Tag: United Nations

Partition has failed, prepare something else

Posted in Daniel Serwer - September 25, 2018 - 0 Comment

Serbian President Vucic has announced that his efforts to get something in negotiations with Kosovo have failed. What could he mean, and what does the announcement portend? It is hard to tell, but my guess is that Vucic has come to realize that there will be no unilateral partition of Kosovo.

That is what Vucic wanted: the northern majority-Serb municipalities in exchange for some sort of recognition of rump Kosovo. Kosovo President Thaci has made it clear he would only agree to some version of that proposal if Kosovo gets equivalent territory in southern Serbian municipalities that have Albanian majorities as well as UN membership.

The Serbian security services have no doubt told Vucic that is unacceptable. The land/people swap just isn’t going to work out, as it fails to protect vital interests of both Belgrade and Pristina: the former is concerned about its main route to the sea through southern Serbia and the latter with its main water supply in the north. Moreover, Serbia can no longer–if it ever could–commit to UN membership for Kosovo, which is blocked by a Russian veto in the Security Council.

The failure of this proposition is a relief, as it will avoid raising questions about borders in Macedonia, Bosnia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Vucic and Thaci may regret it, but the rest of the world should rejoice that Putin has not been handed a prize he would use to try to shift borders to accommodate Russians in what he regards as his “near abroad.” We should also be glad that Serbia itself, Spain, China, and other countries with ethnically diverse regions will not find ethnic secessionists re-empowered.

So far so good, but what about Kosovo? What are its prospects if the land/people swap is dead?

Again I’m guessing, but I think there are still deals to be had. They will not involve UN membership, because Russia now has its own interests in blocking that unless it gets satisfaction on South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Crimea, and Donbas. But Pristina still wants and needs bilateral recognition, or at least de facto acknowledgement of it authority on all the territory of Kosovo, not least so that it can join multilateral organizations as well as settle issues still outstanding with Belgrade: unpaid pensions, state property, border demarcation, Serbian efforts to prevent Serbs from joining its police and security forces, protection of Serbs and Serb religious sites throughout Kosovo, and creation of a Kosovo army.

Belgrade has wanted to use the creation of an Association of Serb Municipalities, something that has already been agreed, to create in Kosovo a de facto self-governing Serb “entity,” analogous to Republika Srpska (RS) in Bosnia, with veto powers in Pristina. Vucic is likely now to double down on that idea, but it is clearly something Thaci cannot deliver. The Kosovo constitutional court has already ruled out anything analogous to the RS, which has rendered governance in Bosnia dysfunctional. The votes for a constitutional amendment to enable creation of a Serb entity in Kosovo simply don’t exist in the Kosovo Assembly.

Nor do the votes exist in the Serbian parliament for changing its constitution, which claims Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. Those votes are unlikely to emerge before EU accession is imminent. At that point, Serbia can expect to get nothing in return, since all the leverage will be with the EU, which will not accept Serbia until normalization with Kosovo is a done deal.

So whatever emerges now is likely to be messy. That is not unusual. Colleagues in KIPRED have done us all a favor by reviewing some available options that have proved feasible elsewhere. I’d suggest Vucic and Thaci read that fine paper. They’ve both got good thinkers available. Put them in the same room to come up with something viable for both parties. And in the meanwhile focus political efforts on preparing their electorates for the inevitable compromises.

Tags : , , , , , , , ,

A Syrian plea

Posted in Uncategorized - September 6, 2018 - 0 Comment

I received today this “Statement to the Public Opinion from Syrian Political & Civil Forces”:

Supported by Russia, al-Assad Regime continues the mobilization of its forces around Idlib Governorate and its countryside, to complete the Russian plans of a military windup and fait accompli imposition.

We, being Syrian institutions, organizations and activists, condemning the statements of the Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, that plainly justify a military invasion by the Regime and its allies and call for the United Nations’ participation in the resulting forced displacement, we remind everyone that any military action on Idlib, under any designation or pretext, threatens the life and safety of more than 3 million civilians, who approximately half of them were forcibly displaced from other areas fleeing the military operations of al-Assad Regime and its allies.

Signatories of this Statement call on the International Community, in general, and the United Nations and Security Council members, in particular, to undertake their responsibilities in protecting the civilians and preventing war crimes against them.

