Tag: United Stataes
Stevenson’s army, November 12
– WaPo says Ukrainian was involved in Nordstream sabotage.
– NYT says Trump plans mass deportations.
– Legal analyst sees problems with Trump plan to take over regulatory agencies.
– Tim Wu has good ideas for regulating AI.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, November 5
Exactly one year before the big federal elections —
– WaPo suggests both House and Senate might flip control.
– NYT polls look bad for Biden in battleground states. Here’s more analysis.
– WSJ says US & Israel divided over Gaza goals
– NYT says US offered ideas to reduce civilian casualties
– NYT sees rift in Ukrainian leadership
– WaPO says Putin had good October
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, September 23
– The indictment of Sen. Menendez [D=NJ] certainly makes him look sleazy.
– He is accused of taking bribes and then acting officially, including on matters of Egyptian arms sales.
As I read the indictment, however, several of his actions as SFRC chairman do not appear outrageous. Telling the Egyptians the number [but not the names] of American and Egyptian nationals working at the Cairo embassy doesn’t seem significant. Alerting Egyptians of his dropping a hold on an arms package isn’t inappropriate. Meeting with Egyptians and listening to their concerns is normal.
As required by Senate Democratic rules, he has stepped down from SFRC chairmanship. It’s unclear whether he will be succeeded by Sen. Cardin [D-MD] or Sen. Shaheen [D-NH]. CRS has more on the rules regarding indicted members.
In other news, NYT says US and Ukraine are arguing over military strategy.
But US and China are reopening lines of communication on economic matters.
And if you’ve just upgraded your Apple devices, check this out.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, July 7
– The Biden Administration is trying to get around the Constitution’s delegation of trade powers to Congress by making deals and then asking Congress to approve.
– And the House seems willing to oblige, by passing a law allowing it.
– BTW, USMCA hasn’t worked as promised [The story is truncated because neither I nor SAIS wants to pay $5000+ per year for Politico Pro]
– The Supreme Court is making law behind the scenes with its Shadow Docket.
– And news coverage of the Court misses key developments.
– CFR members are backchanneling with Russia
– GOP does want to send US troops into Mexico.
– Walter Pincus sees culture wars in the US military
-DOD wants to block Chinese & Russian influence over academia.
– Tel Aviv police chief charges political interference.
– Germany cuts all but defense.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, December 20
– The omnibus bill. including appropriations across the government and the Electoral Count Act as well as other measures, has been released. Here’s the reporting by Politico and RollCall. Also the bill text and summaries by Democrats and Republicans.
– NYT summarizes the growing criticism of the Supreme Court’s seizure of power from the other branches.
– Guardian reports the embarrassing breakdown of German Puma tanks.
– Vox tries to make sense of the crisis in Peru.
– NYT discovered that a newly elected GOP Congressman faked most of his resume.
To me, the blame goes to the Dems for inadequate oppo research. Punchbowl notes:
Yet the DCCC can hardly be accused of ignoring Santos’ candidacy. The campaign arm compiled an 87-page opposition document in August complete with dozens of social media posts, financial filings and information on Santos’ employment with a scandal-ridden corporation. The bulk of the research centered on Santos’ false claims of voter fraud, his hardline anti-abortion rights stances and support for conspiracy theories.
But the DCCC appears to have missed out on fact-checking basic biographical information, such as Santos’ education and employment. The NYT also revealed that Brazilian authorities charged Santos for making fraudulent purchases with a checkbook in 2010.
There are actions the new Congress could take, as a CRS report indicates.
WOTR hasa good historical summary of Truman, Eisenhower & Kennedy policies on Taiwan.
Charlie added this interesting note later:
I was exchanging reading recommendations with a friend and realized that there have been a few books in recent years that actually changed my mind regarding what I thought happened in history. I read a lot of disappointing books — too shallow, too heavy, too incomplete — but I generally enjoy revisionist historians, especially if they have a provocative thesis and ample evidence. If you want to buy one of these, the best place to look is https://www.bookfinder.com/ So here’s a short list:
World War I: I’m now persuaded that Russia shares much of the blame for the start of the Great War by its policies to dominate Turkey and by mobilization during the July 1914 crisis. After deep dives into long-hidden Russian archives, Sean McMeekin showed in The Russian Origins of the First World War that even Barbara Tuchman got the sequence wrong by relying on the falsified memoirs of the Russian Foreign Minister. McMeekin’s books on Russian diplomacy and the July crisis changed my view of German war guilt, though Austria-Hungary still deserves shared blame with Russia. See also his Russian Revolution, July 1914, and Stalin’s War, which describes World War II from Stalin’s viewpoint rather than the usual FDR/Churchill one.
Philip Zelikow’s The Road Less Traveled persuaded me that leaders missed a chance to end the war in December 1916 with a poorly staffed peace initiative by Woodrow Wilson that was undercut by Secretary Lansing and “Colonel” House.
FDR’s boldness: I had long admired Franklin Roosevelt’s strategic bravery in maneuvering the United States in support of Britain and against Hitler, believing that he was just ahead of public opinion, skillfully pulling it along. Lynne Olson’s Those Angry Days persuaded me that, much of the time, FDR vacillated, doing less than many of his advisors urged and hoped. He still was a great leader, just not quite as bold as I had thought.
World War II: James Lacey’s The Washington War, a bureaucratic politics analysis of FDR’s leadership, persuaded me that administrative and economic policies had as much to do with America’s ultimate success as its military operations. Phillips Payson O’Brien’s The Second Most Powerful Man in the World: The Life of Admiral William D. Leahy, Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff persuaded me that Leahy was far more influential on FDR’s war policy than General George Marshall. Jonathan Schneer’s Ministers at War: Winston Churchill and His War Cabinet persuaded me that much of Britain’s success was due to the way the cabinet worked together; Churchill dominated, but the cabinet mattered.
