Tag: United Nations
Dumb and dumber
Serbian Interior Minister Ivica Dačić yesterday announced the arrest of two Kosovo Albanians in retaliation for the arrest of four Serbs by Kosovo authorities:
The reciprocal measures are not in Serbia’s interests and the Serbian police does not wish to do this….[but] this type of situation (arrests of Serbs) can obviously no longer happen without reciprocal measures.
I hardly need mention that “reciprocal” or retaliatory arrests have no place in a rule of law lexicon. Nor need I mention that doing things not in your country’s interest is dumb. With this singular act of hubris, Dačić has likely done more to tarnish Serbia’s European credentials than anyone else in recent months.
The problem goes deeper. The arrests were made under a warrant issued by a Serbian court, one that is no longer resident in Kosovo. This illustrates how little Belgrade respects UN Security Council resolution 1244, to which it appeals regularly and mistakenly as the basis for claims to Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. That resolution, if it did nothing else, put Kosovo–including its judicial system–under temporary UN administration, pending a decision on final status. Serbia does not accept the proposition that the decision has been made, which is its right. But under 1244 it has no right to be administering law in Kosovo.
The law under which the arrest was made includes, according to Balkan Insight, the following:
Whoever attempts to unconstitutionally bring Serbia or SaM[Serbia and Montenegro] into a position of subjugation or dependence in respect of another state, shall be punished by imprisonment of three to fifteen years.
So we are not talking small beans here. And the impact of the arrests will be much broader than on the two people arrested. It will curtail travel by Kosovo Albanians in Serbia, which the recent EU-brokered agreement between Belgrade and Pristina on travel documents and border regime was supposed to encourage.
Dačić is no fool. He knows full well that his move will bring him nationalist votes and embarrass President Tadić, who has sought to burnish Serbia’s European credentials as he tries to convince Brussels to give Serbia a date on which to start accession talks. Tadić is going to have a hard time explaining to Brussels why it should bend over backwards for Serbia when Belgrade is busy undoing an agreement the EU brokered.
What about the arrest of the four Serbs by the Pristina authorities? According to the press, they were carrying election materials for the May 6 Serbian elections, which Belgrade wants to conduct in Serb communities in Kosovo and Pristina wants to prevent.
I am sympathetic with those Kosovars who want to establish full sovereignty on the entire territory of Kosovo, but I still need to ask why it was necessary to arrest the four Serbs. Surely there are more nefarious activities going on than carrying election materials. I suspect the answer is that it will be a politically popular move for Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, who faces strong pressure from more nationalist Albanians to stop Serbia’s many activities inside Kosovo. But he also expects to visit Washington next week, where a provocative move like the arrests is unlikely to be welcome.
I’d call this dumb and dumber. I’ll let you decide which is which.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Geography and oil are fate
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki seems for the moment to be winning his high stakes bet on hosting the Arab League summit this week in Baghdad. The first bar is set pretty low: if the meeting comes off without any major security incidents or diplomatic kerfuffles, Iraq will be able to herald it as a successful milestone marking the return of Baghdad to regional prominence and a renewed role in the Arab world.
It could amount to more. It already says something about the Arab League that a Kurdish president and a Shia prime minister are leading an Arab League summit. Maliki has successfully courted improvements in relations with Sunni-dominated Egypt, Algeria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the last couple of months. Some are hoping he might use the occasion to tilt Iraq away from Iran, perhaps even capturing a significant role with Russia in the effort to manage a negotiated transition in Syria.
Of course the whole thing might still blow up, too. Either literally, if Al Qaeda in Iraq slips through Baghdad’s well-manned but still porous security cordons, or figuratively, if heads of state decline to attend or the Syria issue leads to a serious diplomatic breach with the Sunni Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar that would like to boot Bashar al Assad.
A successful Arab League summit could significantly improve Maliki’s standing at home, where he has also been doing some fence mending. His big achievement was passing the budget in parliament. His Sunni and Kurdish putative allies in parliament might still like to bring him down, but they have been unable to mount a serious threat and have not managed even to suggest an alternative majority. Besides, they like their cushy jobs.