Committing ourselves into finding solutions for the protection of civilians and guarantee of their safety, we propose that the international community:

– Provide the needed support to the local actors in Idlib in order to eliminate any extremist forces in the area, in parallel with preventing al-Assad’s forces, Iran and Russia from exploiting the situation to achieve any gains on the ground and forcing them to respect the De-escalation Agreement by ceasing any land or aerial bombardments on the area.

– Support the local civic institutions, to manage the area and begin the reconstruction process, as well as to establish a free democratic model that represents the desires and expectations of the people.

The International Community and United Nations have lost many opportunities to save the Syrian People from numerous crimes committed against it, and to hold the perpetrators accountable. Despite our great frustration and lack of trust in the international entities, we still hope that these institutions and current international system undertake their responsibilities this time to save the Syrian People from further crimes and disasters.

Signatories:

  1. Ahl Horan

  2. Ahrar – The Working Group for Syria

  3. Al Kawakibi Organization for Human Rights

  4. Al Sharqia Patriotic Grouping – Political Committee

  5. Assyrian Democratic Organization

  6. Baytna Syria

  7. Damir Movement

  8. Free Syria

  9. General Union of Syrian Students

  10. Ghaith Charitable Organization

  11. Idlib Political Committee

  12. Idlib Provincial Council

  13. Idlib Revolutionary Movement Committee

  14. Local Development and Small-Projects Support (LDSPS)

  15. Muatana Current

  16. Rethink Rebuild Society

  17. Shaml Syria Civil Society Coalition

  18. Sound and Picture Organization

  19. Syrian Declaration for National and Democratic Change

  20. Syrian Democratic Coalition

  21. Syrian Democratic Movement

  22. Syrian Network for Human Rights

  23. Syrian Patriotic Coalition

  24. Syrian Patriotic Democratic Coalition

  25. Syrian Women Network

  26. Syrians Coalition

  27. The Day After Association

  1. The Patriotic Coalition of the Revolutionary Forces of Hassaka

  2. The Syrian Women’s Political Movement

  3. Together Movement for a Free and Democratic Syria

  4. Watan Plan

  5. Zaiton Magazine 

Tags : ,

Tragedy impends

Posted in Daniel Serwer - September 5, 2018 - 0 Comment

Pristina daily Koha Ditore has given me permission to republish in English Besnik Krasniqi’s in-depth interview of Ambassador Lulzim Peci, published Sunday:

Lulzim Peci has insisted that “the correction” of borders, for which the president Hashim Thaçi and his Serbian counterpart, Aleksandar Vučić, are being engaged, is a euphemism for the partition of Kosovo. He is against this option, becaues he thinks that it will cause human tragedies in the forms of masive expulsions and displacements.

Peci is the founder and the Executive Director of the Institute KIPRED, and in the past he has served as Ambassador in Stockholm, as well as the first Liasion Representative of Kosovo in Belgrade.

In an interview given to “Koha Ditore,” he spoke on the option of “the correction” of borders between Kosovo and Serbia, which was warned to be put in discussion in the final phase of the dialogue in Brussels. He told what the country will lose from this process, and he spoke on the effects that such a solution will have in the region and abroad. He argued that neither the supporters in Washington nor in Brussels will be able to manage the effects of such a solution.

Among other things, in this interview Peci has told why he considers this “innovative” policy of Brussels as a triumph of Russian foreign policy in the Balkans and in its surroundings, as well as the barriers which it will create for Kosovo in its rush to become a member of the UN and integrated into the EU.

Koha Ditore: Mr. Peci, what is the meaning for Kosovo of the fact that its President has already agreed to discuss the option of “the correction” of borders in the final phase of the dialogue with Serbia?

Peci: First of all, it should be clear to us that “the correction” of borders is a euphemism for the partitioning of Kosovo, with or without exchange of territories with Serbia. The accuracy of the borderline between Kosovo and Serbia was not contested at all, for enabling anyone to correct it, given that the borders between federal units of former Yugoslavia were determined with cadastral borders of the municipalities which were in the two sides of the respective borders. Serbia has demanded, and is demanding, the partition of Kosovo, but so far it has never contested the accuracy of the borderline. Also, based on these well-defined borders, the Mission of NATO (KFOR) was established, and the Kumanovo Agreement of June 9th, 1999 was enforced, including the Land and Air Security Zone.

