Tag: United Nations
Peace Picks June 10- June 15
1. India’s Election results: Impacts on the Economy and Economic Relations with Washington|June 10th, 2019|2:30pm-4:30pm|Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20004|Register Here
On May 23, India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was catapulted back into power with a landslide victory in national elections. Two of the biggest immediate challenges in its second term will be economic: Tackling rising unemployment, and pursuing an economic reform plan that struggled during the BJP’s previous term. The new Indian government will also confront considerable challenges in its trade relations with Washington, a key partner. What is the election result’s impact for India’s economy? What might it mean for the U.S.-India economic relationship, which has lagged behind the fast-growing defense partnership? What is the potential for bilateral cooperation in the high-tech and innovation sectors? More broadly, how significant are the strains on the commercial side, and to what extent do they affect U.S.-India strategic partnership? Do U.S.-China trade tensions have implications for India and U.S.-India relations? This event will address these questions and more.
Moderator:
Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Wilson Center
Speakers:
Suman Bery, Public Policy Fellow at the Wilson Center
Richard M. Rossow, Wadhwani Chair, U.S.-India Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Seema Sirohi, Senior Journalist and Columnist, The Economic Times (India)
Jeremy Spaulding, Founder and President, JMS Innovation & Strategy, and Senior Advisor and Program Architect, Alliance for US International Business
2. The Deal of the Century: What About Palestinian Citizens of Israel?|June 11th, 2019|10:00am-11:00am|Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1319 18th Street NW Washington, DC|Register Here
In addition to examining the ramifications of recent political and legislative developments in Israel and the so-called “Deal of the Century,” panelists will discuss the central role of the Palestinian Arab minority in promoting the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace and how the international community can support it in that role.
Moderator:
Lara Friedman, President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP)
Panelists:
Jafar Farah, Founder and Director of the Mossawa Center, the Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel
Shibley Telhami, Sadat Professor for Peace and Development, Director of the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Maya Berry, Executive Director of the Arab American Institute (AAI).
Jeremy Ben-Ami, President of J Street, bringing to the organization deep experience in American politics, a strong belief in the power of diplomacy and a passionate commitment to the state of Israel.
3. Strategic Interest and Leadership in the United Nations|June 13th, 2019|9:30am-11:00am|CSIS Headquarters, 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
Although there are existing criticisms surrounding the United Nations, a functioning United Nations remains in the U.S. interest. One of the most critical roles the United Nations plays is addressing global problems and burden sharing the costs of security, development, and other public goods. CSIS would like to use this opportunity to identify areas of bipartisan agreement over the U.S. role in the United Nations. Please join us for a public armchair discussion with Governor Bill Richardson and Catherine Bertini which will reflect on the progress made at the United Nations since its formation and will examine how the United States can partner with the United Nations for its economic and national security interests.
Speakers:
Catherine Bertini, Former Executive Director, United Nations World Food Programme
Bill Richardson, Former Governor of New Mexico and Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
4. The Future of Taiwan-US Relations | June 12th, 2019 | 10am-12:45am | The Heritage Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium 214 Massachusetts Ave NE Washington, DC 20002 | Register Here
In this, the 40th year of the Taiwan Relations Act, it bears evaluating the state of the Taiwan-US relationship. There are many positive signs, arms sales, significant unofficial diplomatic contact, and a peak in Congressional activity. There are also signs of reserve on the part of the US administration, including uncertainty over the sale of F-16 fighter jets that have been under consideration for more than 10 years, a failure to pick up on the idea of a US-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement, and a low key opening of the new American Institute in Taiwan. On the other side of the relationship, Taipei is election season, with a range of possible outcomes. So where are US-Taiwan relations today and where are they headed in the short to medium term. Please join us for an assessment, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Szu-chien Hsu and a discussion with leading experts on the relationship from both sides of the relationship.
