Tag: United Nations
The road to Damascus still runs through Moscow
Michelle Dunne and Dimitri Simes got it wrong in yesterday’s discussion on the PBS Newshour of Russia’s role in Syria. They failed to understand the main reason the Obama Administration hesitates to buck Moscow and offered a precedent–the 1999 Kosovo intervention–that can’t be mechanically applied in today’s conditions.
If only Syria were at stake and the Russians were tacitly on board, it would be foolish, as Simes suggested, for the Americans to hesitate to act without UN Security Council (UNSC) approval. They acted without approval in Kosovo without any serious backlash from Russia, which in 1999 was in no position to offer much resistance.
But that is not the current situation. Iran is also on the chess board. If the United States attacks Syria without Moscow’s concurrence, it will lose Russian participation in the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran. Your top national security priority for the moment is stopping Iran from getting nuclear weapons, but you would put that goal at risk for the sake of Syria? Whether you believe stopping Iran can be done by diplomatic means or you think that military action will be required, you want to keep your powder dry and the Russians on side as much as possible.
Russia to boot is not the basket case it was in 1999, when it winked and nodded at NATO’s attack on Serbia, which after several months ended Belgrade’s repression and the expulsion of the Albanians from Kosovo. Simes conveniently forgot that Kosovo briefly threatened real problems between the United States and Russia, when Moscow seized the Pristina airport before NATO forces arrived there. But Russia was too weak and too broke to do anything more than putter around the runways. Moscow today is far better equipped with armed forces, hard cash and diplomatic support to respond than it was in 1999.
The key to solving the Syria problem is convincing Moscow that it risks losing everything when the Assad regime comes down. Diplomatic persuasion, not military action, is what is needed. At some point, Russia will realize that protecting its port access in the Mediterranean and its arms sales to Syria requires support to the successor regime. If Moscow fails to jump ship in time, the Russians will go down with it.
Moscow sounded a bit desperate yesterday underlining that its arms sales to Bashar al Assad violate no UN resolution or international law. True enough. What they violate is common sense and human decency. No one should be surprised that this is difficult for Vladimir Putin to understand. He is after all having his own problems with demonstrators. But even he by now understands that helicopter gunships are not the right way to deal with dissent.
When President Obama sees President Putin at the G-20 meeting in Mexico next week, Syria should be high on the agenda. The road to Damascus still runs through Moscow.
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What does civil war meme?
Yesterday UN peacekeeping under secretary general Herve Ladsous suggested that Syria is indeed in a civil war:
Yes, I think we can say that. Clearly what is happening is that the government of Syria lost some large chunks of territory, several cities to the opposition, and wants to retake control.
The Syrian government denies it, insisting that its operations are aimed at suppressing terrorists.
What is the significance of the “civil war” meme? The conflict in Syria appears to meet the formal definition of civil war:
a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies
There may be some doubt as to how “organized” the Free Syria Army really is, but it seems, as Ladsous suggested, to be organized enough to control at least some territory. The Syria conflict certainly meets the threshold of 1000 casualties the academics require to label a conflict “war.”
The Syrian government prefers the counter-terrorism meme because it puts the conflict in a context that justifies vigorous state action. President Obama abandoned the “war on terror” metaphor long ago, but it continues to fight extremism with all the means at its disposal. Why shouldn’t Bashar al Assad do likewise?
If the conflict in Syria is a civil war, it does not follow that international intervention is appropriate. The United Nations will generally avoid engagement in such situations until the “warring parties” offer their consent. Consent in Syria so far is certainly nominal: the government allows the UN observers in and permits them to move around a bit, but it has not implemented the six-point Annan plan. The Free Syria Army has renounced the ceasefire that never really took effect.
During the Bosnian conflict, the label “civil war” was used mainly by those who opposed international intervention. While intervention in civil wars by neighbors, super powers and other interested parties has often occurred, in the American political lexicon “civil war” has usually been used to justify a wait and see attitude. If they are fighting among themselves, why should we get involved? It’s dangerous and potentially counterproductive if we prolong a conflict that might just burn itself out.