Maliki may be mending his fences, but they are still fences. His majority is increasingly dependent on support from the Sadrists, whose reliance on Iran will limit his room to maneuver.
What does this mean for the U.S.? The most immediate issue is Syria: Washington would like Baghdad to help get Bashar to walk the plank. Tehran will resist that mightily, and if it happens will redouble its effort to create in Iraq any “strategic depth” it loses in Syria. Maliki can only gain from an end to the Assad regime if it gets him serious support from the Kurds and Sunnis within Iraq, as well as the broader Arab world. I’d like to believe that would happen, but he is unlikely to have enough confidence it would.
The longer-term issue is the political orientation of Iraq. Will it stand on its own and develop strong ties with the West, as well as with the Arab world and Iran? Or will it tilt inexorably in Iran’s direction, risking internal strife as well as its own independence? The Arab League summit is unlikely to have much long-term impact in determining this question. Iraq’s Sunnis are convinced Maliki is an Iranian stooge. The Americans still hope he’ll come around in their direction.
One major factor determining the outcome is rarely discussed, even in expert circles: how Iraq exports its oil and eventually also its gas. If it continues to put the vast bulk of its oil on to ships that have to pass through the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz under Iranian guns, Tehran’s influence will grow. But there is an alternative. If Baghdad repairs and expands the “strategic” pipeline to enable export of large quantities of oil (and eventually gas) to the north (to Turkey) and west (to Syria or Jordan), any government in Baghdad will see its links to the West as truly vital. Maliki’s government has been doing the needed feasibility studies, but it is not yet clear that it is ready to make the necessary decisions, since export to the north and west would mean crossing Kurdish and Sunni controlled territory.
Iraq once seemed hopelessly divided. But those divisions can be bridged, if there is political will to do so. Geography and oil are fate.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Arms and the man
My friends and colleagues are all over the lot on Syria. One suggests we consider going to war against Bashar al Assad, but then offers more, and more powerful, arguments against than in favor of the proposition. Some are criticizing the Obama administration for not supporting humanitarian safe zones and arming of the Syrian opposition, to be undertaken apparently by the Turks and Saudis respectively. Others view diplomatic and political support for the opposition combined with nonintervention as a strategically correct choice, one that undermines Iran and Russia and hurts their standing with the Sunni Arab world. Who is right?
It is of course difficult to say. I don’t doubt anyone’s sincerity in advocating one way or the other. But the arguments in favor of U.S. military intervention are simply not convincing: the Arab League hasn’t asked for it, the Security Council won’t approve it, and the consequences are wildly unpredictable. Besides, the U.S. needs to be ready in coming months to make a credible threat of the use of force against Iran’s nuclear program. Attacking Syria would undermine American readiness and reduce the credibility of the threat against Iran, which is arguably much more important for U.S. national security than Syria.
Humanitarian safe zones and arming the opposition don’t come out any better. Humanitarian zones are target-rich environments that will need protection from the Syrian army. They are not safe unless made safe. Doing so would be a major military undertaking, with all the disadvantages already cited. Arming the opposition would intensify the civil war, make a collapse of the Syrian state more likely, and spread sectarian and ethnic warfare to Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey. That is precisely what the United States should be avoiding, not encouraging.
The diplomatic approach the Administration has chosen is not fast and not easy, but it is beginning to show results. Tom Pickering, who knows as much about these things as anyone on earth, sees the UNSC presidential statement as a step forward:
What we need now is a concerted effort to convince the Russians that Bashar is a bad bet. If they want to keep port access in Syria, and arms sales there, they will need to switch horses and back a transition. Bashar will not last long once they make that decision: the Russians can cut off financial and military resources without which he knows he cannot survive.
The question is whether a threat to arm the opposition might help with the diplomacy. This is arguable, it seems to me, and in any case it is what is happening. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have made a lot of noise about arming the opposition. It would be surprising if they weren’t already doing it, and preparing to do more. I don’t expect it to have much impact on the battlefield, where the Syrian army has a clear advantage, especially when it uses artillery against civilian population centers. But it could help to tilt the Russians against Bashar and create a sense of urgency about passing a UNSC resolution that begins the transition process.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The view of Tehran from Rome
So, you might ask, how did the Italians react to my presentation today at the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) on the Iranian nuclear program?