Panel 1: Economic Statecraft and Opportunity
Panelists:
Moderator: Walter Lohman, Director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation
Szu-chien Hsu, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)
Riley Walters, Policy Analyst, Asia Economy and Technology, The Heritage Foundation
Roy Chun Lee, Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Taiwan WTO and RTA Center, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research
Panel 2: The Defense of Taiwan, Peace and Security
Moderator: Walter Lohman, Director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation
Panelists:
I-Chung Lai, President of the Prospect Foundation
Scott Harold, Associate Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy
5. What is happening in Idlib?|June 13th, 2019|11:00am-12:00pm|Turkish Heritage Organization|Register Here
Please join THO as we host a teleconference on the current situation in Idlib. More details will be announced soon.
Speakers:
Ammar Al Selmo, White Helmets Volunteer
Mariam Jalabi, Representative to the UN for the Syrian National Coalition
6. The Role of Open Data in Strengthening Nigerian Democracy|June 11th , 2019|2:00pm-3:30pm|National Endowment for Democracy, 1025 F Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20004|Register Here
Transparent, accessible, and credible data has emerged as a key tool for safeguarding the integrity of Nigeria’s democracy against conflict, corruption, and abuses of power. Data empowers civil society, journalists, and citizens to hold power-holders accountable and to expose and address corruption. Data equips government to make policy by providing foundational information about the Nigerian population and its needs. Data improves Nigeria’s information space, countering disinformation and enhancing the quality of reporting. Yet, data has not been used to its full potential in Nigeria. Though the government is increasingly releasing data to the public, it is often inaccessible and difficult to understand. Further, lack of capacity and political will has hindered robust data collection on critical issues. Join us in discussion with our esteemed panelists.
Speakers:
Joshua Olufemi, Current head of knowledge and innovation at Premium Times and Program Director at the Premium Times Centre for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ) in Abuja
Christopher O’Connor, senior program officer for West Africa at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world
7. Peering Beyond the DMZ: Understanding North Korea behind the Headlines|June 11th , 2019|12:00pm-1:30pm|Hayek Auditorium, Cato Institute|Register Here
Negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are at an impasse, and tensions are rising. And while neither side appears to want a war, the path to a diplomatic solution remains unclear. What is obvious, however, is that most U.S. policymakers have little understanding of what the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is or how it operates, a fact that limits America’s ability to peacefully resolve the crisis. Join us as our panelists offer their insights into the “Hermit Kingdom”
Moderator:
Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute
Panelists:
Heidi Linton, Executive Director, Christian Friends of Korea
Randall Spandoni, North Korea Program Director and Senior Regional Advisor for East Asia, World Vision
Daniel Jasper, Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for Asia, American Friends Service Committee
Moderator: Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute
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Libyans be damned
Reversing long-standing policy of supporting United Nations efforts in Libya, President Trump last week opted instead to back Khalifa Haftar’s “Libyan National Army” march on Tripoli from his Benghazi stronghold. Haftar is a former Libyan army officer who spent two decades in Virginia and became a US citizen. Trump says he backs Haftar’s counterterrorism efforts. Haftar’s idea of counterterrorism is killing anyone who opposes him. He doesn’t even pretend to be pro-democratic and is seeking to install himself as Qaddafi’s successor.
Few Libya-watchers think Haftar has the firepower to take Tripoli by force. So far militia resistance appears to be slowing his advance, causing him to resort to airpower presumably provided by his Emirati or possibly Saudi backers. Qatar and Turkey will be supporting Islamist forces intent on holding on to Tripoli, where the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is hunkered down. It is no paragon: it has failed to gain control even of the capital and has precious little sway in the rest of the country.
Trump’s move to back Haftar was a surprise only because the President had previously indicated the US would not get involved in Libya but instead leave it to the UN and the Europeans. That a would-be autocrat would appeal to Trump should be no surprise, especially one the Saudis and Emiratis support. The French and Russians will be pleased, as they too support Haftar, but the Italians were backing the GNA. Once again, Trump has demonstrated that he is prepared to turn US policy 180 degrees on a dime, especially to favor an autocrat, thus ensuring that everyone who deals with Washington–especially those committed to democracy–needs to hedge.