On the other hand, we should keep in mind that interstate borders can be corrected only if the mistakes acceptable for all the sides in the process of demarcation of the borderline are ascertained, and such a thing can be done only between two independent and sovereign states which do recognize each other. In the case in which it explicitly does not recognize Kosovo, it is very likely that Serbia will not interpret this “correction” as a correction of interstate borders, but as a correction of administrative ones, which will further complicate the situation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Serbia will recognize Kosovo without taking the largest part of the North, as well as the territory of the Municipality of Raniluk in the Southeast of Kosovo, and, in the best case, it will give as a compensation to Kosovo a number of villages in the Valley, perhaps with the inclusion of the city of Preshevo. This option can have consequences not only for the Albanian population that has remained in the North – for which the political cynics can easily say that majority of them were already expelled – given that we can have further displacements, if not even the outright expulsions, of Albanians remaining on the other side of the border, as well as of the Serbs below the river Ibar.

If Serbia would accept to recognize Kosovo, by exchanging the Municipality of Preshevo with that of Leposaviq, which was appended to Kosovo in 1959, then this option could have been considered as a bilateral correction of the border, without any major consequences for both, the Albanian population in the North, and the Serbian population below the Ibar river, but we cannot believe that this option would imply the terminology of “the correction of borders” of Thaçi, or that of “razgraničenje” [delimitation] of Vučić, which was inspired by the ideas of Dobrica Čosić .

Consequently, the acceptance of Thaçi to discuss this issue in the dialogue with Serbia, does not have to do with any correction of borders between Kosovo and Serbia. It has to do with changing of borders and the partitioning of the country. Such a discussion will put in question for the first time the territorial integrity of the state of Kosovo, which was not contested by anyone until now. There is no doubt that this option will undo the results of Kosovar politics and of international support over the last two decades, including here the military intervention of NATO, and it will also pave the way for the partition of the country based on ethnic geopolitics, and, as such, it will mark the first case of change of interstate borders according to this principle in the post-Cold War Europe.

Koha Ditore: So, you are among those who oppose the negotiations on territory? What does really Kosovo lose from touching the borders?

Peci: First of all, I am against this option as a human being, given that I think that it will cause human tragedies in the form of masive displacements, of Albanians from the northern part of Kosovo, and of Serbs from the part below the river Ibar. Albanians and Serbs do not deserve something like this 20 years after the end of the war, as well as after the results which were achieved with so many difficulties – results that can, indeed, be modest, but which, nevertheless, cannot be ignored – in the creation of a democratic and multiethnic society.

Secondly, I think that countries that aim at monoethnicity end up as xenophobic and fascistoid, and this is in complete contradiction with my political convictions and trust in liberal democracy, and, thirdly, given that Kosova, with the option of the partition, will put in question the safety of its water and energetic sources, as well as its potential for economic development, if the Ujman (Gazivode) Lake passes under the sovereignty of Serbia.

After the proposal of Thaçi for “moratorium for the solution of Kosovo status” of the year 2003, the entry into the game of “the correction of borders” is undoubtedly his biggest political adventure, but this time this adventure can engender irreparable consequences.

Koha Ditore: More precisely, which are the borders in which you are afraid that Kosovo might end up, if the borders are put on the Brussels discussion table, and what Kosovo gains and loses from a solution based on the exchange of territories?

Peci: As I have mentioned above, I apprehend that Kosovo will lose four municipalities in the North, as well as the Municipality of Raniluk in the East of the country, in exchange for some villages inhabited with Albanian majority in the Valley, and, perhaps, the city of Preshevo. The cost of this option will be extremely burdensome, even if Serbia does explicitly recognize the statehood of Kosovo. On the other hand, we should not forget that without normalization of relations with Kosovo, Serbia cannot get membership in the EU. Therefore, we have no major reason for entering into the game of “the correction” of borders, in order to do a service to Belgrade, by working against Berlin, given that without Berlin’s approval neither Kosovo, nor Serbia, can have any European future.

