Tag: United Nations
Credit the observers
The UN Supervision Mission in Syria has started posting its own Youtube videos (apologies if this is old news–it has just come to my attention):
The caption reads:
In Homs where increased and intensified fighting is taking place, smoke drift into the sky from buildings and houses hit by shelling. Next the observers traveled to Talbiseh and al-Rastan, north of Homs city. The roads were empty and all shops, garages, health centers were closed. The bridge on the highway between Talbiseh and al-Rastan appeared shelled.
A Syrian opposition flag – with three stars – draped from the bridge as the smoke and fire continued to burn. UN military observers on patrol to these towns noticed helicopters firing. There was fresh blood on corridors and outside some of the houses.The UN patrol team spoke with both side – Syrian army soldiers and oppositions free Syrian army – to try and ascertain the extent of this increased heavy weapons and attacks.Copyright UNSMIS 2012
This will not stop the Syrian government from committing atrocities, and it doesn’t even clearly asign responsibility. But it certainly improves the visibility of what is going on and generates both internal and external pressure against the regime. Unless you think the opposition is flying those helicopters and using artillery.
Does anyone doubt that the international observers, restricted and abused though they may be, are serving a useful purpose? I salute their courage, and their use of Youtube.
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Observe the observers observing
I won’t even try to link to the multitudes who have declared the Annan plan for Syria a failure and the UN observers useless. It is easy to prove the first proposition: Bashar al Assad’s regime has not even withdrawn its heavy weapons, never mind fulfilled the five other points of the Annan plan.
But that does not make the UN observers useless. To the contrary, what would we know about the massacre at Mazraat al-Qubeir if the UN observers had not gone in? Even a visit two days later, after a thorough cleanup by the regime, was sufficient to conclude that something dreadful had happened. It is vitally important that the UN observers continue their efforts and get the word out on what they find quickly and widely. This is what makes current events in Syria so dramatically different from the massacre Bashar al Assad’s father committed twenty years ago in Hama, which remains even today less than fully documented. It is still unknown how many thousands, or maybe tens of thousands, were killed.
Ground truth concerning what is going on in Syria is not only important for the international community but also for Syrians. Last weekend’s “general” strikes (more like “souk closures”) in Damascus and Aleppo were reactions to the al-Houla massacre, also disclosed because of the post facto presence of the UN observers. Symbolic bazaari resistance undermines an important pillar of the regime–heretofore it was feeling little pressure from the merchant class to stop the crackdown.
The lot of the observers is not a happy one: they are being shot at, blocked at checkpoints, threatened and likely worse. But they are going about their work with determination and, it seems from afar, considerable skill and courage. Will this end the parade of horrors the Syrian regime is committing? Not likely. Bashar al Assad has driven himself and his regime into a cul-de-sac. His only hope of remaining in power is to escalate the violence further, in the hope of restoring the fear that is vital to the survival of autocracy.
The observers are however important. They are revealing the facts of what is happening. They are witnessing what otherwise might go unreported. They are helping to keep up international pressure on the Assad regime. They are inducing Syrians who previously supported the regime to reexamine their position. They are embarrassing the Russians and Iranians, whose support for Bashar al Assad seems to be weakening.
None of this makes a resolution of the conflict in Syria imminent. It could go on for a long time. What we’ve got now is an insurgency that falls more or less in the civil war category. Such conflicts are rarely settled quickly. Only if Bashar al Assad can be persuaded to step aside, or if someone gets lucky and steps him aside, will it be possible to start the post-Assad political process that is the real purpose of the Annan plan.
Anne-Marie Slaughter argues against regime change as the international community objective. Instead, she proposes that the international community should, in accordance with the “responsibility to protect” doctrine, create safe areas in Syria, where civilians will be protected by military means from the regime’s security forces. This in my view is wrong: it would leave Bashar al Assad in place, ruling over and abusing a large portion of the population and likely causing partition of Syria, an outcome inimical to peace and stability throughout the region.
Bashar al Assad is the problem. Removing him is the solution. Diplomatic means are likely to be far more effective in achieving that objective than military ones. But that is not the purpose of the UN observers, who are there to observe. They are doing a good job under difficult circumstances. Let’s applaud their courage and determination.
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Slaughterhouse Syria
Gregor Nazarian, who has joined me for the summer as a Middle East Institute intern, writes:
Syria said yesterday that it would allow UN aid workers into the country, as required by the UN/Arab League Annan plan. This is good news, if it happens. But the presence of aid workers will not do much to discourage the Assad regime from continuing to commit atrocities.
The regime’s approach was clear in Assad’s speech on Sunday. He again blamed the violence on “terrorists.” He claimed the new constitution, recently chosen parliament and political dialogue would resolve legitimate issues but struck a defiant tone on armed conflict, declaring that the government would continue to kill its enemies.
