Tag: United Nations
Diplomatic observers in Syria?
Reading the news from Latakia, it is hard for someone just coming out of Pristina not to note the similarity in military technique between Bashar al Assad’s Syrian forces and Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslav forces.
Milosevic aimed more explicitly to cause the Kosovo Albanians to flee their homes, using artillery to put holes in roofs and leaving the bodies of prominent people in the centers of towns. But the indiscriminate attacks on one neighborhood after another (or one village after the other in Kosovo) seem to the non-military eye comparable. Ditto the rounding up of young people, the random shootings and the mistreatment and torture in prison.
Also similar is the difficulty the rest of the world is having coming to a clear and unequivocal statement against the violence, which Nadim Shehadi notes is the truly complicated side of the equation. But it is an instructive analogy. When the international community unified and spoke with a single voice, it was always difficult for Milosevic to continue the violence.
We haven’t had that kind of unity yet vis-a-vis Syria. The Security Council has managed a statement, but no resolution. Individual voices have been crystal clear: I am in Istanbul this evening and read a statement from the Turkish Foreign Minister in the English version of Hurriyet that was unequivocal in demanding that the Syrian regime stop. We have to make those many voices one. A Security Council resolution passed with Russian and Chinese support would be the ideal diplomatic vehicle.
There is also a need to operationalize the international community’s concern. In Kosovo, this was done with the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), an effort agreed to by Milosevic that I felt at the time was too little too late. But it was a lot more than has been done or even proposed in Syria, where the regime has kept out even the press. And KDOM ultimately had a big impact, when its chief was shown a massacre site and reacted with appropriate horror, calling Milosevic out for what had been done in Serbia’s name.
Diplomatic observers would do what Robert Ford can’t: be present all over Syria and report on any violations of a ceasefire quickly. They can only be deployed once Bashar al Assad agrees to stop the military action. If and when he does, would it be a good idea?
PS: See Jeff White’s piece, which I don’t seem to be able to HTML: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3393
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Preparing for post-Qaddafi Libya, shortened
For those who think the full Council on Foreign Relations version is too long, here is my 750-word version, most of which has also been published on CFR’s The Water’s Edge and CNN.com:
Muammar Qaddafi clings to power in Tripoli. The end could come with little warning. That will mark the beginning of a difficult transition in Libya, not the end. We need to be prepared.
The first challenge will be security. Failure to maintain public order is what got us into big trouble in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein’s “stay behind” operation stirred civic unrest and destroyed government buildings. The murder in Libya last month of the overall rebel commander is a reminder that internecine warfare among the more than 45 rebel militias is a real possibility. People who lost family and tribal members to the Gaddafi regime may seek to settle scores. Former regime elements may seek to defend themselves and to “privatize” state assets. Criminals will see opportunities to traffic in arms, drugs and even people.
The humanitarian challenges will be no less daunting. Fighting has displaced at least half a million Libyans from their homes. Perhaps half of those are still in Libya, and many who are not will seek to return quickly once Qaddafi falls. Food, water, shelter and health services need to be secured for the most vulnerable. In addition, keeping water and electricity flowing to the residents of Tripoli and other major urban centers will be vital to maintaining public order, especially if Qaddafi falls this summer.
U.S. interests in Libya are limited, but a relatively successful transition from the Qaddafi regime to a united, stable, more open and democratic Libya would be seen in the region and more widely as a credit to the NATO-led intervention. It would also enable Libya to resume oil and gas exports, demonstrate international community capacity to manage such transitions and encourage positive outcomes to other Arab Spring protests, including those in Yemen and Syria.
Failure to stabilize Libya could lead to chaos, breakup of the Libyan state that sets an unwelcome precedent elsewhere, or restoration of dictatorship. These outcomes would all damage American and allied credibility and likely also cause major problems for our European allies, including shortfalls in energy supplies, loss of major investments and a continuing refugee flow. Refugees could also cause problems in Tunisia, Egypt, and the rest of the Mediterranean.
It is therefore the Europeans, along with the Arab League, who should take the lead in post-Qaddafi stabilization of Libya, under a clear United Nations Security Council mandate that recognizes a legitimate post-Qaddafi Libyan authority and sets out strategic goals for the transition. The goals should include a united and sovereign Libya within its well-established borders that can sustain, govern, and defend itself through inclusive democratic institutions, using Libya’s resources transparently and accountably for the benefit of all its people.
