Tag: United States
The Middle East without Soleimani
Following the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, who was an IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) general and the Quds Force commander, Iran retaliated against the US by launching a missile attack on US bases in Iraq. What further impact will Soleimani’s death have? And what will it mean for US interests in the region?
On January 22, Carnegie Endowment for International Studies hosted a panel discussion on The killing of Soleimani and the future of the Middle East. The discussion included three speakers: Rasha Al Aqeedi, the managing editor of Irfaa Sawtak (Raise Your Voice) and a research analyst of contemporary Iraqi politics and political Islam, Dexter Filkins, a journalist for The New Yorker, and Emile Hokayem, a senior fellow for Middle East Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The panel discussion was moderated by Karim Sadjadpour, a senior fellow with the Carnegie Middle East Program.
Soleimani projected Iran’s power in the region
Filkins described Soleimani as a “master spy” and “a man in the shadow.” His influence was pervasive. Lebanese people didn’t decide their government, Soleimani did. Assad was not running the war, Soleimani was. Soleimani was a product of the Iran-Iraq War, during which he worked on strengthening and allying with the Shia around the Middle East.
Hokayem depicted him as one of the most influential actors in the Levant for securing Iran’s long-term interests. Soleimani turned Hezbollah from a formidable insurgent group into a conventional actor with missile forces menacing Israel. He was implicated in Hariri’s assassination in 2005, led efforts to shore up the Assad regime in 2012, and was also involved in the Battle of Kirkuk in 2017.
Al Aqeedi noted that when ISIL (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) took over Mosul in 2014, Soleimani reacted by forming security forces/militias to help Iraq, based on Iran’s interests. Since then, Soleimani had kept the US-trained Iraqi army as weak as possible, while strengthening and formalizing the Shia militias in Iraq. In 2017, Soleimani rallied the Iraqi army to forcefully retake Kirkuk and suppress the results of Kurdistan’s independence referendum.
Further retaliation?
Sadjadpour believes that the assassination has energized the radicals of the Iranian regime, who may intensify their repression, but the downing of the Ukrainian airline has constrained popular support for retaliation. Filkins doubts benefits to US interests from the assassination.
Al Aqeedi noted that if any Iranian retaliation targeted US embassies or Americans, the US may intensify its retribution against Iran. Hence, Iran and the US need to think twice before taking any further actions. Hokayem suggested Iran possesses lots of tools to retaliate, not necessarily against American targets but also against regional American proxies, such as Saudi Arabia.
Impacts
Hokayem emphasized that the assassination neither mitigates Iran’s threat to its regional rivals nor changes the ordering of the region. Iran has secured its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. He also claimed that the Trump administration doesn’t care much about Iraq. The US military presence was keeping a low profile even before the Iraqi parliament urged the government to expel foreign troops from its territory.
Al Aqeedi agreed with Hokayem that the US isn’t interested in being involved in the Iraqi protests. She underlined that the US presence in Iraq is not an occupation, and there is no US military base in Iraq. Hence, she argued that the current campaign against US presence in Iraq is a distraction from the protest, which targeted the IRGC. The Iraqi protesters are reluctant to be dragged into the US-Iran confrontation and want Iraq to avoid becoming a proxy for any external actors. Al Aqeedi is deeply concerned that Iraqi protesters are likely to encounter more violence from the IRGC and forces it controls.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Guilty as charged
The opening of the trial proceedings in the Senate has already produced an obvious result: the President has no defense against the charge that he tried to use US government aid to gain a personal political advantage over a potential rival, then obstructed Congress in its investigation. White House lawyers are not claiming he didn’t try to extort the Ukrainians to announce an investigation of Joe Biden, only that he was free to do it and to block witnesses and documents the House of Representatives requested.
This amounts to the inverse of nolo contendere, in which a defendant doesn’t admit guilt, but accepts punishment. Trump is admitting the facts, but the Republican-controlled Senate is protecting him from the penalty provided in the Constitution, removal from office. It has the power under the Constitution to do that and is exercising it with vigor, preventing even submission of documentary evidence and witness testimony to the wrongdoing.
