Tag: United Nations
Things can still get worse in Syria
David Case, senior editor at GlobalPost, caught up with me as I headed out yesterday to give a talk to Marine Corps officers. Here is his edited version of what I said, with a few minor editorial amendments of my own (I know, it needs more, but I hesitate…):
GlobalPost: How would you characterize today’s bombing? Does this mark a turning point in the civil war? Is this the beginning of the end for the Assad government? Or is this merely a temporary setback?
Daniel Serwer: A lot of people will tell you this is the beginning of the end for the Assad government, but they’ve been saying that for 6 months and in some cases for a year.
It could also be the beginning of a transition to democracy, or a temporary setback for Assad, though it’s very difficult for me to picture how he’s going to re-impose order even on Damascus, never mind beyond. But that doesn’t mean Assad is coming down. It just means it’s going to be a chaotic situation.
The attack appears to be highly sophisticated, succeeding in taking down several key figures at once. What does this tell us about the rebels, their ability to infiltrate the regime?
Certainly someone was able to infiltrate rather well. Who it is and how they did it is still unclear, but that they were able to infiltrate the very inner circle of the regime is quite clear. I’m not sure I would necessarily describe that as highly sophisticated, but it does suggest some weaknesses in the regime structure.
Will the loss of these key people make it much more difficult for Assad to run Syria?
Yes. These are experienced people who are at the top of the hierarchy. Yet it would be foolish to imagine that there won’t be deputies who will step into their places, that he won’t find someone else. He’s not really running Syria anyway at this point. He’s running his side of the civil war and there are enough people who believe their lives are at stake that he’s going to find people who will fight this war for him.
Both the Free Syrian Army and the Islamist rebel group Liwa al-Islam are claiming responsibility for the attack. If it was indeed the Islamists who staged the bombing, is this cause for concern for the West?
Yes, it’s cause for concern. I think the real concern has to be about what happens after the Assad regime goes. If it falls to an Islamist group that is not oriented towards the democratic transition, that’s going to be quite different than if it falls to relatively democratically oriented people in the Syrian National Council. I think it’s very unclear what the post-Assad direction of Syria is likely to be.
If Syria fell to Islamists, what would be the most significant concern?
Let’s not talk about Islamists. The Syrian National Council has lots of Islamists — the Muslim Brotherhood is well represented there.
The real question is, if it falls to extremists and they are able to exert control, you could end up with a group in charge of Syria that is highly intolerant of its several minorities — Christian, Alawite, Druse and Kurds. You’d be living with a very serious risk of a post-Assad Syria that is not a liberal democracy.
According to live feeds from Damascus, Syrians are quite fired up about the bombing. What will this do to rebel morale?
I would imaging that it will heighten morale significantly, but morale is not the only factor behind who wins in warfare. The fact that the rebels are crowing at the moment should not blind us to the very real possibility that there lie ahead some very bad days, even for the rebellion in Syria.
The day after the Assad regime is a very dangerous at which many lives are at risk. We need to ask ourselves whether the international community is really ready for that day.
How should the international community respond?
I think a Security Council resolution that reiterates the need for a democratic transition in Syria is in order, additional sanctions are in order, but I also think that the international observers should be renewed, because an international presence in Syria if the Assad regime comes down will be necessary. And if it doesn’t come down, it’s also necessary, in order to maintain a level of transparency.
The observers haven’t been able to do what we would like them to do — which is to arrange a peaceful transition. But they have been able to give us some transparency about what’s happening in Syria. They’ve assigned responsibility for some of the atrocities, and that’s a very positive factor in keeping the international community informed.
I may be the only guy on earth who thinks the international observers are useful, but I think they have been.
You mentioned that the day after an Assad fall would be a particularly dangerous one. Can you elaborate on that, and contrast it to post-Gaddafi Libya, which hasn’t been flawless but they did manage to pull off elections.
Right. They’ve been doing quite nicely in Libya.
