Tag: United Nations
Blink, or else
I am speaking tomorrow at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on Iran, the United States and Europe. Here are the speaking notes I’ve prepared for myself.
1. This year’s biggest foreign policy puzzle is how to handle Iran and its nuclear program. The piece of this puzzle I would like to talk about is Washington. What have the Americans got in mind? What are they trying to achieve? What will they do to achieve it? What happens if they fail?
2. The objective is clear: President Obama aims to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. He rejects containment. He has broad support in the Congress and beyond for this position.
3. There should really be no doubt about American willingness to use force to achieve this goal. If diplomacy fails to stop Iran from moving toward nuclear weapons, the Americans will attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, and possibly much more.
4. This would not be a one-time decision. It would only set back the Iranian nuclear effort a year or two. We will have to repeat the attacks, likely at more frequent intervals. I don’t agree with Marvin Weinbaum that the Iranians will welcome military action, but it offers only a temporary and unsatisfactory solution. That may be enough for Israel, as Richard Cohen suggests, but it is not good enough for the U.S., which has other priorities in the world and needs to tend them.
5. Karl Bildt and Erkki Tuomioja, foreign ministers of Sweden and Finland, are also wrong to suggest diplomacy is the only option. But it is a preferred option. In a little noted passage in his interview with Jeffrey Goldberg earlier this month, the President outlined what his preference:
…the only way, historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That’s what happened in Libya, that’s what happened in South Africa. And we think that, without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interested. They recognize that they are in a bad, bad place right now. It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to be the best decision for Israel’s security.
6. David Frum misinterprets this passage as meaning that the president is bluffing on the use of force. That is a mistake. But Obama is clearly saying he prefers a diplomatic solution, because it has the potential to be longer-lasting than the military one.
7. From the Washington perspective, Iran is in diplomatic, political and economic isolation. The P5+1 are united. Sanctions are biting. The Sunni Arab world has come to the realization that Iranian nuclear weapons will require a response, one that will make the Middle East a far more dangerous place than it has been even in the past several decades.
8. Many countries have made the commitment that the President is referring to. They usually do it by signing and ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty (or in Latin America the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and agreeing to strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Brazil and Argentina made this commitment in the 1990s.
9. The trouble is that Iran, a state party to the NPT, has violated its commitments by undertaking uranium enrichment outside the inspection regime and also working on nuclear explosives. So President Obama will be looking for verifiable commitments reflecting a genuine decision not to pursue nuclear weapons, based on the calculation that Iran will be better off without them.
10. How could that be? Acquisition of nuclear weapons creates security dilemmas for Tehran. The United States will target a nuclear Iran (we have foresworn first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, but not against nuclear weapons states), Israel will not only target Iran but also launch on warning, and other countries in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Egypt?) are likely to begin seriously to pursue nuclear weapons, greatly complicating Iran’s situation.
11. Keeping its enrichment technology but giving up on nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a good deal of prestige without creating as many problems. U.S. intelligence leaks claim that Iran has not in fact made the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, leaving the door open to an agreement along the lines the President suggests.
12. Such a diplomatic solution would require Iran to agree to rigorous and comprehensive inspections as well as limit enrichment to well below weapons grade, which is 90% and above.
13. The question is whether the internal politics of the three countries most directly involved (United States, Iran and Israel) will allow an agreement along these lines. As Martin Indyk points out, they are currently engaged in a vicious cycle game of chicken: Israel threatens military action, the U.S. ratchets up sanctions to forestall it, Iran doubles down on the nuclear program, causing the Israelis to threaten even more….
14. Can Obama deliver on such a diplomatic solution? The Americans are hard to read. Best to listen to is Senator Mitch McConnell, who as Senate opposition leader represents the anti-Obama position. He declared earlier this month:
If Iran, at any time, begins to enrich uranium to weapons-grade level, or decides to go forward with a weapons program, then the United States will use overwhelming force to end that program.
15. This was generally read as a belligerent statement, since it makes explicit the American willingness to use military force if its red lines are crossed. But in fact it is consistent with the kind of diplomatic solution Obama has in mind.
16. But this Obama/McConnell proposition asks of Iran considerably less than Israel would like. Israel wants to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons capability. This means giving up the technology required to enrich uranium to weapons grade or reprocess plutonium.