The big question is how the country will react to a President who believes he can abuse power as much he wants and suffer no consequence. According to the first poll taken since the articles of impeachment were delivered to the Senate, a thin majority of Americans now believes he should be removed from office, a wider margin believes the charges against him are true, and two-thirds believe the proceedings in the Senate should include testimony from witnesses.
If confirmed, those results would be a substantial deviation from the trend line in recent months, which is basically flat. The partisan divide is still wide and Republicans in the Senate continue to believe that their prospects in the November election are more threatened by Trump-allied challengers in the primaries than by Democrats at the polls. None of the supposed Republican moderates in the Senate have budged from the majority on the many Democratic proposals to bring witnesses and documents into the process.
The Republicans have an option if the going gets rough. They could decide to defenestrate Trump and put Vice President Pence in his place. More genuinely conservative than Trump on social and religious issues, Pence could be relied on to appoint judges who would please the anti-abortion, pro-Christian, Republican base as well as continue the anti-immigration crusade (double meaning intended) Trump has conducted. What Pence lacks is even a rudimentary personality, never mind charisma.
The Democrats are meanwhile still engaged in the fratricidal warfare of the presidential primaries. For now the presidential hopefuls seem mostly incapable of refocusing their attacks on Trump rather than each other. That isn’t good, but the next month or two may well sort out who the candidate will be. If that doesn’t happen, the Democrats could go to the mid-July convention in Milwaukee without a candidate. A “brokered” convention would not be a good thing.
But the biggest single factor in the next election will be the economy. Trump’s bragging at Davos this week was based on falsehoods. The Obama expansion has continued, but growth is now slowing, though not dramatically yet. The Trump tax cut did little to stimulate the economy but a great deal to balloon the government deficit. The trade deal with China failed to correct most of the structural issues that have given the US such a large bilateral deficit. The trade deal with Mexico made desirable updates. Hourly wages have begun to perk up, but inequality continues its long rise.
The picture is worse on the national security front. The fights Trump has picked with North Korea, Venezuela, and Iran have produced no good results for the US. He has nothing to show for his lovefest with Russian President Putin, who still sits on a big piece of Ukraine. The Israel/Palestine peace plan is a bust. The NATO allies despise the President and are holding their breath for him to leave office. He ignores Latin America and Africa (to their benefit more than likely) while talking tough on China but doing precious little.
If there were professor who could judge the Trump Administration on its economic, social, and national security merits, it would get an F. He is not only guilty as charged, but incompetent as well.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, January 21
– NYT says Treasury wants to reclaim the Secret Service from its current place in Homeland Security. I bet many of the 21 other components of DHS would like to return to their prior home.
– DOD wants to reduce Africom size and activities. The command is now touting its value, and Congress may resist the cuts
– WSJ foresees a global split over technology, US from China.
-The executive branch just isn’t filling its key jobs.
– Be sure to look at these new articles by SAIS profs: Prof. Gavin on how to understand the nature of the world order [or disorder], and Barno & Bensahel on US vulnerability to drones.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, January 16
GAO has ruled that the delay in Ukraine aid was illegal. Here’s a story and the text of the judgment. This is the same procedure Sen.Bentsen and I used to block Sec. Cheney’s effort to kill the V-22 Osprey in 1991.
Politico says the administration does not want the annual state of the world hearing with the heads of the intelligence community to have any unclassified sessions — in order to avoid public contradictions of Trump.
CFR has another of those grand strategies for China relations that looks pretty good; has 22 pretty specific recommendations.
Monkey Cage has a good explainer of the Libya situation.
And here’s how NYT verified the Ukraine airplane video.
I missed this earlier edition:
– WaPo says Trump threatened Europeans with a 25% tariff on autos if they didn’t start the process under the Iran nuclear deal to restore sanctions.
-Iraqi prime minister says US troop presence will be decided by his successor.