My co-presenter, Riccardo Alcaro, made a number of interesting points:
- A military attack would end International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and the information they provide, making uncertainty about it much greater and increasing the difficulty of repeated military action after the first effort.
- There is an important distinction between Israel’s concerns, which focus on the existential threat of Iranian nukes as well as the need to maintain Israeli strategic superiority, and American/European concerns that have more to do with an unstable Middle East.
- Europe has played a constructive role at several important moments in dealing diplomatically with Iran and will likely continue to do so, even if it cannot lead the effort.
Riccardo views Israel’s concern with the existential threat as exaggerated. He also notes that nuclear weapons have never really given any state enhanced regional capability to compel others to do as the nuclear state wants. I think he is basically correct about this. Nuclear weapons contribute to the frame in which power relations are determined, but they do not provide a practical diplomatic or military tool.
Questioning focused on the legal basis for military action, the significance of proposals for a nuclear-free (or WMD-free) zone in the Middle East, the reaction of Sunni Arabs to a military attack on Iran, and whether American aversion to containment might moderate after the U.S. election.
In response, I offered a few thoughts. Harold Koh (the State Department legal advisor) will surely write a good memo on the legal basis, but it is also possible it would be fixed after the fact, as the intervention in Kosovo was. The Americans simply don’t have the kind of prohibition on military action without UN approval that several European countries have in their constitutions. The nuclear free zone is a lovely idea with no practical impact; it will be a consequence of peace in the Middle East, not a cause of it. The Muslim Brotherhoods that have been the big political winners thus far in Tunisia and Egypt are still developing their relations with the United States. The Sunni street, which is admittedly more important after the Arab spring than before it, may not respond sympathetically to Iran. The successful use of force has its own logic.
On containment, the Americans will certainly turn to it if their efforts to prevent Iran getting nuclear weapons (including military action) fail. What other choice would they have? In that case several Sunni Arab states may decide to develop nuclear weapons, unless the Americans provide a credible nuclear umbrella. But that is precisely what the Americans do not want to do. I can’t say failure to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons is not an option, since it always is a possibility. But its consequences could be devastating to American hope of turning attention away from the Middle East to Asia and the Pacific.
The Iranian embassy official present, first counselor Ahmad Hajihosseini, averred that Iran is a victim in all this talk about nuclear weapons and complained that no Iranian was on the panel. I of course would welcome an Iranian speaker at Johns Hopkins, as IAI would in Rome. And I don’t think it was so bad an idea for Tehran to get a report on this discussion among Americans and Europeans.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Blink, or else
I am speaking tomorrow at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on Iran, the United States and Europe. Here are the speaking notes I’ve prepared for myself.
1. This year’s biggest foreign policy puzzle is how to handle Iran and its nuclear program. The piece of this puzzle I would like to talk about is Washington. What have the Americans got in mind? What are they trying to achieve? What will they do to achieve it? What happens if they fail?
2. The objective is clear: President Obama aims to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. He rejects containment. He has broad support in the Congress and beyond for this position.
3. There should really be no doubt about American willingness to use force to achieve this goal. If diplomacy fails to stop Iran from moving toward nuclear weapons, the Americans will attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, and possibly much more.
4. This would not be a one-time decision. It would only set back the Iranian nuclear effort a year or two. We will have to repeat the attacks, likely at more frequent intervals. I don’t agree with Marvin Weinbaum that the Iranians will welcome military action, but it offers only a temporary and unsatisfactory solution. That may be enough for Israel, as Richard Cohen suggests, but it is not good enough for the U.S., which has other priorities in the world and needs to tend them.