Furthermore, I doubt very much that the EU’s five non-recognizers will recognize Kosovo, even if Serbia recognizes it explicitly, after the change of borders based on ethnic geopolitics, given that for the partition of territories in which their numerous minorities live, this can be interpreted as a precedent that is even more dangerous then the Kosovo’s independence itself. I can only imagine how can such a “historical agreement” be interpreted by Cyprus, Slovakia, or Romania, regardless of the fact that with their non-recognition of Kosovo they have contributed themselves for the opening of such an option, by emboldening Serbia, as well as by hindering Kosovo’s European future. Therefore, I fear that with “the correction of borders” Kosovo will lose both, the territory, and the perspective for the membership in the EU.

Koha Ditore: Does the President have the mandate to represent Kosovo in the final phase of the dialogue and to negotiate the borders of the state without the blessing from the Assembly? If not, do you see any actions that should be taken against him?

Peci: Nobody in Kosovo has the mandate to negotiate its borders, given that this is in contradiction with the Constitution of the country, from the point view of the territorial integrity, as well as of the territorial claims against any other country. On the other hand, I think that the President has no explicit constitutional obstacles to represent the country in the dialogue with Serbia, but he must represent the country and the unity of the people in this dialogue, first of all by building political unity – which he has abused and destroyed by bypassing the Assembly and the Government, as well as by talking, in opposition with the Constitution, for changing the borders of the country. So far as the opening of the issue of the changing of borders of the country in the dialogue with Belgrade is concerned, I think that there is sufficient space for treating the constitutionality of this Thaçi’s action by the Constitutional Court.

For me, it is very surprising how can Thaçi push with such a zeal his already common agenda with Vučić for “the correction of borders,” given that I assume that he knows how unlikely it is that it will be approved at the Assembly of Kosovo. But he is perhaps calculating exactly on the small-minded interests of the politicians from the position and opposition, which were shown so successful so far in the execution of the partition of Kosovo. We should not forget that with this type of political action Thaçi has kept himself effectively in power during the last 11 years. We should not exclude here Thaçi’s possible attempts to manipulate the passing of this option by bypassing the Assembly of Kosovo by asking for the opinion of the Constitutional Court. Regardless of the fact how difficult this is to be realized, it should not be neglected as a possible scenario.

On the other hand, the option of the approval of this agreement through referendum is absurd, given that this cannot be done, not only because Kosovo has no law on referendum – which Thaçi has a mandate to sponsor, but because the change of the Constitution of the country, including here of its borders, can be done only through parliamentary procedures which demand the approval of the two-thirds of the deputies, including the two-thirds of the deputies of non-majority communities. The epilogue of these actions leaves only two options to Thaçi: to be considered as the biggest Don Quixote of the Kosovar politics, or as a genius of political skills, and I don’t believe that there is any middle solution here.

Koha Ditore: How do you see the role of institutions and of political subjects regarding this development, and is there any danger that the Assembly will arrive in a stage in which it will deliver the North to Serbia, together with Ujman (Gazivoda), a part of Trepça, etc.? Read more

Tags : , , , , ,

A bad idea whose time should not come

Posted in Daniel Serwer - August 2, 2018 - 13 Comments

Kosovo President Thaci has made it clear he intends to discuss changing Kosovo’s borders with Serbian President Vucic. He denies this means ethnic partition of Kosovo and calls it a correction of the border, a euphemism intended to mean an exchange of territory:

If the Kosovo-Serbia border correction and the final agreement on mutual recognition are achieved, if such an agreement is of bilateral and balanced, meaning a win-win for both parties, then no one would be against it.

Presumably he is open to trading some or all of Kosovo’s Serb-majority northern municipalities for Albanian-majority territory in southern Serbia. The deal would of course have to include, prior to the land swap, mutual diplomatic recognition. Only sovereign states can exchange territory.

This idea has been widely circulated in recent weeks, but Thaci’s remarks are the first clear confirmation from the Albanian side of the equation. It would not be happening without US and European concurrence. Brussels and Washington have apparently decided that integrating the northern Serb municipalities with the rest of Kosovo is just too difficult, so they have dropped their previous firm opposition.