17. No country I know of has given up uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technology, once acquired. It isn’t even clear what it would mean to do so, since the know-how resides in scientists’ brains and not in any given physical plant.
18. If war is to be avoided, someone has to break the cycle Indyk refers to, putting a deal on the table. Daniel Levy suggests that Netanyahu is not really committed to Israeli military action but is trying to stiffen Obama’s spine. He is unlikely to blink. Obama is constrained because of the American elections from appearing soft on Iran. He has to appear ready and willing to use military force.
19. This leaves a possible initiative to Tehran, which is free to move now that its parliamentary elections have been held. They marked a defeat for President Ahmedinejad, who has appeared to be the Iranian official most willing to deal on the nuclear program. Supreme Leader Khamenei is more committed to the game of chicken. He may even think nuclear weapons necessary to his regime’s survival, a conclusion Indyk thinks rational in light of what has happened with North Korea on the one hand and Libya on the other.
20. It is really anyone’s guess what Khamenei will do. But at least he has an undivided polity behind him. My hope is that either he or Obama–better both–decide to blink and cut a deal that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions definitively and avoids a military effort that will have to be repeated at shorter intervals for a long time to come.
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Peace picks this week
I’m late with this week’s top items. Missed two good ones today: on Syria option at Brookings and on war with Iran at Georgetown. I hope you caught them. Here is the rest of the week, with most of the interesting stuff on Wednesday:
1. The Human Rights Situation in Syria: An Assessment by the United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry, Brookings, 4:30-6 pm March 20
For the past year, the international community has been largely paralyzed in responding to Bashar al-Assad’s violent repression of protests in Syria. Though the United Nations Security Council has failed to pass a condemnatory resolution, the UN Human Rights Council swiftly established an independent international Commission of Inquiry in September 2011 to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since the beginning of the uprising. After extensive interviews with victims and witnesses, the commission’s report presented this month concluded that the Syrian military and security forces have been committing gross violations of human rights since the onset of the protests.
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
RELATED CONTENT
On March 20, Managing Global Order and the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host the members of the commission to discuss the findings of this recently released report. Paulo Pinhiero, chairman of the commission, along with commissioners Yakin Ertürk and Karen AbuZayd will provide an overview of their investigation and describe the current human rights situation in Syria. Senior Fellow Ted Piccone, deputy director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.After the program, panelists will take audience questions.
Participants
Panelists
Karen AbuZayd
Commissioner, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former Commissioner General, UN Relief and Works Agency
Yakin Ertürk
Commissioner, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
Paulo Pinheiro
Chairperson, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar
2. Challenging the Axis of Resistance: Syria, Iran and the Strategic Balance in the Middle East, Reserve Officers Association, One Constitution Avenue, NE 7:30-9 am March 21
The Iran-Syria alliance poses significant challenges for U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. Iran’s support for Syria has helped the Assad regime sustain a brutal campaign of repression against the Syrian people, insulating it from the full effect of international and Arab sanctions. Syria’s support for Iran has enhanced Tehran’s regional influence, promoted Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon, and helped to consolidate an “axis of resistance” that has reshaped the strategic balance in the Middle East.
Please join Jay Solomon, foreign affairs correspondent of the Wall Street Journal, and Daniel Brumberg, USIP’s senior adviser in the Center for Conflict Management, as they examine two of the most significant challenges for the Middle East, Iran and Syria, and the ramifications that their interplay has for U.S. regional strategy. The discussion will be moderated by Steven Heydemann, senior adviser for Middle East Initiatives at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
This is the third in a series of breakfast briefings titled, “A Year of Turmoil: The Arab Awakening and the Path Ahead.” The briefings are organized by the United States Institute of Peace in partnership with the Defense Education Forum of the Reserve Officers Association.
Speakers
- Jay Solomon, Discussant
Foreign Affairs Correspondent
Wall Street Journal - Daniel Brumberg, Discussant
Senior Adviser, Center for Conflict Management
U.S. Institute of Peace - Steven Heydemann, Moderator
Senior Adviser for Middle East Initiatives
U.S. Institute of Peace
Breakfast will be available at 7:30am, followed by the moderated discussion from 8-9am.