The short answer is that, first of all, Syria’s conflict has been very violent. Second, the Syrians are much less united against the regime than the Libyans were. And the Syrians don’t just lack military unity, but also political unity. The Syrian National Council has found it very difficult to put forth a vision for the future of Syria that everyone can share. And Syria is a much more diverse society in terms of ethnicity and sects. It has very significant minorities, a number of which are strong supporters of the Assad regime.
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After the battle of Dimashq
In response to a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll showing Americans mostly unsupportive of bombing Syrian air defenses or sending troops there, @MaydaySyria this morning tweeted:
We don’t’ care, we don’t need you and your coward #Obama.
Certainly the armed opposition is showing a lot of daring. Today’s attacks in Damascus include a bombing that killed the Syrian Defense Minister, his deputy and possibly other major figures in the Syrian security establishment.
The Syrian army today responded:
the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stresses resolution to decisively eliminating the criminal and murder gangs and chasing them out of their rotten hideouts wherever they are until clearing the homeland of their evils.
It added:
whoever thinks that by targeting some leaders they could twist Syria’s arms is deluded, affirming that Syria, people, army and leadership, is today more determined to counter terrorism with all its forms and cutting off the hand of whoever thinks to harm Syria’s security.
So it looks as if the contest between the Asad regime and its inchoate opposition will be settled (or not) by force, not negotation.
The escalating violence in Damascus is occurring–not incidentally–at just the moment the UN Security Council faces a decision on whether to extend its observer mission in Syria. The Syrian opposition has generally wanted it withdrawn, because of its ineffectiveness. The Russians and the Asad regime have been trying to keep it alive.
I’m entirely on the side of the Syrian opposition in their efforts to bring down Bashar al Asad, but I’d like to see the UN observers stay. They have played a useful role in reporting the various massacres Asad has indulged in as well as its flaunting of the Annan peace plan with the use of heavy weapons in populated areas. I don’t see how reducing the transparency of what is going on in Syria will be helpful to ensuring a successful transition there. If the Asad regime survives and continues the violence against its opponents, the observers could continue to play a limited but useful role in reporting on what they see.
But I confess to another motive as well: if Asad goes, Syria is going to need an international presence to help keep the peace. The UN monitors could form the vanguard of such a peacekeeping force. Where we will find the needed numbers I have no idea. Once Asad falls, Syria will have numerous armed forces still in motion. Keeping them separate and protecting the civilian population will be no easy task. Conventional back-of-the-envelop calculations based on Syria’s population and geographic size would suggest a peacekeeping force of 50,000 or so. I have no idea where such a number would come from, though I can well imagine that Moscow will be offering.
If the international community fails to prepare for post-Asad Syria, there is a strong likelihood of massive violence against the regime’s supporters and sympathizers. Some will be able to protect themselves in Alawite strongholds. Others will flee to Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. But some will be trapped and vulnerable. “Politicide,” the murder of a particular political group, often follows revolution. It would be a serious mistake for the international community not to anticipate the need to protect Alawites, Christians, Druze and Sunni who remained loyal to Asad.
Much as I might wish the fall of the regime, I’ve got to recognize that what comes then is just as important. Excitement about current events should not blind us to future risks. If Syria implodes in a violent spasm of sectarian violence, or even breaks up, the Levant could find itself in chaos for years. Getting Syria onto a path toward unity, stability and eventually democracy is not going to be easy.
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At last
The defections in the last few days of a senior Syrian republican guard commander and Damascus’ ambassador to Iraq could be a tipping point. It has taken a remarkably long time for cracks in the regime to show. But these two defections could be the beginning of an avalanche, one that would sweep away Bashar al Asad’s murderous regime.
If so, we need to begin considering seriously whether the international community and the Syrian opposition are ready for the difficult days ahead. Syria, unlike Libya, has limited oil resources and frozen assets abroad. It is a more diverse society than Tunisia, with significant Alawite, Christian, Druze and Kurdish minorities. It has seen a great deal of violence.