There was nothing in the speech indicating any serious intention on Assad’s part to implement the six-point Annan plan. He mentioned it only once, claiming that the Houla massacre was committed by terrorists hoping to sabotage the plan on the eve of Annan’s visit to Damascus and thereby bring about NATO intervention. Syria’s expulsion of Western diplomats (in retaliation for the expulsion of Syrian diplomats) signals that Assad is not planning any near-term compromises.
The humanitarian access to four provinces Assad has announced falls short of the full access the Annan plan authorized. Like the release of 500 detainees last week (release of prisoners is another of Annan’s six points), it is designed only to provide a veneer of cooperation while military operations continue.
Annan’s plan also calls for freedom of access for journalists, freedom to protest peacefully, an inclusive political process, and an end to violence. Assad will likely address each with half-measures, sleight of hand and well-timed gestures. But he will give no ground on the military front. While conceding that some opponents have expressed legitimate concerns, Assad claims to have addressed them with recent window-dressing reforms. He will deal with international pressure in much the same way: by claiming to have addressed the issues, without however making any serious moves.
Assad treats the violence as a separate question. The military conflict is between security forces and terrorists armed and supported by Syria’s enemies abroad:
Terrorists are concerned neither with reform nor with dialogue. . . Not distinguishing between terrorism and the political process is a great error made by some people.
Assad cannot prevent images and videos of atrocities from reaching the outside world. Denying the violence is impossible, so he laments it, blames the terrorists for atrocities and claims to be fighting them. He repeated numerous times in his speech that reasonable political demands had been met, but that terrorism continues unabated and would be fought to the bitter end.
The most striking image in Assad’s speech was that of the Syrian state as surgeon:
Do we condemn the surgeon because his hands are bloodstained or do we praise him for saving a human being’s life?
Of course there was blood on his hands, Assad said, but the killing was for the good of the country. Like a surgeon covered in the blood of his patient, Assad will make the people bleed as he cuts away the tumor of international terrorists from the body politic. Supporters and critics alike, he suggested, should thank him for it.
The rhetorical separation of the political process from the military conflict suggests that Assad will use small political concessions as cover for a continuing military crackdown. Even as we see some progress on the Annan plan, we may not see an end to the real problem: the continuing slaughter of Syrians.
PS: Don’t watch this if you’ve just eaten or don’t want to see the truly atrocious consequences of a war against ordinary people, including many children:
The caption on Youtube reads: “This footage, uploaded by Syrian democracy activists on May 25, 2012, depicts the aftermath of a massacre of around 32 children under the age of 10. They were allegedly murdered by forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad in the town of Al-Houla in Homs. Dozens were killed by tank and artillery shelling, while according to survivor testimony dozens more were shot or stabbed by Syrian security forces. The relative proportions of each category remain disputed.”
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Intervene now or later?
Joshua Landis, who knows the Syrian regime as well as any American, warns vigorously against military intervention: we’ve failed at nation-building elsewhere, the effort would be difficult and expensive, our military is overstretched, the Syrians are fractious. He argues further:
In all likelihood, the Syrian revolution will be less bloody if Syrians carry it out for themselves. A new generation of national leaders will emerge from the struggle. They will not emerge with any legitimacy if America hands them Syria as a gift. How will they claim that they won the struggle for dignity, freedom and democracy? America cannot give these things. Syrians must take them. America can play a role with aid, arms and intelligence, but it cannot and should not try to decide Syria’s future, determine winners, and take charge of Syria. If Syrians want to own Syria in the future, they must own the revolution and find their own way to winning it. It is better for Syria and it is better for America.
Convinced of the strategic significance of depriving Iran of its Syrian ally, Jamie Rubin takes the opposite view.
The rebellion in Syria has now lasted more than a year. The opposition is not going away, and it is abundantly clear that neither diplomatic pressure nor economic sanctions will force Assad to accept a negotiated solution to the crisis. With his life, his family, and his clan’s future at stake, only the threat or use of force will change the Syrian dictator’s stance. Absent foreign intervention, then, the civil war in Syria will only get worse as radicals rush in to exploit the chaos there and the spillover into Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey intensifies…
Arming the Syrian opposition and creating a coalition air force to support them is a low-cost, high-payoff approach. Whether an air operation should just create a no-fly zone that grounds the regimes’ aircraft and helicopters or actually conduct air to ground attacks on Syrian tanks and artillery should be the subject of immediate military planning. And as Barak, the Israeli defense minister, also noted, Syria’s air defenses may be better than Libya’s but they are no match for a modern air force.
