Tag: United Nations
Not with a bang
The prime ministers of Macedonia and Greece today announced a solution to the “name” issue: they propose that the former will in the future be known as the Republic of Northern Macedonia, its language as Macedonian, and its citizens Macedonians, if I understand correctly. The new name is to be used both within Macedonia, including in the constitution, and externally, as the Greeks had insisted. The agreement needs to be approved by parliaments in both capitals as well as by referendum in Macedonia.
This is excellent news. Disagreement about the name has slowed the country’s progress towards the EU, stalled its entry into NATO, and exacerbated frictions between its Albanian and Macedonian communities. A solution would mark important progress in a lingering Balkans dispute. Progress in one place gives encouragement to others, as last year’s entry of Montenegro into NATO did. Keeping the Balkans bicycle moving forward is vital to keeping it from falling over.
Of course it isn’t finished until it’s finished. Approvals in parliaments aren’t automatic. Nationalists in both countries will oppose the new name. Referenda are likewise dicey: no telling how things will go, though the Albanians in Macedonia, who are impatient for NATO accession, will presumably turn out in force to vote in favor. That’s close to half the votes needed for approval.
This is one of those issues that has aroused passions but will soon be forgotten once the solution is approved in both countries. There are much more important issues for both Greece and Macedonia: the welfare of their citizens (including EU and NATO membership for Macedonia), defending their electoral campaigns from Russian trouble-making, and exploiting the many synergies between their economies. The sooner both countries refocus on those issues, the better.
Once the name issue is settled, the remaining Balkan tough nuts will be normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia as well as making the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina capable of negotiating and implementing the acquis communautaire required for EU membership. Those are not easy problems, but there is more than enough time to solve them before the window for EU membership opens again in 2023.
Republic of Northern Macedonia: it’s a solution that could have been found at any time during the last 25 years. No big bang here, but a blessing to the politicians willing to take the associated risks. Prime Ministers Tsipras and Zaev deserve a lot of credit, as do Foreign Ministers Dimitrov and Kotzias and the ever-patient UN envoy Nimetz. Congratulations! Googletranslate tells me the right words are: συγχαρητήρια! and алал да му е! I trust someone will tell me if I’ve got that wrong.
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No formula for success
The downsides of withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal are all too obvious. But it behooves any conflict management type like me to consider the other side: what does the Administration think it will accomplish, and why do some allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia support withdrawal?
The Administration is saying that its main reason for withdrawing was the sunset clause, that is the expiration of parts of the agreement seven years from now. That sounds silly: why not wait until just before the agreement expires to threaten re-imposition of sanctions in order to negotiate a follow-on agreement? The answer is that Washington is trying to prevent Iran from gaining the economic benefits that will accrue during those seven years.
The Administration’s goal is to squeeze Iran through not only re-imposition of US sanctions but also through secondary sanctions that will dis-incentivize European, Russian, Chinese, and other companies from doing business with Tehran. Proponents of withdrawal believe this will at least limit Iranian capabilities–non-nuclear as well as nuclear–and make Iran less of a threat in the future. Some Americans seem to hope it will even bring the Islamic Republic to its knees, precipitating regime change.
These effects would depend on virtually universal adherence to the re-imposed sanctions. Why would the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese play ball? A well-informed Israeli put it this way, with respect to the Europeans: they fear war with Iran more than they fear re-imposition of sanctions. They will, in other words, go along in order to avoid an American attack on Iran. Even if you believe that–and I doubt it–it leaves Russia and China unconstrained. They are unlikely to be as easily cowed as the Europeans. They and many other countries will gladly do business with Iran, surreptitiously if not openly.
There is thus no reason to believe that sanctions can be made nearly as tight as they were in 2015 when the UN Security Council was unanimous and the nuclear deal was negotiated. Nor do I think the Europeans will buckle easily to American will. They are far more likely to try to sustain the agreement, which is what Iranian President Rouhani is saying he wants to do as well, so long as Tehran sees the consequent economic benefits.
