Tag: United Nations
Less bang, fewer bucks
“Violence is not the way to resolve political disputes,” declared GlobalSolutions.org President Bob Enholm at yesterday’s event, co-sponsored with Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping, about the need for U.S. engagement in peacekeeping operations. This statement set the tone for the panel, which featured three experienced peacekeepers including Lynn Holland, the first American woman to participate in a UN peacekeeping operation. The speakers focused on the advantages of peacekeeping and reasons the U.S. should increase its participation.
Holland, now at PAE, came to peacekeeping through police work in the United States. She volunteered to join for two weeks a project in Haiti that would train police personnel. After six months, she decided that she could not go back to writing tickets in the U.S. so she followed what she described as a “calling” into several other countries as a peacekeeper, including Bosnia, Kosovo and Liberia. From this she learned that peacekeeping operations must be tailored to each situation and comprehensive. It only creates problems to train more police officers without also training judges and corrections personnel. Holland believes there are advantages to using women peacekeepers. After she negotiated a ceasefire in Kosovo, one of the protagonists told UN personnel that the effort would not have been successful if it had been led by a man.
William Stuebner of IDS International listed the reasons the U.S. should be more involved in UN peacekeeping operations. Successful peacekeeping work quarantines conflict, saves money, and depoliticizes responsibility. Additionally, Stuebner argued that it is just the “right thing to do,” though he acknowledged this argument carries little weight in Washington.
Deborah Owens, who has served in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans, emphasized that peacekeepers live “close to the ground” getting their hair cut at local salons, visiting local restaurants, and staying in normal apartments, which allows them to understand the local issues in a more nuanced way. Finally, peacekeeping missions have established a presence in conflict zones that would be hard for other countries to enter without inciting violence.
As for what the U.S. could do to help more, Stuebner pointed to training, assisting with transportation, intelligence and special troops. The U.S. should also continue to pay its assessed dues. It is a misconception in the U.S. that we contribute a significant number of peacekeepers when in reality, on the list of countries that contribute the most blue berets (UN peacekeepers) we were number 58 as of August.
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Wishing Brahimi well, despite the odds
Yesterday’s Security Council decision to end the UN Supervisory Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) is one of those inevitable moves that makes me wonder how the international system, such as it is, manages to survive. We had several hundred trained observers in Syria in close contact with officials of the Asad regime and at least some of the opposition activists. They played a critical role in reporting what was going on in Syria for several months and in assigning responsibility for events like the Houla massacre. We know we are going to need that kind of knowledge of the local terrain whenever a transition away from the Asad regime begins. What do we do? We withdraw the observers.
Fortunately the UN is wise enough to leave a couple of dozen international officials behind in Damascus. Their immediate concerns will be coordination of humanitarian assistance and support for the newly named UN/Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. But they will also be the vital brain trust of any future UN transition mission. My compliments to friend and colleague Edmond Mulet, who heads of UN peacekeeping, for maintaining at least a seed of something that can grow if and when circumstances permit.
While it is amply clear that the Annan plan failed, largely because the opposition was unwilling to negotiate with the regime so long as Bashar al Asad remains in place and Asad was unwilling to step aside, it is not clear if the savvy Brahimi has better prospects. He has rightly spent the last week or so trying to ensure stronger and more unified Security Council support for his mission, but he does not seem to have succeeded yet. The Americans have decided to go around the UN to collaborate with Turkey and provide more direct support to the Syrian revolutionaries. The Russians canceled a meeting scheduled for today in New York of the “action group” for Syria. When diplomats cancel meetings, things are not going well.
I won’t be surprised if withdrawal of the observers precipitates intensification of the fighting in Syria. With less likelihood of being observed internationally, both sides will try to gain advantage. The sectarian dimension of the fighting will deepen. The Iranians are playing a more and more critical role in supporting the regime, with the opposition reporting not only Iranian boots on the ground but also direct engagement in fighting. Saudi Arabia and Qatar will be upping their ante in the form of weapons for the opposition, which is begging for shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADs) to counter Asad’s increased use of aircraft.
