Tag: United Nations
War on war
The newly established North America office of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute directed by Chantal de Jonge Oudraat yesterday hosted discussion of the statistical decline of armed conflict and whether it will continue. Moderated by Sissela Bok, presenters were Peter Wallensteen of Uppsala University and Joshua Goldstein of American University, author of the recently published Winning the War on War. The presenters and audience took as undisputed the uneven statistical decline of war since 1945, with a further dip after 1989.
Wallensteen attributed this mainly to better management of conflict, especially through the UN Security Council after 1989, and increased attention to rights, minorities and human dignity. There is no increase in ethnic or one-sided conflicts that would muddy the statistical picture. With war declining, other security concerns have emerged: terrorism, state fragility and state failure. Wallensteen thought the future looks promising if major powers continue to cooperate, security concerns remain limited, welfare economics has priority and human dignity is central to international concerns. It is possible to envision zero conflicts in the future.
While not so sure about the zero conflict vision, Goldstein mostly agreed. He debunked three causes for the decline in war:
- nuclear weapons, because their number is decreasing sharply, without triggering an increase in war,
- U.S. hegemony, because it too is declining without triggering an increase, and
- democracy, because China has been peaceful but not democratic.
He supported three other causes:
- normative disapproval of war and growth of the idea that peace is good, a view also advocated by Steven Pinker;
- increases in prosperity, trade and global interdependence, which is what keeps the Chinese leadership out of war, since it derives its legitimacy from prosperity;
- UN and other conflict management capacity, including increased use of peacekeeping.
Americans, Goldstein noted, on average pay $700 per month for U.S. defense and veterans benefits but only $2 per month for the UN. Eighty per cent of Americans support the UN. Doubling its budget would clearly bring real benefits. When will politicians realize this?
The presenters were too polite to mention it, but there is a great irony for Americans in the decline of war: our armed forces have been active in conflict zones every year since 1989. While much of the rest of the world has enjoyed relative peace, we have been expending trillions of dollars on less than fully successful military enterprises in Iraq and Afghanistan. This, too, is something for our politicians to ponder.
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This week’s peace picks
1. His Excellency Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations: Building and Sustaining Peace: The UN Role in Post-Conflict Situations, CSIS, 11-noon May 7
The Center for Strategic and International Studies Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (C3) invites you to a Statesmen’s Forum with
His Excellency Ban Ki-moon
Secretary-General of the United Nations
On
Building and Sustaining Peace: The UN Role in Post-Conflict Situations
Welcoming Remarks and Moderated by
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Counselor and Trustee
CSIS
Monday, May 7, 11:00 a.m.–12:00 p.m.
B1 Conference Room
1800 K Street, NW, Washington DC 20006
This event will be webcast live and viewable on this webpage.
For questions or concerns, please contact statesmensforum@csis.org.
Ban Ki-moon is the eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations. His priorities have been to mobilize world leaders around a set of new global challenges, from climate change and economic upheaval to pandemics and increasing pressures involving food, energy, and water. He has sought to be a bridge builder, to give voice to the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people, and to strengthen the organization itself. Mr. Ban took office on January 1, 2007. On June 21, 2011, he was unanimously reelected by the General Assembly and will continue to serve until December 31, 2016.
2. Decline of Armed Conflict: Will It Continue? Stimonson, 12:30-2 pm May 7
SIPRI North America, 1111 19th St. NW, 12th floor, Washington DC 20036
RSVP: Please click here.
There is a prevalent public perception that the world has become a more violent place. However, many leading experts agree that there has been a decline of violence and war since 1989. To expand upon these findings and explore their future implications, SIPRI North America will convene a roundtable discussion with two leading experts in the peace and conflict field.
The following key questions will be discussed by a panel of experts:
- What are the reasons behind the decline of armed conflict? And will the decline of armed conflict continue?
- What do we know about the nature and patterns of armed conflict?
- Should the definitions of armed conflict be adjusted?
- How does the Arab Spring fit into the paradigm of declining conflict?
- What role did and should the international community play in mitigating armed conflict?
Welcome: Dr. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Executive Director, SIPRI North America
Speakers:
- Dr. Sissela Bok, Board Member, SIPRI North America and Senior Visiting Fellow, Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies (Moderator)
- Dr. Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor at the School of International Service, American University
- Dr. Peter Wallensteen, Dag Hammarskjöld Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Universit
*Light lunch and refreshments will be provided
If you have any questions, please contact Masha Keller at sipri-na@sipri.org
3. Thinking the Unthinkable: Potential Implications of Oil Disruption in Saudi Arabia, Heritage Foundation, noon-1:30 pm May 8
If an “Arab Spring” uprising completely disrupted Saudi oil production, the U.S. and the global economy would face a massive economic and strategic crisis. Russia and Iran as oil-producing states would likely exploit the crisis to increase their power around the world while undermining U.S. influence, especially in the Middle East. A crisis in Saudi Arabia would have drastic implications for the United States, its economy, and the whole world.