If the Europeans withdraw, I suspect the Iranians will ramp up their enrichment activity and weapons research so as to reduce their breakout time to well under the one year the nuclear deal was designed to maintain. But Tehran will also want enough transparency through international inspections to ensure that the Israelis and Americans can be reasonably confident they are not actually producing nuclear weapons. It is not in Tehran’s interest for there to be any doubt on that score, since Israel can be expected to react or even pre-empt in kind if it perceives that it might be subject to a nuclear attack.
As for the hope that Iran may be constrained or even fatally weakened by re-imposed sanctions, that day is far off. It suits the Islamic Republic, especially its hardliners, well to have a foreign enemy it can blame for its own economic failures. The public demonstrations of the last year or so occurred precisely because the regime could no longer blame only the foreigners. Nor do I know of any regime that has wanted nuclear weapons that couldn’t find the financial resources to fund the program. North Korea has demonstrated how even a very poor country can do it. Iran will do likewise, no matter what sanctions are re-imposed.
As in many things, Trump has over-estimated his own power and underestimated his enemy. That is not a formula for success.
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Peace picks, April 9 – 15
- Russia and the European Court of Human Rights after 20 Years | Monday, April 9 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Wilson Center | Register here |
Despite ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights 20 years ago, the Russian government today remains widely criticized for its human rights record. Using the findings of the recent book Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: the Strasbourg Effect, the panel will discuss what socialization has taken place in Russia as a result of its participation in the ECHR system. Featuring Marina Agaltsova (Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, Human Rights Center), Maria Issaeva (Threefold Legal Advisers, Moscow), and Lauri Mälksoo (Professor of International Law, University of Tartu, Estonia).
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- The Race is On: 2018 Electoral Landscape Starts to Take Shape in Brazil | Monday, April 9 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
Join the Wilson Center for a conversation with leading political analysts, six months out from perhaps the most consequential election since Brazil’s return to democracy and just days after the Brazilian Supreme Court voted to reject former President Lula’s request to remain free while he appeals a corruption conviction, likely ending his bid for the presidency. The looming April 7th deadline for prospective candidates for the presidency of Brazil to affiliate with a political party and resign from their current executive positions will also help to define an electoral landscape that has been unusually difficult to predict. Although opinion polls at this early stage often tell us little about an election’s eventual outcome, the field of contenders is beginning to take shape and will soon provide the first real indications of where this race could be headed. Featuring David Fleischer (Professor Emeritus, University of Brasilia), Christopher Garman (Managing Director for the Americas, Eurasia Group), Mauricio Moura (CEO and Founder, IDEIA Big Data), and Ricardo Sennes (Director and Partner, Prospectiva Consultoria Internacional). With introductory remarks by Paulo Sotero (Director, Brazil Institute, Wilson Center). There will be a live webcast of this event.
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- The Russian Way of Warfare | Monday, April 9 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | CSIS | Register here |
After ten years of military modernization and defense reform, Russia’s military is now a reliable instrument of national power that can be used in a limited context to achieve vital national interests. Russian strategists, concerned about instability along the Russian periphery or an aerospace attack on the Russian heartland, are focused on preserving influence in buffer states and on reinforcing defensive bulwarks. Russian military strategy and operations show an increasing degree of coordination, deception, and simultaneity to achieve objectives quickly while minimizing vulnerabilities. What does the evolution of Russia’s armed forces, its strategy, and the way it uses force tell us about the future? Featuring Scott Boston (Defense Analyst, RAND), Dara Massicot (Policy Researcher, RAND), Olga Oliker (Senior Adviser and Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS), and Michael Kofman (Research Scientist, Russia Studies Program, CNA) as moderator. There will be a live webcast of this event.