Quick deployment of a peacekeeping force of several thousand paramilitary police, mainly to keep order in Tripoli and other population centers, would help ensure these goals are met. The European Union and its member states can deploy several hundred paramilitaries. Turkey and Arab countries might supply the remainder. An international peacekeeping operation would not administer Libya but would support an inclusive interim authority in maintaining stability, providing humanitarian assistance, and beginning the reconstruction process.
What if this does not work? NATO will need to be prepared to step in. Only as a last resort—to deal with widespread disorder, a threatened breakup of the Libyan state, or a humanitarian catastrophe—should the international community consider armed intervention without the invitation of a legitimate Libyan authority. This could mean U.S. boots on the ground, but only briefly as part of a broader multilateral effort.
Leadership in post-Qaddafi Libya should be passed as quickly as possible to the Libyans, who have already set up local councils and a Transitional National Council, which help to organize and provide services in the liberated portions of the country. These indigenous institutions merit nurturing and support, including unfreezing of Qaddafi-era assets so that the councils in liberated areas can begin to meet the needs of their populations. The post-Qaddafi era has already begun there.
Libya is a resource-rich country with a relatively well-educated citizenry that has demonstrated courage under fire. The country lacks institutions and political experience, but not talent and commitment. The international community should prepare to support Libyan efforts to take charge of the country’s destiny once Qaddafi leaves the scene.
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Post-Qaddafi Libya
I’m traveling tonight, so I’m putting up tomorrow’s blog post today:
Politicians don’t like to answer hypothetical questions, but analysts do. When Paul Stares, who leads CFR’s conflict prevention efforts, asked me a month or so ago to write about post-Qaddafi Libya, I jumped at the opportunity. I’ve been thinking about Libya since the uprising there started six months ago, discussed it in my post-war reconstruction class here at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, and published a few pieces about it on www.peacefare.net.
To my great regret I’ve never been to Libya, but I did work on it at the State Department once upon a time (around 1994), trying to figure out whether we could convince our allies to tap a small portion of frozen Libyan oil assets to compensate families of Pan Am 103 victims. It was a flaky idea the Brits told me. They had what I regarded as an even flakier one: a trial for the perpetrators in a Scottish court convened in The Hague. Go figure.
That was Libya before Qaddafi decided to give up his nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs. But in one profound sense nothing changed. Qaddafi gave up his WMD because he feared the Americans would do to Libya what they had done to Iraq. He was still in power and wanted to stay there.
The rebellion in Libya is determined to deny him that privilege. I don’t know whether they are going to succeed. I could certainly write another paper treating a scenario in which he stays in place in Tripoli and central Libya, having lost control of Benghazi and the east (Cyrenaica) as well as parts of the west. But this one focuses on a scenario in which he and the regime collapse. I’ve tried to imagine the most urgent problems arising in the days after Qaddafi’s fall, outline options for dealing with them, and recommend appropriate policies.
The result is Contingency Planning Memorandum 12, the first CFR has done on what most people would define as a post-conflict situation, albeit one that has not yet come into existence. I prefer to refer to “societies emerging from conflict,” since conflict doesn’t end, even if you are relatively successful and violence does. That’s just the point with Libya: there are many ways in which post-Qaddafi Libya could be conflictual and even violent, unless we prepare carefully and take the necessary preventive measures.
I am convinced that American interests do not justify a major U.S. role in the aftermath of Qaddafi’s fall, just as they do not require a continued leading role in the military action the UN Security Council authorized. The Europeans stand to lose oil and gas supplies as well as investments in a chaotic Libya, not to mention the possibility of Libyan migrants reaching Italy, France and Spain in numbers that would cause serious political tension. The Europeans should lead, preferably with a UN Security Council mandate and lots of Arab and African support. We should be prepared to fill in, and step in with NATO intervention if the Europeans fail.
It will be interesting to see how much of what I’ve written holds up in the weeks after Qaddafi loses power. Analysts like hypotheticals more than they like reality, unless they get lucky and hit the mark. We’ll see, soon enough I hope.
