Tag: United Nations
Empty threat?
Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani in a soft-spoken but hard-hitting performance today at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy touted Iraqi Kurdistan’s political, economic, commercial and social success, underlining its safe and secure environment as well as its tolerance, relative prosperity, literacy and attractiveness to foreign investors, including American oil companies.
But he lambasted Iraq, describing its central government as headed towards dictatorship, unwilling to implement its constitution (by proceeding with the Article 140 referenda in disputed territories) or abide by the November 2010 Erbil agreement that was supposed to institute serious power-sharing among Kurdish, Shia and Sunni dominated political forces. Prime Minister Maliki is accumulating all sorts of power: over the security forces, the intelligence services, the judiciary and even over the central bank. If a constitutional solution to the current political impasse cannot be found, Barzani threatened to “go back to the people,” by calling as a last resort a referendum on a question to be posed by Kurdistan’s parliament at a time unspecified.
The threat was clearly stated, but left a lot of open questions. In addition to the timing and content, it was not clear how Kurdistan would handle the disputed territories in a referendum scenario or whether it was prepared to defend itself by military means from strengthening Iraqi security forces. Barzani foreswore the use of force, but indicated that an eventual clash might be inevitable. He did not comment on how he thought Ankara and Washington would react to an independence referendum.
On other issues, Barzani made it clear Kurdistan is trying to mend fences with Turkey, which has changed its tune on Kurdish issues. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) would cooperate “without limit” he said with non-military, non-violent efforts against the PKK (Kurdish insurgents who use Kurdistan as a safe haven but attack inside Turkey).
Barzani promised moral, political and financial assistance to the Syria’s Kurds, but said the decision whether to join the revolution would be left to them. The KRG would not provide weapons, he said.
Barzani noted the KRG’s common interest with the United States on Iran issues. Presumably Kurdish assistance in this respect was discussed in some detail in official meetings. Kurdistan supports UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, including those regarding sanctions in particular. U.S. influence in Iraq, Barzani said, depends not on the presence of American troops but on the degree of commitment in Washington. He clearly hoped to see more commitment to diverting Maliki from his current course.
Barzani declined to criticize Iraqi Parliament Speaker Nujayfi, noting that he has not accumulated or abused power the way Prime Minister Maliki has. On Iraqi Vice President Hashemi, who fled to Kurdistan to avoid arrest in Baghdad, Barzani said the Iraqi judicial system is inadequate to the task because the Prime Minister controls it.
Barzani sounded determined, but a referendum threat is only as credible as the likelihood that an independent Kurdistan will gain significant recognition. He may be buttering up Turkey and the U.S. in hopes of neutralizing their opposition to such a move, but he has a long way to go before they will contenance it.
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David Kanin responds
David Kanin writes, in response to my last:
Dan–
Thank you for sending me your twist on our discussion–it’s your blog, of course, and so you can post any interpretation you desire. In my view, you conceded a great deal more to me than I did to you (for example, over the failed US diplomatic efforts to replace 1244, and the fact that the error of forcing an asterisk on Kosova makes it essential to get the recalcitrant 5 EU members to recognize the new state and to convince the EU to make it clear Serbia does not get in without a solution to the question of Kovosar sovereignty–which, whether you admit it or not, remains contested).
Still, I am disappointed that you chose to misstate my position so baldly. From the beginning (by which I mean the piece I wrote that drew your ire), my position on the asterisk had nothing to do with the contents of 1244. My choice not to challenge your legalistic defense or the asterisk was based–as I said repeatedly but you chose not to mention in your blog–was that the details of the resolution were irrelevant. You are welcome to disagree with my opinion, but you really should at least reflect the views you are disagreeing with accurately.
In fact, I thought about bringing up 1244’s security annexes, because they provide a stronger Serbian claim to residual sovereignty than the language you noted, but–because I do not consider the 1244 argument important–I did not want to get bogged down in the minutiae of the resolution.
I could correct your misstatement of my views on your blog, but that would just draw out a discussion on a topic that–on this I agree with you–is getting somewhat old. It would be nice if you would at least correct the dodgy strawman you misrepresented as my view (or choose to reprint this note on your blog), but I leave that to you.
All that aside, I very much enjoyed yesterday’s discussion and am grateful you proposed it. I stand ready to reprise the experience on any topic at any time you desire.
David
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*?
I debate David Kanin, my colleague here at SAIS, today on the question the asterisk* question. Here are the notes I prepared for myself:
I appear before you today to debate the following proposition: that the asterisk* following Kosovo that will be used in European regional meetings somehow limits or conditions its sovereignty and independence.
That is not the case. The footnote attached to that asterisk * refers to two things: UN Security Council resolution 1244 and the advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence issued by the International Court of Justice. The advisory opinion says that the declaration was not illegal. The controversy, if there is any, concerns 1244.
I’ve got four factual propositions about 1244 for you today:
- UN Security Council resolution 1244 does nothing to preserve Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo but instead provides the basis for a final status decision.
- The process preliminary to a final status decision foreseen in resolution 1244 was completed in March 2007 when former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari reported to the UNSG.