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- Mexico Elections 2018: A Referendum on Populism? | Monday, April 9 | 6:00pm – 7:30pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register here |
Join the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) for insights on the state of the Mexican political and economic climate ahead of the country’s upcoming presidential election. Featuring Dr. Monica de Bolle (Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University SAIS & Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics), Dr. Antonio Ortiz-Mena (Senior Vice President, Albright Stonebridge Group & Former Head of Economic Affairs, Embassy of Mexico in the United States), Mr. Christopher Wilson (Deputy Director, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center), and Dr. Riordan Roett (Professor & Director, Latin American Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University SAIS) as moderator.
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- The UN’s New “Sustaining Peace” Agenda | Wednesday, April 11 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Stimson Center | Register here |
From North Africa and the Middle East to South Sudan, Ukraine, and Afghanistan, the past several years have witnessed a marked uptick in political violence within states, reversing the trend recorded since the end of the Cold War. In 2016 alone, more countries experienced violent conflict than at any time in nearly 30 years, including the continued sharp rise in terrorist attacks. Earlier this year, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres released his Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace to inform a related UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting planned for April 24-25, 2018 in New York. This panel discussion will explore whether and how best the UN’s new “Sustaining Peace” Agenda can help to reduce violence substantially in fragile and conflict-affected countries, while building more just, inclusive, and resilient societies. Featuring Ambassador Tariq Al-Ansari (Director of the Department of International Cooperation, Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Charles Call (Associate Professor, American University), Eric Gaudiosi (Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, DOS), Corinne Graff (Senior Policy Scholar, USIP), Elizabeth Hume (Senior Director for Programs and Strategy, Alliance for Peacebuilding), and Richard Ponzio (Director, Just Security 2020 Program, Stimson & Co-Chair, UNA-NCA Peace & Security Committee) as moderator.
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- The French-American Alliance in an America-First Era | Thursday, April 12 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
In April 2018, President Donald Trump will host French President Emmanuel Macron for the first state visit of the US president’s term. As these two unlikely partners meet again, the visit will signal a pivotal moment in the bilateral relationship between the United States and France that has matured markedly in the last decade. It could set the stage for continued deep cooperation that has flourished in recent years or preface a return to competitive rivalry in an occasionally tempestuous relationship between Washington and Paris. On the occasion of the launch of Non-Resident Senior Fellow Jeff Lightfoot’s report “The French-American Alliance in an America-First Era,” the Future Europe Initiative will convene a panel of experts to discuss this forthcoming state visit as well as assess the outlook of the US-French relationship more broadly. Featuring H.E. Gérard Araud (Ambassador, Embassy of France in the United States), Ms. Susan Glasser (Staff Writer, The New Yorker), and Mr. Pierre-Andre Imbert (Social Policy Advisor, Office of the President of the Republic of France).
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- Palestine in Political Limbo: What the Loss of the Two-State Framework Means for Palestinians | Thursday, April 12 | 1:00pm – 3:00pm | New America | Register here |
The emerging consensus is that the two-state solution is all but dead, largely due to the continuing expansion of Israeli settlement colonies in the occupied Palestinian territory and President Trump’s proclamation recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. How will Israel’s efforts to legalize certain aspects of its occupation under its domestic law impact Palestinians in historic Palestine and in the diaspora? Will Israel’s warming relations with the Arab world complicate or facilitate a just solution to the Palestine-Israel conflict? What role might the international community play as Israel attempts to extend its sovereignty over Palestine? Might recent events have opened up new opportunities for Palestinians to re-imagine Palestine? Featuring Zena Agha (Co-founder and Executive Director, Al-Shabaka), Yara Hawari (US Policy Fellow, Al-Shabaka), Nadia Hijab (Palestine Policy Fellow, Al-Shabaka), and Zaha Hassan (Middle East Fellow, New America).