Washington will presumably let the Emiratis and Saudis try to ensure Haftar’s victory. US forces, not previously known to have been in Libya, have supposedly withdrawn, though it is of course possible that they are still clandestinely shifting to help Haftar. The Emiratis and Saudis have proven inept at best, catastrophically incapable at worst, in Yemen, where their intervention against the Houthi rebellion has stretched into a years-long war of attrition, rendering most of the country in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. Something similar could of course happen in Libya.
If instead Haftar is able to conquer the capital and move on to the west, the picture will be different but not likely pretty. Islamist militias will go underground to continue their resistance and Haftar will react with the kind of blunt force used in Benghazi, where he demonstrated little concern for collateral damage to civilians. Even as civil war has raged on and off over the past eight years, Libyans have enjoyed self-government at the municipal level, where they are in the midst of holding elections. It seems unlikely Haftar, if he succeeds in chasing the GNA from Tripoli, will tolerate even that much democracy. He has been actively stacking local governments in areas he already controls.
President Trump certainly won’t be one to press Haftar, who if he wins will be beholden to the absolute monarchies in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The President has found another autocrat he likes, in addition to Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping, Rodrigo Duterte, Vladimir Putin, and others. Libyans be damned. Full steam ahead.
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No way out
A few weeks ago, the second round of UN-led peace talks between Morocco and the Polisario independence movement ended in Geneva without substantial progress that would bridge the parties’ contradicting positions. Morocco insists on a form of autonomy for the Western Sahara territory under its sovereignty, while the Polisario Front clings to a referendum on self-determination.
A former Spanish colony, Morocco annexed the mineral-rich Western Sahara in 1975. Sixteen years of bloody war between Morocco and Polisario Liberation Front ended with a UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991, enabling a self-determination referendum for the Saharawi people to choose between independence or integration into Morocco. The UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) deployed to supervise the democratic transition. Yet the referendum has not taken place due in large part to the parties’ disagreement over who gets to vote, as well as the “winner takes all” solution.
In March 1997, the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, appointed James Baker, former US Secretary of State, as a personal envoy to Western Sahara. Baker put forth two additional proposals: The Baker plan I in 2001(also known as the Framework Agreement) and Baker Plan II in 2003. Although his last plan won Security Council endorsement, neither got both parties’ approval. In 2004, Baker resigned, lacking the full support from the Security Council to enforce a solution. UN mediators who came afterward were doomed to failure, putting the issue in the textbook of frozen conflicts.
In 2007, Morocco offered an autonomy plan that would give the Saharawi people the power to run their executive, legislative and judicial affairs under Moroccan sovereignty. Polisario Front put forth a parallel proposal: a referendum on self-determination giving wide guarantees to Moroccan settlers if it lead to independence. The seemingly irreconcilable proposals stalled negotiations in 2012, undermining the efforts of the then UN mediator, former US ambassador, Christopher Ross. The deadlock continued for over six years. This stagnant situation has prompted recurrent tensions between the parties on the UN-monitored buffer zone between Moroccan- and Polisario-controlled territory. The possibility of war looms.
Last December, in a speech at the Heritage Foundation displaying the Trump administration’s new Africa strategy, National Security Advisor John Bolton made clear the US would like to see a self-determination referendum take place. This new US approach to the conflict was also reflected at the level of the Security Council when the US shortened MINURSO’s periodic one-year mandate to six months, tying its renewal to progress on the ground. The US representative at the UN stated “there is no business as usual” regarding this issue, signaling the US willingness to push towards a final solution to the conflict.
The current active US involvement in the long-standing dispute has generated momentum. After six years of deadlock, the UN Special Envoy to Western Sahara, former German President Horst Kohler, has been able to bring the parties to the table. Yet the parties’ views are fundamentally diverging; Morocco seeks no solution beyond sovereignty over the territory, while the Polisario Front is committed to the principle of self-determination.
Based on the current UN paradigm, a “realistic, practicable and enduring solution based on a compromise which would provide the Saharawi people for self-determination” seems impossible to achieve. Morocco sees autonomy as a practicable and realistic form of self-determination, while Polisario Front considers giving the people the right to decide their future as the most viable and realistic solution. Since 2001, no single plan has so far won the parties agreement.