The meme that works in favor of intervention in the U.S. is a liberation meme, provided the government of the country in which the conflict occurs is not a friendly one. The Kosovo Liberation Army was an example, as was the NATO-led intervention in favor of the Libyan National Transitional Council. Not for nothing was the war in Iraq termed Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The Free Syria Army would like to be seen as part of such a liberation meme. So far, that has not gotten it direct American assistance. But yesterday’s revelation that Russia is providing attack helicopters to the Syrian army will likely open the spigot of clandestine transfers by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to the Free Syria Army a bit wider.
That won’t necessarily bring an end to a war that already threatens to destabilize Lebanon and in due course other neighbors. International intervention can lengthen and spread wars, whether they be termed anti-terrorist, civil or liberation.
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Credit the observers
The UN Supervision Mission in Syria has started posting its own Youtube videos (apologies if this is old news–it has just come to my attention):
The caption reads:
In Homs where increased and intensified fighting is taking place, smoke drift into the sky from buildings and houses hit by shelling. Next the observers traveled to Talbiseh and al-Rastan, north of Homs city. The roads were empty and all shops, garages, health centers were closed. The bridge on the highway between Talbiseh and al-Rastan appeared shelled.
A Syrian opposition flag – with three stars – draped from the bridge as the smoke and fire continued to burn. UN military observers on patrol to these towns noticed helicopters firing. There was fresh blood on corridors and outside some of the houses.The UN patrol team spoke with both side – Syrian army soldiers and oppositions free Syrian army – to try and ascertain the extent of this increased heavy weapons and attacks.Copyright UNSMIS 2012
This will not stop the Syrian government from committing atrocities, and it doesn’t even clearly asign responsibility. But it certainly improves the visibility of what is going on and generates both internal and external pressure against the regime. Unless you think the opposition is flying those helicopters and using artillery.
Does anyone doubt that the international observers, restricted and abused though they may be, are serving a useful purpose? I salute their courage, and their use of Youtube.
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Observe the observers observing
I won’t even try to link to the multitudes who have declared the Annan plan for Syria a failure and the UN observers useless. It is easy to prove the first proposition: Bashar al Assad’s regime has not even withdrawn its heavy weapons, never mind fulfilled the five other points of the Annan plan.
But that does not make the UN observers useless. To the contrary, what would we know about the massacre at Mazraat al-Qubeir if the UN observers had not gone in? Even a visit two days later, after a thorough cleanup by the regime, was sufficient to conclude that something dreadful had happened. It is vitally important that the UN observers continue their efforts and get the word out on what they find quickly and widely. This is what makes current events in Syria so dramatically different from the massacre Bashar al Assad’s father committed twenty years ago in Hama, which remains even today less than fully documented. It is still unknown how many thousands, or maybe tens of thousands, were killed.
Ground truth concerning what is going on in Syria is not only important for the international community but also for Syrians. Last weekend’s “general” strikes (more like “souk closures”) in Damascus and Aleppo were reactions to the al-Houla massacre, also disclosed because of the post facto presence of the UN observers. Symbolic bazaari resistance undermines an important pillar of the regime–heretofore it was feeling little pressure from the merchant class to stop the crackdown.
The lot of the observers is not a happy one: they are being shot at, blocked at checkpoints, threatened and likely worse. But they are going about their work with determination and, it seems from afar, considerable skill and courage. Will this end the parade of horrors the Syrian regime is committing? Not likely. Bashar al Assad has driven himself and his regime into a cul-de-sac. His only hope of remaining in power is to escalate the violence further, in the hope of restoring the fear that is vital to the survival of autocracy.
The observers are however important. They are revealing the facts of what is happening. They are witnessing what otherwise might go unreported. They are helping to keep up international pressure on the Assad regime. They are inducing Syrians who previously supported the regime to reexamine their position. They are embarrassing the Russians and Iranians, whose support for Bashar al Assad seems to be weakening.
None of this makes a resolution of the conflict in Syria imminent. It could go on for a long time. What we’ve got now is an insurgency that falls more or less in the civil war category. Such conflicts are rarely settled quickly. Only if Bashar al Assad can be persuaded to step aside, or if someone gets lucky and steps him aside, will it be possible to start the post-Assad political process that is the real purpose of the Annan plan.