- The decision itself was taken in the Kosovo declaration of independence, now accepted and recognized as establishing a sovereign state by 89 other sovereign states.
- The International Court of Justice, in response to a request initiated by Serbia, has advised that the declaration of independence violated no international law.
Let me explain.
1244: You may have heard, because Belgrade declares it long and loud, that UNSC resolution 1244 acknowledges Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. That it does. In the preamble, the resolution reaffirms “the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” But this is preambular language, which in international law is not binding. Circumstances change. The United States and 88 other countries have decided that they no longer wish to uphold a commitment that existed in 1999, but which they are not obligated to continue. This is their right: no one can claim that the United States gave up its right to extend recognition when it voted in favor of 1244. Certainly the ICJ did not think so.
The process preliminary to a final status decision: 1244 also “authorizes the Secretary General…to establish an international civilian presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.” This is complicated but it clearly associates “substantial autonomy within the FRY” with an interim UN administration. The resolution goes on to say that one of the main responsibilities of the international civilian presence is “promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo” as well as “facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.”
What was that political process? The President of the Security Council was absolutely clear: on October 24, 2005 he said “The Council…supports the United Nations Secretary-General’s intention to start a political process to determine Kosovo’s Final Status, as foreseen in Security Council resolution 1244…” The Secretary-General thereafter appointed Marti Ahtisaari to conduct that political process, with the full participation of Serbia and Montenegro as well as the Russian Federation. As Ahtisaari said in his final report: the Security Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo
…by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future.
That process concluded in March 2007 with Ahtisaari’s recommendation: “independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community” for Kosovo.
Serbia and Russia rejected this recommendation.
The final status decision: That was their right, but other states accepted it. Kosovo proceeded with its declaration of independence, which was not unilateral but thoroughly coordinated with not only the United States but also the European Union and many other states. When asked for its opinion, the ICJ could find nothing in international law—including in resolution 1244—to bar Kosovo from declaring its independence. Other sovereign states clearly have the right to recognize, or not, as they see fit.
Conclusion: So what does the asterisk signify? Nothing more than what it says in the footnote: a UNSC resolution that is the basis for a final decision on Kosovo and an ICJ opinion that found nothing unlawful about how the final decision was taken.
The asterisk conditions Serbia’s claims of sovereignty, denying them full validity, while doing nothing to limit Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence. I’d wear that asterisk with pride.
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The road to Damascus runs through Moscow
The Syrian National Council (SNC) issued its Covenant this week, while the Friends of Syria today issued the Chairman’s conclusions from its meeting in Istanbul.
Friends of Syria is a group of countries and international organizations that are supporting “the just cause of the Syrian people,” which they define as a transition away from dictatorship and towards democracy. Its statement is a tawdry model of diplomatic waffling. Mostly it reiterates things said previously, without the means or the will to make them happen. As Ian Black, The Guardian’s Middle East editor tweeted to me, “awful! reeks of urge to sound purposeful + united while ignoring toughest questions. diplomacy of lowest common denominator.”
Ironically, since Syria’s international friends have criticized the SNC repeatedly for its failure to outline a vision of the New Syria, the SNC statement is a model of clarity. The New Syria will be “a civil, democratic, pluralistic, independent and free state”:
Syria’s new democratic order will be founded on the principle of “unity in diversity” and will embrace all individuals and communities without any exclusion or discrimination.
If this is not explicit enough, the Covenant specifies:
The constitution will ensure non-discrimination between any of the religious, ethnic or national components of Syrian society – Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turkmens or others. It will recognize equal rights for all within the context of Syria’s territorial and demographic integrity and unity.
It is hard to beat this for clarity.
There is an important moment of fuzziness in the Covenant, though it could be a translation issue or just something on which I don’t have the required background. It says:
The transitional government will be committed to hold free and fair elections upon the fall of the current, illegitimate regime. A constituent assembly, formed by the transitional government, will engage in drafting a new constitution containing the principles of this Covenant and submit it to a free referendum.
Does the transitional government form the constituent assembly? It seems to me the constituent assembly should be the result of the elections. And who forms the transitional government? Does it exist before the constituent assembly elections and continue after them? How is it chosen? Or does the constituent assembly choose the transitional government? These are not small questions. I’ll hope that there is more clarity about them than in the English translation of the Covenant.
Of course the main question now is how to begin a transition when Bashar al Assad is still holding on to power, with pretty solid support from the Syrian army and security services as well as the country’s diplomats. Sadly, the Friends of Syria offer nary a hint, apart from urging no arms sales and tightening of sanctions. Humanitarian assistance, which the Friends emphasize, is not going to be sufficient to initiate the political dialogue that Kofi Annan’s plan calls for. If the revolutionaries are able to unsettle Damascus, spreading peaceful demonstrations throughout the capital, that would make a big difference.
The missing international piece of this puzzle is Russia. It has to be convinced to read Bashar the riot act. Only the Americans can hope to bring Moscow around to do this. The road to Damascus runs through Moscow.