3. Iran and the West at a Crossroad: Will Recent Elections Make or Break a Deal on Iran’s Nuclear Program? Middle East Institute, 12-13:15 pm March 21
Location:
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has described upcoming talks with Iran over its nuclear program as “the last chance to resolve the crisis.” Yet as the final hour approaches for an opportunity to avert a military attack, there are few apparent signs Iran will make compromises. Recent parliamentary elections have only strengthened the power of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the hardliners in his inner circle who aspire to make the Islamic republic a regional superpower. Join us for a discussion with Geneive Abdo and Syed Aliakbar Mousavi on the impact of the elections on the future of Iran’s nuclear program, and the outlook for the forthcoming negotiations aimed at de-escalating U.S.-Iranian tensions.
Bio:
Geneive Abdo is the director of the Iran Program at The Century Foundation, a Washington and New York-based think tank. Her current research focuses on contemporary Iran and political Islam. She is the creator and editor of the newly-launched website: www.insideIRAN.org She was formerly the Liaison Officer for the Alliance of Civilizations, a U.N. initiative under Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Before joining the United Nations, Abdo was a foreign correspondent. Her 20-year career focused on coverage of the Middle East and the Muslim world. From 1998-2001, Abdo was the Iran correspondent for the Guardian and a regular contributor to the Economist and the International Herald Tribune. Abdo is the author of No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam (Oxford University Press, 2000), and Mecca and Main Street (Oxford University Press, 2006). Abdo’s commentaries and essays on Islam have appeared in Foreign Policy, the New York Times, and the Washington Post, among other outlets. She has been a commentator on NPR the BBC, the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, CNN, and al-Jazeera,
Seyed Aliakbar Mousavi is a visiting fellow at the University of Maryland and a digital freedom & human rights activist. From 2000 to 2004, Mousavi served as a member of the 6th Parliament of Iran, where he held several positions including Deputy of the Parliamentary ICT Committee, Secretary of the Tehran District, and Head of Inspecting and Supervising of Prisons. Currently, he advises the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, an advocacy group based in the United States, and was a visiting fellow in the Iranian Studies program at Stanford University. He is the founder and former general secretary of the Iranian Graduates Organization and was a member of the Central Council of the Iranian Students Union. Mousavi was also a participant in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), and an founder of the Prisoners Rights Defense Association.
4. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Looking for the Arab Spring, Georgetown University, 12:30-2 pm March 21
This event requires a ticket or RSVP
The Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding
invites you to:
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Looking for the Arab Spring
________________________
featuring:
Natana J. DeLong-Bas
________________________
Wednesday, March 21
12:30pm – ICC 270
________________________
In the midst of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia alone seems to have escaped public protests over corruption, authoritarianism and the quest for more equitable sharing of benefits. This impression masks the realities of life and reform within the Kingdom. This presentation explores some of the ways in which Saudi Arabia is working to address the challenges of the Arab Spring from a long-term perspective, offering analysis of areas of both stability and uncertainty for the future.
________________________
Dr. Natana J. DeLong-Bas is the author of Jihad for Islam: The Struggle for the Future of Saudi Arabia (forthcoming, Oxford, 2012), Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (rev. ed., Oxford, 2008 – named “1 of the 5 best books for understanding Islam” by the Wall Street Journal), and Notable Muslims: Muslim Builders of World Civilization and Culture (OneWorld, 2006), and co-author of Women in Muslim Family Law (with John L. Esposito, rev. ed., Syracuse, 2001). She is Editor-in-Chief of [The Oxford] Encylopedia of Islam and Women (forthcoming, Oxford, 2012) and Deputy Editor of The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World and Oxford Islamic Studies Online (Oxford, 2008), as well as serving on the Advisory Board for Oxford Bibliographies Online – Islamic Studies. She serves as a consultant to the media, the US and international governments and corporations and is a member of The British Council’s Our Shared Future Opinion Leaders Network. Her Op-Ed pieces on contemporary issues in Islam have been published in the US, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. She teaches comparative theology (Islam and Christianity) at Boston College.
___________________________________________________________
Please RSVP here:
http://gulfarabspring.eventbrite.com/
Seating is limited.
Lunch will be served.