So what should we be expecting? The country will be broke at the end of this year and a half of contestation. It will have several armed forces on its territory: the Syrian army and intelligence forces (including non-uniformed thugs), the Free Syria Army and various neighborhood watch and other militias. Sectarian resentment against Alawites, who form the mainstay of the regime even if some have joined the revolution, will be ferocious. Some Christians and Druze will also be afraid of retaliation. Large numbers of regime supporters may flood into neighboring countries (there are still hundreds of thousands of Qaddafi-supporting Libyans in Tunisia and Egypt). Refugees now in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon will flow back into Syria to reclaim and defend their homes. Weapons will be circulating freely, with some risk that the regime’s heavier armament and chemical weapons will fall into the hands of malefactors. Sunni extremists (whether Al Qaeda or other varieties) will see a chaotic situation and try to take advantage of it.
I see no sign that the international community is ready for post-Asad Syria. I know why: we are tired of doing post-war reconstruction, which has posed expensive and seemingly insurmountable difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. We’d like Syria to be like Libya and Tunisia, which are taking reasonably good care of themselves. Or like Yemen, which is bumbling along under the former autocrat’s vice president with help from the UN and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Or at worst like Egypt, where the military is clumsily trying to steer a revolution that has managed so far to avoid massive violence.
I doubt that is possible in Syria. Too much blood has been spilled for the revolution to entrust the army with steering anything, even itself. The army is unlikely to evaporate, as Qaddafi’s did in Libya. While many of its draftees will happily go over to a revolutionary regime, the elite units of the republican guard are unlikely to do that. Nor will the Alawite paramilitaries known as shabiha.
I’ve seen little sign of serious thinking or preparation for the big challenges ahead: creating a safe and secure environment, separating combatants, minimizing sectarian violence, providing for returnees and refugees, re-establishing law and order, beginning a political transition and somehow funding the effort. Nothing about the Syrian National Council’s performance in recent months suggests that it is capable of handling the situation with the modicum of legitimacy and skill that the Libyan National Transitional Council managed. Nothing about the Syrian army’s performance suggests that it could do even as well as the shambolic performance of the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Nothing about the UN’s performance in trying to implement the Annan peace plan suggests it can take on Syria and be effective.
We are in for a rough ride in Syria. Post-war transitions are difficult in all situations. This one will be among the toughest.
PS: Nothing in Steve Heydemann’s The End Game in Syria convinces me the situation is better than the doubtful one I describe above.
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Diplomacy doesn’t end with the communiqué
The final communiqué of the “action group” for Syria is a good one. It goes further in defining next steps in the “Syrian-led” transition than the Annan plan did, in particular in insisting on the appointment of negotiators by the “parties” (presumably the government and opposition), establishment of a transitional governing body, preparation of a new “constitutional order” and holding thereafter of free and fair multiparty elections. All well and good, but it leaves to the imagination that in order for all this to happen Bashar al Asad needs to step aside.
But that is the rub. There is no indication that he is prepared to do that, and lots of indication that he thinks he is winning. As Hassan Mneimneh puts it:
The Bashar al-Assad regime’s stated position is that the conspiracy to topple it has been contained, but will require some time to eradicate because of its concerns for civilian casualties. Western and regional co-conspirators have exhausted all means available to them because of the steadfastness of the regime’s bases of support — the armed forces, security apparatus, popular committees, and the population as a whole — as well as the robust support of international actors who resist Western hegemony: the BRICS, Iran, and Asian and Latin American voices. The regime will prevail, and its enemies will return to an unshaken Damascus, once again seeking reconciliation. The regime’s international standing will also be restored: the alleged atrocities, it would argue, were either committed by foreign-funded terrorists, were outright lies fabricated by outside media, or were unfortunate collateral damage in legitimate efforts to squash an illegal insurgency.
This may appear delusional to those of us who follow events in Syria mainly from the Western press. The issue is how to puncture the delusion.