The border correction, or whatever you call it, is a bad idea, for many reasons:

  • The majority of the Serbs in Kosovo as well as the more important Serb monasteries and other religious sites are not in the north. Those south of the Ibar River will be at risk, both short term and long term, if territory is exchanged.
  • The exchange would increase support for those Albanians in Kosovo who favor union with Albanian and for those in Macedonia who would like to join such a Greater Albania, potentially destabilizing Macedonia as well.
  • Republika Srpska, the Serb-controlled 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will want to follow suit, declaring independence and seeking to join Serbia. That will precipitate a comparable Croat move to have the Croat-majority cantons of Bosnia join Croatia.
  • The Russians will point to this correction of borders as precedent for what they would like to do with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, and Donbas as well as Crimea in Ukraine.
  • They may even like the idea enough to allow Kosovo into the United Nations, which would be a Pyrrhic victory if it then joins Greater Albania, or if China decides still to veto Kosovo membership.

I am still hoping agreement on this bad idea will prove difficult to achieve. Serbia has good security reasons not to give up territory in southern Serbia that lies adjacent to its main outlet to the sea. The Serb Orthodox Church stands to a big loser if this “correction” proceeds. Kosovo has good reason not to precipitate a series of claims to international border corrections that are unlikely to be peaceful. Nor will Pristina’s current politicians thrive in an environment in which Kosovo’s population is anticipating the end of the country’s statehood by merger into Albania. Vetevendosje, a movement that has advocated the option to join Albania, will be the big winner.

A democratic Kosovo and a democratic Serbia should be able to come to terms on protection of their respective minority populations without this perilous exchange of territory and populations. Of course that is precisely the problem: neither is a consolidated democracy and both are run by ethnic nationalists who still lack adequate respect for minorities. It shouldn’t be a big surprise that an ethnic nationalist administration in the US and an EU in which ethnic nationalism has gained lots of ground weaken in their commitment to democracy and the rule of law, but it is not a welcome development. This is a bad idea whose time should not come.

Tags : , , ,

Chemical weapons: how and who

Posted in Nicolas Reeves - June 20, 2018 - 0 Comment

The deployment of chemical weapons in Homs, Syria by the Assad regime in late 2012 ended a 20-year freeze on state employment of chemical weapons. Since then, the use of these weapons of mass destruction has exploded, with over 200 attacks reported in Syria alone, in addition to incidents in Iraq, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom.

One week before the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OCPW) meets to discuss multilateral methods to enforce accountability for users of chemical weapons, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a group of chemical weapons experts to share their ideas for enforcing accountability for users of chemical weapons. Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the OCPW, gave the keynote address before a panel moderated by Rebecca Hersman, Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS, discussed the issue of chemical weapons proliferation. The panel included:

Yleem D.S. Poblete, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance

Samantha Job, Counsellor for Foreign and Security Policy, British Embassy Washington

Nicolas Roche, Director of Strategic, Security and Disarmament Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Üzümcü detailed the successes of his tenure as OPCW Director-General, which included the elimination of 96 percent of declared chemical weapons stockpiles worldwide. He also delved into the challenges the OPCW faces in the coming years, emphasizing that increased chemical weapon attacks in Syria and elsewhere call for heightened international coordination to reinforce nonproliferation. However, Russia’s enabling attitude towards Syria’s chemical weapons use has actually eroded this norm. In recent years, Russia has vetoed UN Security Council resolutions to condemn Assad’s actions. Putin has also led a defamation campaign against the OPCW’s investigation methods. In the face of this challenge to the OPCW and its mission, the Director-General advocated for member states to give the organization the power to conduct investigations to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks.

Roche focused on France’s desire to combat chemical weapons use by strengthening multilateral institutions. He stressed the importance of international partnerships for information gathering and sharing, as well as the need for a stronger OPCW with the power to identify perpetrators of chemical weapons violence. In what could be seen as a slight to both the US and Russian behavior vis-a-vis international institutions over the last year, Roche emphasized that a multilateral regime for addressing the attribution gap in chemical weapons investigations is a greater good. France will move forward with multilateralism in combating the chemical weapons threat, regardless of who is on board.

Poblete agreed that multilateralism should be at the forefront of the fight against chemical weapons proliferation, but argued that bilateral negotiations between states should also play a role. International approaches fail when compromise becomes the enemy of the good. Poblete defended president Trump’s bilateral strategy with North Korea, repeating multiple times that the administration was well-informed going into the Kim summit. Trump’s failure to mention Kim’s chemical weapons program in the buildup or the aftermath of the meeting in no way indicated that dismantling North Korean stockpiles was off the table.