The U.S. must plan ahead and develop pro-active, multi-layered preventive and responsive strategies to deal with political threats to the security of oil supply. These would combine intelligence, military, and diplomatic tools as well as outline domestic steps the United States should take in such a crisis. Please join our distinguished panel of experts as they discuss strategic threats to oil supply; policy options available to the United States and to the oil consuming and producing states; and examine lessons learned from other Heritage Foundation energy crisis simulation exercises.
More About the Speakers
Ariel Cohen , Ph.D.
Senior Research Fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation
Bruce Everett, Ph.D.
Adjunct Associate Professor of International Business, The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Simon Henderson
Baker Fellow and Director, Gulf and Energy Policy Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Hosted By
4. The Consequences of Syria for Minorities in the Levant, Middle East Institute, noon-1 pm May 9
The Middle East Institute is proud to host journalist and author Jonathan C. Randal for a discussion about the impact of the conflict in Syria on neighboring Lebanon and its complicated religious and ethnic make-up. A tired joke among Lebanese asks why their much-battered country has been spared most of the turmoil that has attended the Arab Spring and its often violent ramifications elsewhere in the Middle East. The jest’s cynical answer: because Lebanon is automatically seeded for the finals. Such gallows humor reflects fears Lebanon will end up footing the bill whether the Alawite regime prevails in Damascus or succumbs to the largely Sunni Syrian opposition. Once again, the region’s minorities feel threatened by outsiders’ geostrategic considerations pitting Iran and its Syrian and Hezbollah allies against the United States. Europe, and the Gulf monarchies. Will the Syria conflict, like so many earlier Middle East conflicts, end up undermining, the role and status of the Levant’s Christian and other minority communities? Randal will draw from his many decades covering Lebanon for the Washington Post and from his book about Lebanon’s civil war, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and the War in Lebanon (1983, Viking Press) which has been reissued by Just World Books with an all-new preface as The Tragedy of Lebanon: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and American Bunglers.
Speaker: Toby Dodge, Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, IISS
Venue: IISS-US, 2121 K Street NW, Suite 801, Washington, DC 20037
Dr Dodge will discuss the future of Iraqi politics.
Dr Toby Dodge is Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is also a Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Dr Dodge has carried out extensive research in Iraq both before and after regime change, and has advised senior government officials on Iraq. He holds a PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
This meeting will be moderated by Andrew Parasiliti, Executive Director, IISS-US and Corresponding Director, IISS-Middle East.
IISS-US events are for IISS members and direct invitees only. For more information, please contact events-washington@iiss.org or (202) 659-1490.
6. Will Democratic Governance Take Hold in the Middle East? IRI, 3-5 pm May 10
Agenda
9:00 am | Identifying the Hallmarks of 21st Century Conflict and How to Manage Conflict in Complex, Chaotic, and Fragile Environments
- Ambassador Rick Barton, Keynote Address
Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations - Robert Ricigliano, Introduction
Board Chair, Alliance for Peacebuilding - Richard Solomon
President, U.S. Institute of Peace - Melanie Greenberg
President and CEO, Alliance for Peacebuilding - Pamela Aall
Provost, Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, U.S. Institute of Peace
10:00 am | Results of the USIP-funded Peacebuilding Mapping Project
- Elena McCollim
Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego - Necla Tschirgi
Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego - Jeffrey Helsing, Discussant
Dean of Curriculum, Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, U.S. Institute of Peace
11:20 am | How Other Fields Manage Complexity — And What Peacebuilding Can Learn From Them
- Bernard Amadei
Founder, Engineers without Borders - Simon Twigger
Department of Physiology, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee - Daniel Chiu
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Office of the Secretary of Defense - Timothy Ehlinger
Department of Biology, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee - Sheldon Himelfarb, Moderator
Director, Center of Innovation: Science, Technology and Peacebuilding,
U.S. Institute of Peace
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Glass empty
Yesterday’s Middle East Institute discussion of Hamas’s shifting political calculations, moderated by Phil Wilcox of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, was one of the more depressing events I’ve attended lately. And I attend a lot of them.
Bottom line: the shifts, though potentially real, will make no difference to the peace process with Israel. Or even to reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.
Rob Malley of the International Crisis Group suggested the Arab awakening has certainly sharpened questions for Hamas about its relationship with Syria and Iran and about whether it should moderate its views, as other Muslim Brotherhood organizations have done. Hamas refused to support Bashar al Assad, but somehow that is now a byegone. Iran has renewed its financing, though at what level is unclear.