5. Halting the Descent:U.S. Policy toward the Deteriorating Situation in Iraq, 2172 Rayburn, 1:30 pm March 21
You are respectfully requested to attend the following open hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building.
General Jack Keane, USA, Retired
(Former Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army)
Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA, Retired
Senior Fellow
Institute for the Study of War
Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D.
President
Institute for the Study of War
Colin H. Kahl, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow
Center for a New American Security
6. Ahmed Rashid – Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Politics and Prose, 7 pm March 21
Four years after his Descent into Chaos, the Lahore-based Pakistani journalist reassesses the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan and offers suggestions for American foreign policy in the region. He pays particular attention to the role of the Taliban and the reliability of American allies.
- 5015 Connecticut Ave NW
- Washington, District Of Columbia
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Shut out
Max Boot in the Washington Post today makes the case for U.S.-led military intervention in Syria. Zack Beauchamp at foreignpolicy.com makes the case for relying on diplomatic, political and economic tools. Zack wins. The score isn’t even close.
Boot
Boot dismisses most of the downsides of military intervention without serious discussion. He cites Syria’s lack of air defense effectiveness against Israel in 1982 (sic) and in 2007, when the Israelis achieved strategic and tactical surprise in a one-time raid on a single target. The inapplicability of these instances to a major, fully anticipated air campaign against multiple targets in urban areas in 2012 should be obvious. An American-led air war in Syria is going to be difficult and kill a lot of civilians.
Likewise, Boot writes off the large Syrian army as mostly conscripts and unmotivated. But it has also proven cohesive during a year of attacking Syrian cities. There have been few defections compared, for example, to Libya. The notion that only Alawites will fight for Bashar al Assad, as Boot implies, is just wrong.
Boot also writes off the argument that we don’t want to get into a proxy war with Iran, claiming that the Iranians are already fighting a war with the U.S., or with Russia, saying Moscow won’t fight for Bashar. But he doesn’t even consider the political and military risks to our ability to attack Iran, if that proves necessary to prevent it from building nuclear weapons, arising from a prior attack on Syria. The Obama Administration is not making a mistake to keep its powder dry if it wants to maintain a serious military threat against Tehran’s nuclear program.
Claiming that we have not even provided communications capabilities to the Syrian opposition, which is surely untrue, Boot says Syria is already in a civil war and doesn’t bother considering whether foreign military intervention could make things worse rather than better. After all, our other Middle Eastern military adventures have gone swimmingly over the past 10 years, without any blowback that undermines U.S. national security?
Our military intervention will also somehow prevent Syrian chemical weapons from falling into the wrong hands. The evidence on this question in Libya is still not in, but I’ll bet we haven’t prevented it entirely there, where our assets were much stronger than what they are likely to be in Syria.
Beauchamp
Zack doubts that airstrikes can have the desired impact in urban areas. He also notes the strength of the Syrian army (relative to the Libyan one) and the divisions in the opposition (also relative to the Libyan one). “Safe zones” would be target-rich environments for the Syrian army and difficult to defend for those intervening. Ground troops would be required. As for chemical weapons, Bashar might well use them in the event of an international military intervention, making things much more deadly than they would otherwise have been.
Beauchamp also considers the negative implications of a U.S.-led military intervention without Security Council approval. It would, he says, stiffen Indian, Brazilian and other resistance to “responsibility to protect,” undermining its usefulness in the future. Certainly there is ample reason to believe this.
Instead, he suggests we rely on diplomatic, political and economic pressure: referral of Bashar al Assad to the International Criminal Court (ICC), assurances to the Russians that their interests will be served in a post-Assad Syria, and consideration of renunciation of any debt Bashar incurs now as “odious,” i.e. not to be repaid. These are, admittedly, not strong options: the Security Council referral to the ICC is unlikely, assurances already offered have not yet moved the Russians, and anyone who still thinks Bashar’s debts are going to be repaid in full if the opposition wins is smoking something.
Shut out. These are, nevertheless, the right approaches to a problem for whose solution there are no good options. A U.S.-led military intervention without a UN Security Council resolution or even an Arab League request is a non-starter. I’d call this one four or five to zero for Beauchamp. And he didn’t even know what game he was playing: his piece is mostly about R2P and how it is properly applied to Syria. He’s right on that too.
