Tag: United States
Imbalanced Region
On September 20 the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted a panel discussion entitled “Red Sea Rivalries: Middle East Competition in the Horn of Africa” to introduce and discuss a new report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) on the influence of Gulf Countries on the Horn of Africa. Opening remarks were delivered by Ambassador Johnnie Carson and Robert Malley, President of ICG. Elizabeth Dickinson, ICG’s Arabian peninsula analyst and Dino Mahtani, ICG’s Africa program deputy director outlined the report’s findings. UN advisor Nicholas Haysom, African Union Chief of Staff to the High-Level Implementation Panel Abdul Mohammad, and former Egyptian Ambassador Hesham Youssef provided commentary.
Malley described three key findings: first, the Gulf must stop exporting its conflicts to the Red Sea region; second, the Red Sea countries should negotiate collectively with the Gulf; and third, Western countries have a role to play in these conflicts but have only recently begun to do so.
Dickinson argued that Gulf competition in the Red Sea region is part of wider strategy throughout North Africa and the Sahel. Qatar and the UAE-Saudi alliance’s interventions in Sudan are related to its actions in Chad and Niger, the three countries bordering the stronghold of the UAE’s Libya proxy General Haftar. She also argued that the Gulf countries do not consider the Horn of Africa part of a different continent in which they are foreign meddlers. Rather, they think of the Red Sea as part of their region and their role in it as a natural extension of longstanding historical ties.
Mahtani emphasized that he is cautiously optimistic about the prospect of a stable dynamic between Gulf countries and domestic actors in Sudan. The killing of 120 people in Khartoum in June by General Hemeti’s forces pushed his Emirati and Saudi backers to show contrition. In July, an attempted coup by Qatar-backed members of Sudan’s military showed that Hemeti faced strong enough opposition to prevent him from ruling through coercion alone. Mahtani argued that this reality may push the UAE to compromise with Qatar on Sudan. This could lay the groundwork for future cooperation between the two countries on their overall plans for Sudan’s post-Bashir development.
Mahtani contrasted this to the situation in Somalia, where the federal government in Mogadishu is aligned with Qatar while regional political leaders receive support from the UAE and Saudi Arabia. He also described the UAE’s indirect support of al-Shabab through purchases of Somali charcoal, a significant source of funding for the militant group. In exchange, al-Shabab has increased the number of their attacks this summer and targeted a delegation of Qataris and Somali federal government employees, acting as “subcontractors for political violence.” Several panelists agreed that the Gulf rivalries have contributed to political fragmentation and violence in Somalia and will likely continue to do so indefinitely.
Both Dickinson and Mahtani emphasized the role that multilateralism can play in addressing the power asymmetry between the Gulf countries and those in the Horn of Africa. They argued that Horn of Africa countries can increase their bargaining power by negotiating jointly with the Gulf through regional multilateral organizations like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or the African Union. The United States rarely involves itself but when it does it can make a big difference to the effectiveness of these multilateral discussions. In Sudan, the Quad talks among the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE facilitated the power sharing compromise.
Mohammad agreed that Africa’s strong tradition of multilateralism could benefit the countries of the Horn of Africa and added that it could provide an example of positive multilateral relations to the Gulf countries. He argued that while Gulf countries have weaponized the GCC against each other in recent years, adopting an African-inspired culture of multilateralism could provide a means to transcend conflict in the Middle East. Hesham agreed that multilateralism in this part of the world is important but argued that it will not solve the problem of asymmetry in the bilateral relationships between Gulf states and Horn of Africa countries.
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Impeachment, sort of
Speaker Pelosi announced a formal “impeachment inquiry,” to be conducted by six House committees. Pay close attention to her words:“Today, I am announcing the House of Representatives is moving forward with an official impeachment inquiry,” she said at a Tuesday afternoon press conference, after hours of meetings with Democratic leaders, committee chairs, and the rest of the House Democratic Caucus. “I am directing our six committees to proceed with their investigations under that umbrella of impeachment inquiry.” BTW, she also quoted in Latin the phrase Caesar used when he crossed the Rubicon to attack Rome.
This responds to the political pressure in her caucus but doesn’t require anyone to vote on it yet. In 1973 and 1998, the House formally voted to begin an impeachment inquiry. Not this time, at least not yet. CNN reported that she discarded the idea of a special committee because it would anger the 6 chairmen who have the jurisdiction now for issues likely to be part of any impeachment.