Job took the point about the need for multilateralism a step further, focusing on the critical role OPCW plays in strengthening the international norm against chemical weapons proliferation. Job emphasized the need to combat Russia’s attacks on the legitimacy of the Chemical Weapons Convention’s regulatory body, arguing that member countries should appoint permanent representatives to the OPCW to accomplish this goal. OPCW also needs increased funding to face the threat of chemical weapons attacks by non-state actors. Like Roche, Job also explicitly endorsed giving the OPCW the power to fill the attribution gap that currently exists in the prosecution of chemical weapons crimes.

Bottom Line: The international community is currently at a crossroads when it comes to dealing with the rejuvenated threat of chemical weapons attacks. Our European allies have already decided on the way forward: multilateralism. The United States is still welcome at the international negotiation table, but like with the JCPOA, France and other European powers will not capitulate to the US preference for bilateralism. The United States must present a united front with its allies on the chemical weapons issue, both for the sake of nonproliferation and for prevention of further erosion of American credibility in the current international framework.

 

Tags : , , , , , ,

What Iranians want to know

Posted in Daniel Serwer - June 18, 2018 - 0 Comment

Mohammed Ataei of the Iranian Republic News Agency last week asked some questions. I answered. The interview was published in Farsi today: 

1. President Trump asserted that his decision to abandon the JCPOA had already changed Iran’s regional policies. Do you think his statement is based on any factual evidence or is it just a political statement in response to internal and international criticisms of his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement?

A: I know of no factual evidence for this. Iran remains forward deployed and engaged in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Bahrain. Much as I might hope that Tehran would pay more attention to the welfare of Iranians and less to its military adventures in the region, I don’t think it is happening.

2. Since the election of President Trump, we have seen many reports about Israeli and Saudi lobbying campaign to undermine the Nuclear Agreement with Iran. They openly welcomed President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the agreement. To what extent was Trump’s decision influenced by Benjamin Netanyahu and Bin Salman?

A: I think both Netanyahu and MbS were influential, even if I don’t understand what either one gains from the withdrawal.

3. ‎President Obama always said that he had been able to create an international consensus ‎against Iran. ‎Now some observers argue that President Trump’s unilateral policies have ‎unwittingly brought Russia, ‎China and India closer together. How would you see the efficiency ‎of the US sanctions on Iran in the ‎context of the US unilateralism in international affairs?‎ Do you think Secretary Pompeo can persuade the international community to rebuild the sanctions ‎coalition against Iran?

A: In a word: no. Even if the Europeans are compelled by secondary sanctions to observe the U.S. restrictions, China, Russia, India and others will not. There will be no voluntary international consensus, as there was in the lead-up to the JCPOA.

4. President Trump said that he would target any third party which violates the US sanctions against Iran. There are reports that the EU has threatened to take the US to the World Trade ‎Organization. ‎Don’t you think that Trump is isolating the US rather than isolating Iran?

A: He is definitely isolating the U.S. more than he is isolating Iran, as you saw yesterday at the G7 Summit. But the WTO is a slow mechanism and big European companies are not likely to defy the U.S.

5. How would you explain the challenge of the US extraterritorial sanctions to international agreements and the UN Security Council’s resolutions such as 2231?

A: I’m not a lawyer, but I do think the U.S. has the right to limit use of its own financial system. It just isn’t wise to do so. The U.S. is clearly in violation of UNSC res 2231. But who is going to enforce it?

6. The EU vowed to stop European companies from leaving Iran despite the renewed threat of U.S. sanctions. However, major European companies have already announced that they would end business with Tehran. Do you think that the European leaders have done enough to save the JCPOA?

A: Not yet. They will have to be very tough with the U.S. to save it. Iran will also need to be flexible.

7. How does the US withdrawal from the JCPOA affect the worldwide nuclear disarmament? How would you see the future of NPT?

A: U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA undermines nuclear non-proliferation efforts worldwide. We’ll have to wait and see what Iran does, but if it proceeds now with its nuclear program without restraints, we could also see quite a few other countries proceed in the same direction.

PS: Mohammed followed up with a phone call in which he asked about the differences between a treaty and other executive agreements, how the Europeans might maneuver around secondary sanctions, as well as a few other things.

Tags : , , , , , ,
Tweet