with this approach:
- We are very unlikely to reach the desired endstate, which depends on Syria declaring all its chemical weapons, securely moving them to a relatively few destinations, and giving international inspectors unfettered access while a civil war rages. Remember what happened to the Arab League and UN observers? With no US boots on the ground, international control of Syria’s chemical weapons likely means mainly Russian control, which isn’t going to satisfy anyone in Washington. But it will make military intervention much more difficult.
- Chemical weapons are not all that is at stake for the United States in Syria. Continuation of the civil war there threatens the stability of Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey. The longer the fighting goes on, the more likely it is that Islamist extremists will eventually succeed and make Syria a haven for Al Qaeda’s ambitions. That will mean threats to Israel as well.
Thousands of civilians will die from conventional weapons in the next month or so, while the diplomats try to hammer out a solution. Read the latest report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry for the gruesome details.
If it is any comfort, this kind of diplomatic delay was also the rule rather than the exception in the 1990s, when NATO intervened from the air first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. The decisive intervention in Bosnia came more than two years after the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to protect UN-designated safe areas. Prior pinprick attacks had little impact. In Kosovo, force was used only after months of diplomatic efforts (and without a specific authorizing resolution from the UNSC).
President Obama’s enormous reluctance to use military force in Syria is not, as some commentators would have it, a sign of weakness. It of course behooves us to pursue any diplomatic lead that might accomplish our ends without the use of force, which always causes collateral damage and unanticipated consequences. The only real signal of weakness came from the Congress’ apparent willingness to back military action.
Where I differ from President Obama is on the breadth of American interests in Syria as well as the odds of a favorable diplomatic outcome. Chemical weapons are a relatively small part of the problem there. The real issue is an autocrat who prefers state collapse–so long as he remains in power in Damascus–to stepping aside and allowing the democratic evolution that the nonviolent protests called for.
While he did not mention the Syrian opposition last night, I can hope that the President is quietly trying to ensure that the more moderate forces of the Free Syrian Army have the means to protect themselves and the civilians who live in liberated areas. The Russians have not hesitated to make sure that the regime is well equipped and armed. Without an effort to level the battlefield, diplomatic initiatives to end the war are doomed to failure. Military interventions after diplomatic failures need to be more vigorous, not less.
Give diplomacy a chance, but don’t bank on it yet.
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