[FWIW, I still doubt that the transcript due to be released today will be clear and compelling enough to convince undecideds, and I still believe that if the goal is to remove Trump from office, the advocates still lack the GOP support needed to accomplish that.]
WaPo reports that Giuliani took over from the regular executive branch people and processes to run Ukraine policy, leading to confusion and anger among the professionals.
NYT has an interesting story on how Trump’s international phone calls are conducted.
House Republicans are considering changing their term limit rules because of so many retirees.
Congress often outsources strategy on foreign policy to others. It created the Quadrennial Defense Review in 1986 and regularly requires an outside panel to review the QDR. It requires the President to submit a National Security Strategy and other such documents. In 2006 it created a special panel to study Iraq policy. Yesterday came the report of a similar panel created last year to study Syria policy. Here’s a story and the actual exec summary.
It’s always worth reminding people, as 538 does, that there really are very few independent voters, and not many of them are centrist or moderate.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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A bad rethink
The Trump Administration, according to a draft leaked document published by Josh Rogin, is contemplating a realignment of US foreign aid “for a new era of great power competition.” Josh sees little good in this idea. I beg to differ, even if I dissent from many of the document’s policy conclusions.
Let’s start with the basic proposition that a realignment is necessary. I think they’ve got that right. USAID is a poverty reduction/economic development agency without the necessary means. Its more or less $17 billion dollars spread around the world amounts to no more than a drop in the economic development bucket, especially if you subtract the amounts spent on humanitarian relief and health. Private money flows now vastly exceed foreign aid worldwide. The US government has little idea how to relieve poverty at home. The notion that it will do better in Bangladesh is unconvincing.
Nor is it clear that reducing poverty will serve US interests in defeating terrorism. The Trumpistas have got that right too. Terrorist recruitment depends on an intersection between local grievances and global ideology, but the local grievances are often unrelated to the socioeconomic status of the population. Terrorism isn’t about just jobs. Injustice, inequity, and bad governance drive terrorist recruitment, not poverty.
The White House is also correct in thinking that we have entered a period of great power rivalry. Russia, China, and Iran are challenging US hegemony in Europe, the Asia Pacific, and the Gulf. None are a match for US power, but Washington has great difficulty in using its military, diplomatic, political, informational, and economic levers in a coordinated way. That is easier for autocrats, especially if their purpose is mainly disruptive rather than constructive, as is the case for Moscow and Tehran (not so much so for Beijing however).
As with many of my students’ papers, the problem with the White House document lies in the connection between this correct analysis of the situation and the policy conclusions, which are ill-conceived . The White House wants foreign aid to go only to countries that support priority US foreign policy objectives. The idea is to use aid as leverage to convince foreigners to do what the US wants them to do.
But the funds available are insufficient for that purpose too. US non-humanitarian aid to Ethiopia before its recent turn toward democracy was on the order of $400 million per year. How much poverty reduction would that buy you in a country of 100 million people? It bought even less political influence with an authoritarian regime enjoying more or less 10% GDP growth.
Cutting aid to countries that don’t line up to support US priorities is far more likely to turn them against those priorities and towards the Russians and especially the Chinese, who are writing a lot of checks these days far bigger than what the US can afford. Here I agree with Josh. Aid conditionality of this sort is penny wise and pound foolish. It is likely to help America’s rivals.
That is also true of the document’s proposal to limit financing for multilateral development organizations. They have real money, an order of magnitude and more than the US can provide. They loan and spend it under tight multilateral scrutiny, often for major infrastructure projects that the US cannot afford. It would be a serious mistake to limit US influence in these institutions by cutting back on US contributions. I’ve seen no evidence whatsoever that bilateral assistance is more effective than multilateral assistance, and I have a strong suspicion reality works the other way around.
So how should the US adjust its aid to enable it to compete more effectively with great power rivals? The heart of the matter is governance. Countries that are governed well in response to the needs of their citizens in inclusive ways are far more likely to prosper and support US objectives–and reject Russian and Chinese ones–than autocracies. Democratic states with vibrant civil societies will be resilient to shocks and resistant to Moscow and Beijing. The White House paper acknowledges this, but of course fails to square it with the Trump Administration’s effort to establish cozy relations with autocrats and wannabe autocrats, including Kim Jong-un, Mohammed bin Salman, Rodrigo Duterte, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and too many others.
US foreign assistance does need rethinking. But it has to be done by people not affiliated with this deeply corrupt and increasingly unaccountable American version of autocracy. Its distorted view of the world would reduce US influence and eviscerate its relations with a large part of the developing world, including many friendly states. Josh is right about that. America’s citizens should not allow it to happen.