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- The Venezuelan Refugee Crisis: Challenges and Solutions | Friday, April 13 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Brookings Institution | Register here |
The current mass exodus of Venezuelans into neighboring Colombia, Brazil, and other South American countries has the potential to wreak havoc in border communities and budgets. Official figures place the number of Venezuelan residents in Colombia at 600,000 and in Brazil at around 40,000, with observers on the ground estimating the real numbers to be much higher. To manage such an enormous challenge, the international community—including the U.N. system, international institutions, and other private, public, and multilateral stakeholders—will have to work together to mobilize the necessary resources and forge a collective response that provides relief to suffering Venezuelans fleeing their country. Featuring Karen L. Freeman (Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID), Matthew Reynolds (regional representative for the United States and the Caribbean, UN High Commissioner for Refugees), and Dany Bahar (David M. Rubenstein Fellow, Brookings Institution) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Ted Piccone (Senior Fellow, Latin America Initiative and Charles W. Robinson Chair, Brookings).
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- Ending Civil Wars: How Can We Succeed with Limited Opportunities? | Friday, April 13 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
As a part of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ ongoing project on Civil Wars, Violence and International Responses, the second volume of a special issue of the journal Dædalus was released in January 2018 to explore trends in civil wars and solutions moving forward. Join us as experts discuss their findings and recommendations on how the United States can better respond to intrastate conflict and promote both development and stability to create lasting peace. Featuring Nancy Lindborg (President, USIP), Dr. Stephen Biddle (Professor, George Washington University), Stephen Krasner (Professor, Stanford University), Barry Posen (Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Clare Lockhart (Director and Co-Founder, Institute for State Effectiveness), and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry (Director, U.S.-Asia Security Initiative, Stanford University) as moderator.
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Dare to dream
Alexandros Mallias, former ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to the US and now a special adviser to Eliamep, writes (based on his presentation to the 5th Hellenic High Strategy Conference, March 29 -30:
A process that runs from Tehran to Helsinki via Jerusalem? Madness, or surrealism? Call it utopia, but tomorrow it may become necessity. Allow me to identify six major problems and offer six proposals:
Mismatch between threats, military interventions and their consequences
The so-called “Arab Spring” is not simply a lost opportunity for the Arabs but also a great occasion missed by Europe and the United States as well. For the first time since the rise of “Arab nationalism” in the 1950s, the origin of the revolts did not target Europe, the United States, and Israel. What happened next was due also to our action, miscalculations or inertia and affects our own security and stability.
The unprecedented flow of refugees and migrants to Europe is the unavoidable “collateral damage.” The refugee and migration flows undermined the European integration process and pushed xenophobia and nationalism into mainstream politics. The refugee issue was the catalyst for the Brexit referendum. The European Union is losing a global politico-military partner and capabilities. I earnestly hope this trend will be reversed.
The EU was inadequate, divided and slow to assess the threat, to react, and to act. The lack of a common and integrated foreign policy as a functional common denominator is at the heart of the problem.
Proposal: prevention of population movements should be at the center of political decision-making
The following conditions need to be fulfilled before giving the “green light” for military power:
- Defining the problem: what threat was Libya’ s dictator Muammar Gaddafi to Europe’s security? Is today’s Libya a security provider for Europe?
- A clear political goal: what do we want to achieve? What does success consist of?
- A clear line between wishful thinking and what is possible: no early “mission accomplished” fireworks.
- Political objectives matched by appropriate economic, political, and military means.
Conflicts of interest of the Middle East actors
The vital interests of regional players diverge. They are part of the problem as well as of the solution.
Proposal: a new regional security system covering the Middle East and the Mediterranean
The proposed arrangement might include all MENA States, Iran included, the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the EU. This idea was floating in the UN Security Council Resolutions (Iran-Iraq cease fire) in the late 80’s.
Without a minimum understanding between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, there is no possibility of establishing balanced, interest-based security in the wider region of the Middle East and North Africa.
Saudi Arabia is changing. The modernization policies are essential for the Kingdom’s stability and security. Potentially aggressive behavior by Iran during the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s welcome reforms must be prevented. But the stabilization process of the wider Middle East is not achievable without Iran.