None of this is good news. While conventional wisdom holds that Asad cannot last, when and how he goes will be important. Continuation of the violence for even a month or two more risks serious regional destabilization, which is the worst outcome for the United States. It is not uncommon these days for people to question whether the territorial division in the Levant, rooted in the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, can last. If the state structure of the region starts to implode, the consequences could be a good deal more chaotic, and geographically more widespread, than what happened during Iraq’s sectarian civil war in 2006-7.
I am wishing Brahimi well, despite the odds.
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The trick is to stay on course
Loyal readers will not be surprised by Libya’s smooth handover of power yesterday from its revolutionary Transitional National Council (NTC) to its General National Conference, the parliament elected in July. The July election went far better than many expected.
The Libyan revolution had many ways of going wrong. I wrote about them for the Council on Foreign Relations during the spring of 2010. My visit last September convinced me they had come down to just two: militias and Islamic extremism. Both have proved problematic, but they have not derailed a process that the NTC scoped out a year ago.
Why has Libya gone more right than wrong? There are many reasons. It is a geographically large but demographically small (6.4 million, more or less) country. It is rich. Even before the oil and gas started flowing, repatriated frozen assets provided ample resources. Libya is relatively homogeneous from an ethnic and sectarian perspective (compared to Iraq or Syria), though there are distinct groups, especially in the south, that have not yet fully accepted the revolution. The regional tensions are real, especially in the eastern province of Cyrenaica, but the revolution against Qaddafi gave Libyans a common cause, at least until now.
The role of the international community in Libya has been one of support, not direction. The United States and Europe, which were vital to the NATO operation that dislodged Qaddafi, had more important things on their minds once he was gone: Syria, Iran and the euro crisis. The United Nations and closely allied agencies (UNDP, IFES, etc.) provided assistance in organizing the July elections, but the Libyans were unequivocally in the lead. They have owned their revolution and its aftermath.
Now Libya faces its biggest challenges: deciding on how power is to be distributed and who will have it to start. A prime minister and new government is to be chosen within 30 days. When I left Libya last month, the clear intention of the biggest winner in the election, Mahmoud Jibril, was to form a broad, national unity government. If it can be done, this is smart. Bringing the Muslim Brotherhood and others with significant popular support in is a lot better than keeping them out.
The first and most important job of that new government is to decide how the committee to write the constitution is to be chosen. The original plan was for the GNC to somehow empower a committee. The TNC decided, in a last-minute move of dubious validity intended to encourage electoral participation in the east, that the committee should instead be elected on a regional basis.
However selected, the committee is to prepare a draft within 60 days that has to be submitted for approval by a 2/3 majority in a popular referendum. This is important: it guarantees that, however and by whomever written, the new constitution will have to have broad geographical and popular legitimacy. The time for preparation of the new constitution is far too short to allow serious public participation in the process. It would be wise for the GNC to give the process more time.
Once the constitution is approved, the GNC promulgates a new election law within 30 days and new elections are held with 180 days.
Many people are still worried about Libya’s once-revolutionary militias, which have not been fully demobilized or reintegrated, and about its Islamic extremists, who have been attacking the Red Cross (symbol of the crusaders of course) and trying to sow havoc. These are real and present dangers. Libya is still a long way from establishing law and order, even if the environment is already reasonably safe and secure most places most of the time.
Libya is on a good course. That is what counts. I am reminded of Zeno’s “dichotomy” paradox in its collegiate version: if you halve the distance between yourself and an attractive other at a constant rate, mathematicians say you’ll never arrive. But for all practical purposes, you do.
On its current course, Libya will arrive at something resembling a democracy, sooner or later. The trick is to stay on course.
PS: for another, well-informed, view see Christopher Blanchard’s Libya Transition and US Policy.
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What if Syria needs peacekeepers?