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Stevenson’s army, September 20
- Politico takes suggestions from a wide range of people and comes up with “99 ways to fix American politics.” Most of the suggestions are small bore, maybe helping on the margins. But the causes are much deeper, driven by demographics and partisan incentives and Supreme Court decisions that aren’t easily reversed.
- The fight between the administration and the House Intelligence Committee is over oversight powers. By law, an “urgent” whistleblower complaint to the Intelligence Community Inspector General is supposed to be shared with the intelligence committees. This hasn’t been done.
- Meanwhile two sources have told the Post and the Times that the matter involved President Trump and Ukraine. [The suspicion is that Trump promised the release of military aid to Ukraine, which was done last week, on condition that it take certain actions relating to Paul Manafort and the Biden family.]
On Iran, the Pentagon is bragging that it is giving the president military options. - The NYT wonders why the $150 billion in recent arms sales to Saudi Arabia didn’t guard against the oil facilities attacks.
- John Hannah, longtime Cheney hardliner, warns that US and Israel face conflicts over China.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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No rush
Pristina’s Gazeta Express (Besnik Velija) asked me questions today. I replied:
Q: How do you see the decision of State Secretary to appoint Matt Palmer as a Special Envoy for Western Balkan and for the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: I suppose it signals one more push to settle things, especially between Pristina and Belgrad.
Q: What are your expectations from Matt Palmer, as a Special Envoy ?
A: Matt is a good soul, but I’m not sure he brings the full weight of the United States to the table: military, economic, and political as well as diplomatic. We’ll have to wait and see.
Q: There is reporting saying that US wants a solution until next summer. Do you see latest moves from the US, as a hurry for reaching a final solution between Prishtina and Belgrade? If yes, can that be good for the whole process?
A: Yes, the Americans are in a hurry, but that doesn’t mean Pristina should be. First it needs to hold a good election and form a government that can take a widely supported position to the dialogue. Serbian parliamentary elections are due by April 2020, which means any negotiation this winter will include enormous pressure from Europe and the US for an agreement that President Vucic can sell as a victory to his electorate. I think Pristina should not be expected to negotiate during the pre-electoral period in Serbia.
Q: There was also a declaration from Bundestag member, Peter Beyer, that even EU should appoint a Special Envoy for Western Balkan and for Kosovo and Serbia dialogue. Do you see these moves as an effort to show who leads the European policy?
A: Once the Americans appointed a Special Envoy I suppose it was inevitable that Europe would want one too. I’d prefer that both the US and EU get a common policy before appointing special envoys, but that is not the way it is proceeding.
Q: Who should be the main mediator on dialogue, Brussels or Washington, or both? What about ideas to involve Russia? (ex US ambassador at Belgrade, Cameron Munter said that Russian Ambassador at Belgrade, Alexander Bocan-Harchenko, is an expert and he could help on the dialogue process).
A: Brussels has most of the leverage, but Washington support is vital, especially in pressuring Pristina. I don’t think the Russians will be helpful to the mediation in any way. Moscow favors Belgrade and does not want to see a solution that would allow Kosovo to proceed to NATO membership. It will also want a high price for UN membership: likely US acceptance of the annexation of Crimea and perhaps recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That will not help the negotiations.
Q: Senator Chris Murphy on a personal statement about the last visit in Kosovo, when he describe meeting with Kosovo politicians, said that they told on meeting at US embassy that they don’t know who to listen to, EU or USA , about the dialogue issue: “The leaders tell us that these days, the United States and Europe come to Pristina and give them different advice on how to break the impasse — they don’t know who to listen to. More fallout from the disastrous Trump foreign policy.”
A: Nothing good happens in the Balkans until Brussels and Washington speak in unison.
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Stevenson’s army, September 19
- SecState Pompeo says Iran committed an “act of war” and US is trying to form coalition at the UN to deter future attacks.
- President Trump wants more sanctions but not war. [Since US has already sanctioned 674 Iranian entities, it’s not clear what that will be.] US is withholding visas for about 40 of the 124 Iranians in the delegation to the General Assembly with Rouhani.
- Josh Rogin urges attacks in Syria. A quick poll found only 13% of Americans for military action.
- Bolton speaks out, at a private lunch.
- APSA classmate Paul Musgrave has a column about the new national security adviser.
- HFAC has arranged a closed door hearing with Amb. Khalilzad about Afghanistan peace talks.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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