The larger point is that as long as Washington stays firm that no U.S. ground troops will be deployed, à la Kosovo and Libya, the cost to the United States will be limited. Victory may not come quickly or easily, but it will come. And the payoff will be substantial. Iran would be strategically isolated, unable to exert its influence in the Middle East. The resulting regime in Syria will likely regard the United States as more friend than enemy. Washington would gain substantial recognition as fighting for the people in the Arab world, not the corrupt regimes.
Both Landis and Rubin try to make the choice sound easy. It is not. What could go wrong with American intervention ? Remember Iraq and Afghanistan. What could go wrong if we don’t intervene, or if we delay? Remember Bosnia and Rwanda.
Rubin has conveniently forgotten that the Kosovo intervention that he cites as the right way to do things did eventually involve American boots on the ground. Units of the National Guard are still there 13 years later. But he is right that a successful intervention resulting in a pro-Western Syria would reduce Iran’s influence. If you don’t count firefights among militias at the international airport, you can count Libya as the kind of success Rubin would like in Syria.
The trouble is that an intervention without Russian concurrence, which as Rubin notes will not be forthcoming, would end the P5+1 talks with Iran and wreck any possibility of a united Security Council to deal with its nuclear program. If your primary strategic objective is not limiting Iran’s influence but rather preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, preferably by diplomatic means, that would be a big loss. Intervention in Syria could even hasten Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability.
Whatever the merits, I don’t think the intervention is going to happen any time soon. Neither does Bashar al Assad, whose speech to Syria’s puppet parliament yesterday gave no indication that he expects to face international intervention. He seems to have not even mentioned the Annan plan or the international observers (but I confess I am still trying to get hold of a full English translation). Bashar remains confident he can weather the storm.
I’m not certain he is wrong. Many people are saying that he will never be able to regain control of Syria because he is now illegitimate. But was he ever really legit? The difference is that the state he presided over, which once more or less functioned to preserve his hold on power, is now broken, perhaps even failed.
There is little chance that Syria after the civil war in which it is currently engaged will be able to pick itself up, dust off and proceed peacefully to democratic rule, or stable rule of any sort. Those who hope for a “managed transition” are likely to be disappointed. Even a coup will not be clean and easy. Bashar could even stay for years.
But the day is likely to come when the battered Syrian state fails utterly. The international community may then want to intervene to prevent the civil war and refugees from overflowing into Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. It may also want to prevent the slaughter of the Alawite sect that provides the foundation of the Assad regime, along with Christians and others who have supported Bashar and his father. If so, it will require boots on the ground.
The question is whether to intervene now, or later.
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Why partition of Kosovo is bad for Serbs
Today I spent a couple of hours at the Serbian orthodox monastery in Dečani, a 14th century beauty of enormous historical and religious significance to the Serbian Church. There is only one Serb living in the town, which lies in a cradle of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The monastery currently houses 24 monks and is building a guest house to handle an increased flow of visitors.
I heard no flag-waving Serb nationalism at the monastery. The mood there is contemplative and reflective. No one there wanted Kosovo independence, but political frameworks are transitory. The Church needs to ensure its own permanence.
Its primary concerns are two: the welfare of its flock and the protection of its churches, monasteries and other property. Most of these are south of the Ibar river, which is often proposed as the dividing line for a partition between the Serb-majority population of the north and the Albanian-majority population of the south. The Church opposes partition. It would lead to the loss of the Serb population south of the Ibar and most of the precious churches, monasteries and property.
But that view does not carry much weight in Belgrade, where the politicians simply want to hold onto something in Kosovo so that they can claim they have not lost everything. Nor is the Church particularly influential in northern Kosovo, where it has nevertheless tried to convince Serbs not to use violence.
It hasn’t been entirely successful at that either. Serbs in the north have erected barricades–including a large cross–on an important road. KFOR, the NATO-led force that is entrusted by the UN Security Council with ensuring a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, tried to remove them yesterday morning, leading to a clash in which two German soldiers and one American were reportedly injured. The Church is unhappy when such clashes occur, since they increase ethnic tension throughout Kosovo and raise doubts about whether the majority of Serbs who live south of the Ibar can continue to do so.
Kosovo’s government is currently completing the process of adopting constitutional amendments and laws to implement all aspects of the Ahtisaari plan, a proposal for settlement of the Kosovo dispute that was rejected by Belgrade because it entailed Kosovo independence. It provides extensive protection for Serbs and Church property. But the Church worries that constitutional amendments and laws are not sufficient. It wants international guarantees, since there are Albanian political parties that would seek to reverse anything done now to offer protection, should they come to power in the future.
The Western-educated elite that runs many Kosovo institutions today has good intentions. But this elite has little to do with the more traditional clan structures that hold power at the local level. The Church wants the international community to ensure that guarantees will last, no matter who comes to power in Pristina.