It is tempting to think that this can best be done using military force, in particular air attacks. There is no reason to believe that this would work quickly. Even in those cases where they have worked (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan), air assaults have taken weeks and even months to convince opponents that they cannot hold on to territory or power. Nor am I detecting even the slightest willingness to use military force on the part of the Americans, the Turks or the Arab League, who are the major potential contributors to such an effort. The reasons are many but compelling: for the Americans the need to keep Russia in the P5+1 and to continue to provide access to the northern distribution network for Afghanistan, for the Turks the Syrian capability of striking back by unleashing Kurdish terrorists, and for the Arab League an aversion to military risk unless someone else is out front.
In any event, nonviolent means have a much better track record. Before you all send me notes about how unreasonable it is for Syrians to return to nonviolence, let me insist on this: nonviolent methods have never shut down in Syria. Every day sees protests, strikes, boycotts and more. We are not hearing about this because the Western press doesn’t report it much. If it bleeds it leads. It is the rare reporter who like Deb Amos makes her way to Hamadiya souk to interview merchants who closed down for a general strikes, as well as talking to people in the Christian Quarter who support the regime.
The quickest route to political transition in Syria is still an end to the violence and implementation of the Annan plan’s provision for freedom of assembly. If Bashar al Asad can be convinced for even a week to shut down his military assaults on the population, Syrians will puncture his delusion, not by violence but by massing in unprecedented numbers in support of a democratic transition.
That’s Kofi Annan’s job: to get Bashar to make the mistake of allowing freedom of association and the right to demonstrate. Overconfident autocrats do make such mistakes: Slobodan Milosevic famously called an election and lost it. Ironically, forcing this mistake will require pressure from both Russia and Iran, neither of which is big on freedom of association or the right to demonstrate. Threatening the use of force, as Hillary Clinton and Susan Rice would clearly like to do, might also be helpful, but it is awfully hard to make the threat credible without a major shift in attitudes in the U.S., Turkey and the Arab League.
Diplomacy doesn’t end with the communiqué.
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This week’s peace picks
Lots of good events in DC this week, several of them big all-day events. I’ll be away part of the week in Vienna–that’s my excuse for not going to everything. Write-ups for peacefare.net are, as always, welcome.
1. Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA, Stimson, noon June 25
Event Details
On June 13, 2012, The Centre for International Governance Innovation released its long-awaited report, “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA.”
The report will be presented at an event on June 25 in Washington, DC, co-hosted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute North America (SIPRI North America). CIGI Senior Fellow Trevor Findlay, author of the report, will present the report’s findings. He will be introduced by Dr. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, executive director, SIPRI North America.
The release of “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA” marks the culmination of a two-year research project that examined all aspects of the Agency’s mandate and operations ― from major programs on safeguards, safety, security and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to governance, management and finance. The report makes multiple recommendations, both strategic and programmatic, for strengthening and reform of the Agency. The project was a joint undertaking of CIGI’s global security program and the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance (CCTC) at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada.
Professor Findlay holds a joint fellowship with the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He also holds the William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs at NPSIA and is director of the CCTC.
When & Where
SIPRI North America, Stimson Center
1111 19th Street NW
Twelfth Floor
Washington, DC 20036
3. Iran and the West: Oil, Sanctions, and Future Scenarios, SAIS room 500 BOB, 9-12:45 June 26
Room 500
1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC
| 9:00 – 9:15 | Light Breakfast |
| 9:15 – 9:30 | Welcoming RemarksAmbassador Andras Simonyi (Managing Director, SAIS CTR) |
| 9:30 – 11:00 | PANEL I Energy and Politics: Myths and Reality of a Complex InteractionSpeakers:
Claudia Castiglioni (Calouste Gulbenkian Fellow, SAIS CTR) Sara Vakhoshouri (President of SVB Energy International and former Advisor to Director of the National Iranian Oil Company International) Guy Caruso (Senior adviser in the Energy and National Security Program at CSIS, former administrator of the Energy Information Administration) Moderator: Robert J. Lieber (Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University) |
| 11:00 – 11:15 | Coffee |
| 11:15 – 12:45 | PANEL II The Future of Iran-West Relations: A Transatlantic PerspectiveSpeakers:
Michael Makovsky (Foreign Policy Director at the Bipartisan Policy Center) Abbas Maleki (Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at Center for International Studies, MIT) Moderator: Suzanne Maloney (Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution) |
4. Crisis Yemen: Going Where? City Club, 555 13th St NW, 10-noon June 26
June 26, 2012
Crisis Yemen: Going Where?
Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Lecturer and Director, Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative, Princeton University; and former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen
Mr. Gregory Johnsen, Ph.D. Candidate, Princeton University; author, Waq al-waq blog and The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia; and former Fulbright and American Institute for Yemeni Studies Fellow in Yemen
Dr. Charles Schmitz, Associate Professor of Geography, Towson University; President, American Institute for Yemeni Studies; and former Fulbright and American Institute for Yemen Studies Fellow in Yemen
Mr. Robert Sharp, Associate Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, U.S. Department of Defense/National Defense University
Dr. John Duke Anthony, Founding President & CEO, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations; former Fulbright Fellow in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen; and official observer for four of Yemen’s presidential and parliamentary elections
5. Armed Drones and Targeted Killing: International Norms, Unintended Consequences, and the Challenge of Non-Traditional Conflict, German Marshall Fund, 12:15- 2 pm June 26
| Date / Time |
Tuesday, June 26 / 12:15pm – 2:00pm Register with host
|
|---|---|
| Location |
German Marshall Fund 1744 R Street NW, Washington DC, 20009
|
| Speakers | Mark R. Jacobson, Sarah Holewinski, Mark V. Vlasic |
| Description | A discussion of the dilemmas posed by the use of RPVs, or “drones to include the implications for alliances, international norms, and their use outside of traditional armed conflict. The panel will also address the unique capability this new technology presents as well as the potential for unintended consequences and “blowback.”Speakers include Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of CIVIC (Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict) who is preparing a report on drones with the Colombia Law School Human Rights Clinic and Mark Vlasic from Georgetown University and Madison Law & Strategy Group PLLC who has served at the World Bank and the Pentagon and has authored a legal analysis of Targeted Killing in the Georgetown Journal of International Law. The event will be moderated by Dr. Mark Jacobson, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and former Deputy NATO Representative in Afghanistan. |
6. Third Annual Conference on Turkey: Regional and Domestic Challenges for an Ascendant Turkey, National Press Club, 9-5 June 27
The Middle East Institute’s Center for Turkish Studies
in collaboration with the Institute of Turkish Studies present:
“Regional and Domestic Challenges for an Ascendant Turkey”
June 27th, 2012
9:00am-5:00pm
National Press Club
529 14th Street, NW 13th Floor
Washington, DC 20045
Conference Schedule:
8:45am – 9:00am: Registration
9:00am – 9:15am: Welcome
Ambassador Wendy J. Chamberlin, Middle East Institute
Gönül Tol, MEI’s Center for Turkish Studies
Ross Wilson, Institute of Turkish Studies
9:15am – 10:00am: Opening Keynote
Senator John McCain
United States Senate
10:00am – 10:30am: Keynote
Ömer Çelik
Deputy Chairman of the Justice and Development Party
10:30am – 10:45am: Coffee Break
10:45am – 12:15pm
Panel 1: Turkey’s Domestic Calculus: The Kurds, the Constitution, and the Presidential System Debate
Yalçın Akdoğan, Member of Parliament, Justice and Development Party
Ruşen Çakır, Turkish Daily Vatan
Michael Gunter, Tennessee Technological University
Levent Köker, Atilim University
Moderator: Michael Werz, Center for American Progress
12:15pm – 1:00pm: Lunch*
1:00pm – 1:45pm: Keynote
Ibrahim Kalın
Chief Adviser to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
1:45pm – 3:15pm
Panel 2: Turkey, the EU, and the U.S.: Evolving Partnerships Post-Arab Spring
Brice de Schietere, Delegation of the European Union to the U.S.
Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, IREX
Ambassador Ross Wilson, Atlantic Council
Yaşar Yakış, Center for Strategic Communication, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moderator: Sharon Wiener, Koç University
3:15pm – 3:30pm: Coffee Break
3:30pm – 5:00pm
Panel 3: Turkey’s Leadership Role in an Uncertain Middle East
Amr Darrag, Freedom and Justice Party, Egypt
Joost Hiltermann, International Crisis Group
Yigal Schleifer, Freelance Journalist
Robin Wright, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Moderator: Abderrahim Foukara, al-Jazeera
*Complimentary lunch will be available on a first come first served basis
Follow @CSIS for live updates
The CSIS Southeast Asia Program will host its second annual conference on Maritime Security in the South China Sea June 27-28, 2012.
The conference is a timely policy level discussion of the complex and important issues around the South China Sea. The program will take place a week before Secretary of State Clinton departs for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell will deliver the keynote speech on Wednesday, June 27 and Senator Jim Webb (D-VA), chairman of the Senate’s Asia Pacific subcommittee, will present a keynote address on Thursday, June 28.
In addition, CSIS is pleased to have recruited a world-class group of experts from Asia and the United States to initiate the dialogue around five key themes:
- Recent developments in the South China Sea
- South China Sea in ASEAN-U.S.-China relations
- Assessment of the South China Sea in a changing regional landscape
- Role of international law in resolving and managing territorial disputes
- Policy recommendations to boost security and cooperation in the South China Sea
Continuing disputes suggest there is a great need and interest to explore security in the South China Sea. We have invited approximately 20 experts to make presentations and will invite senior officials, executives, academics, and members of the media to participate in the dialogue. The full conference agenda is available here.
Please click here to RSVP by Monday, June 25, 2012. When you RSVP you MUST include the panels you wish to attend.You must log on to register. If you do not have an account with CSIS you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, please contact imisadmin@csis.org.
8. Libya, One Year Later, CATO, noon June 27
Noon (Luncheon to Follow)
Featuring Diederik Vandewalle, Adjunct Associate Professor of Business Administration and Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College; Jonathan Hutson, Director of Communications, Enough Project to End Genocide and Crimes against Humanity; Benjamin H. Friedman, Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies, Cato Institute; moderated by Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst, Cato Institute.
The Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
If you can’t make it to the Cato Institute, watch this event live online at www.cato.org/live and join the conversation on Twitter with the hashtag #CatoEvents. Also follow @CatoEvents on Twitter to get future event updates, live streams, and videos from the Cato Institute.
Some political commentators have called the Obama administration’s intervention last year in the Libyan civil war an “undeniable success” and one of “the greatest triumphs and signature moments in Barack Obama’s presidency.” One year later, however, Libya remains in crisis. Reports suggest that operatives linked to al Qaeda are active in Libya. Militias are detaining thousands of former regime loyalists and engaging in widespread torture. Instability remains rampant and has spilled into neighboring states. Moreover, President Obama’s unilateral decision to intervene contravened congressional war powers.
What do these troubling developments mean for the future of the UN’s “responsibility to protect”? Did the death of Muammar Qaddafi vindicate the intervention? Will Qaddafi’s example make other so-called rogue states less willing to relinquish their nuclear programs? Were political commentators premature in declaring NATO’s intervention a success? Please join us as leading scholars examine this under-appreciated and almost forgotten topic.
Cato events, unless otherwise noted, are free of charge. To register for this event, please fill out the form below and click submit or email events@cato.org, fax (202) 371-0841, or call (202) 789-5229 by noon, Tuesday, June 26, 2012. Please arrive early. Seating is limited and not guaranteed. News media inquiries only (no registrations), please call (202) 789-5200.
9. Sanctions on Iran: Implications for Energy Security, Brookings, 9-12:30 June 29
Next month, international economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran will intensify dramatically. Although Iran has been the target of various U.S. and multilateral sanctions throughout most of the past three decades, the latest measures are the most severe in history. These actions have been credited with reviving Iran’s interest in negotiations with the world, but they have yet to persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, and are creating new challenges for the international coalition that has sought to constrain Iran. They also pose new uncertainties for energy markets and the international economy at a precarious period in the global recovery and the U.S. presidential campaign.