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The joke is on us
The temptation to do an April Fool’s post is great, but the barriers are greater: how can anyone joke about Bashar al Assad murdering Syria’s citizens and managing nevertheless to stay in power? Or about nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian theocracy? A war we are losing in Afghanistan? A peace we are losing in Iraq? A re-assertive Russia determined to marginalize dissent? An indebted America dependent on a creditor China that requires 7-8% annual economic growth just to avoid massive social unrest? I suppose the Onion will manage, but I’m not even one of its outer layers.
Not that the world is more threatening than in the past. To the contrary. America today faces less threatening risks than it has at many times in the past. But there are a lot of them, and they are frighteningly varied. Drugs from Latin America, North Korean sales of nuclear and missile technology, Al Qaeda wherever, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the wrong hands, bird or swine flu… Wonks are competing to offer a single “grand strategy” in a situation that does not permit one. Doctrine deprived Obama has got it right: no “strategic vision” can deal with all these contingencies. They require a case by case approach, albeit one rooted in strength and guided by clear principles.
American military strength is uncontested in today’s world and unequaled for a couple of decades more, even in the most draconian of budget situations. A stronger economy is on the way, though uncertainty in Europe and China could derail it. All America’s problems would look easier to solve with a year or two, maybe even three, of 3-4% economic growth. The principles are the usual ones, which I would articulate this way:
- The first priority is to protect American national security
- Do it with cheaper civilian means as much as possible, more expensive military means when necessary
- Leverage the contributions of others when we can, act unilaterally when we must
- Build an international system that is legitimate, fair and just
- Cultivate friends, deter and when necessary defeat enemies
My students will immediately try to classify these proposition as “realist” or “idealist.” I hope I’ve formulated them in ways that make that impossible.
There are a lot of difficult issues lying in the interstices of these propositions. Is an international system that gives the victors in a war now more than 65 years in the past vetoes over UN Security Council action fair and just? Does it lead to fair and just outcomes? Civilian means seem to have failed in Syria, and seem to be failing with Iran, but are military means any more likely to succeed? If the threats to American national security are indirect but nonetheless real–when for example North Korea threatens a missile launch intended to intimidate Japan and South Korea–do we withhold humanitarian assistance?
America’s political system likes clear and unequivocal answers. It has categories into which it would like to toss each of us. Our elections revolve around identity politics almost as much as those in the Balkans. We create apparently self-evident myths about our leaders that don’t stand up to scrutiny.
The fact is that the world is complicated, the choices difficult, the categories irrelevant and the myths fantasies. That’s the joke: it’s on us.
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Maliki wins another bet
Nouri al Maliki, the prime minister orginally chosen in 2006 because he and his Dawa party were regarded as too weak to threaten the bigger fish of Iraqi politics, is improbably completing his sixth year in office (give or take a month or two) with another relative success: the Arab League Summit he hosted this week in Baghdad. It marks the reemergence of Iraq as a regional player, one which borders both Syria and Iran, the West’s two big preoccupations in the Middle East these days.
While the Western press is underlining that fewer than half the 22 heads of state attended the summit, the Iraqis will be glad to have gotten 10 of them to a security-handicapped Baghdad, including the Emir of Kuwait. That’s significant, not only because of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 but also because relations between the two countries were tense until recently.
Also significant is the absence of the other Gulf heads of state, who want to see better treatment of Sunnis in Iraq. Boycotts are not my style of diplomacy–they’d have done better to attend and complain. But I suppose the message was clear enough.
The main substantive issue was Syria. The Arab League is now backing Kofi Annan’s plan, which to Baghdad’s satisfaction backs off the demand that Bashar al Assad step down. Instead it talks about “an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people.” Anyone who has followed Maliki’s elastic interpretation of his domestic political commitments over the past year–in particular to his putative coalition partners Iraqiyya and the Kurdish bloc–will understand immediately that this language will not constrain him to insist that Bashar has to go.
That said, it is not really Iraq’s role, or even the Arab League’s, to push Bashar aside. That role belongs mainly to the Russians, who have so far protected him from a UN Security Council resolution. They are showing signs of impatience with their protégé, who is not looking so reliable these days. The Americans need to convince the Russians that they have better chances of maintaining their port access and arms sales in Syria with a successor who can last rather than a wobbly Bashar.
In the wake of the Summit, Iraq will take over the presidency of the Arab League from Qatar. This will put Baghdad in a decisive role vis-a-vis Syria during the period in which a denouement is likely to occur. Iraq will want to make sure that the successor regime in Damascus is one that does not feed Sunni insurgency in Iraq and treats Alawis gently.
Baghdad will face enormous challenges if Bashar al Assad does step down. The West will look to the Arab League for answers to difficult questions: how will law and order in Syria be maintained? What will have to be done to help it revive its flagging economy? Where will the necessary relief come for what are now likely more than a million refugees and displaced people? Iraq, not far itself from having been a basket case, will have a major role fixing another broken state.
But those challenges lie in the future. For the moment, Maliki can enjoy his earnings from what was a high stakes bet.
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