Logic dictates that long-term balance of power and interests should allow establishing the terms for the inclusion of Iran, Saudi Arabia and at a later stage Israel in a regional security arrangement, no matter how impossible this perspective looks today. However, logic rarely becomes a mainstream practice in international relations.
We should remember that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 cemented the era of détente and cooperation, before the end of the Cold War. It included recognition that: “The participating states are convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole…”
We need to launch a process including the OSCE member-states and the MENA states. The participating states should undertake commitments similar to those adopted within the Helsinki Process. China should also participate.
Nuclear proliferation
The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East is real. It will become unavoidable if Iran gets nuclear capabilities. Already, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and possibly Egypt are contemplating their own nuclear ambitions.
Egypt’s well-known proposal for the creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East sounds good. However, Israel has its own reasons not to back the Egyptian plan.
Proposal: a phased multilateral treaty
First : The elaboration and adoption of a binding multilateral treaty for the non-use of nuclear weapons in the greater Middle East (including Iran).
Second: the Treaty could include a clause that bans, within a defined time schedule (for example 20 years), nuclear weapons in the wider Middle East, establishing a nuclear-free zone. The Permanent Members (P5) of the UN Security Council and the European Union could also be contracting parties.
Ballistic missiles and conventional forces
Iranian ballistic missiles are a threat to Israel’s security. The anticipated improvements in their accuracy and delivery capacity will further increase Israel’s and others’ concern and need for security, deterrence and retaliation.
Proposal: a “Middle East Conventional Forces Control and Reduction Treaty”
This would require the proportional and simultaneous reduction of ballistic and other conventional armaments. It could take the shape of a legally binding instrument similar to the November 1990 Paris “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.”
We could foresee an intermediate set of Confidence Building Measures, including international inspections and observation of military exercises.
Anachronism and dysfunction of the global collective security system
The UN is unable to discharge its duties as the global collective security system. Unilateral actions by the P5 without foresight actions are well illustrated through their involvement in the Syrian chaos.
Often acting at the margins of their mandate (mainly the UN Charter’s Articles 23 and 24 ) their acts are justified by self-interest. Their motivations are geopolitical; about prevailing and expanding or containing influence.
Proposal: The UN Charter to be revised and the Security Council updated
Τhe post-war composition and the abuse of veto power do not match the present global risks, balance of power and capabilities.
Conclusion
We need to dare to dream. Today’s impossible is tomorrow’s achievement. Peace in the Middle East is not beyond our reach.
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Fragile states pose security threats
State fragility is on the rise. In recent years, civil wars have proliferated throughout the world. In 2015, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) reported 49 active intrastate conflicts, the highest number since 1991; likewise, casualties have increased consistently during the past 25 years. These developments are worrying. In contrast to most interstate conflict, civil wars are extremely difficult to resolve. Studies on intrastate conflicts since 1945 have shown that civil wars tend to last an average of about seven to twelve years, making their repercussions tremendous. As the brutal civil war in Syria exemplifies, the fallout includes humanitarian crises, the rise of extremist organizations, and regional political instability. Policy makers in the West must thus adopt more effective policies to stabilize fragile and failed states.
On March 19, the United States Institute of Peace hosted a high-profile panel discussing how the United States and the international community can address better the national security challenges stemming from state fragility. Nancy Lindborg, President of the US Institute of Peace, was joined by Ilan Goldenberg, Director of the Middle East Security Program at Center for a New American Security, and Kimberly Kagan, founder and President of the Institute for the Study of War. Joshua Johnson, host of NPR’s program 1A, moderated the discussion.
State fragility poses critical security threats. According to Nancy Lindborg, fragile states are characterized by the inability to provide basic public goods such as security and lack political legitimacy as governments typically exclude parts of their citizenry from participating in politics, the country’s social life, and the economy. As a result, fragile states suffer from weak institutions and are less able to manage shocks like disasters and conflict. In this respect, Ilan Goldenberg emphasizes that fragile states often require merely a spark to disintegrate. Collapsing states create serious security vacuums. As outside actors are concerned about losing political influence, they are incentivized to intervene. This generally exacerbates and perpetuates the conflicts already unfolding within failed states.