With each deterioration of the situation in Syria, I wonder how we could possibly see a democratic transition there–or any kind of transition that isn’t catastrophic–without an international peacekeeping presence. Then I take a glance at Jim Dobbins’ cheat sheet for calculating the size of a peacekeeping mission.
I blanch. Assuming the heavy peace enforcement model will be required–because there are well-armed and active warring parties on the ground–Syria would require upwards of 300,000 international personnel (more than 80% of them military) in an operation costing about $60 billion per year. This is a lot of people and a lot of money. Even the light peacekeeping model would require upwards of 35,000 internationals and over $6 billion per year. That’s still a lot of people and money, though far more feasible than the heavier version.
Peacekeeping for Syria is something we need to be thinking about. Sure, Libya got off without it. But Libya is a far smaller and richer country in which the army evaporated rather than fight Qaddafi’s battles. Egypt didn’t need it either, because the revolution turned the transition over to the army. The Syrian army is not evaporating, and it is unlikely to inherit the revolution except by coup d’etat.
Once Bashar al Assad is gone, it and its paramilitary adjuncts will have to be separated from the Free Syrian Army and other assorted revolutionary fighters. Then both will need to undergo the painstaking processes known as DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) and SSR (security sector reform), shrinking their numbers, unifying their command and improving their responsiveness to civilian authority. International peacekeepers will, well, keep the peace in the meanwhile, hoping to see the quick emergence of a disciplined Syrian police force and military the population will appreciate.
The likely need for peacekeepers is one of many reasons why it is important to keep the UN monitoring mission (the UN Supervision Mission in Syria, or UNSMIS) in place. As of the end of June, UNSMIS had 278 military observers, 81 international civilian staff and 40 Syrian staff in place. They have not been able to supervise a ceasefire that has never taken effect or monitor implementation of the Annan peace plan, which is a dead letter. But they have greatly enhanced the visibility of what is going on in Syria and assigned responsibility for some of the worst abuses to the Asad regime.
They would also be a good advance party for an international peacekeeping force. The UN is a relatively effective and economical mechanism for peacekeeping, but its deployments are notoriously slow. Keeping UNSMIS in place would enable a much faster deployment than usual, even if the UN is not put in charge. The UNSMIS personnel could be “rehatted” to another organization (Arab League?) or a coalition of the willing.
The UN Security Council this week extended UNSMIS for a month, with the fairly clear intention of terminating it if progress is not made in implementing a ceasefire and the Annan plan. Many are arguing that its inability to perform its mandated tasks means it should be withdrawn. Carne Ross tweeted yesterday:
Extension of
#Syria UN monitoring mission a mistake; plays to Russian game; better 2 do nothing than pretend 2 do something
I don’t see it that way. In fact UNSMIS has been useful, especially in assigning responsibility for atrocities. The Asad regime will not be unhappy to see UNSMIS withdrawn. Let’s see how the situation evolves, but keeping UNSMIS in place to provide whatever visibility it can and hasten deployment of a larger peacekeeping contingent sounds wise to me.
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You know things are bad
You know things are bad when you lay siege to your own capital. They are worse if the rebels seize border posts. The worst is if you flee to your ancestral homeland, with the apparent intention of making a last stand there. It’s even bad if no one knows where you are. And its over the top bad if you start moving your chemical weapons, either to use them or to prevent them from falling into rebel hands.
Yes, Bashar al Asad’s days are numbered, but it is still unclear how many people he will kill before he meets his end. Even after he is gone, Syria could implode in a frenzy of violence. Bashar’s Alawite co-religionists are trying to carve out an enclave in the west, bombarding and murdering nearby Sunnis in the process. Damascenes are leaving for safer ground. Kurds are organizing themselves. Christians and Druze face a risky choice: Bashar, who has tolerated them, or a rebellion that may be far more Islamic than they will be able to tolerate.
