Tag: United Nations
Nuclear cabal
The big news today is Iran’s progress towards nuclear weapons. The reports are based on information reported to have been given to the UN-affiliated International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which administers the Non-proliferation Treaty (Iran is a “state party”).
It is the people who gave the information to the IAEA who seem to have leaked the information, which includes details of Iranian efforts not only to obtain the necessary highly enriched uranium but also to learn how to detonate a nuclear weapon. Foreign assistance from Russia, Pakistan and North Korea is alleged to be involved.
I have no reason to doubt the assertions, but no confirmation either. The IAEA will not necessarily publish its findings later this week with all the spin that accompanies today’s revelations. It is often more cautious than the Americans like, and presumably today’s leaks are an effort to box the IAEA into taking a hard line.
For what purpose? My best guess is that the Americans are trying to get the Security Council to go along with ratcheting up the sanctions on Tehran. While there has been audible saber-rattling from Israel the last few days, I don’t think we can expect that to happen in the lead-up to a real attack. Israel needs tactical surprise to pull it off. The rumbling from Israel is also preparation for tougher sanctions, I imagine.
The most interesting aspect of the reports today is the part about foreign assistance. Those in charge of nonproliferation policy in my past often assumed that no state with nuclear weapons would consciously help another get them. That assumption has evaporated. We seem to have a kind of nuclear cabal willing to do things thought anathema in the past.
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Useless idiots have their purposes
Tweeter Hani Sabra:
there’s no nice way to say this, so here goes: anybody who thinks damascus would abide by the plan is total, useless idiot.
I agree with the sentiment, but why then did the Arab League propose the plan, and why did Bashar al Assad accept it?
They aren’t idiots, and the plan serves their useful purposes. The Arab League is certainly not on the side of the protesters. Most of its members either already have, or would if the occasion arose, repress demonstrations like the ones occurring in Syria.
What the Arab League is trying to do is help Bashar. He understood the gesture: you pretend to give me a plan to end the violence, and I’ll pretend to end the violence. No one is fooled, but it at least buys a week, two or even three while the Arab League pretends to wait for implementation and Bashar pretends to implement. In the meanwhile, a lot of demonstrators get killed, hurt and discouraged. Maybe some of them will even agree to the dialogue with the government proposed in the plan. That would buy some more time.
What happens when this charade gets boring? Likely not much, unless the Arab League or the Security Council can be convinced to take more serious action. As regular readers know, my favorite proposal is diplomatic observers. If the Arab League were serious, it would have insisted on verification.
Why would Bashar accept? Only if he thinks he has things under control and can rehabilitate himself internationally by agreeing. What if he rejects? That at least shows him up for the lying bastard he is.
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They’ll miss it once it’s gone
Tim Wirth argues that UNESCO admission of Palestine as a member will initiate a cascade of U.S. withdrawals from UN specialized agencies, damaging important American interests. This is because current law prohibits the U.S. from providing financial contributions to any UN entity that admits Palestine as a member.
John Bolton says
UNESCO has made its decision: It prefers Palestinian membership to American participation. Now let the rest of the U.N. specialized agencies make their choice.
This is game of chicken, played between the U.S. Congress, which is not interested in changing the law, and foreign governments, most of which have so far seen support for Palestine’s membership in international organizations as a cheap way of supporting the Palestinians and expressing dissatisfaction with the Israeli government’s negotiating stance.
Despite its good works, few care much about UNESCO, which the U.S. stayed out of for years without much harm done. As Wirth notes, the more important UN agencies for American interests are the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Telecommunications Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Each will make its own decision based on the procedures outlined in its charter.
Some argue that failure to pay dues does not automatically lead to withdrawal from membership, and the U.S. could continue in arrears for at least several years, and possibly more, without legal consequences. That may be so, but American influence would certainly decline, as would the capabilities of organizations that really do perform functions–like inspection of nuclear programs–that serve U.S. interests.
We are watching a diplomatic game of chicken, which like most diplomatic games occurs in slow motion. If Palestine’s supporters blink first, their cause suffers a setback, but not really a very serious one. More than 100 countries have already recognized Palestine. Membership in international organizations won’t add much. The international system would then remain what it is: an imperfect but useful multilateral instrument through which Washington has often been successful in pursuing its interests.
But if they don’t and the U.S. cuts off funding, we could be witnessing the end of the post-World War II international system, one that depends on the United Nations and its specialized agencies to carry a lot of water for Washington. Bolton and company don’t see it that way–they see it as a hindrance to American power and would rather get rid of it altogether. But they’ll miss it once it’s gone.
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Violence, or no violence?
As the regime of Bashar al Assad continues its bloody crackdown in Syria, at least some protesters are tempted to respond violently, especially those who have defected from the army. There is no question in my mind about their right to self-defense. The question is whether it is good strategy to resort to violence and whether the United States should encourage or discourage it.