Anne-Marie Slaughter argues against regime change as the international community objective. Instead, she proposes that the international community should, in accordance with the “responsibility to protect” doctrine, create safe areas in Syria, where civilians will be protected by military means from the regime’s security forces. This in my view is wrong: it would leave Bashar al Assad in place, ruling over and abusing a large portion of the population and likely causing partition of Syria, an outcome inimical to peace and stability throughout the region.
Bashar al Assad is the problem. Removing him is the solution. Diplomatic means are likely to be far more effective in achieving that objective than military ones. But that is not the purpose of the UN observers, who are there to observe. They are doing a good job under difficult circumstances. Let’s applaud their courage and determination.
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Slaughterhouse Syria
Gregor Nazarian, who has joined me for the summer as a Middle East Institute intern, writes:
Syria said yesterday that it would allow UN aid workers into the country, as required by the UN/Arab League Annan plan. This is good news, if it happens. But the presence of aid workers will not do much to discourage the Assad regime from continuing to commit atrocities.
The regime’s approach was clear in Assad’s speech on Sunday. He again blamed the violence on “terrorists.” He claimed the new constitution, recently chosen parliament and political dialogue would resolve legitimate issues but struck a defiant tone on armed conflict, declaring that the government would continue to kill its enemies.
There was nothing in the speech indicating any serious intention on Assad’s part to implement the six-point Annan plan. He mentioned it only once, claiming that the Houla massacre was committed by terrorists hoping to sabotage the plan on the eve of Annan’s visit to Damascus and thereby bring about NATO intervention. Syria’s expulsion of Western diplomats (in retaliation for the expulsion of Syrian diplomats) signals that Assad is not planning any near-term compromises.
The humanitarian access to four provinces Assad has announced falls short of the full access the Annan plan authorized. Like the release of 500 detainees last week (release of prisoners is another of Annan’s six points), it is designed only to provide a veneer of cooperation while military operations continue.
Annan’s plan also calls for freedom of access for journalists, freedom to protest peacefully, an inclusive political process, and an end to violence. Assad will likely address each with half-measures, sleight of hand and well-timed gestures. But he will give no ground on the military front. While conceding that some opponents have expressed legitimate concerns, Assad claims to have addressed them with recent window-dressing reforms. He will deal with international pressure in much the same way: by claiming to have addressed the issues, without however making any serious moves.
Assad treats the violence as a separate question. The military conflict is between security forces and terrorists armed and supported by Syria’s enemies abroad:
Terrorists are concerned neither with reform nor with dialogue. . . Not distinguishing between terrorism and the political process is a great error made by some people.
Assad cannot prevent images and videos of atrocities from reaching the outside world. Denying the violence is impossible, so he laments it, blames the terrorists for atrocities and claims to be fighting them. He repeated numerous times in his speech that reasonable political demands had been met, but that terrorism continues unabated and would be fought to the bitter end.
The most striking image in Assad’s speech was that of the Syrian state as surgeon:
Do we condemn the surgeon because his hands are bloodstained or do we praise him for saving a human being’s life?
Of course there was blood on his hands, Assad said, but the killing was for the good of the country. Like a surgeon covered in the blood of his patient, Assad will make the people bleed as he cuts away the tumor of international terrorists from the body politic. Supporters and critics alike, he suggested, should thank him for it.
The rhetorical separation of the political process from the military conflict suggests that Assad will use small political concessions as cover for a continuing military crackdown. Even as we see some progress on the Annan plan, we may not see an end to the real problem: the continuing slaughter of Syrians.
PS: Don’t watch this if you’ve just eaten or don’t want to see the truly atrocious consequences of a war against ordinary people, including many children:
The caption on Youtube reads: “This footage, uploaded by Syrian democracy activists on May 25, 2012, depicts the aftermath of a massacre of around 32 children under the age of 10. They were allegedly murdered by forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad in the town of Al-Houla in Homs. Dozens were killed by tank and artillery shelling, while according to survivor testimony dozens more were shot or stabbed by Syrian security forces. The relative proportions of each category remain disputed.”
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Intervene now or later?