5. Karl Bildt and Erkki Tuomioja, foreign ministers of Sweden and Finland, are also wrong to suggest diplomacy is the only option. But it is a preferred option. In a little noted passage in his interview with Jeffrey Goldberg earlier this month, the President outlined what his preference:
…the only way, historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That’s what happened in Libya, that’s what happened in South Africa. And we think that, without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interested. They recognize that they are in a bad, bad place right now. It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to be the best decision for Israel’s security.
6. David Frum misinterprets this passage as meaning that the president is bluffing on the use of force. That is a mistake. But Obama is clearly saying he prefers a diplomatic solution, because it has the potential to be longer-lasting than the military one.
7. From the Washington perspective, Iran is in diplomatic, political and economic isolation. The P5+1 are united. Sanctions are biting. The Sunni Arab world has come to the realization that Iranian nuclear weapons will require a response, one that will make the Middle East a far more dangerous place than it has been even in the past several decades.
8. Many countries have made the commitment that the President is referring to. They usually do it by signing and ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty (or in Latin America the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and agreeing to strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Brazil and Argentina made this commitment in the 1990s.
9. The trouble is that Iran, a state party to the NPT, has violated its commitments by undertaking uranium enrichment outside the inspection regime and also working on nuclear explosives. So President Obama will be looking for verifiable commitments reflecting a genuine decision not to pursue nuclear weapons, based on the calculation that Iran will be better off without them.
10. How could that be? Acquisition of nuclear weapons creates security dilemmas for Tehran. The United States will target a nuclear Iran (we have foresworn first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, but not against nuclear weapons states), Israel will not only target Iran but also launch on warning, and other countries in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Egypt?) are likely to begin seriously to pursue nuclear weapons, greatly complicating Iran’s situation.
11. Keeping its enrichment technology but giving up on nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a good deal of prestige without creating as many problems. U.S. intelligence leaks claim that Iran has not in fact made the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, leaving the door open to an agreement along the lines the President suggests.
12. Such a diplomatic solution would require Iran to agree to rigorous and comprehensive inspections as well as limit enrichment to well below weapons grade, which is 90% and above.
13. The question is whether the internal politics of the three countries most directly involved (United States, Iran and Israel) will allow an agreement along these lines. As Martin Indyk points out, they are currently engaged in a vicious cycle game of chicken: Israel threatens military action, the U.S. ratchets up sanctions to forestall it, Iran doubles down on the nuclear program, causing the Israelis to threaten even more….
14. Can Obama deliver on such a diplomatic solution? The Americans are hard to read. Best to listen to is Senator Mitch McConnell, who as Senate opposition leader represents the anti-Obama position. He declared earlier this month:
If Iran, at any time, begins to enrich uranium to weapons-grade level, or decides to go forward with a weapons program, then the United States will use overwhelming force to end that program.
15. This was generally read as a belligerent statement, since it makes explicit the American willingness to use military force if its red lines are crossed. But in fact it is consistent with the kind of diplomatic solution Obama has in mind.
16. But this Obama/McConnell proposition asks of Iran considerably less than Israel would like. Israel wants to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons capability. This means giving up the technology required to enrich uranium to weapons grade or reprocess plutonium.
17. No country I know of has given up uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technology, once acquired. It isn’t even clear what it would mean to do so, since the know-how resides in scientists’ brains and not in any given physical plant.
18. If war is to be avoided, someone has to break the cycle Indyk refers to, putting a deal on the table. Daniel Levy suggests that Netanyahu is not really committed to Israeli military action but is trying to stiffen Obama’s spine. He is unlikely to blink. Obama is constrained because of the American elections from appearing soft on Iran. He has to appear ready and willing to use military force.
19. This leaves a possible initiative to Tehran, which is free to move now that its parliamentary elections have been held. They marked a defeat for President Ahmedinejad, who has appeared to be the Iranian official most willing to deal on the nuclear program. Supreme Leader Khamenei is more committed to the game of chicken. He may even think nuclear weapons necessary to his regime’s survival, a conclusion Indyk thinks rational in light of what has happened with North Korea on the one hand and Libya on the other.