Simon Henderson argues in The New Republic that the United States should not discourage it. He sees no reason to take the option off the table. He would also leave open the possibility of foreign military intervention, which the Obama Administration has so far ruled out.
Elliott Abrams takes a more nuanced view in a Council on Foreign Relations paper:
The United States should encourage defections but should not encourage violence in any form. Yet if a military opposition comes into existence and fights the regime, U.S. policymakers will not want to see that opposition crushed. Thus, the United States should not discourage other governments from assisting the rebels if they wish to do so. Nor should it try to stop other groups—for example, Sunni tribes living on both sides of the Syria-Iraq border areas—from assisting brethren inside Syria.
We took an approach of this sort with Bosnia in 1993-95: we turned a blind eye to arming of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats to fight against the Bosnian Serb Army and its ample support from Belgrade.
I side with the Administration on this issue in Syria. Violence by the demonstrators will consolidate the security forces in support of the regime, reduce the likelihood of defections, and strike fear into minority populations, especially if there is cross-border Sunni cooperation in providing arms. The threat of military intervention (by NATO, the U.S., Turkey or someone else) is not credible. No UN Security Council resolution will pass authorizing it; U.S. action in its absence is theoretically possible but highly unlikely. The Arab League is far less antagonistic to Bashar than it was to Qaddafi. The Russians haven’t even allowed a resolution condemning the regime’s violence. Moscow’s naval base at Latakia is too valuable for them to risk another Libya-type air war that would likely put in place a regime unfriendly to the Russian presence on the Mediterranean.
Lest anyone wonder, I agree wholeheartedly with Elliott that the U.S. would benefit from seeing the back of Bashar al Assad. He puts it well:
The end of the Assad regime would be a great gain for the United States. The regime is a bloody dictatorship that is host to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, Iran’s only Arab ally, the route through which Iran arms Hezbollah, and a permanent threat to Lebanon’s sovereignty and internal peace. Moreover, by doing its best to assist jihadis seeking to fight Americans in Iraq, it was complicit in the deaths of many Americans soldiers and the wounding of far more. As the regime fights its own populace and clings to power, effective sanctions and vigorous diplomacy can help shorten its life and lay the foundations for a determined effort to build a democratic state in its place.
But violence on the demonstrators’ part has no place in a strategy aimed at weakening the regime, which has advantages in firepower and ruthlessness that simply cannot be overcome in today’s international environment. It isn’t fair, and it isn’t moral, to ask the Syrian National Council to foreswear the use of violence against a regime that is showing little restraint. But it is realistic and necessary.
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Next week’s “peace picks”
Good stuff, especially early in the week. Heavy on Johns Hopkins events, but what do you expect?
1. Strengthening the Armenianj-Azerbaijani Track II Dialogue, Carnegie Endowment, October 17, 10-11:45 am
With Philip Gamaghelyan, Tabib Huseynov, and Thomas de Waal
With the main diplomatic track negotiating the conflict over Nagorny Karabakh apparently deadlocked, more attention is being focused on how tension can be reduced and bridges built through Track II initiatives and dialogue between ordinary Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
Mohamed Salah Tekaya, Tunisian ambassador to the United States; Tamara Wittes, deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs and deputy special coordinator for Middle East Transitions at the U.S. Department of State; Mohamed Ali Malouche, president of the Tunisian American Young Professionals; and Kurt Volker (moderator), managing director of CTR, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, visit http://www.eventbrite.com/event/2279443878/mcivte
4. Mexico and the War on Drugs: Time to Legalize, former Mexican President Vicente Fox, held at Mount Vernon Place, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Cato Institute, to be held at the Undercroft Auditorium, 900 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. October 18, noon
Mexico is paying a high price for fighting a war on drugs that are consumed in the United States. More than 40,000 people have died in drug-related violence since the end of 2006 when Mexico began an aggressive campaign against narco-trafficking. The drug war has led to a rise in corruption and gruesome criminality that is weakening democratic institutions, the press, law enforcement, and other elements of a free society. Former Mexican president Vicente Fox will explain that prohibition is not working and that the legalization of the sale, use, and production of drugs in Mexico and beyond offers a superior way of dealing with the problem of drug abuse.
To register for this event, email events@cato.org, fax (202) 371-0841, or call (202) 789-5229 by noon, Monday, October 17, 2011.