Shortening MINURSO’s mandate to six months has broken the deadlock, but it is still not enough to yield positive results. Without an existential threat–such as expelling MINURSO, which would trigger a war the parties cannot handle–there is no “zone of possible agreement.”
There are two other possible options:
- Compelling the parties to accept a tailored compromise in which they either both win or both lose.
- A drastic change in the region, bringing new governments seeking regional integration and willing to end this conflict.
Something like the latter is already underway in Algeria. But unless something more serious starts to happen in Morocco, the low -intensity conflict in Western Sahara is likely to remain a frozen conflict.
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Peace Picks April 8-12
1. From war to peace: the Balkans, Middle East and Ukraine| Wednesday, April 10, 2019 | 12:30am- 2:30| The Middle East Institute | 1319 18th St. NW, Washington D.C. 20036| Register Here |
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a book talk with MEI Scholar Daniel Serwer, the director of John Hopkins SAIS’s conflict management and American foreign policy programs and the author ofFrom War to Peace: the Balkans, the Middle East and Ukraine.
In his book, Serwer explores how lessons learned from peacebuilding initiatives in the Balkans in the 1990s can be applied to conflicts in the Middle East. Serwer draws comparisons between the sectarian, ethnic, and religious divides of the Balkans in the 1990s and similar tensions in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. He also explores the impact of policies such as conflict prevention, engagement of neighbors, the establishment of safe zones, partition, decentralization, and power sharing arrangements, and how they can be effectively utilized, or not, in the Middle East.
Speakers
Daniel Serwer, , author
Scholar, MEI; director, Conflict Management and American Foreign Policy program, John Hopkins SAIS
Randa Slim, discussant
Senior fellow and director of Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues program, MEI
Paul Salem, moderator, President, MEI
2. Youth: the missing peace | Tursday, April 11, 2019 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | United States Institute for Peacr | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037| Register Here|
Join USIP and the Global Coalition on Youth, Peace and Security for an interactive, intergenerational conversation with the study’s lead author, Graeme Simpson, as well as youth and peacebuilding experts and young peacebuilders from around the world.
The event will look at the two-year evidence gathering process—which engaged more than 4,000 young people around the world and has been heralded as “possibly the most participatory process ever undertaken by the U.N.”—to draw out key lessons and recommendations regarding what works in the field of youth, peace and security, and what prevents youth’s meaningful inclusion in peace and security efforts. The conversation will also look forward, with an eye toward sustaining UNSCR 2250’s momentum and cementing our commitment to the role of youth people in preventing conflict and contributing to sustainable peace.
Speakers
Nancy Lindborg, welcoming remarks,
President, U.S. Institute of Peace
Aubrey Cox, Program Officer, Youth, U.S. Institute of Peace
Giannina Raffo, Youth Peace Leader, Venezuela
Graeme Simpson, Lead Author of the Progress Study and Director, Interpeace USA
Noella Richard, moderator, Youth Team Leader, United Nations Development Program
Saji Prelis, closing remarks
Director of Children & Youth Programs, Search for Common Ground
3. Will Sisi be Egypt president for life | Monday, April 8, 2019 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace| 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036-2103| Register Here|
The Egyptian parliament is in the process of finalizing amendments to the 2014 constitution that would allow President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to stay in office for twenty years, increase military control of politics, and end judicial independence. U.S. President Donald Trump has invited Sisi to Washington for a visit prior to a public referendum on the proposed amendments.
Please join the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Project on Middle East Democracy for a discussion of the ramifications of the amendments and Sisi’s visit for the future of Egypt, the U.S.-Egypt relationship, and for regional peace.
Speakers:
MOATAZ EL FEGIERY, general coordinator for the Egyptian Human Rights Forum.
MAI EL-SADANY, legal and judicial director for the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.
MICHELE DUNNE, Director and senior fellow of the Carnegie Middle East Program.
SUSAN B. GLASSER, staff writer at the New Yorker.