On June 29, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host a discussion assessing the wide-ranging implications of the Iran sanctions regime and consider the prospects for a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
After each panel, participants will take audience questions.
Details
June 29, 2012
9:00 AM – 12:30 PM EDT
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
For More Information
Brookings Office of Communications
events@brookings.edu
202.797.6105
Event Agenda
- 9:00Welcoming Remarks
- 9:15Panel One: Strategic and Energy Implications of Iran Sanctions
-
Moderator
-
-
-
- 10:45Break
- 11:00Panel Two: International Approaches to Iran Sanctions
-
Moderator
-
-
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Tanvi Madan
Fellow
The Brookings Institution
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No, Yemen won’t work in Syria
Tonight at the International Peace Institute in New York, Jamal Benomar, special representative of the UN Secretary General for Yemen, discussed whether the “Yemen model,” a negotiated transfer of power from Bashar al Assad to one of his two vice presidents, Farouk al-Sharaa, might work in Syria (the female vice president, Najah Al-Attar, was not mentioned–no surprise that). I attended all but the last few minutes by webcast.
Jamal was appropriately circumspect. Yemen, he emphasized, was a unique and complicated situation. The state started to collapse and lose control over parts of the country. The President refused the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) deal initially and only accepted when offered complete immunity not only for himself but also for others in his regime. The solution was a Yemeni one, based on face-to-face negotiations among Yemenis and codified eventually in UN Security Council resolution 2014 with support from the GCC and participation by other actors in Yemeni society. Women’s rights, rule of law and democracy are explicit parts of the agreement. The vice president, now President Hadi, had the trust of the opposition. A military committee is responsible for disengagement and security sector reform. There is also provision for a national dialogue, constitution-making, national reconciliation and traditional justice. It is a clear and detailed road map culminating in elections in February 2014.
There is no way to transplant the Yemeni model. Yemen has a history of political parties, active politics and powersharing. There is a sophisticated civil society. Parliament functions, elections are held. There is democratic space that does not exist in Syria. The peace deal is a power sharing arrangement between parties that believed there was no viable military solution (a “mutually hurting stalemate” in the parlance of conflict management). All wanted a peaceful and orderly transition.
Yemen suffered nothing like the level of violence we have seen in Syria. The total number of protesters killed in Yemen was 270 or so, far fewer than the more than 10,000 in Syria. The Security Council, the region and the international community more generally spoke with one voice. That voice was in favor of transition and backed the UN as facilitator. The agreement was signed in Riyadh because the presence of the Saudi King was useful. The Yemenis in the end all cooperated because they concluded there was no other way than a peaceful solution. Implementation of the agreement is on track.
So there may be lessons from Yemen, but Ambassador Abdullah M. Alsaidi (former Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations) summarized the differences between Yemen and Syria:
- the Syrian regime is stronger and controls the territory
- Yemen had a coherent opposition that is lacking in Syria
- Yemen had more democratic space than Syria, because its reunification in 1990 made it necessary
- the region and the UN Security Council are united in Yemen, divided in Syria
- rebel forces in Yemen were relatively larger
- the Yemeni military resisted a military solution and insisted on a political course, which is not yet the case in Syria
- in Syria the vice president has disappeared from sight and doesn’t have the confidence of the opposition (or perhaps even of Bashar al Assad)
The government in Syria still believes it can win militarily. It faces a divided Security Council and a divided Arab world. No, the Yemen model won’t work in Syria, not at least under current conditions.
But the UN has certainly demonstrated that in the more permissive Yemeni conditions it can, given time, add value in facilitating negotiations among local actors and prevent the worsening of a conflict that would have had devastating humanitarian and political effects. UN agencies have also been able to provide a good deal of humanitarian relief. Yemen is a success story, so far. Success in Syria will require that both sides realize that further military action will not produce results.
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