Gaith al Omari of the American Task Force on Palestine said Hamas needs Iranian financing less than in the past because it has Gaza’s revenue, which makes the Gaza leadership more independent. There is really no progress on reconciliation with Fatah, which would require more than naming a new unity government. It would require agreement on holding elections and unifying the security forces. So far, all we’ve seen is reconciliation theater, nothing more.
Mark Perry of the Jersalem Media and Communications Center anticipates generational change will be important inside Hamas. The outside (of Gaza) leadership may be ready for acceptance of the 1967 borders for a Palestinian state and for reconciliation, but the inside Gaza leadership is not. The division is not really ideological, Malley said, but based on where you happen to sit. There is a real debate happening, but the outcome is unclear.
The U.S. is a problem. The “quartet” (U.S., EU, UN and Russia) conditions (recognition of Israel’s right to exist, renunciation of violence and acceptance of past agreements) are unconditional. But Hamas sees no likelihood that Washington can really bring Israel to the negotiating table with anything interesting to offer on settlements, Jerusalem or other important issues. Hamas’ great fear is that it will get trapped like Fatah, having compromised without getting anything substantial in return. They want to know if they accept the conditions what would happen next. The U.S. has no serious response.
There is nevertheless no alternative to a U.S.-led mediation process. The Europeans and the UN have nothing substantial to offer.
This left me wondering whether George W. Bush was right when he shunned the Middle East peace process. The prospects for anything interesting happening sounded minimal to me. Then again, when the experts all agree the glass is empty, that’s when something interesting happens.
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Justice delayed
The conviction of former Liberian president Charles Taylor more than a decade after the war crimes he aided and abetted during the period 1996-2002 answers one important question about his role in the war in Sierra Leone: did he bear some responsibility for rebel atrocities, even if he did not command them directly or conspire to produce them? The court said yes, though an alternate judge held a dissenting view.
Judging from Helene Cooper’s graphic piece in the New York Times about her own family’s experiences, the conviction also provides an important occasion for victims. Even more than ten years after the fact, even though the indictment covered only crimes in Sierra Leone and not in Liberia, they take some satisfaction from knowing that justice has not been denied but only delayed.
But what does it do, and not do, to prevent war crimes and crimes against humanity in the future? When Charles Taylor was indicted, it was widely believed that the court action would disrupt the then ongoing process of beginning the reconstruction of Liberia. Helene Cooper notes that he was tried for crimes in Sierra Leone rather than Liberia to avoid political problems that might have arisen in the country of which he was once president. So far as I can tell, these fears have proven unfounded. Charles Taylor is not today an important political factor in a Liberia that has made substantial progress in becoming a normal, functioning country, even if a frighteningly poor one.
Many diplomats bemoan the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President Omar al Bashir of Sudan, because they say it makes him hold on to power more tightly and interferes with diplomatic efforts to resolve the various conflicts embroiling his country. That view readily prevails in Syria, where President Bashar al Assad’s obvious responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity cannot lead to an ICC indictment because Russia will prevent the necessary referral from passing in the UN Security Council. Ugandan religious leader Joseph Kony, an ICC indictee, is still at large, despite a U.S.-aided manhunt. ICC indictment of Muammar Qaddafi, his son Saif and their security chief in Libya does not appear to have had much impact on their behavior.
So what good is an indictment that won’t produce justice for decades? It is unlikely that the indictees themselves will moderate their behavior in response to an indictment. Their discount rate is high and the results too uncertain and too far in the future to make them behave. But there are other possible benefits. First, an indictment may give pause to some of those below the top leadership, who will want to avoid also being held responsible. Second, an indictment is a concrete expression of international community will to remove a leader from power. It may not help in cutting deals, but it makes the bottom line remarkably clear.
Charles Taylor is the first head of state to be convicted since the Nuremberg trials. He is likely not the last. International justice is agonizingly slow, frustratingly incomplete, and potentially damaging to prospects for negotiated settlements. But even justice delayed can shed light on past events, moderate behavior and provide satisfaction to victims.
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Remembrance without resolve
How much time is required to decide if the UN observers in Syria are failing? If you are the New York Times, two weekend days after authorization by the UN Security Council will do. You wouldn’t want to wait until a significant number of them have actually deployed. Even today, only eleven are active. And you would cite Syrian army attacks occurring while they are not present as evidence of their ineffectiveness, whereas the opposite would seem more likely the case: reduced attacks while the observers are present suggest they are having an impact.
The observers admittedly have a thankless task. There is as yet no peace to keep in Syria, where the regime continues to attack its opponents, refuses to withdraw the military from population centers or to allow peaceful demonstrations, blocks journalistic and humanitarian access and is not prepared to discuss a transition away from the Assad regime. The opposition also occasionally resorts to violence against the security forces. If they are going to have an impact, the observers will need to acquire it after full deployment over a period of weeks, working diligently with both protesters and the regime to ensure disengagement and to gain respect for Kofi Annan’s six-point peace plan.