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What now?
Bashar al Assad and his opponents have now both rejected Kofi Annan’s mission impossible. On behalf of the UN and the Arab League, he sought a ceasefire, followed by humanitarian aid and dialogue on a political solution.
This failure was not surprising. His was always a low-probability proposition. But the rejection came faster than I anticipated. I’d have guessed that Bashar would see some benefit in stringing Annan along.
Instead he slapped Annan’s proposition down without hesitation, grabbing some World Health Organization support for a Syrian Red Crescent mission to assess health needs in conflict areas. Not bad: wage war against your own population, then get the internationals to pay for your own cronies to assess the damage.
Bashar is feeling his cheerios. Russian support is holding. Arab threats to arm his opponents seem not much more than hot air at this point. Lots of small arms are getting in to Syria, but they won’t do much against Bashar’s armor and artillery. Defections are growing, but the numbers are small and they still have not reached into the inner circle.
It is a bit harder to explain the attitude of the opposition, which is feeling abandoned by the West and not much supported in the East. They’d have gained more from supporting Annan’s initiative, and then having Bashar reject it, than by opposing it from the first. They want Bashar out before dialogue can take place, which I understand perfectly well. But they just don’t have the horsepower at the moment to make it happen.
Many, though not all, in the opposition want arms for the Free Syrian Army, the network of defectors who have refused to fire on demonstrators and taken up the cudgels against Bashar. The problem is that arming the opposition will prolong the civil war and make it ever more sectarian, which is precisely what the West does not want.
The opposition’s main hope is international military intervention against Bashar, which still seems to me a distant prospect. An American military attack on Syria without Security Council approval and in the midst of a high-stakes diplomatic duel with Iran over its nuclear program is unlikely. Washington will want to keep its powder dry for the main battle. Europe is absorbed in its defense of the Euro.
A combined Turkish/Arab attack on Syria is theoretically possible. But without Security Council approval and extensive U.S. support, it risks political and military failure. There are already far too many hints of a broad and prolonged Sunni/Shia war in the Middle East. Do we really want to throw fuel on that fire?
This leaves us with few alternatives other than continuing to support the opposition, to isolate the Syrian regime and to press the Russians and Chinese to stop shielding Bashar from even a mild UNSC resolution. The only big question is whether the support should include whatever the opposition needs to take up arms. This includes not only the arms themselves but also intelligence support and training. The opposition lacks real-time information on the disposition of the army and its checkpoints, a deficiency that is too often deadly to militants trying to move around Syria.
I’ve opposed arming the opposition, on grounds that doing so militarizes the fight and shifts it to means that favor the regime. The same argument does not work for intelligence support, which is vital to protecting the opposition whether it takes up arms or not. Our overhead capabilities are stunning. If the opposition can organize itself to make effective use of real-time intelligence data to protect its adherents, we should be providing it.
I am at a loss as to what to recommend beyond that. This is one of those situations where there are bad options and worse ones. I don’t see a route out of the current impasse, other than the one Annan failed to sell to both sides.
What is happening in Syria is extraordinarily cruel and ugly. Bashar is mowing down people who are asking for no more than the freedom to decide their own fates. His moment of accountability will arrive, but for the moment we don’t seem to have a way of making it arrive sooner rather than later.
PS: Annan declared himself optimistic after a second meeting with Bashar al Assad today (Sunday). Hard to know what to make of that. The Arab League seems to have softened its demand that Bashar step aside, leading the Russians to sound a bit more helpful. The opposition should be getting ready to have its arm twisted to talk with the regime before Bashar is removed. Meetings at the UN Security Council this afternoon and tomorrow are likely to lead in that “optimistic” direction.
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Negotiation time
With all the jabber the last few days about the use of force against both Syria and Iran, media attention is not focused on the prospects for negotiated settlements. But there are such prospects still, even if the odds are getting longer by the day.