20. It is really anyone’s guess what Khamenei will do. But at least he has an undivided polity behind him. My hope is that either he or Obama–better both–decide to blink and cut a deal that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions definitively and avoids a military effort that will have to be repeated at shorter intervals for a long time to come.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks this week
I’m late with this week’s top items. Missed two good ones today: on Syria option at Brookings and on war with Iran at Georgetown. I hope you caught them. Here is the rest of the week, with most of the interesting stuff on Wednesday:
1. The Human Rights Situation in Syria: An Assessment by the United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry, Brookings, 4:30-6 pm March 20
For the past year, the international community has been largely paralyzed in responding to Bashar al-Assad’s violent repression of protests in Syria. Though the United Nations Security Council has failed to pass a condemnatory resolution, the UN Human Rights Council swiftly established an independent international Commission of Inquiry in September 2011 to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since the beginning of the uprising. After extensive interviews with victims and witnesses, the commission’s report presented this month concluded that the Syrian military and security forces have been committing gross violations of human rights since the onset of the protests.
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
RELATED CONTENT
On March 20, Managing Global Order and the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host the members of the commission to discuss the findings of this recently released report. Paulo Pinhiero, chairman of the commission, along with commissioners Yakin Ertürk and Karen AbuZayd will provide an overview of their investigation and describe the current human rights situation in Syria. Senior Fellow Ted Piccone, deputy director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.After the program, panelists will take audience questions.
Participants
Panelists
Karen AbuZayd
Commissioner, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former Commissioner General, UN Relief and Works Agency
Yakin Ertürk
Commissioner, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
Paulo Pinheiro
Chairperson, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar
2. Challenging the Axis of Resistance: Syria, Iran and the Strategic Balance in the Middle East, Reserve Officers Association, One Constitution Avenue, NE 7:30-9 am March 21
The Iran-Syria alliance poses significant challenges for U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. Iran’s support for Syria has helped the Assad regime sustain a brutal campaign of repression against the Syrian people, insulating it from the full effect of international and Arab sanctions. Syria’s support for Iran has enhanced Tehran’s regional influence, promoted Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon, and helped to consolidate an “axis of resistance” that has reshaped the strategic balance in the Middle East.
Please join Jay Solomon, foreign affairs correspondent of the Wall Street Journal, and Daniel Brumberg, USIP’s senior adviser in the Center for Conflict Management, as they examine two of the most significant challenges for the Middle East, Iran and Syria, and the ramifications that their interplay has for U.S. regional strategy. The discussion will be moderated by Steven Heydemann, senior adviser for Middle East Initiatives at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
This is the third in a series of breakfast briefings titled, “A Year of Turmoil: The Arab Awakening and the Path Ahead.” The briefings are organized by the United States Institute of Peace in partnership with the Defense Education Forum of the Reserve Officers Association.
Speakers
- Jay Solomon, Discussant
Foreign Affairs Correspondent
Wall Street Journal - Daniel Brumberg, Discussant
Senior Adviser, Center for Conflict Management
U.S. Institute of Peace - Steven Heydemann, Moderator
Senior Adviser for Middle East Initiatives
U.S. Institute of Peace
Breakfast will be available at 7:30am, followed by the moderated discussion from 8-9am.
3. Iran and the West at a Crossroad: Will Recent Elections Make or Break a Deal on Iran’s Nuclear Program? Middle East Institute, 12-13:15 pm March 21
Location:
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has described upcoming talks with Iran over its nuclear program as “the last chance to resolve the crisis.” Yet as the final hour approaches for an opportunity to avert a military attack, there are few apparent signs Iran will make compromises. Recent parliamentary elections have only strengthened the power of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the hardliners in his inner circle who aspire to make the Islamic republic a regional superpower. Join us for a discussion with Geneive Abdo and Syed Aliakbar Mousavi on the impact of the elections on the future of Iran’s nuclear program, and the outlook for the forthcoming negotiations aimed at de-escalating U.S.-Iranian tensions.