4. The Taiwan Relations Act at Forty and U.S.-Taiwan Relations| Tuesday, April 9, 2019 | 8:30 am – 5:00pm | Center for Strategic and International Study | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036| Register Here|
The Taiwan Relations Act, enacted by the United States Congress in April 1979, authorized continued “commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan” in the wake of the U.S. decision to establish diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China. By authorizing the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and other provisions, the TRA created a framework for relations between the U.S. and Taiwan which has enabled their partnership and friendship to thrive in the absence of diplomatic relations.
In observance of the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, this daylong public conference will feature analysis of the creation and implementation of the TRA, and how it continues to guide U.S.-Taiwan relations and interaction among Taiwan, China, and the United States.
This conference is co-hosted by CSIS, the Brookings Institution, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
8:35am Opening Remarks
John Hamre (President and CEO, CSIS)
8:45am Welcome Speech
Stanley Kao (Representative, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States) (Introduced by Bonnie Glaser)
8:55am Speaker Introduction
Richard Armitage (President, Armitage International and CSIS Trustee)
9:00am VTC Speech and Q&A
Her Excellency President Tsai Ing-wen of the Republic of China (Taiwan)
Q&A Moderator: Michael Green (Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS / Director of Asian Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service)
9:45am Coffee Break
10:00am Panel One: Looking Back on U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1979
Moderator: Richard Bush (Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution)
Panelist 1: The TRA and the U.S. One-China Policy
Stephen Young (Former Director, American Institute in Taiwan)
Panelist 2: Cross-Strait Relations and U.S.-Taiwan Relations
Steven Goldstein (Associate, Harvard Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies)
Panelist 3: The Evolution of the U.S.-Taiwan Security Partnership
Shirley Kan (Former Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Congressional Research Service)
11:15am Coffee Break
11:30am Speech and Q&A
Legislator Bi-khim Hsiao (Legislative Yuan)
(Introduced by Bonnie Glaser)
12:15pm Keynote Remarks
Representative Gerald Connolly (D-Virginia)
(Introduced by Richard Bush)
1:00pm Lunch
1:30pm Panel Two: Taiwan’s Strategic Environment Today
Moderator: Bonnie Glaser (Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project, CSIS)
Panelist 1: Taiwan’s Changing Security Environment
Michael Chase (Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation)
Panelist 2: How Taiwan Should Ensure Economic Competitiveness
Eric Altbach (Senior Vice President, Albright Stonebridge Group)
Panelist 3: Taiwan’s Options Regarding China
Susan Thornton (Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs)
Panelist 4: U.S.-Taiwan Economic Ties
Da-nien Daniel Liu (Director of the Regional Development Study Center, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research)
2:45pm Panel Three: The Next Forty Years
Moderator: Abraham Denmark (Director of the Asia Program, Wilson Center)
Panelist 1: The TRA’s Continuing Relevance to U.S. Policy
Robert Sutter (Professor of Practice of International Affairs, George Washington University)
Panelist 2: China’s Strategies Toward Taiwan and Taiwan/U.S. Responses
Ryan Hass (David M. Rubenstein Fellow – Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution)
Panelist 3: Taiwan’s Future Sources of Strength and Weakness
Jacques deLisle (Professor of Law & Political Science, University of Pennsylvania)
4:00pm Coffee Break
4:15pm Speech and Q&A
W. Patrick Murphy (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs)
(Introduced by Abraham Denmark)
5:00pm Conference End
5. China’s Influence Activities: Implications for the US-Taiwan Relationship| Monday, April 8, 2019 | 4:00pm-5:15| The Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St NW, Washington, DC 20005| Register Here |
Last week, a bipartisan group of senators introduced the Taiwan Assurance Act, which reaffirms the US commitment to Taiwan forty years after the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act. As China exerts increasing pressure against Taiwan’s position in the region, Taiwan’s leaders have sought greater support from the United States. Given US interests in the Indo-Pacific, what diplomatic, economic, and security steps should the United States take to signal support for Taiwan as a democratic partner in the region? What opportunities and challenges do the United States and Taiwan face moving forward? Where do US-Taiwan relations fit into the broader strategic picture?