This they can do, but only by being forthright in their assessments of what is going on, determined in their efforts to go where they want when they want and honest in communicating their observations to both the Syrian and the international press.
The regime will do everything it can to intimidate the observers and shield their eyes from the worst of what is going on. It will retaliate against protesters who communicate with the observers. And it will play “cat and mouse,” encouraging the observers to go where nothing is happening and discouraging them from going where something interesting might be observed.
Kofi Annan will not be easily fooled. His long experience with UN peacekeeping and with the Security Council will ensure that Bashar al Assad faces a savvy and determined international civil servant, provided Washington continues to back the UN effort.
The initial deployment is for 90 days. It should have been shorter, so that the Security Council would be forced to review and decide whether to renew the mission earlier than July. Still, reports every 15 days to the Council will keep the issue on its agenda. The number of observers is limited to 300, still too few to monitor a country the size and population of Syria. At the very best, they will be able to make a difference in a relatively few communities, unless their numbers are much increased.
Some of the observers are likely to resign in frustration, as some of the Arab League observers did over the past winter. Others will take the regime’s side, criticizing the protesters for violence against the security forces. There will be confusion, even consternation, as they try to get a grip on a very slippery situation, one that threatens every day to descend into sectarian bloodletting of the worst sort.
Ultimately, Kofi Annan will need to decide whether the observers are serving a useful purpose. The history of such missions suggests that they are greeted initially with a surge of violence, which subsides if the observers gain respect as truly neutral. The difficulty is that “neutrality” is in the eye of the beholder. One of the beholders in Syria, Bashar al Assad, has labelled all the demonstrators terrorists and will try to settle for nothing less from the UN.
As chance would have it, President Obama on Monday announced the creation of an Atrocities Prevention Board, saying
…remembrance without resolve is a hollow gesture.
The first test of those words will be in Syria, Bahrain and the border between what is now Sudan and South Sudan. In all three places, there is a need to stiffen international community and in particular U.S. resolve to prevent atrocities, protect civilians and make oppressors accountable. This does not necessarily mean the military action others are calling for. In fact, none of these situations lends itself to military means. But the full political, diplomatic and economic weight of the United States should be brought to bear. The President needs make sure his words and gestures are not hollow as he weighs U.S. options in these on-going conflicts.
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The 90 day ultimatum
United States Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice used today’s passage of UNSC Security Council resolution 2043 authorizing deployment of 300 UN observers to Syria to issue an ultimatum: the Syrian government needs to fully comply with the six-point Annan plan or else.
Or else what? The explicit threat was not to renew the observer mission. But Rice was trying to imply more than that:
…let there be no doubt: we, our allies and others in this body are planning and preparing for those actions that will be required of us all, if the Asad regime persists in the slaughter of the Syrian people.
There are not a lot of good options out there. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing Thursday revealed few. Tightening sanctions is one, but the Russians resisted including that in the resolution. Maybe they will be willing to do it if Damascus continues to defy the Security Council for another 90 days. An arms embargo is another. But arms embargoes are normally enforced against a country, not only a government. The Russians are unlikely to allow one to pass that applies to Damascus but not the Free Syria Army. While I am not in favor of a violent uprising, it would be profoundly unjust to deny Syrians the means to defend themselves.
Then there is the option Rice was presumably trying to imply: military action, by NATO and/or a coalition of the willing. I still see little prospect of this happening, though three more months of Syrian government defiance could change the picture.
Unfortunately what the 90-day ultimatum does in the meanwhile is to give Bashar al Assad a three-month hunting license. It is now in his interest to get the observers in as quickly as possible, since no military action can be taken while they are deployed in Syria. He’ll try to use the 90 days to bag as many protesters as possible. It would have been far better to deploy them with no fixed time limit, or with a shorter one requiring re-authorization by the Security Council. The reports the Secretary General is required to make every 15 days are a useful mechanism to keep international attention focused on implementation of the Annan plan, but they don’t provide the same leverage that a shorter authorization would have done.
That said, the key is to get the Syrian army out of artillery range of population centers. Randa Slim wisely reminds us that local leaders in Syria have the capacity to put hundreds of thousands–maybe millions–into the streets if peace protests are permitted, as required by the Annan plan. This she suggests would be a game changer.
I agree. Syria needs no more than a couple of days of relative peace for the people to show unequivocally and peacefully their preference for Bashar al Assad’s departure. If the observers can help to give them those days, their deployment will be worthwhile. If not, withdrawal in 90 days will be the right move. But then it will be incumbent on the Obama Administration to have a plan for what comes next.
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