Bio:
Geneive Abdo is the director of the Iran Program at The Century Foundation, a Washington and New York-based think tank. Her current research focuses on contemporary Iran and political Islam. She is the creator and editor of the newly-launched website: www.insideIRAN.org She was formerly the Liaison Officer for the Alliance of Civilizations, a U.N. initiative under Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Before joining the United Nations, Abdo was a foreign correspondent. Her 20-year career focused on coverage of the Middle East and the Muslim world. From 1998-2001, Abdo was the Iran correspondent for the Guardian and a regular contributor to the Economist and the International Herald Tribune. Abdo is the author of No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam (Oxford University Press, 2000), and Mecca and Main Street (Oxford University Press, 2006). Abdo’s commentaries and essays on Islam have appeared in Foreign Policy, the New York Times, and the Washington Post, among other outlets. She has been a commentator on NPR the BBC, the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, CNN, and al-Jazeera,
Seyed Aliakbar Mousavi is a visiting fellow at the University of Maryland and a digital freedom & human rights activist. From 2000 to 2004, Mousavi served as a member of the 6th Parliament of Iran, where he held several positions including Deputy of the Parliamentary ICT Committee, Secretary of the Tehran District, and Head of Inspecting and Supervising of Prisons. Currently, he advises the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, an advocacy group based in the United States, and was a visiting fellow in the Iranian Studies program at Stanford University. He is the founder and former general secretary of the Iranian Graduates Organization and was a member of the Central Council of the Iranian Students Union. Mousavi was also a participant in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), and an founder of the Prisoners Rights Defense Association.
4. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Looking for the Arab Spring, Georgetown University, 12:30-2 pm March 21
This event requires a ticket or RSVP
The Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding
invites you to:
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Looking for the Arab Spring
________________________
featuring:
Natana J. DeLong-Bas
________________________
Wednesday, March 21
12:30pm – ICC 270
________________________
In the midst of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia alone seems to have escaped public protests over corruption, authoritarianism and the quest for more equitable sharing of benefits. This impression masks the realities of life and reform within the Kingdom. This presentation explores some of the ways in which Saudi Arabia is working to address the challenges of the Arab Spring from a long-term perspective, offering analysis of areas of both stability and uncertainty for the future.
________________________
Dr. Natana J. DeLong-Bas is the author of Jihad for Islam: The Struggle for the Future of Saudi Arabia (forthcoming, Oxford, 2012), Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (rev. ed., Oxford, 2008 – named “1 of the 5 best books for understanding Islam” by the Wall Street Journal), and Notable Muslims: Muslim Builders of World Civilization and Culture (OneWorld, 2006), and co-author of Women in Muslim Family Law (with John L. Esposito, rev. ed., Syracuse, 2001). She is Editor-in-Chief of [The Oxford] Encylopedia of Islam and Women (forthcoming, Oxford, 2012) and Deputy Editor of The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World and Oxford Islamic Studies Online (Oxford, 2008), as well as serving on the Advisory Board for Oxford Bibliographies Online – Islamic Studies. She serves as a consultant to the media, the US and international governments and corporations and is a member of The British Council’s Our Shared Future Opinion Leaders Network. Her Op-Ed pieces on contemporary issues in Islam have been published in the US, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. She teaches comparative theology (Islam and Christianity) at Boston College.
___________________________________________________________
Please RSVP here:
http://gulfarabspring.eventbrite.com/
Seating is limited.
Lunch will be served.
5. Halting the Descent:U.S. Policy toward the Deteriorating Situation in Iraq, 2172 Rayburn, 1:30 pm March 21
You are respectfully requested to attend the following open hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building.
General Jack Keane, USA, Retired
(Former Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army)
Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA, Retired
Senior Fellow
Institute for the Study of War
Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D.
President
Institute for the Study of War
Colin H. Kahl, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow
Center for a New American Security
6. Ahmed Rashid – Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Politics and Prose, 7 pm March 21
Four years after his Descent into Chaos, the Lahore-based Pakistani journalist reassesses the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan and offers suggestions for American foreign policy in the region. He pays particular attention to the role of the Taliban and the reliability of American allies.
- 5015 Connecticut Ave NW
- Washington, District Of Columbia
RSS - Posts