KEYNOTE REMARKS BY
H.E. Bi-khim Hsiao, Legislator, Legislative Yuan, Taiwan
FEATURING
Mr. Ian Easton, Research Fellow Project 2049 Institute
Mr. Michael Mazza, Visiting Fellow, Foreign & Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute
Mr. Barry Pavel, Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
6. SSANSE Project: Symposium on Russia and China’s Political Interference Activities in NATO Small States| Monday, April 8, 2019 | 8:45 am – 12:15pm | The Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20004-3027| Register Here |
For both Russia and China, foreign political interference activities are a useful and cost-effective method of foreign policy. In Russia it is theorized as “smart power”, while China still uses the Soviet-era term “united front work”. The activities of Russia and China go well beyond accepted norms of public diplomacy and are having a corrupting and corrosive effect on many societies. This half-day symposium focuses on Russia and China’s Political Interference Activities in NATO Small States. The world is seeing a return of both “might is right” politics and spheres of influence. As history has shown, the weakness of small states in a time of rising security threats can undermine the security of larger powers. The Symposium examines case studies of some representative small NATO states experiencing Russia and China’s political interference activities, the patterns of interference to look for, and discusses what is to be done.
Speakers:
Neringa Bladaitė, University of Vilnius
Anne-Marie Brady, Wilson Center/University of Canterbury
Donald J. Jensen, Center for European Policy Analysis
Ryan Knight, Georgetown University
Martin Hála, Charles University
Margarita Šešelgytė, University of Vilnius
Khamza Sharifzoda, Georgetown University
Mark Stokes, 2049 Project
Alan Tidwell, Georgetown University
Baldur Thorhallson, University of Iceland
Moderator: Abe Denmark, Asia Program, Wilson Center
AGENDA:
8:45am – Panel One
Donald J. Jensen: Assessing Contemporary Russian Interference Activities
Anne-Marie Brady: Magic Weapons? An Overview of CCP Interference Activities
Mark Stokes: Huawei and One Thousand Talents: China’s military links and technology transfer activities
Ryan Knight: Russia’s use of the Orthodox Church in Small NATO states
Alan Tidwell: Active Measures: Lessons Learned from the Past
10:10am – Morning tea
10:30am – Panel Two
Martin Hála: The CCP’s Magic Weapons at work in the Czech Republic
Khamza Sharifzoda: Armenia’s Struggle: Escaping the Kremlin
Baldur Thorhallson: Iceland’s engagements with Russia and China
Neringa Bladaite: Russia’s Political Interference Activities in Latvia
Margarita Šešelgytė: Russia and China’s Political Interference Activities and Lithuania
The Small States and the New Security Environment (SSANSE) Project is funded by NATO-SPS
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Dim future
The Wilson Center held a panel discussion on February 26 exploring the future of the US-Iran relationship . The panel included Robin Wright, journalist and USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow, Michael Singh, Managing Director and Senior Fellow at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Robert Malley, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group.
Wright claims that Iranian Foreign Minister Jawad Zarif wanted to resign for several reasons. Internally, jealous rivals surround him and sought to impeach him in the parliament (but the issue never came to a vote). He is realist but does not represent the majority; the Supreme Leader and the hardliners are on top of him. Zarif was upset for not being invited when Bashar Assad turned up in Tehran for a meeting with the Supreme Leader. Externally, he failed to sustain the nuclear deal and prevent the Trump administration re-imposition of sanctions. He was also unable to respond to the pressure of Western governments to release a dual national American detainee in Iran or get Iranian banks to comply with international banking standards that were imposed post 9/11.
Singh pointed out that US administrations from Jimmy Carter until now had some engagement with Iran, but it was President Obama who took relations in a different direction with the nuclear agreement. At odds with US policy and interests, Iran does not operate according to conventional norms. It resorts to proxy wars in Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain. These destabilizing actions in the region seek to keep Israel and Saudi Arabia focused on border problems and not Iran itself. Iran has wanted the US out of the region. Obama sought a balance of power in the Middle East between US friends and Iran. That did not happen, and more chaos is coming . While there are shared interests between the US and Iran on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan and ensuring a stable government in Iraq, the ways they pursue those interests tend to be diametrically opposed.