An implosion inside Syria will necessarily have a broad impact in the region. Turkey is already hosting upwards of 100,000 refugees and supplying the rebels inside Syria. Jordan and Lebanon are also burdened with Syrians fleeing the violence. The refugee presence has aggravated sectarian tensions inside Lebanon, where Sunnis are anxious to support the Syrian rebellion while Shia (and Hizbullah) are standing by Bashar. Iraq has closed its border posts where the rebels have taken over, in an apparent effort to prevent the Sunni population of western Iraq from aiding the rebellion in Syria. The impact will be minimal: that border is like a sieve.
The Russian and Chinese veto yesterday of still another modest Security Council resolution has guaranteed that Bashar will not hear a unified international community voice asking him to step down. The Russians have doubled their bet on the regime and now stand to lose alliance, port and arms sales if the rebellion succeeds. The hopes of many, including me, that they would abandon ship when it became apparent that it was sinking are not being realized.
The Americans are providing both rhetorical and real, covert support to the rebellion, whose success would be a major blow against American enemies Hizbullah and Iran. But they have done little to prevent the kind of chaotic implosion that would spoil the triumph. They seem concerned mainly with the possible use of chemical weapons. My own guess–but it is only a guess–is that Bashar will find it hard to convince his soldiers to use them. It is difficult for soldiers, especially in 100+ degree weather, to protect themselves from chemical weapons. The soldiers will know how indiscriminate the effects are.
It is not clear how the international community would react to the use of chemical weapons. I might hope that would change some minds in Moscow and Beijing, but I’ve begun to wonder. It looks as if this is a challenge the current international system will fail to meet. The outcome will be decided by violence inside Syria. It is not going to be pretty.
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The end of Asad
The Daily Mail, admittedly not my favorite source, reports that Syrian President Bashar al Asad is in Latakia, as the Washington Post’s Liz Sly also confirmed this morning, and that his wife Asma has fled to Russia. If true, we are close to the end of the Asad regime, which is not going to be able to hold Syria from the hinterlands of its fifth largest city. Even there, the urban population is majority Sunni. Only its rural districts are majority Alawite.
But that does not mean Syria is at the end of its travails. Disorder, even chaos and sectarian war, could make what we’ve seen so far pale. Refugees are reportedly pouring across Syria’s borders. The country is broke. Its army and paramilitaries are bristling with arms and lashing out against their opponents. Rumors that the regime is about to use chemical weapons are unsettling, even if untrue. If true, the results could be catastrophic and precipitate an abrupt international military effort. The Syrian state could crumble and fragment even as its territory is divided among religious and ethnic groups.
Neither the Syrian opposition nor the international community seems well-prepared for the moment. The Syrian National Council lacks a clear vision. The Free Syrian Army, while claiming the bombing that killed the defense minister and other Asad regime luminaries, is not a single, coherent force but an agglomeration of franchisees. The UN Security Council has been unable for weeks to come up a unified reaction to the Asad regime’s blatant violations of the Annan plan, despite ample testimony from the UN observer team on the ground in Syria. Russian support for Asad has been faltering, but Moscow has been unwilling to tell him he has to step down. The Americans have offered rhetorical and covert support to the revolution but have stopped short of bucking the Russians with overt military intervention.
There are two places to watch today: New York and Damascus.
The Security Council has an opportunity to mend its rift and speak with a single voice in favor of a political transition that begins with Bashar al Asad stepping down. Sanctions should be stiffened, with a clear commitment to ending them quickly if a democratic transition is begun. The UN observers should be authorized to stay and a commitment made to increasing their number if conditions permit. The Secretariat should be asked to begin preparations for a possible peace keeping operation.
In Damascus, the issue is whether the regime will hold or implode. If it implodes, the Free Syria Army should show its mettle by restoring order quickly. They won’t be able to prevent a big celebration, but they should try to get the city back to something like normal in a day or two, without the revenge killing and sectarian cleansing that some will want to indulge in. If the regime holds in Damascus despite the odds, we are in for an unpleasant siege that could leave many thousands of Syrians dead and wounded before order is restored, who knows how.
The odds of an even remotely orderly transition in Syria are low. But best to try.
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