Syria
International Crisis Group is out yesterday with a “now or never” manifesto rightly focused on prospects for UN/Arab League envoy Kofi Annan’s efforts:
Annan’s best hope lies in enlisting international and notably Russian support for a plan that:
Arming the Syrian opposition, which is happening already, is not likely to improve the prospects for a negotiated settlement along these lines. To the contrary, Western contemplation of safe areas and humanitarian corridors, loose Arab talk about armed the Syria Free Army, the occasional Al Qaeda suicide bombing and a Russian blank check for the regime to crack down are combining to plunge Syria into chaos. Someone may think that deprives Iran of an important ally, but it also spells lasting (as in decades-long) trouble in a part of the world where we can ill afford it.
The Americans have been mumbling about how arms will inevitably get to the Syrian opposition. This is true enough. But some visible support for Annan, and a behind the scenes diplomatic game with the Russians, would be more helpful to the cause of preventing Syria from becoming a chronic source of instability in Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.
Iran
Netanyahu came but this time did not conquer. He needed President Obama to be forthcoming on an eventual military action against Iran as much as Obama needed him to refrain from aligning with Republican critics. It fell to Senator Mitch McConnell to crystallize the emerging U.S. position: if Iran enriches uranium to bomb grade (at or above 90%) or shows signs of having decided to build a nuclear weapon (design and ignition work), then the U.S. would respond with overwhelming force. This is the proposed “red line.”
We should not be fooled by McConnell’s belligerent tone. Even assuming very strict verification procedures, the line he proposes is a relatively expansive one that leaves Iran with enrichment technology and peaceful uses of atomic energy, which is what the Islamic Republic claims is its red line.
While the press was focused on belligerent statements, the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) have apparently responded to Iran’s offer of renewed negotiations. Iran has also told the International Atomic Energy Agency that it can visit a previously off-limits nuclear site believed to be engaged in weapons research, but procedures have not yet been worked out.
Bottom line
I wouldn’t get excited about the prospects for negotiated solutions in either Syria or Iran. But if ever there was a time to negotiate, this is it. By fall, both situations will likely be too far gone, with serious consequences for the United States, the Middle East and the rest of the world.
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Partial success or eventual failure?
Noah Pollak of the Emergency Committee for Israel tweeted today:
Obama policy = preventing Iran from getting nuke. Israel policy = preventing capability to build nuke. There’s the rub.
That is indeed the rub, but there is vast ambiguity hiding behind both equations. What does “getting” a nuke really mean? What does “preventing capability” really mean?
In short, building a nuclear weapons requires two of three things:
- Enrichment technology, or
- Plutonium production capability, and
- Specific design and ignition capabilities for nuclear weapons
Enrichment and plutonium production are “dual use,” that is they can be used for both peaceful and weapons purposes. Iran already has enrichment technology enabling it to enrich to 20%. That program is more advanced than its plutonium efforts. Moving beyond 20% enrichment is not a big technological step. What would it mean to take away this capability?
I suppose there is someone who thinks it means killing whichever Iranian nuclear scientists provide this capability. But realistically speaking that won’t be possible. The centrifuge enrichment technology that Iran has acquired is not a big mystery. There must be dozens if not hundreds of Iranians now capable of carrying the effort forward. To my knowledge, no state that has acquired enrichment technology has every surrendered it, though Libya may have come close. But Libya is not Iran, and what happened to Qaddafi would not encourage Supreme Leader Khamenei to go down the same road.
The only realistic approach to denying Iran nuclear weapons capability is to put its entire nuclear program under strict safeguards, with verifiable guarantees that it won’t enrich beyond current levels. Iran would also have to give up working on specific design and ignition capabilities. That is the direction President Obama is pointing when he says there is still a diplomatic solution.
The real question is whether Israel and its supporters in the United States could accept such a diplomatic solution as denying Iran nuclear capability. There was no sign of that at the AIPAC meeting today, where the President was applauded only when he talked about the military option and not when he mentioned diplomacy.
The problem with the military option is that it only delays and does not resolve. Iran would unquestionably redouble its efforts if its nuclear facilities are attacked. That is the correct lesson of the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in 1981, as Colin Kahl points out. Any attack would have to be repeated at shorter and shorter intervals, without any guarantee that they would prevent Iran from eventually getting nuclear weapons.
So which do you prefer? Diplomacy that leaves some capability in Iranian hands, and has to be constantly monitored to ensure compliance, or the military option, which is doomed to eventual failure in preventing Iran from “getting” nuclear weapons?
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