Monday, October 17, 2011
7:30 PM – 9:00 PM
Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
1957 E Street, NW
5. Revolutionary vs. Reformist Islam: The Iran-Turkey Rivalry in the Middle East, Lindner Family Commons, room 602, 1957 E St NW, October 18, 7:30-9 pm
Ömer Tapinar, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Hadi Semati, Iranian Political Scientist
Mohammad Tabaar, Adjunct Lecturer, GW
The Arab Spring has brought Iran and Turkey into a regional rivalry to sell their different brands of Islam. While Tehran is hoping to inspire an “Islamic awakening”, Ankara is calling for a “secular state that respects all religions.” The panelists will discuss this trend and its influences on domestic politics in Iran and Turkey.
The Middle East Policy Forum is presented with the generous support of ExxonMobil.
This program will be off the record out of respect for its presenters.
RSVP at: http://tinyurl.com/3ntfx9o
Sponsored by the Institute for Middle Eastern Stuides
PS: I really should not have missed this Middle East Institute event:
Troubled Triangle: The US, Turkey, and Israel in the New Middle East, Stimson Center, 1111 19th St NW, 11th floor, October 18, 4:30-6 pm
The trilateral relationship between Turkey, Israel and the United States has deteriorated in recent years as Israel’s and Turkey’s foreign policy goals in the Middle East continue to diverge. Despite repeated attempts, the United States has failed to reconcile these two important regional allies since the divisive Mavi Marmara incident in May 2010. Please join us for a discussion of this critical yet troubled trilateral relationship in a time of unprecedented change in the Middle East. The discussion will feature Prof. William B. Quandt, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Professor of Politics at University of Virginia, Lara Friedman, Director of Policy and Government Relations and Gönül Tol, Executive Director of MEI Center for Turkish Studies, and will be held on October 18 at the Henry L. Stimson Center.
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An orthodox approach to heresy
In today’s news: the Kenyan army is going after El Shabab, the Somali extremist group. The United States is deploying 100 troops to search for Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony. It is a good time to have a look at how to deal with non-state armed groups (NSAGs in governmentese), the subject of a new report from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
Of course there are many other examples besides these two most recent ones of armed groups that present big problems in today’s world, even though they belong to no state. Think Taliban, Hizbollah, Al Qaeda in its several franchises, and Hamas (at least before it took over governance in Gaza). Think Mexican drug cartels, Burmese insurgents, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, the Irish Republican Army, Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group, Afghan mujahideen, Maoist insurgents in Nepal, Naxalites in India…
How should states deal with this alphabet soup of armed groups pursuing through violence freedom, justice, dignity, equity, utopia, money, power, God’s kingdom on earth? Those we like we call freedom fighters (Kosovo Liberation Army, Libyan National Transitional Council) and provide weapons and other assistance. The conventional American approach to those we don’t like is to declare them outside the pale, refuse to talk with them (especially if they are labeled terrorist) and go after them with military and police forces. That’s what the Kenyans and Americans are doing today with al Shabab and the LRA. Sometimes this works, at least partially. More often, there is eventually a political settlement.
Political settlements require dialogue, talks, negotiations. That’s where the CFR report comes in. It makes an effort to define why, when and how the United States should “engage” with NSAGs. Let’s be clear: though the report is prepared by an active-duty Foreign Service officer, it is courageously proposing something that has heretofore generally been regarded as heresy, except in specific instances.
That said, Payton Knopf takes an orthodox approach:
- Analyze: leadership, military effectiveness, constituency, territorial control, platform, sponsors, needs.
- Define the U.S. objective: conflict prevention, humanitarian access, intel collection, regime change, reform, weakening the NSAG, encourage moderation, reach a peace agreement, block spoilers.
- Weigh costs and benefits.
The benefits may include preventing, helping an NSAG or a sponsor we like, bolstering the U.S. image, facilitating peace negotiations, gaining intelligence, mitigating violence, empowering more pragmatic factions. Costs can include conferring legitimacy where we prefer not to, undermining a state, taking sides in a conflict, encouraging violence, providing time for an NSAG to prepare for more violence, and triggering domestic U.S. opposition.
This kind of rational, long-term approach to dealing with NSAGs is not, however, what we generally do today, as Knopf points out. Instead we jump on opportunities in the short term when there is no viable alternative, not too much domestic resistance and some reason to hope that things might work out.
Nor are we well-organized or well-staffed for this kind of work. Knopf goes easy on the State Department but makes it clear that its staff is not trained to engage with NSAGs or to do conflict management work in general. He is correct. Nor are the regional bureaus, whose embassies must necessarily regard government officials in the host countries as their primary interlocutors, likely to take up engagement with NSAGs, except in rare instances. The responsibility might appropriately fall to nongovernmental groups, but legal restrictions and a Supreme Court decision have made that problematic.
This leaves us with international organizations–the UN, the International Red Cross, some regional organizations–as vital players in engaging NSAGs. The CFR report does not address this option, but it has done a great service in calmly raising the issues in the American context and placing the heresy of engaging with NSAGs in an orthodox cost/benefit framework.
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