Malley asserted that Democrats and Republicans have engaged with Iran using a mix of coercion and engagement. Both have failed to establish normal relations with Tehran. Even Trump tried to meet Rouhani at the UN. Historically, the US relationship with Iran was not built on a strong basis: take for instance the hostage crisis, the ousting of Mosaddegh, and US support for the Shah.
Most importantly, the Iran-Iraq war, in which almost every country including the US backed Iraq, had a psychological impact on Iran’s attitude toward the US and the region, which is not only polarized between Iran and Saudi Arabia but also between Iran and Israel. Iran wants to play a key major role, but the US has deep strategic interests in oil, support for Israel, and counter-terrorism. Iran believes US backing for Tehran’s foes is an obstacle to its natural weight in the region: Iraq in the past or Saudi Arabia and Israel today.
According to Malley, the one agreement that could have sustainably changed Iranian behavior is the JCPOA. It was better to have that agreement, defuse the nuclear crisis, and prevent a catastrophic war. The JCPOA succeeded because there was pressure and a realistic outcome that Iran and the US with difficulty could accept. Without it, the future is dim.
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The time has come
Kosovo has decided to begin the process of adopting legislation that will eventually convert its lightly-armed Kosovo Security Force into an army. Serbia is opposed and warns of consequences. I hope that is as empty a threat as the the threat Kosovo’s army will pose to Serbia.
Kosovo aims for a force of 5,000, thoroughly integrated into NATO from the first. It will be something like 10 years before that level is reached, and possibly another 10 more before the force is fully capable, provided Pristina can find the financial resources needed. The Kosovo army will never be a match for the Serbian army of more than 40,000 (plus 50,000 reserves). Even if constituted as a territorial defense force, a fully developed and equipped Kosovo army would be able to do little more than slow a Serbian advance for a week or 10 days. The real opposition to a Serbian Army invasion would come from citizen mobilization, not from a formally constituted army.
Nor would a properly constituted Kosovo army integrated with NATO pose a significant threat to Serbs inside Kosovo. The threat from disorder and riot is much larger, as we saw only too well in March 2004 when Albanians attacked Serb communities, churches, and other religious sites. The main instrument for keeping internal order should of course remain the Kosovo Police Force, which is the most trusted institution in the country and has prevented any repetition of the rioting for almost 15 years. May they continue to succeed.
The real reason for Serb opposition to a Kosovo army has to do not with threat to Serbia or Serbs but with Belgrade’s own threat to Kosovo. Serbia still claims all of Kosovo as its sovereign territory and resists any moves that undermine that claim, even the withdrawal of a now largely pointless UN Mission that Belgrade views as symbolizing Security Council resolution 1244, which makes vague and not dispositive reference to Yugoslav sovereignty.
Belgrade still has levers to pull. Its main effort in recent months has focused on harassing Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Force, in an effort to get them to quit. The intimidation is unfortunately working, since Serbian security forces can reach easily into Serb communities inside Kosovo and have opportunities at the boundary/border to hassle Serbs who live in Kosovo but visit Serbia.
If Belgrade really were concerned with the threat from a Kosovo army, its best move would be to recognize Kosovo and establish diplomatic relations with it. Kosovo would then design its army not for territorial defense but rather for international deployments, which is really the most important function remaining for the armies of Balkan countries that join NATO. A Kosovo Security Force capable of helping to operate, maintain, and fly the helicopters the Americans want to keep at Camp Bondsteel would be a serious contribution to the Alliance and no threat to Serbia.
The time has come for a Kosovo army. Serbia would do better to reduce the threat environment to which Pristina needs to respond than to continue a quixotic effort to prevent the inevitable.
PS: Here is Petrit Selimi’s summary of Belgrade’s alarmist headlines on the issue:
Petrit SelimiVerified account @Petrit9h9 hours agoMore
Good morning with a taste of fear, loathing and warmongering. Serbian tabloids start the day informing their public “Albanians want war” “Albanians and West will arrest thousands of Serbs” any day now, and that Serbia must “declare occupation of Kosovo if Kosovo gets an army”.
10 replies11 retweets23 likesReply 10 Retweet 11 Like 23 Direct message
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