Syria is a prime example for this vicious dynamic. Goldenberg argues that the 2011 Arab Spring caused the disintegration of the Syrian state and ignited a domestic conflict, which has developed into a regional and international fight over influence in the Levant. Today, Syria is divided into five different zones of influence: a Jordanian-supported rebel pocket in southwestern Syria, the Iran-backed Assad regime in the center of the country, an al-Qaeda safe haven in the province of Idlib, a Turkish-controlled territory in the north, and a Kurdish canton that enjoys US support. Conflict erupts at the intersections of these “tectonic plates.” To pacify Syria, all involved parties must first agree on long-term political arrangements concerning these hotspots before a national reconciliation project can be launched. Goldenberg is however not hopeful that positive change will occur soon. Kimberly Kagan affirms this observation and stresses that the diverging interests of the foreign actors involved in Syria impede any peace progress.
To avoid more Syria-like scenarios, the United States must invest more effort in stabilizing fragile states and pacifying failed states. Given U.S. economic strength, Lindborg argues that Washington has a moral obligation to help fragile states. Support must thereby exceed simple humanitarian assistance and rather address the sources of fragility. Kagan highlights that moral obligations often align with political and security interests such as counteracting breeding grounds of terrorism. She thus advocates more US engagement in form of a balanced hard and soft power approach to help fragile states recover themselves and create situations whereby governance can return. Goldenberg adds that the United States also acts as a role model in addressing state fragility. If the US demonstrates leadership, other states follow suit.
However, Washington is currently unwilling to meets is obligation of providing stability around the world. Lindborg points out that US policies are too reactive. Although consecutive administrations have identified state fragility as a key security threat, they have only responded to crises after they had become far too problematic. The United States is in a state of “hunkering down” whereby Americans are “tired of playing world police.”
It is clear, however, that the United States and European states must tackle state fragility more proactively. While conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, or South and Central America often appear to be localized problems at first glance, they have critical repercussions on the political, societal, and economic situation in the developed world. The international refugee crises and its impact on European and US politics is evidence enough for this circumstance.
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Opportunity or trap
Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA nuclear safeguards inspector, writes:
US President Trump suddenly decided to accept a meeting with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un. Was it an erratic reaction to a long-lasting deadlock? Or was it conscious cutting of the Gordian knot, a well-planned move towards the solution of the nuclear crisis?
Whichever, it undoubtedly represents a fundamental change in the basic US prerequisite “no dialogue without promise of complete denuclearization.” This now turns into “dialogue to achieve denuclearization.”
This change will be understood, at least by North Korea, as US policy tuning toward reality: recognizing the fact that military elimination of the country’s nuclear capabilities would be a tragic operation with no winner. Nuclear deterrence, which North Korea has long struggled for and finally achieved, has become Kim Jong-un’s strongest negotiation card.
Fifteen years after North Korea left the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) the US, as the leader of the six-party effort to solve the constantly escalating nuclear crisis, is now facing an unprecedented challenge: to negotiate a lasting end to this grave nuclear crisis. The road is not short and presents crucial obstacles, quite different from those encountered in the Iran deal. It is worth anticipating a few of them:
- While North Korea will seek recognition as a Nuclear Weapons State with a status equivalent to that of India and Pakistan, the US will call for North Korea to terminate all its nuclear tests and related nuclear activities with a possible military dimension.
- Agreement on waiving of UN and US sanctions in exchange for a verifiable and irreversible implementation of the agreed outcome.
- Accomplishing a new balance between two basic theses: “denuclearize the Korean Peninsula” and “removing the threat (US nuclear umbrella included) until Pyongyang feels secure.”
However, if president Trump’s sudden decision was just an erratic reaction distant from any rational concept or strategy, then he is walking into a risky trap, even a dangerous situation with a deeply uncertain outcome.
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