PS: “Q”addafi is CFR’s (and the NY Times’) preferred spelling. “G”addafi is what I’ve been using, I don’t remember why. I guess I’m inclined to switch to the usage of my betters. Anyone want to tell me which one is closer to being correct?
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Making Bashar al Assad history
As Marc Lynch points out in a tweet this morning, the region is belatedly beginning to react to regime violence against protesters in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have denounced it and have withdrawn their ambassadors, along with Qatar and Kuwait. Turkey is sending its foreign minister to Damascus tomorrow with a “final warning.” The Arab League has expressed “growing concern.”
Blake Hounshell at Foreign Policy is predicting the downfall not only of Bashar al Assad but of the whole regime:
The whole Baathist system has to come down, and it probably will. The only questions now are how long it will take, and how much more innocent blood will be shed in the process.
I hope he is correct, but it won’t happen unless the pressure builds.
Let’s leave aside the remarkable hypocrisy of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia denouncing violence against demonstrators. They are more than welcome to join the international chorus against it in Syria, even if they jointly repressed the demonstrations this spring in Bahrain. The denunciations already make some difference, as they are necessarily the first step on the road to more vigorous action. What more can Syria’s neighbors do that will make a difference?
Andrew Tabler and David Schenker discussed the options early in July. Those that have not been tried yet include depriving Bashar al Assad of revenue by blocking oil exports, expanding sanctions on his businessman cronies, referring him to the International Criminal Court, and encouraging Syrian army defections. Most of the rest of what they recommend has already been tried, including denunciation by UN human rights experts, enhanced relations with the opposition and more vocal alignment with the Syrian people.
The brutal fact is that whether Bashar al Assad falls, and how long it takes, depends more on the wisdom and fortitude of the Syrians than on anything else. So far, they have been remarkable. A journalist who has been there and talked with the protesters recently has assured me that they look even better up close.
The two key “pillars of the regime” remain the army and the business communities in Aleppo and Damascus. If one or both of these crumbles, Bashar al Assad is history.
PS: The LA Times put up this video, allegedly recorded in Idlib yesterday:
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A Libya busman’s holiday
I’ve got a paper coming out on Libya over at the Council on Foreign Relations in the next couple of days, but I mosied over to the Carnegie Endowment this afternoon for a discussion on Libya’s post-Gaddafi transition featuring Esam Omiesh of the Libyan Emergency Task Force and Fadel Lamen of the American-Libyan Council, Carnegie’s Marina Ottaway in the chair.
Marina started off with a cautionary tone: the transition has to be fast enough to provide the country with some semblance of order and governance, but not so fast that legitimacy is brought into in doubt. The country was already devastated by the Gaddafi regime even before the fighting, which has now split it east and west. The security forces are also divided. Political agreements take time, elections are not urgent, but some sort of interim administration is necessary.
Esam outlined the process as currently foreseen by the Transitional National Council (TNC). The goal is a united, constitutionally based, democratic Libya. In the immediate future, the NTC hopes for a ceasefire and withdrawal of Gaddafi’s forces, creation of humanitarian “safe zones,” release of prisoners and removal from power of Gaddafi and his family.
The NTC thinks of itself as a temporary umbrella group, a hybrid executive and legislative body. It has already expanded from the original 31 members to 60 and will need to expand further as more areas are liberated. Tripoli will be a particular challenge. Tribal cleavages will not be an issue in Libya, as so many foreigners seem to think. Nor will ethnic differences emerge as important, as Berbers are thoroughly integrated and have been fighting with the rebels in the Nafusa moutains.
The NTC foresees a committee of 15 to write a new constitution within 45 days by a committee of 15, then approved in a referendum. Legislative elections would follow in 4 months, with presidential elections 2 months later. Fadel and Marina preferred a provisional constitution, subject to subsequent revision in an unspecified way. The new constitution, it has already been decided, would cite Islam as “a” (not “the”) source of law.
All this would be done in line with international mandates and seeking international support through a reconstruction conference. International nongovernmental organizations will be welcomed, provided they are well informed and seek the trust of the Libyans, and especially if they have Libyan American staff. The NTC may negotiate with Gaddafi, but it will not agree to allow him or any of his family to remain in power.