– Look what Australia is doing about Huawei and 5G.
– NYT has good list of what’s in and not in new China trade agreement.
– WSJ doubts trade deal will meet its goals.
– New book by WaPo reporters depicts Trump as erratic and ill-informed.
– CFR has a new foreign policy jobs site..
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Laughing stock
This is an interesting and detailed accounting of US “maximum pressure” efforts against Syria. Googletranslate worked pretty well. I haven’t seen the material in the English-language press. The Americans are trying to use their own and European pressure to get political reform and reduce Iranian influence in Syria. The pressure is intended to come from new sanctions, withholding normalization, blocking reconstruction assistance, and drying up Syrian finances.
Meanwhile the Russians are supporting a regime offensive into Idlib province and blocking humanitarian assistance from crossing the Iraqi and Jordanian borders. Both Washington and Moscow seem inclined to wait the other out. Tehran–under pressure on the home front, handicapped by Soleimani’s death, and preoccupied with US threats–are losing some traction in Syria, yielding to Moscow’s stronger hand. Damascus meanwhile is stonewalling the UN effort to negotiate political reform.
Presidents Assad and Putin think they are holding the stronger hand, as we can tell from this joking conversation about inviting President Trump to Damascus so that he’ll see the light:
I think they are right. There just is not enough in the American pressure package to stop Assad and Putin from laughing at Trump, who has been busy claiming to his supporters that US troops in northeastern Syria are “keeping the oil.” He is apparently unaware that the amount is small, it is sold locally (likely to Damascus), and I suspect the proceeds go to the Kurds helping to protect the oil field, not the Americans. No need to mention that any “keeping the oil,” even the profits from it, would be a warm crime under the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as several other international agreements prohibiting pillage.
The American approach to Syria has been ineffectual from the first, when it started in the Obama Administration. That is partly because the Americans don’t really care about Syria at all, but only about extremists and Iranians present there. From that perspective some progress has been made: the Islamic State has lost its geographic caliphate and the Iranians are finding it difficult to sustain their efforts there as the Russians claim whatever meat is left on the bone. It is good news that the Americans and Europeans are maintaining the sanctions and continuing to insist on political reform as the price for reconstruction assistance, but it isn’t likely to happen anytime soon.
What does all this mean for Syrians? Nothing good. The standoff between Moscow and Washington is likely to continue, the Turks are busy trying to stabilize a good part of northern Syria, the Russians and the regime are pressing ahead in Idlib, and the Americans are doing their best to hold on to a toehold in the northeast with their Kurdish friends. The war has declined in intensity, but large numbers of people are still being displaced (many of them after several previous displacements), and the regime is increasing its control over humanitarian assistance.
The Americans are continuing to prove ineffectual. Make America Great Again appears to mean becoming a laughingstock for Assad and Putin.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, January 15
Although Wolf Blitzer and fellow moderators devoted the first hour of the Democratic presidential candidate debate to foreign policy, political experts at a CFR panel I attended Tuesday said foreign policy hardly ever matters in US elections unless there is an active shooting war with significant American casualties. Even trade isn’t making a difference with voters these days, they said. Most interesting to me was Charlie Cook’s observation that unless Biden is the clear leader after Iowa and NH, Mike Bloomberg is likely to shoot to the front on Super Tuesday and stands a good chance of winning the nomination even in a brokered convention.
Sen. Kaine [D-Va] seems to have the votes for a war powers restriction on President Trump regarding Iran. The Hill has the best story of the successful negotiations with Republicans, but the parliamentary snafu that postpones debate until next week.
Washington Examiner has a story based on SAIS prof Jim Mann’s new book about the Cheney-Powell feud over foreign policy in the Bush 43 administration.
Fred Kaplan dissects administration Iran policy, sees regime change as a delusion.
A CFR writer says Huawei blacklist may backfire.
Vox disputes Trump claim about Saudi contributions to US military.
WSJ says US threatens cut in military aid to Iraq if US troops are forced to leave.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
RSS - Posts