Postwar American policy: Derek Leebaert’s, Grand Improvisation: America Confronts the British Superpower, 1945-57, persuaded me that Britain hoodwinked America into doing what it wanted until the collapse at Suez. Samuel F. Wells, Jr.’s Fearing the Worst: How Korea Transformed the Cold War, convinced me that American misjudgments in the Korean war made the nuclear arms race with the USSR more likely. Serhii Plokhy’s Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, persuaded me that JFK lied about his policies and we came dangerously close to a full-scale nuclear war.
Slave Power’s influence on foreign policy: I never thought that slavery and its perpetuation had much impact on American foreign policy until I read Matthew Karp’s eye-opening history, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy.
Karp details how the South dominated key foreign policy posts and consciously advocated policies to protect and even extend slavery in the decades before the War of the Rebellion. Defenders of slavery really had a “deep state.”
The Revolutionary War: I used to have a typical American high school student’s view of our war for independence as a story of brave patriots, toughened at Valley Forge and led by George Washington, who finally triumphed at Yorktown. Two books have changed my understanding of that conflict. One was Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy’s of British politics during the conflict, The Men Who Lost America. He argues that the British gave up for broader strategic reasons. Add to this Holger Hoock’s Scars of Independence, which describes the local violence on both sides and the mistreatment of Loyalists during and after the war. The good guys won, but they won dirty.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Iran is already at the nuclear threshold
This video is more than a year old:
Iran, which is now enriching uranium to at least 60%, is already a nuclear threshold state. There are no difficult technical obstacles that remain before enriching to weapons-grade material. Moving beyond that to fabricating a nuclear device is more difficult, but certainly not beyond Iranian capability. The question is: what difference does this make? The answer to that question depends on who you are. Israel, other regional states, the European Union, and the United States have distinct answers.
Israel apparently doesn’t care
Iran is significantly closer to nuclear weapons than when President Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal (aka Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). This is in part because Israel urged the US to back out of the JCPOA and has done its best to prevent the US from re-entering it. The Israelis have preferred their own approach, which involves assassinations and attacks on nuclear infrastructure. But given the outcome so far, it appears they don’t care how much weapons-grade uranium the Iranians accumulate.
Why are the Israelis behaving this way? Is it because they are supremely confident of their ability to prevent weaponization of enriched uranium? Is it because their second-strike capability (from submarines) is thought to be a sufficient deterrent to an Iranian nuclear attack? Or is it because the Israelis believe American guarantees that Iran will never get nuclear weapons?
Whatever the reason, it is clear that Israel doesn’t really care about Iran accumulating weapons-grade uranium.
The region does, but what are they doing about it?
Major states in the region do care. Both Turkish President Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have said, more or less explicitly, that they will not be left wanting if Iran gets nuclear weapons. This is not how they have reacted to Israeli nuclear weapons, about which they complain readily but apparently do little. Neither country has used the decades since Israel became a nuclear power to mount serious nuclear weapons programs of their own, so far as is known. Instead, they have pleaded for a regional nuclear-free zone, which they know the Israelis won’t agree to.
Their reaction to Iran is rhetorically different. Riyadh and Ankara appear to see Iranian nuclear weapons as a threat to the regional power balance, one they need to counter. There are however still big questions about intentions and capability. Were Erdogan and MBS serious, or just rhetorical? Turkey has American nuclear weapons on its territory. Would Ankara risk losing those if it decides to go nuclear on its own? Does Turkey have the nuclear and high-explosive expertise required to enrich uranium or extract plutonium, as well as design a working nuclear weapon? Does Saudi Arabia? Has either obtained the needed materials, technology, and even weapons from Pakistan?
Egypt has been more circumspect than Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It has lived with Israeli nuclear weapons on its border for decades, apparently confident they won’t be used against a neighbor who has made peace, even if a cold one. American influence in Cairo is far greater than in Riyadh and Ankara, which is likely another factor in Egyptian reluctance to move in the direction of nuclear weapons.
Europe cares, but not in the same way as the United States and Russia
The European Union has exhausted itself in nuclear negotiations with Iran. This is not because of any threat to Europe from Iranian nuclear weapons. Most European states would like to normalize relations with Tehran. The unresolved nuclear issue makes that impossible. Hence the diplomatic efforts, first to negotiate the 2015 JCPOA and, after Trump left office, to revive it.
For the United States and Russia, the concern is nuclear proliferation, or to put it another way maintenance of their exclusive status as global nuclear powers. Both were unhappy with India and Pakistan getting nuclear weapons, but neither Delhi nor Islamabad has challenged the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the Perm 5), all of which are nuclear states. Instead they have accepted the subcontinent nuclear balance and avoided nuclear contests beyond South Asia. This is true even though India views its nuclear weapons as necessary to balance China more than Pakistan. But nuclear balance has not been a factor in outstanding border disputes between New Delhi and Beijing.
The Middle East is not South Asia
It is harder to picture easy adjustment to Iranian nuclear weapons in the Middle East, especially if the Turks and Saudis follow suit. In a Middle East with four nuclear powers, or even five if Egypt joins the party and six if you count Pakistan, a stable balance will be far more difficult to achieve than between two parties like Pakistan and India. A nuclear arms race in a region with few stabilizing institutions and lots of destabilizing conflicts will be extraordinarily difficult to contain.