All of this sounds to me well grounded and rational. Unfortunately, it is not what we are hearing out of President-elect Tomislav Nikolić in Belgrade. He is still attached to partition ideas that would destabilize a large part of the Balkans.
It is high time Europe as a whole minced no words about this. I doubt Angela Merkel will: her message on a visit last summer to Belgrade was unequivocally against partition. She presumably won’t hesitate to reiterate that message now that two more Germans have been injured. But more is needed: Greece and Cyprus in particular need to recognize that their refusal to recognize Kosovo is encouraging partition proposals that, if adopted, would end with the partition of their favorite island.
Not to mention the loss of this spectacular monastery:
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Goat rope
I arrived in Pristina yesterday and have enjoyed two days of intense conversations about Kosovo’s international relations, which are enormously complex for a country of less than 1.8 million inhabitants.
Let’s review the bidding. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, after almost nine years of UN administration following the 1999 NATO/Yugoslavia war. Serbia, of which Kosovo was at one time a province, did not concur in independence and has not recognized the Kosovo state’s sovereignty. But 90 other countries have, including the United States and 22 of the 27 members of the European Union (EU) and 24 of 28 members of NATO. Russia has blocked approval of UN membership in the Security Council, at the behest of Serbia. An International Civilian Office (ICO) will supervise Kosovo’s independence until September, when it plans to certify that the Kosovo government has fulfilled its responsibilities under the international community “Ahtisaari plan” (the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement). That was intended to be the agreement under which Kosovo became independent but was implemented unilaterally (under international community pressure) by the Kosovo government when Serbia refused to play ball. Belgrade and Pristina talk, but almost exclusively in an EU-facilitated and US-supported dialogue limited to resolution of technical, not political, issues.
Even after the ICO closes, Kosovo will be under intense international scrutiny (for a fuller account, see the Kosovar Center for Security studies report). NATO provides a safe and secure environment and is training its security forces for their enhanced roles after the July 2013. An EU rule of law mission monitors Kosovo’s courts and provides international investigators, prosecutors and judges for interethnic cases. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) provides training and advice on democratization, human and minority rights. The Council of Europe (CoE) administers programs on cultural and archaelogical heritage, social security co-ordination and cybercrime. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) continues despite its inconsistency with both the Ahtisaari plan and the declaration of independence, which at Serbia’s behest the International Court of Justice has advised was not in violation of international law or UN Security Council resolution 1244 (which established UNMIK).
Kosovo’s many complications get even worse north of the Ibar river, in the 11% of the country’s territory contiguous with Serbia that is still not under Pristina’s control. It may not really be under Belgrade’s control either, but that makes the situation there even more difficult. Partition of that northern bit, which Belgrade authorities have pursued, would likely precipitate ethnic partitions in other parts of the Balkans: Macedonia, Bosnia and Cyprus would all be at risk if Kosovo were split, an outcome neither Europe nor the U.S. wants to face. Serbia’s President-elect Nikolic suggested last week that Belgrade might recognize the Georgian break-away regions of South Ossetia and Abhazia, a move that would simultaneously deprive Serbia of its heretofore principled stance against Kosovo independence but at the same time reinforce Belgrade’s hope for partition of northern Kosovo.
What we’ve got here is a goat rope, as the U.S. military says. The situation seems hopelessly tangled. It is a miracle that the Kosovo government gets anything done with so many foreigners people looking over its shoulders. It naturally also has to meet domestic expectations, which are increasingly in the direction of more independence and fewer non-tourist foreigners, though Americans seem always to get a particularly warm welcome because of their role in past efforts to protect Kosovo from the worst ravages of Slobodan Milošević.
Kosovo unquestionably continues to need help. OSCE recently organized Serbian presidential elections in the Serb communities of Kosovo, a task that would have proven impossible for the Pristina or the Belgrade authorities. NATO has a continuing role because it will be some years yet before Kosovo can defend itself for even a week from a Serbian military incursion, which is unlikely but cannot be ruled out completely until Belgrade recognizes the Kosovo authorities as sovereign. The Kosovo courts would still find it difficult to have their decisions fully accepted in many cases of interethnic crime.
But the time is coming this fall for this overly supervised country to struggle on its own, making a few mistakes no doubt but also holding its authorities responsible for them. Kosovo needs a foreign policy that will take it to the next level. That means not only untangling the goat rope (or occasionally cutting through it) but also achieving normal relations with Belgrade and UN membership. There is no reason that an intense effort over the next decade cannot take Kosovo into NATO and perhaps even into the EU, or close to that goal, provided it treats its Serb and other minority citizens correctly and resolves the many outstanding issues with Belgrade on a reciprocal basis, and peacefully.
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