Fadel, noting that Libya under Gaddafi was a stateless state, or worse a stateless autocracy, surveyed the key players. The TNC, he said, is accepted as legitimate everywhere, as is its chair Judge Abdul Jalil. There is controversy about some of its other members, and it does not always make good decisions, but it has served well so far.
Local councils have grown up in liberated areas as well as in Gaddafi-held territory, including Tripoli (where there are thought to be four). They are the ones governing at the local level. The February 17 coalition of lawyers and judges is influential. A relatively moderate Muslim brotherhood seems to dominate the Islamists part of the political spectrum, at least for the moment. Technocrats from the Gaddafi regime, military officers, militia leaders, “syndicates” (regime-sponsored guilds of lawyers, doctors, etc.), secular democrats will all have roles to play.
An international honest broker will be needed, but not Qatar or the Arab League. The UN and EU will play important roles, but Fadel wants the U.S. not to lead only from behind. There will be a real need in order to ensure security for Muslim and Arab peacekeeping boots on the ground.
My comment: A lot of wishful thinking here, especially about the speed and ease of the transition. But what’s a revolution without a bit of idealism and hope? I’m not one to fault people for wanting a good outcome, moving quickly, and being inclusive.
The local councils are the real news here: few conflict societies generate bodies of this sort with palpable legitimacy. For some reason, Libya does. It will be difficult but important to preserve them from the depredations of the foreign invasion of embassies and NGOs, who will want to hire away everyone in sight who speaks English or has a decent education.
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What if Gaddafi holds on?
The Atlantic Wire has usefully assembled all the occasions on which Muammar Gaddafi has indicated he will step down. Obviously that hasn’t happened, and it may not, malgré Juppé. The question is what do we do if he continues to hold on to power in Tripoli and the rebels are unable to make real headway in taking territory? What is plan B?
Failure is definitely an option, at least in the near term. While the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) in Benghazi has not lost any ground in weeks, it hasn’t gained much either. It is managing more or less to administer the territory it does control, where street crime is down, local councils have been set up and humanitarian assistance is delivered. Electricity and water are still ample, but fuel and medicine is reportedly low in some areas.
The NTC is viewed as legitimate outside of Tripolitania (Tripoli and the western portion of the country), not least because it is not claiming to be a government-in-waiting but only a stopgap until a full interim administration with representation from the whole country can be formed after a ceasefire takes effect. Its roots are particularly strong in Cyrenaica (the eastern portion of the country, where Benghazi is located).
If Gaddafi manages to hold on to Tripoli and there is no ceasefire, my guess is the NTC will need to do more than it currently plans. This creates a great moral hazard: the more we help the NTC to govern the country separately from Gaddafi, the greater the likelihood Libya will split into two (or more) pieces, something that most in the international community would find highly objectionable.
What would be needed then is a concerted effort to broaden participation in the NTC and keep its governing structure as open as possible to eventual reformulation. This might mean incorporating more prominent representatives from Tripoli, creating a Tripoli administration-in-exile and maintaining some degree of consistency between how Cyrenaica and Tripolitania are governed. It would mean maintaining insofar as possible those infrastructure networks that still function across the front lines between Gaddafi’s forces and the rebels.
It will also likely mean finding a way to get at least some of Libya’s oil and gas flowing again. This will not be easy: oil company lawyers are rightfully cautious about property rights, which would remain “sketchy,” as my kids say, if Gaddafi is still around. I gather it is legal to buy from Arab Gulf Oil, which is under rebel control. A mechanism for depositing revenues into a UN or other fund, with transparent and supervised drawdown by the NTC, might help get the oil and gas moving again.
The question of currency is likely to arise sooner or later. Libyans seem still to be using Gaddafi-era dinars, but what if they run short in areas outside Gaddafi’s control, or if people lose confidence and want a substitute? Issuance of a new currency would be a big step in the direction of dividing Libya. It would likely be better to allow euro-ization or dollarization to proceed according to market forces, something that has worked reasonably well in a number of conflict situations.
The UK-led International Stabilisation and Response Team, which visited Libya May 20-June 30), has prepared an excellent draft report on what to do once a ceasefire is in place. Is it time to consider more deliberately what happens if there is no ceasefire?
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