Joshua Landis, who knows the Syrian regime as well as any American, warns vigorously against military intervention: we’ve failed at nation-building elsewhere, the effort would be difficult and expensive, our military is overstretched, the Syrians are fractious. He argues further:
In all likelihood, the Syrian revolution will be less bloody if Syrians carry it out for themselves. A new generation of national leaders will emerge from the struggle. They will not emerge with any legitimacy if America hands them Syria as a gift. How will they claim that they won the struggle for dignity, freedom and democracy? America cannot give these things. Syrians must take them. America can play a role with aid, arms and intelligence, but it cannot and should not try to decide Syria’s future, determine winners, and take charge of Syria. If Syrians want to own Syria in the future, they must own the revolution and find their own way to winning it. It is better for Syria and it is better for America.
Convinced of the strategic significance of depriving Iran of its Syrian ally, Jamie Rubin takes the opposite view.
The rebellion in Syria has now lasted more than a year. The opposition is not going away, and it is abundantly clear that neither diplomatic pressure nor economic sanctions will force Assad to accept a negotiated solution to the crisis. With his life, his family, and his clan’s future at stake, only the threat or use of force will change the Syrian dictator’s stance. Absent foreign intervention, then, the civil war in Syria will only get worse as radicals rush in to exploit the chaos there and the spillover into Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey intensifies…
Arming the Syrian opposition and creating a coalition air force to support them is a low-cost, high-payoff approach. Whether an air operation should just create a no-fly zone that grounds the regimes’ aircraft and helicopters or actually conduct air to ground attacks on Syrian tanks and artillery should be the subject of immediate military planning. And as Barak, the Israeli defense minister, also noted, Syria’s air defenses may be better than Libya’s but they are no match for a modern air force.
The larger point is that as long as Washington stays firm that no U.S. ground troops will be deployed, à la Kosovo and Libya, the cost to the United States will be limited. Victory may not come quickly or easily, but it will come. And the payoff will be substantial. Iran would be strategically isolated, unable to exert its influence in the Middle East. The resulting regime in Syria will likely regard the United States as more friend than enemy. Washington would gain substantial recognition as fighting for the people in the Arab world, not the corrupt regimes.
Both Landis and Rubin try to make the choice sound easy. It is not. What could go wrong with American intervention ? Remember Iraq and Afghanistan. What could go wrong if we don’t intervene, or if we delay? Remember Bosnia and Rwanda.
Rubin has conveniently forgotten that the Kosovo intervention that he cites as the right way to do things did eventually involve American boots on the ground. Units of the National Guard are still there 13 years later. But he is right that a successful intervention resulting in a pro-Western Syria would reduce Iran’s influence. If you don’t count firefights among militias at the international airport, you can count Libya as the kind of success Rubin would like in Syria.
The trouble is that an intervention without Russian concurrence, which as Rubin notes will not be forthcoming, would end the P5+1 talks with Iran and wreck any possibility of a united Security Council to deal with its nuclear program. If your primary strategic objective is not limiting Iran’s influence but rather preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, preferably by diplomatic means, that would be a big loss. Intervention in Syria could even hasten Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability.
Whatever the merits, I don’t think the intervention is going to happen any time soon. Neither does Bashar al Assad, whose speech to Syria’s puppet parliament yesterday gave no indication that he expects to face international intervention. He seems to have not even mentioned the Annan plan or the international observers (but I confess I am still trying to get hold of a full English translation). Bashar remains confident he can weather the storm.
I’m not certain he is wrong. Many people are saying that he will never be able to regain control of Syria because he is now illegitimate. But was he ever really legit? The difference is that the state he presided over, which once more or less functioned to preserve his hold on power, is now broken, perhaps even failed.
There is little chance that Syria after the civil war in which it is currently engaged will be able to pick itself up, dust off and proceed peacefully to democratic rule, or stable rule of any sort. Those who hope for a “managed transition” are likely to be disappointed. Even a coup will not be clean and easy. Bashar could even stay for years.
But the day is likely to come when the battered Syrian state fails utterly. The international community may then want to intervene to prevent the civil war and refugees from overflowing into Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. It may also want to prevent the slaughter of the Alawite sect that provides the foundation of the Assad regime, along with Christians and others who have supported Bashar and his father. If so, it will require boots on the ground.
The question is whether to intervene now, or later.
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